{"id":42784,"date":"2021-07-13T18:16:49","date_gmt":"2021-07-13T16:16:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=42784"},"modified":"2021-07-13T19:04:15","modified_gmt":"2021-07-13T17:04:15","slug":"why-a-europea-perspective-for-ukraine-corresponds-to-german-interests-shulga","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/why-a-europea-perspective-for-ukraine-corresponds-to-german-interests-shulga\/","title":{"rendered":"Why a European perspective for Ukraine corre\u00adsponds to German interests"},"content":{"rendered":"
Foto: Shutter\u00adstock, Mykola Komarovskyy<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

In this analyses Dmytro Shulga argues for the EU and specif\u00adi\u00adcally Germany to consider it\u2019s own strategic gains in offering Ukraine a way to full EU membership over an extended amount of time. <\/h3>\n

During a three-way television debate on foreign policy between the candi\u00addates of Germany\u2019s main parties for the Chancel\u00adlorship in September\u2019s general election, Ukrainian President Zelensky asked them about the possi\u00adbility of Ukraine joining the EU one day, but he received rather sobering answers from the partic\u00adi\u00adpants, who priori\u00adtised EU decision-making reform and the integration of the Western Balkans.<\/p>\n

The responses highlighted a very uncom\u00adfortable reality for policy-makers in Ukraine. Of all the countries neigh\u00adbouring the EU, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are the only democ\u00adratic countries with EU aspira\u00adtions. However, they have not yet been offered  any prospect of potential EU membership.<\/p>\n

In 2004, following the eastward enlargement of the EU, the European Neigh\u00adbourhood Policy was launched under the general motto \u2018every\u00adthing but insti\u00adtu\u00adtions\u2019. In response to the peaceful \u2018Orange Revolution\u2019 and subse\u00adquent democ\u00adratic elections in Ukraine in late 2004, the EU made a more concrete offer by starting negoti\u00ada\u00adtions (first with Ukraine, and later with Moldova and Georgia) on an associ\u00adation agreement with a deep and compre\u00adhensive free trade area.<\/p>\n

European aspira\u00adtions aknowledged?<\/h2>\n

In 2014, the EU signed these agree\u00adments with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In the preambles, the EU \u2018acknowl\u00adedged the European aspira\u00adtions<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018welcomed its European choice<\/em>\u2019 of the respective countries and at the same time \u2018left open the way for future progressive devel\u00adop\u00adments<\/em>\u2019 in their relations. Since then, relations have indeed progressed signif\u00adi\u00adcantly. With the EU\u2019s support, the three countries began the modern\u00adization of their economies, diver\u00adsi\u00adfying trade flows, increasing energy security, and strength\u00adening mobility (visa-free travel), civil society and political pluralism.<\/p>\n

Despite Russian aggression, Ukraine has in recent years experi\u00adenced not only a \u2018people\u2019s revolution\u2019 but also free and fair elections, peaceful democ\u00adratic changes of government, and ongoing reforms to ensure good gover\u00adnance and the rule of law \u2013 far from being complete, of course. Still, there is a pro-EU government in place, and a strategic goal of joining the EU contained in the Ukrainian Consti\u00adtution (as in the Georgian one)<\/em>. Thus, Ukraine has embraced \u2018Europe\u2019 and its core democ\u00adratic values as part of its modern national identity.<\/p>\n

There is wide public expec\u00adtation in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia that the EU will take a further step and recognize a long-term membership perspective <\/em>for these three countries. It is broadly under\u00adstood as a long-term issue<\/em>, requiring many years or even decades, and dependent on meeting strict criteria.<\/em><\/p>\n

Candidate Status for Ukraine doesn\u2019t have to be immedi\u00adately given<\/h2>\n

It does not mean immedi\u00adately granting candidate status<\/em>. First, the aspiring countries need to demon\u00adstrate that they meet the political criteria<\/em>: stability of the insti\u00adtu\u00adtions guaran\u00adteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. It is evident that it will take many more years<\/em> for these countries to meet these criteria to become candi\u00addates for membership. Thus, by the time the candidacy and accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions materi\u00adalise, both the EU as well as the respective countries will be very different from now.<\/p>\n

EU treaty, European Parliament in favor for Ukraine\u2019s aspirations<\/h2>\n

One should not forget the basic fact that, pursuant to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union<\/u>, any European state may apply to become a member of the EU provided that it adheres to the EU standards of democracy and the rule of law. So, there is no objective reason why the EU should not recognize such a potential long-term perspective for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.<\/p>\n

It is also remarkable that the European Parliament, which repre\u00adsents the EU citizens, has repeatedly recog\u00adnized a membership perspective for these three countries. These calls have been supported by an overwhelming majority of MEPs across all mainstream political groups \u2013 including by the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals and Greens.<\/p>\n

So, the only reason why such a European perspective has not yet been recog\u00adnized by the EU is the lack of consensus among the EU member states<\/em>. While Eastern members (Poland and others) have been supporting their neigh\u00adbours\u2019 potential accession to the EU, other members \u2014 in particular, Germany (also France and the Nether\u00adlands) \u2014 have been reluctant.<\/p>\n

