{"id":39099,"date":"2020-08-24T16:25:46","date_gmt":"2020-08-24T14:25:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=39099"},"modified":"2020-08-24T16:33:25","modified_gmt":"2020-08-24T14:33:25","slug":"russian-soft-power-in-moldova-fake-news-media-propaganda-and-information-warfare","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/russian-soft-power-in-moldova-fake-news-media-propaganda-and-information-warfare\/","title":{"rendered":"Russian soft power in Moldova: fake news, media propa\u00adganda and infor\u00admation warfare"},"content":{"rendered":"

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The President of the Russian Feder\u00adation Vladimir Putin at the annual talk \u00a9 shutterstock_\u200bZhenya Voevodina<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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As part of our project \u201cEastern Part\u00adner\u00adship 2.0\u201d we publish a series of arti\u00adcles about the three EU asso\u00adci\u00ada\u00adtion states. The authors from the region (Mikheil Benidze, Volodymyr Yermolenko, Victor Gotisan) analyze the impact of Russian soft power (fake news, media propa\u00adganda and infor\u00admation warfare) in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova from a civil society perspective.<\/h3>\n

<\/p>\n

Intro\u00adduction or Russian trojan horse within Europe...<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

Back in 2015, British researcher Anne Applebaum asserted that Russia \u201cis already inside Europe\u201d<\/em>. This is largely due to the media network Russia has created. And former Soviet countries, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly those of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), are the most exposed to the propa\u00adganda emanating from this network.[1]<\/a> Many of the challenges relating to internal and external security faced by European states \u2013 both in the European Union (EU) and non-EU members \u2013 over the past two decades origi\u00adnated in Russia: cyber-terrorism, military aggres\u00adsions, political and economic pressures and, most impor\u00adtantly, Russia\u2019s propa\u00adganda machine, which generates fake news, aggressive external disin\u00adfor\u00admation and conducts infor\u00admation warfare. With Russia having ripped the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and the war that broke out in the eastern part of the country shortly there\u00adafter, the security situation in Europe changed substan\u00adtially. Following the annex\u00adation of Crimea though, the Kremlin\u2019s ideol\u00ado\u00adgists learned that \u2018hard power\u2019 tactics (wars, supporting separatist regimes or ethnic conflicts) were both quite costly and becoming less and less efficient. What is more, the inter\u00adna\u00adtional attention and disap\u00adproval that such tactics can result in a margin\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation of Moscow in the inter\u00adna\u00adtional arena. In view of this, Russia reinvented and adopted its \u2018soft power\u2019 tactics, focusing on culture, language, religion and, especially, the media. For instance, the Kremlin has doubled the alloca\u00adtions from the state budget for its propa\u00adganda machine every year since 2016. In 2020, the budget allocated for this machine reached EUR 1.3 billion, more than half of which was earmarked for the holdings of Russia Today<\/em> and VGTRK<\/em> (the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broad\u00adcasting Company<\/em>).[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

The fact that media can be used for disin\u00adfor\u00admation and propa\u00adganda purposes gives rise to challenges on two levels for EaP countries like the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. At the domestic level, a large share of the domestic media outlets in these countries are concen\u00adtrated in the hands of politi\u00adcians, resulting in an increased level of disin\u00adfor\u00admation via media, with an impact on democracy as such. At the inter\u00adna\u00adtional level, these countries are primary targets for external propa\u00adganda campaigns launched and conducted by Kremlin-controled media. Because of its high visibility, both as a source and subject of content, in both linear (TV, radio and print) and non-linear (online) media in these countries, Russia has been able to trigger an infor\u00admation war, increase the level of fake news, manip\u00adulate public opinion and, as a result, weaken cohesion within the societies. The main problem in this respect being the low media literacy in EaP countries and low degree of resilience vis-\u00e0-vis Russian soft power aggression.<\/p>\n

Russian soft power strategy in Moldova: agents & instru\u00adments of influence\u2026 <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

In EaP countries, Russian soft power strategy expressed \u2013 with some slight differ\u00adences \u2013 by the existence of the same agents or instru\u00adments of influence, who have promoted Kremlin narra\u00adtives and messages: a) the media, including the online extension thereof; b) Orthodox Church; and c) political proxy parties controlled or supported by Moscow. The situation gets even more compli\u00adcated in the case of Moldova, where two out of these three agents of influence \u2013 the media and the Orthodox Church \u2013 are among the most trusted and popular of the country\u2019s insti\u00adtu\u00adtions. The Orthodox Church tops the ranking with a 72% approval rating, and the media comes in third with a 62% approval rating. Ranking between these two is the National Army, with a 66% approval rating. Now, let\u2019s take a closer look at the \u2018agents of influence\u2019 in Moldova:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Russian media[3]<\/sup><\/a>, and especially Russian TV channels[4]<\/sup><\/a>, rebroadcast on Moldova\u2019s territory<\/em><\/strong>. The broadcast content most popular among media consumers is produced in the Russian Feder\u00adation (Pervyi Kanal, RTR, NTV, STS <\/em>and TNT<\/em>) and rebroadcast by local media companies.[5]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, according to media audience measure\u00adments, the three most popular television channels in Moldova are all channels that rebroadcast the content of Russian-based outlets: NTV Moldova<\/em> (NTV<\/em>), RTR Moldova<\/em> (Rossiya 1<\/em>), Primul \u00een Moldova (Pervyi Kanal<\/em>)<\/em>.[6]<\/a> Further, among the most widely read newspapers in the country are the local versions of Komso\u00admol\u00adskaya Pravda v Moldove<\/em> and Argumenty i Fakty v Moldove<\/em>, branches of the Russian newspapers of the same names. Also, Russian(-language) Internet platforms rank among the most popular online platforms: ru, Vkontke.ru, Mail.ru, Sputnik.md, Point.md<\/em> and Noi.md<\/em>.[7]<\/sup><\/a> The popularity of the content of Russian media outlets can be explained largely by the nostalgia that Moldovans feel for certain media content that they grew attached to in the past. A second factor is the lack of local alter\u00adna\u00adtives with Russian-language media content. While some local Russian-language media outlets do exist, their content is too unpopular to compete with that produced by the Kremlin\u2019s media machinery.<\/li>\n
  2. The Orthodox Church in Moldova<\/em><\/strong> is part of the Russian Patri\u00adar\u00adchate and subject to its canonical authority.[8]<\/sup><\/a> According to surveys and taking into account that it is the most trusted and popular insti\u00adtution in Moldova\u2019s society, the Orthodox Church is \u2013 along with the media \u2013 one the most efficient instru\u00adments for dissem\u00adi\u00adnating Russian narra\u00adtives and messages.[9]<\/a><\/li>\n
  3. Last, but not least, are the political parties which promote pro-Eastern policy and Russian narra\u00adtives<\/em><\/strong> in Moldovan society. This role used to be played by Party of Commu\u00adnists (PCRM), now the PSRM, with its informal leader, President Igor Dodon, does.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Why is Moldova failing to combat Russia\u2019s soft power strategy successfully?<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n

    For the past few years, the annual reports of both national and inter\u00adna\u00adtional organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions have charac\u00adterised external propa\u00adganda and Russian infor\u00admation warfare as the biggest challenge facing the EaP countries. In the case of Moldova, there are several systemic factors which are ampli\u00adfying the success of the Russian soft power strategy and weakening the media sector\u2019s ability to confront external threat of media propa\u00adganda and infor\u00admation warfare:<\/p>\n