{"id":31445,"date":"2019-01-24T10:42:20","date_gmt":"2019-01-24T09:42:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=31445"},"modified":"2024-06-27T12:00:39","modified_gmt":"2024-06-27T10:00:39","slug":"report-of-our-second-russia-conference-do-we-need-a-new-ostpolitik","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/report-of-our-second-russia-conference-do-we-need-a-new-ostpolitik\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia and the West \u2013 Do We Need a New Ostpolitik?"},"content":{"rendered":"

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\u00a9 Zentrum Liberale Moderne<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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On January 17 the Centre for Liberal Modernity held its second inter\u00adna\u00adtional Russia conference. This year\u2019s topic was if Germany\u2019s policy of detente of the 1970s can offer any guidance for the right Western policy versus Moscow. <\/span><\/h2>\n

<\/p>\n

Ostpolitik is one of the few German words that have made it into English and other European languages. It is also one of the few strategic initia\u00adtives of German foreign policy in the decades following World War II. Ostpolitik is insep\u00ada\u00adrably linked to the charis\u00admatic person\u00adality of Willy Brandt, who was Chancellor of West Germany between 1969 and 1974 (having served as Foreign Minister from 1966 to 1969).<\/p>\n

The term resur\u00adfaced last summer, when German\u2019s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, a Social Democrat, began advocating a new European Ostpolitik. According to Maas, the \u201cdangerous lack of commu\u00adni\u00adcation between Washington and Moscow\u201d makes it necessary to open new paths of cooper\u00adation with Russia in the interest with all European countries.<\/p>\n

But does the impact of the 1970s Ostpolitik justify its resur\u00adrection? Is a new Ostpolitik the right answer to the challenges that emanate from Vladimir Putin\u2019s Russia? This was the topic for intense and at times contro\u00adversial debate at the conference \u201cRussia and the West \u2013 do we need a new Ostpolitik?\u201d held by the Center for Liberal Modernity in Berlin. It was the second in an annual series of confer\u00adences, that aims to bring together Russia-watchers and experts from all over the world.<\/p>\n

The short answer is that it depends. Practi\u00adcally all of the more than 80 partic\u00adi\u00adpants from Russia, Europe and the US agreed that re-upping German foreign policy of the 1970s is neither desirable nor adequate. The world and Europe have simply changed too much. But opinions differ over what exactly should constitute a new Ostpolitik \u2014 and if the term is fitting at all.<\/p>\n

Willy Brandt\u2019s Ostpolitik was aimed at reducing tensions, to overcome the partition of Germany and to find a lasting peaceful order for Europe. It led to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, whose \u201cthree baskets\u201d survive as the three dimen\u00adsions of the Organi\u00adzation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) \u2013 politico-military, economic-environ\u00admental and the \u201chuman dimension\u201d, which includes human rights. It is important to remember the rules-based character of Ostpolitik, even though its original idea of \u201cchange through rapprochement\u201d eroded over time, leaving lots of rapprochement and little change. The \u201cBig Bang\u201d of 1989 \u2014 the fall of the wall and the implosion of the Soviet empire \u2014 was much less a result of detente policy but of the democ\u00adratic revolt in Central-Eastern Europe.  It came unexpected and even against the status-quo-oriented thinking of West Germany\u2019s political elites.<\/p>\n

No man ever steps in the same river twice<\/h2>\n

The differ\u00adences between the 1970s and today are a no-brainer. Germany is united, the former Soviet satellite states have joined NATO and the EU. A German \u201cspecial relationship\u201d with Russia, a regular demand from those on the left and the far right, would be a fatal signal to Germany\u2019s allies. And, as partic\u00adi\u00adpating histo\u00adrians pointed out, Brandt\u2019s Ostpolitik was by no means isola\u00adtionist but firmly based on Germany\u2019s military and political membership in the Western alliance. Political dialogue and military deter\u00adrence were both part of it. NATO allies agreed at the time that it was necessary to talk with Moscow in order to achieve peace in Europe. Changing the status quo seemed possible only with and not against the Soviet Union. After all, the Prague Spring of 1968 and previous uprisings in Hungary 1956 and in east Germany in 1953 served as evidence that Moscow was ready to use force in order defend its sphere of influence in Europe.<\/p>\n

This is a strong parallel with the crisis about Ukraine, which is basically about the foreign policy alignment of Europe\u2019s biggest country by territory. A popular thesis at the conference was that Putin would support a new Ostpolitik because he likes spheres of influence. Accord\u00adingly, partic\u00adi\u00adpants condemned a fresh division of Europe as a historic setback to the times before 1989. A new Ostpolitik would be immoral, one Russian partic\u00adipant said.<\/p>\n

What sort of a country is Russia?<\/h2>\n

Moreover, Putin is not Brezhnev and Russia is not the Soviet Union \u2013 this was one of the conference\u2019s recurring themes. Compared to Putin, Brezhnev was relatively predictable, more inter\u00adested in stability and less inter\u00adested in personal enrichment. By contrast, Putin\u2019s elites possess a high degree of ideological flexi\u00adbility and make political decisions with their personal fortunes in mind.<\/p>\n

Others presented the thesis that the foreign policy agenda of Putin and his inner circle aims to restore Russian great power status and regain as much of the Soviet empire as possible. Ukraine plays a key role for these people\u2019s hold to power and for their imperial ambitions.<\/p>\n

