{"id":41290,"date":"2021-03-09T16:48:26","date_gmt":"2021-03-09T15:48:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/aksana_lutskaya_birth_civil_society_belarus_european_north_korea-copy\/"},"modified":"2021-04-06T14:47:20","modified_gmt":"2021-04-06T12:47:20","slug":"armenias-post-war-political-crisis-giragosian","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/armenias-post-war-political-crisis-giragosian\/","title":{"rendered":"Armenia\u2019s post-war Political Crisis"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Foto: Shutter\u00adstock, Kacper Kawecki<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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Armenia\u2019s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is facing protests and requests to resign after Armenia lost the war with Azerbaijan for Nagorno Karabakh. Richard Giragosian, Director of the independent Think\u00adtanks Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan, Armenia, explains what had happened and how the world should react. (Deutsche Version hier.<\/a>)<\/h3>\n

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A lingering domestic political crisis in Armenia has only further deepened in recent weeks. Although Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was swept into power on the popularity of his leadership and courage in forcing the ouster of the previ\u00adously corrupt government in 2018, that initial euphoria has seriously eroded. Moreover, ever since that impressive victory of non-violent \u201cpeople power\u201d in the country\u2019s \u201cVelvet Revolution,\u201d the Armenian government has seen a steady decline in support while it struggled to sustain the momentum of reform and democratization.<\/p>\n

Although buttressed by a rare degree of legit\u00adimacy from its overwhelming victory in a free and fair parlia\u00admentary election in December 2018, the government has floun\u00addered more recently, however, with a series of serious political missteps and policy mistakes that has contributed to a simmering political crisis. Against that backdrop, it was the unexpected defeat in the 44-day war with Azerbaijan for Nagorno Karabakh in November 2020 that triggered a sharp escalation of the pre-existing political crisis. Given the Armenian government\u2019s lack of prepa\u00adration of society for the scale and severity of unexpected losses from the war, Pashinyan faced an immediate and emotional series of protests, leading to calls for the prime minister to resign and demands for accountability.<\/p>\n

Unprece\u00addented Post-War Vulnerability<\/h2>\n

The depth of this post-war crisis in Armenia stems from the unexpected degree of vulner\u00ada\u00adbility and insecurity. Most signif\u00adi\u00adcantly, Prime Minister Pashinyan is both vulnerable and exposed by his solitary position as the only Armenian leader to have suffered a military defeat over Nagorno Karabakh. This is especially serious as it repre\u00adsents an unprece\u00addented period of vulner\u00ada\u00adbility, given the fact that the Karabakh conflict has long served as the priority element of Armenian security, defense and foreign policy. Having emerged in well within the waning years of the Soviet period, the Karabakh issue actually predates modern Armenian indepen\u00addence and statehood. Within this context, the Armenian government faces a daunting challenge to adapt to a substan\u00adtially new geopo\u00adlitical reality.<\/p>\n

The demands of weath\u00adering the unchar\u00adtered waters of this post-war reality have also forced the Armenia leader to accept a Russian-imposed ceasefire agreement that effec\u00adtively ended the six-week war for Karabakh, but which is also dependent on the presence of Russian peace\u00adkeepers for security. Faced with little choice and no alter\u00adnative, the Armenian accep\u00adtance of the terms of the Russian agreement saved lives and salvaged the remaining territory of Nagorno Karabakh. But the agreement was based on a consol\u00adi\u00addation of signif\u00adicant terri\u00adtorial gains by Azerbaijan and only affirmed Armenia\u2019s stunning defeat. At the same time, the limited scope of the ceasefire agreement does little to resolve the conflict and raises an outstanding question over the status of Karabakh, neces\u00adsi\u00adtating a return to diplo\u00admatic negoti\u00ada\u00adtions to ensure lasting security and stability.<\/p>\n

The crisis escalated signif\u00adi\u00adcantly in February 2021, however, with an unprece\u00addented and unexpected inter\u00advention of the armed forces into the political arena. Sparked by an act of open defiance of the government, a group of some forty senior Army officers called on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign. The act was signif\u00adicant as both a serious move to undermine the tradi\u00adtionally stable civil-military relations and as an unusual display of the politi\u00adzation of the normally neutral armed forces. The motivation and meaning of such an unprece\u00addented devel\u00adopment stems from three factors driving a broader context of political conflict.<\/p>\n

A Prolonged \u201cState of War.\u201d<\/strong> Armenian society has been unable to overcome the shock from the unexpected military defeat in the war for Karabakh that ended in November 2020. While this is partially driven by the Armenian government\u2019s failure to prepare public opinion for the scale and severity of the military defeat in the 44-day war, it is also due to the continued \u201cstate of war\u201d that has only been prolonged by Azerbaijan\u2019s continued failure to return a sizable number of Armenian military prisoners of war and civilian hostages.<\/p>\n

