{"id":44233,"date":"2021-12-15T06:00:07","date_gmt":"2021-12-15T05:00:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/crimea-platform-olha-skrypnyk-copy\/"},"modified":"2021-12-14T22:56:16","modified_gmt":"2021-12-14T21:56:16","slug":"solonenko-eastern-partnership-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/solonenko-eastern-partnership-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Eastern Partnership and Ukraine: the marriage of convenience"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Design: euneighbourseast.eu<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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This Wednesday, the Eastern Partnership Summit will take place for the first time in four years. On this occasion, Iryna Solonenko, Senior Fellow at the Center for Liberal Modernity, sheds light on the signif\u00adi\u00adcance of the project specif\u00adi\u00adcally from Ukraine\u2019s perspective.
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What Eastern Partnership is and is not<\/h3>\n

When the Eastern Partnership was launched in 2009, Ukraine reacted with a lack of enthu\u00adsiasm. The initiative had no added value to the already advanced (compared to other EaP members) EU-Ukraine bilateral agenda. Ukraine already negotiated the Associ\u00adation Agreement (AA), including the Deep and Compre\u00adhensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), with the EU and the prospect of the visa-free travel to the Schengen Area was also on the table when the newly launched EaP expanded this offer to all six Eastern neighbours.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the EaP did not contain any response to the strategic issue of the prospect of EU membership, which Ukraine has officially aspired to since 1998 (when the national strategy of integration with the EU was adopted). Was the EaP a substitute for potential EU membership or an inter\u00adme\u00addiary step towards it? This was and remains open for inter\u00adpre\u00adta\u00adtions. This lack of strategic vision behind the EaP arguably weakens the EU\u2019s \u201ctrans\u00adfor\u00admative power\u201d towards the East European neigh\u00adbours, which is demon\u00adstrated in the case of its \u201cbig-bang\u201d enlargement (whereby ten Central and Eastern European countries joined the bloc in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007). This results in visible discrepancy or strong asymmetry between the integration offer (which is weak) and the scope of \u201chomework\u201d of the EaP countries, whereby they have to incor\u00adporate into domestic legis\u00adlation the scope of the EU\u2019s common market acquis<\/em> close to that of the accession countries. This setup is not suffi\u00adciently motivating (if not demoti\u00advating) for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

On the positive side, it was welcomed that a separate initiative towards Eastern neigh\u00adbours was launched within a broader European Neigh\u00adbourhood Policy covering 16 EU neigh\u00adbours in the East and South. After all, the post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe did not have much in common with the countries of the South Mediter\u00adranean. Moreover, since the initiative was launched as the reaction to the Russian-Georgian war in 2018, one could see this project as having a geopo\u00adlitical signif\u00adi\u00adcance, whereby the EU was ready to assume greater respon\u00adsi\u00adbility for it Eastern neighbours.<\/p>\n

Moreover, if one looks back at the past twelve years, the EaPs people-to-people dimension, which engages broader society beyond the level of author\u00adities, and its financial assis\u00adtance have a clear added value. The EaP Civil Society Forum<\/a>, which is the largest umbrella organ\u00adi\u00adsation for civil society from the EU and the region, including over 1000 SCOs, has expanded its work way beyond the regular General Assembly\u2019s meetings and has become an important instrument of consol\u00adi\u00addating the voice of civil society with respect to EU insti\u00adtu\u00adtions. Also, numerous individuals and organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions from the region benefited from different civil society, researchers, academia, youth and profes\u00adsional exchange, mobility, and cooper\u00adation instru\u00adments. A lot of success stories at the very down-to-earth level can be told after having examined the programs and their beneficiaries.<\/p>\n