Thus, while the Moscow elites of today are more reckless than their Communist prede\u00adcessors, their country lacks the weight wielded by Soviet leaders. While Russia is a nuclear great power and has a standing army of more than one million men, it is just a middle power in economic terms. In 2017, its annual GDP of 1.5 trillion US dollars was less than half of Germany\u2019s (3.68 trillion) and just one eighth of China\u2019s (12 trillion).<\/p>\n

Last but not least, the Kremlin elites are entangled with the West much more than Soviet leaders were. They need Europe as a place to safely park their assets, as a market for natural resources, as a source for high technologies and as a playground for Russia\u2019s \u201cgolden youth\u201d. Hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens already live in Europe perma\u00adnently or temporarily and their number is growing every year. While going to lengths in desta\u00adbi\u00adlizing European democracy, Putin also needs the economic ties with Europe to keep his regime in power.<\/p>\n

Be more assertive!<\/h2>\n

Despite all this, the EU shows few signs of an assertive policy versus Moscow. Especially in Germany there is a tendency to believe that Russia has more leverage and to overes\u00adtimate the strength of Putin\u2019s regime.  Accord\u00adingly, many partic\u00adi\u00adpants found it hard to identify western successes vis-\u00e0-vis Russia. Most agreed that Chancellor Angela Merkel has managed against many odds to keep in place the EU sanctions, which were imposed after the annex\u00adation of Crimea and the invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014.<\/p>\n

However, the effec\u00adtiveness of the measures has been receding since 2016, when the Russian economy returned to albeit moderate growth. Many partic\u00adi\u00adpants warned that the EU consensus for the sanctions is fragile, not least thanks to Putin\u2019s allies in Europe, who can be found in every member state and have even joined some govern\u00adments, like in Italy and Austria.<\/p>\n

In this respect, 2018 was an annus mirabilis for Putin \u2013 an excep\u00adtionally lucky year. Not only did he win the managed election for his fourth term, he might also be happy about gains for right-wing populist parties across Europe. Italy\u2019s Lega, Hungary\u2019s Fidesz and the Sweden Democrats all made signif\u00adicant gains in parlia\u00admentary elections last year.<\/p>\n

Transat\u00adlantic turbulences<\/h2>\n

Pessimism was especially pronounced with regard to the role of the United States. While Washington recently increased its sanctions against Russia, it did so without coordi\u00adnating with Brussels. The threat of sanctions against Nord Stream 2 carries the risk of fresh conflict between the US and Germany. Practi\u00adcally all conference partic\u00adi\u00adpants criti\u00adcized the planned gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea \u2013 because it divides the EU, makes Ukraine lose billions in transit revenue every year, making the country even more vulnerable than before. While the US criticism is princi\u00adpally justified, both Washington\u2019s and Berlin\u2019s unilat\u00ader\u00adalism was seen as counterproductive.<\/p>\n

Moreover, recent talk about the US possi\u00adbility of the US leaving NATO highlighted the growing mistrust of the Trump admin\u00adis\u00adtration. What would be a strategic disaster for Europe would be a dream come true for Putin \u2013 the end of the transat\u00adlantic alliance.<\/p>\n

Nobody is making predic\u00adtions about a strategic-level US-European cooper\u00adation versus Russia, not least because President Trump is likely to remain embroiled in the Russia affair. \u201cExpect more chaos, inves\u00adti\u00adga\u00adtions and subpoenas from Washington,\u201d said one prominent US participant.<\/p>\n

Under these circum\u00adstances it is likely that the Kremlin is going to lay its eyes on a divided Europe:  \u201cPutin is not a chess player but a judo fighter. In order to be successful, a judo fighter must antic\u00adipate his opponents\u2019 actions, make a decisive, preemptive move and try to disable him\u201d, a Russian partic\u00adipant warned.<\/p>\n

No German special relationship but a common European policy<\/h2>\n

Despite all this, there are some hopeful signs, too. Recent elections and opinion polls suggest, that the Putin consensus is weakening. In the regional elections in autumn 2018, four Kremlin candi\u00addates failed to win guber\u00adna\u00adtorial seats. And pollsters detect waning support for the expensive expansive foreign policy. At the same time, there are growing grass root protests against social griev\u00adances and ecological ills, something that conference partic\u00adi\u00adpants inter\u00adpreted as confir\u00admation that Russian civil society is alive and well.<\/p>\n

Other studies speak of changing values. Despite the propa\u00adganda of Russia\u2019s own way, a majority of young people \u2013 mainly in large cities \u2014 see themselves as Europeans and seek a modern way of life. Gener\u00ada\u00adtional change in business and politics opens new chances for rapprochement between Russia and the West. This is why every\u00adthing should be done to support the devel\u00adopment of a democ\u00adratic civil society in Russia.<\/p>\n

One tool suggested at the conference would be an EU-funded Russian-language TV channel that offers an alter\u00adnative to Kremlin propaganda.<\/p>\n

However, no one at the conference was ready to predict an imminent end of the \u201cPutin System\u201d.<\/p>\n

Which is another reason to campaign for a common European policy. Because the EU\u2019s chances to be a strong counter\u00adweight to Moscow are actually not that bad. More than 500 million citizens (446 million after Britian exits the bloc) who enjoy adequate economic growth are a force that no one should under\u00ades\u00adtimate. If they speak with one voice, as a German foreign policy veteran stressed at the conference.<\/p>\n

A good task for the German government and German foreign policy, according to a partic\u00adipant from Poland. Germany\u2019s mission is not to build a special relationship with Russia but to hold Europe together and to enable it to become a player in global politics, he said.<\/p>\n

The conference was held under Chatham House Rules, meaning that quotes are not attributed in order to enable a freer debate.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

\"Textende\"<\/p>\n

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