Post-War Uncer\u00adtainty & Insecurity.<\/strong> A second factor contributing to the escalation of the post-war crisis has been the uncer\u00adtainty and insecurity in the new post-war reality. With a delay in the resumption of diplo\u00admatic negoti\u00ada\u00adtions, this uncer\u00adtainty stems from the vague and incom\u00adplete terms of the Russian-imposed agreement that ended the war on 9 November. Although that agreement repre\u00adsented an important cessation of hostil\u00adities that allowed for the deployment of a Russian peace\u00adkeeping force to Nagorno Karabakh, it was far short of either a peace deal or a resolution to the Karabakh conflict. Moreover, the agreement deferred the status of Nagorno Karabakh to a later stage of diplo\u00admatic negoti\u00ada\u00adtions and left several additionally important issues unanswered, such as military withdrawal of demobi\u00adlization. At the same time, this uncer\u00adtainty was compounded by insecurity, which also impacts Armenia proper as post-war border demar\u00adcation has only exacer\u00adbated local insecurity given the close proximity of Azerbaijani military units along the southern border areas of Armenia.<\/p>\n

Lack of Account\u00adability & State Paralysis.<\/strong> The general perception of a lack of account\u00adability for the military losses and political decisions through the war is a third factor in the lingering domestic political crisis. From a broader perspective, this lack of account\u00adability is rooted in the fact that the Karabakh conflict actually predates Armenian indepen\u00addence, which places the Pashinyan government in polit\u00adi\u00adcally uncharted territory, as the only Armenian leadership to have \u201clost\u201d Karabakh. But more specif\u00adi\u00adcally, the response of the government to the unexpected loss in the war has been both inade\u00adquate and insuf\u00adfi\u00adcient. With no adjustment to the new post-war reality, marked by an absence of any modified or new diplo\u00admatic strategy and a failure to alter military posture or reform, the Armenian government appears impotent in its \u201cstate of denial.\u201d And with little luxury of time, the failure to accept the need for seeking \u201clessons learned\u201d from the war has greatly under\u00admined confi\u00addence in the government. And despite democ\u00adratic gains since coming to power, the meager political response and the marginal role of parliament have only fostered a perception of state paralysis.<\/p>\n

Dangerous Prece\u00addents<\/h2>\n

Against that backdrop, Armenian democracy is further beset by two broader trends, each of which is directly related to the recent losses in the war for Karabakh and that continues to exert destructive pressure threat\u00adening the resilience of Armenian democracy. The first of these trends is the dangerous precedent from the perception that the recent war for Karabakh vindi\u00adcates the use of force as an acceptable means to resolve essen\u00adtially political conflicts. This risk of rewarding aggression and military force as credible options to settle diplo\u00admatic disputes raises serious concerns over the impli\u00adca\u00adtions for other conflicts, ranging from Cyprus to Crimea. And by failing to challenge this precedent of allowing military means to force a resolution of conflicts, the danger is rooted in legit\u00adimizing the concept that \u201cmight makes right\u201d in inter\u00adna\u00adtional relations.<\/p>\n

A second dangerous trend is rooted in a related precedent involving the apparent accep\u00adtance of the military victory of two much larger, more powerful author\u00adi\u00adtarian countries (Azerbaijan and Turkey) over a small democracy. And in the case of any consol\u00adi\u00addation of the victory of these aggressive author\u00adi\u00adtarian states, such consent repre\u00adsents a degree of complicity and culpa\u00adbility. From this perspective, the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community must be cautious in allowing such a precedent to stand, especially as the wave of author\u00adi\u00adtarian repression in Azerbaijan and Turkey will only be encouraged or endorsed, to the detriment of strug\u00adgling democ\u00adracies like Armenia.<\/p>\n

What should the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community do now?<\/h2>\n

Given the combi\u00adnation of these pre-existing challenges and the impact of a dramat\u00adi\u00adcally new post-war environment, democracy in Armenia is now under assault. The dramatic gains of Armenia garnered from its peaceful revolution of 2018, which was driven by an activist population no longer defined by apathy but committed to defending democracy, were widely embraced as a welcome exception. But stability and security in Armenia are now imperiled. While much of the burden of adapting and adopting Armenian national interests to meet this new post-war reality lies with the government, the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community also has a respon\u00adsi\u00adbility to recommit to democ\u00adra\u00adti\u00adzation and reinvest in reform in Armenia. The risk of regress and retreat from reform and democracy not only stands out is as a danger for Armenia, but also stands apart as a threat to the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community. And for the future of Armenia, democracy protection is now as important as democracy promotion.<\/p>\n

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