Financial assis\u00adtance, which was first delivered through the European Neigh\u00adbourhood Instrument (ENP) and now through the global Neigh\u00adbourhood, Devel\u00adopment and Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Cooper\u00adation Instrument<\/a> (NDICI) has also important added value. The EU was also quick with offering assis\u00adtance in view of the COVID pandemics, which broke out in early 2020. The COVID-19 EaP vacci\u00adnation package increased from an initial Eur30 million to Eur75 million in August this year. Also, the EU\u2019s commitment to providing a Eur2.3 billion Economic and Investment plan<\/a> in grants could be an important contri\u00adbution to the economic growth of the EaP countries. The targets for 2025<\/a> spanning from support to SME, individual mobility oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities to health resilience, and digital trans\u00adfor\u00admation are very ambitious.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s concerns and priorities<\/h3>\n

Without under\u00adap\u00adpre\u00adci\u00adating the impor\u00adtance of various support mecha\u00adnisms and assis\u00adtance, which the EU provides within the Eastern Partnership initiative, Ukraine\u2019s key concerns and objec\u00adtives seem to be better addressed through bilateral relations with the EU, through devel\u00adoping multi\u00adlateral formats, such as the Associated Trio and bilateral diplomacy towards individual EU member states with the aim of promoting political support within the EU for eventual Ukraine\u2019s membership.<\/p>\n

First, Ukraine is striving for deeper integration with the EU<\/strong>. The path between the current level of integration and the eventual EU membership is long and one can think of inter\u00adme\u00addiary steps towards the eventual goal. Even if the membership prospect is not on the table, the philosophy of the current framework of political associ\u00adation and economic integration is in line with the idea of a multi-speed Europe, whereby the EaP partners are offered some elements of what the fully-fledged EU Member States enjoy.<\/p>\n

One line of effort is about fully realising the potential of the AA and modernising the AA. When it comes to the first aspect, a consortium of Ukrainian think-tanks identified 15 areas<\/a>, in which Ukraine has to implement certain commit\u00adments to pave the way for the EU decisions on deeper integration. An analysis of the state of play showed that only in two areas, related to certi\u00adfi\u00adcation of agricul\u00adtural goods and natural gas market, tangible progress has been achieved. So there is still a lot of poten\u00adtials. As to moderni\u00adsation of the AA, in 2018 Ukraine and the EU started upgrading the Annexes of the AA In 2021 the compre\u00adhensive overview under Art. 481 was launched. The idea is to accom\u00admodate the evolving EU legis\u00adlation and Ukraine\u2019s desire for deeper integration.<\/p>\n

The second line is about demanding new formats of integration beyond the current political and legal framework. For instance, while Ukraine has to implement the EU acquis, it is not included in the insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, where respective discus\u00adsions and decisions are taken. The option of at least taking part in the consul\u00adta\u00adtions in certain policy areas might be an attractive one. Also, accession to limited sectoral \u2018unions\u2019 might be an option explored by experts<\/a>. Therefore, if the political will is there, inter\u00adesting and attractive solutions can be found.<\/p>\n

Second, Ukraine is inter\u00adested in stronger support on the part of the EU for its sover\u00adeignty and terri\u00adtorial integrity, which is addressing Ukraine\u2019s security concerns<\/strong>. When the EaP was launched in 2009, no one could imagine that Russia would go as far as challenging the European security order estab\u00adlished after the Cold War ended and even redrawing the states\u2019 borders in Europe with the use of force. Today this has become the reality, which the EU cannot ignore. Eastern Partnership offers no solutions to this problem, although, positively, it envisages efforts to make partner states more resilient when it comes to hybrid security threats, such as disin\u00adfor\u00admation and cyber-attacks. Beyond the EaP, there is a European Union Advisory Mission to Ukraine<\/a>, dealing with the civilian security sector. However, there are discus\u00adsions in the EU on a possible new military CSDP mission to Ukraine, initiated by Lithuania. Also, Ukraine declared its interest in cooper\u00adation within the framework of the Permanent Struc\u00adtured Cooper\u00adation (PESCO), whereby projects with individual EU MSs can be imple\u00admented. On top of that, Ukraine has agree\u00adments with individual MSs on direct military assis\u00adtance with Lithuania and Poland being most active in this respect.<\/p>\n