What Germany could gain or lose regarding China\u2019s role<\/h2>\n

There are a number of good arguments, however, why the next German government could find it in its own interests <\/u>to re-consider its stance on opening up a European perspective for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.<\/u><\/p>\n

First, deepening the ties of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to the EU would be the best European policy response \u2013 effective but not provocative \u2013 to Russian aggres\u00adsivity in the region and beyond. It would help strengthen resilience of the three countries and at the same time avoid escalating confrontation with Russia.<\/p>\n

Moreover, in the long run, integration to the EU and other Western insti\u00adtu\u00adtions could help these countries to modernize and thus raise their soft power attrac\u00adtiveness for residents in regions currently occupied by Russia \u2013 in a similar way to what worked once for Western Germany.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, if the EU showed a lack of ambition, it would play right into the hands of other powers as they try to increase their influence in the region. While Russia\u2019s role in violating inter\u00adna\u00adtionally recog\u00adnized borders with military force is obvious, Chinese policy in the region prior\u00adi\u00adtizes economic cooper\u00adation, and China has become #1 trading partner of these three countries.<\/p>\n

A true wake-up call for the EU should be the recent signing of an agreement between Ukraine and China to cooperate in building infra\u00adstructure. In this context, the Chinese press openly wrote that \u2018Ukraine can only embrace China more since the EU and NATO have not shown much interest in Ukraine joining<\/a>\u2019. These trends may have far-reaching conse\u00adquences for the EU\u2019s key interests and values in the immediate neigh\u00adbourhood and on the global scale.<\/p>\n

EU is wasting precious time<\/h2>\n

The EU should not continue wasting time. There is no need to wait until full integration of the Western Balkan countries before opening a perspective for Eastern European partners. According to recent research by the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)<\/a>, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are already becoming increas\u00adingly compa\u00adrable in their alignment on the EU acquis<\/em> with the Western Balkans. So, the EU needs to be objective and non-discrim\u00adi\u00adnatory in its approach, and increase compe\u00adtition for meeting the criteria.<\/p>\n

Germany and the EU need to support the new democ\u00adracies in Europe. An EU perspective would provide pro-European reformers in these countries with powerful leverage. Conversely, failure to recip\u00adrocate by the EU would help the anti-European domestic political forces, oligarchs, nation\u00adalists as well as regional neo-author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanists to reverse these countries\u2019 course.<\/p>\n

European Green Deal and Ukraine<\/h2>\n

EU integration of the three countries is also in line with Germany\u2019s climate policy, as it would help to implement the long-term European Green Deal goals of decar\u00adbon\u00adi\u00adsation and a climate-neutral European continent \u2013 not only by necessary adjust\u00adments of tradi\u00adtional indus\u00adtries but also by cooper\u00adation in devel\u00adoping new technologies for green growth. For example, the European Commission\u2019s Hydrogen Strategy for a climate-neutral Europe already defines Ukraine as a priority partner for the EU in devel\u00adoping this technology.<\/p>\n

It is also in line with European economic interests. The AAs\/\u200bDCFTAs imple\u00admen\u00adtation has already brought economic success and benefits for these countries as well as for the EU. A full-fledged economic integration would expand the size of the EU\u2019s Single market by 50 million consumers and provide oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities to make best use of these countries\u2019 indus\u00adtrial potential, natural resources, and human capital for strength\u00adening the EU.<\/p>\n

Contrary to some percep\u00adtions, domestic public opinion in Germany might not be a big problem. According to an opinion poll<\/a> conducted in September 2020 by socio\u00adlogical agency Kantar Profiles Division<\/a> at the request of the Kyiv-based \u2018New Europe\u2019 Centre, 47% of Germans<\/a> are already in favour of Ukraine\u2019s membership in the EU (rising to 60.7% among those aged 18\u201325 years<\/a>). More research is needed, but it seems that the German public do not perceive citizens of these countries, who over the last years have enjoyed visa-free travel regime with the EU, as that distant in terms of culture or identity.<\/p>\n

Thus, European political, security, climate and economic interests demand opening an EU membership perspective for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. It corre\u00adsponds to the German interests to strengthen the EU\u2019s regional and global standing and trans\u00adfor\u00admative power.<\/p>\n

For Germany specif\u00adi\u00adcally<\/u>, it provides an oppor\u00adtunity for leadership in the EU \u2014 in shaping the vision of the future of Europe, to re-position itself as the driving motor of the EU and a consensus builder among the member states with differing views. This is also an oppor\u00adtunity for Germany and the EU to contribute to rebuilding transat\u00adlantic relations, with the EU assuming more respon\u00adsi\u00adbility and investment in European stability on its most vulnerable flank.<\/p>\n

\n

Dmytro Shulga is the European Program Initiative Director with the Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Renais\u00adsance Foundation, Kyiv.<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/i>\"Textende\"[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator][vc_column_text]Did you like thike this article? If yes, you can support the independent editorial work and journalism of LibMod via a simple donation tool.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]