Third, promoting rule of law<\/strong> and other important reforms is a key issue. Despite the lack of political will for important reforms and strong actors, who block reforms, the quest for these reforms is deeply entrenched in Ukraine. It is not only about civil society demanding reforms, but one can speak of reform-minded enclaves<\/a> among public author\u00adities, including bureau\u00adcracy, local self-gover\u00adnance, academia, etc. It has been widely recog\u00adnised that promoting rule of law is the key reform<\/a> for the overall trans\u00adfor\u00admation of the country and for attracting foreign invest\u00adments. Yet, the EU lacks clear guide\u00adlines and a monitoring system to foster rule of law reforms. Certain important reforms in fighting corruption and judiciary reform were initiated due to condi\u00adtion\u00adality, linked to visa liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation or financial support. Yet, the leverage remains weak if guide\u00adlines are too weak and no specific and credible incen\u00adtives are linked to reform demands. The way to go<\/a>, suggested by Ukraine\u2019s civil society, would be using the EU Justice Dashboard method\u00adology and the EU Rule of Law report to measure the progress of judicial reform and the fight against corruption. Yet, the question of specific incen\u00adtives (like the one of visa-free travel) is still open.<\/p>\n

New foreign policy priorities<\/h3>\n

Apart from bilateral relations with the EU, Ukraine has recently started exploring multi\u00adlateral formats and direct diplomacy towards individual EU MSs. The most prominent initiative so far has been that of the Associ\u00adation Trio. It was officially launched in May 2021, when the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine met in Kyiv and signed the Memorandum of Under\u00adstanding<\/a>. Looking for options of integration with the EU beyond the AA\/\u200bDCFTA and enhancing security cooper\u00adation with the EU are among the key objec\u00adtives of the initiative. The initiative received further devel\u00adopment, as the heads of states of the three countries met in Batumi in July 2021, where they signed a joint Decla\u00adration<\/a>, which empha\u00adsised the quest of the three countries for the EU membership perspective. Impor\u00adtantly, the European Council President Charles Michel was there and welcomed the Trio\u2019s intention to \u201cfoster coordi\u00adnation\u201d between each other and the EU. The Joint Statement<\/a> following the EU-Ukraine Summit in October 2021 \u201ctook good note of the initiative of the three associated partners aiming at increased coordi\u00adnation between them and enhanced cooper\u00adation between the three associated partners and the EU\u201d. While the EU is still reluctant to embrace the initiative and, more impor\u00adtantly, establish insti\u00adtu\u00adtion\u00adalised formats of cooper\u00adation, the idea of multi\u00adlateral cooper\u00adation with the purpose of European integration is not new. The Visegrad 4 format and the different formats of cooper\u00adation among the three Baltic states estab\u00adlished in the 1990s pursued exactly the idea of coordi\u00adnating efforts towards preparing for the EU\u2019s membership. Therefore it would be important for three countries to go ahead with deepening cooper\u00adation and for the EU to establish this additional track without jeopar\u00addising the EaP as an umbrella.<\/p>\n

Kyiv also activated its diplomacy vis-\u00e0-vis individual EU Member States with the purpose of consol\u00adi\u00addating support within the EU for the prospect of EU membership. By now already six EU member states confirmed their support for Ukraine\u2019s membership in the EU through bilateral decla\u00adra\u00adtions: the three Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, and most recently Croatia.<\/p>\n

One can also add the Lublin Triangle<\/a> , an initiative of Poland and Lithuania to promote European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. The respective decla\u00adration on the level of the three foreign ministers was signed in July 2020. This initiative is very much in line with Ukraine\u2019s recently revitalised foreign policy objective of estab\u00adlishing itself as a Central European state<\/a>. From this perspective, the stronger voice and activ\u00adities from Ukraine, when it comes to multi\u00adlateral cooper\u00adation in Central Europe, are expected in the near future.<\/p>\n

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