{"id":45498,"date":"2022-03-18T11:36:50","date_gmt":"2022-03-18T10:36:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/gressel-stand-der-russischen-invasion-ukraine\/"},"modified":"2022-07-26T11:00:48","modified_gmt":"2022-07-26T09:00:48","slug":"gressel-assessment-russian-invasion-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/gressel-assessment-russian-invasion-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Current assessment of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine \u2013 What Germany Can and Must Do Now"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Foto: Alexey Kudenko \/\u200b Imago Images<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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Military expert Gustav C. Gressel on the war in Ukraine: The outcome will depend in part on whether the West supplies Ukraine with the weapons it needs. It is also essential that the Russian economy be quickly crippled to eliminate Putin\u2019s ability to mobilize reserves for the war. A strict oil and gas embargo could be gradually eased after a Russian withdrawal.<\/h2>\n

<\/p>\n

1. Summary<\/h3>\n
    \n
  • The Russian leadership\u2019s aim is the destruction of Ukraine as a state and as a nation. Moscow intends to achieve this aim by elimi\u00adnating the political, cultural and intel\u00adlectual elites and the long-term occupation of the country.<\/li>\n
  • In the event of a Russian victory, it is not an ice-bound Cold War that awaits Europe, but a volatile, unstable situation on its eastern flank, with Putin engaging in continual provo\u00adcation and military intim\u00adi\u00addation to deter the West from inter\u00adfering in the \u201cinternal affairs\u201d of Russia or its occupation regimes in Belarus and Ukraine.<\/li>\n
  • Military threats against NATO \u2013 both conven\u00adtional and nuclear \u2013 will remain solely in the realm of the psycho\u00adlogical as long as Ukraine continues to put up organized military resis\u00adtance. Should this resis\u00adtance collapse, an expansion of Russian aggression beyond Ukraine is conceivable \u2013 to some extent even probable.<\/li>\n
  • Ukraine has a chance of forcing Russia into peace through attrition (Ermat\u00adtungs\u00adfrieden<\/em>), as Finland managed to do in the Winter War, 1939\/\u200b\u200b40. It urgently needs support from the West in order to do so, though.<\/li>\n
  • It will take more than infantry anti-tank weapons and guided anti-aircraft missiles to sustain Ukraine\u2019s ability to defend itself. In order to mount a mobile defence, Ukrainian forces must also have reserves with armoured fighting vehicles. Unless resup\u00adplied with this kind of heavy equipment from the West, the existing reserves will melt away over the coming weeks.<\/li>\n
  • Obtaining weapons systems capable of bringing down aircraft flying at high altitudes is also of vital impor\u00adtance for Ukraine\u2019s air defence.<\/li>\n
  • 1 April 2022 is a critical date from the Russian perspective: this is the date of the next intake of Russian military conscripts and is key to gener\u00adating additional forces for the war. Russia will only be willing to engage in serious negoti\u00ada\u00adtions if Ukraine proves able to withstand the fresh wave of assaults that will follow that date.<\/li>\n
  • A wide-reaching collapse of the Russian economy that occurs before 1 April 2022 appears to offer the only chance for the West to decisively influence this war through the use of sanctions.<\/li>\n
  • Ukraine could continue to maintain organized military resis\u00adtance in its western provinces for quite some time. If a set of heavily protected core zones were set up in western Ukraine, it would be possible to build up Ukraine\u2019s forces and equip them with more sophis\u00adti\u00adcated weapons systems.<\/li>\n
  • However, doing this would require NATO to go beyond symbolic gestures of solidarity and establish a robust military presence on its eastern flank. Only such a presence would create the possi\u00adbility of further military and political, diplo\u00admatic steps.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    2. Russian war aims<\/h3>\n

    The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine aims at the subju\u00adgation and occupation of the entire territory of the Ukrainian state. The primary intent is to eradicate the national and cultural identity of Ukraine. This includes the physical destruction of Ukraine\u2019s army and of its political, intel\u00adlectual, journal\u00adistic, cultural and admin\u00adis\u00adtrative elites, to the extent that they put up any resis\u00adtance. The aims of \u201cdemil\u00adi\u00adta\u00adrization and denaz\u00adi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d, openly touted early on, amount to a barely disguised decla\u00adration of these objec\u00adtives. Numerous arrests in Kherson of repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives of the Ukrainian government and civil society, none of whom have returned or been seen since, are clear indica\u00adtions of Russia\u2019s imperial and colonial aims, as are the campaigns encour\u00adaging people in occupied terri\u00adtories to apply for Russian passports.<\/p>\n

    The Kremlin will not be able to achieve its long-term goal of entirely elimi\u00adnating Ukraine\u2019s intel\u00adlectual elite without setting up concen\u00adtration camps. Decision-makers in the West, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly in Germany, should clearly under\u00adstand just what kind of threat Ukrainian society will face if it loses this war.<\/p>\n

    Russia wants to persuade Ukrainian society to stop supporting the resis\u00adtance and to impose accep\u00adtance of Russian rule, and terror is the tool it is using to do so. This is evident in the targeting bombing of civilian insti\u00adtu\u00adtions \u2013 childcare centres, schools, hospitals, care homes \u2013 as well as deten\u00adtions, killings and degrading treatment, including rape, in the terri\u00adtories occupied by Russian troops. The targeting of partic\u00adu\u00adlarly weak and vulnerable groups in society (women, children, the ill and the elderly) reflects a delib\u00aderate choice: these assaults are intended to demon\u00adstrate that the Ukrainian army cannot protect its citizens. No one should succumb to the delusion that the bombings of maternity clinics and schools are \u201cdue to an error\u201d.<\/p>\n

    Should Russia emerge as the military victor in this war, Ukraine can expect to face a reign of terror of a kind not seen since the Wehrmacht advance into this territory. But there will be other conse\u00adquences as well: A wave of refugees, poten\u00adtially in numbers far exceeding 10 million (based on projec\u00adtions from the numbers for Donbas) will be the least of Europe\u2019s problems. Russia will set up a military structure in Ukraine directed against NATO. Putin already blames the US and NATO for any and all resis\u00adtance to his rule \u2013 whether in the form of efforts towards indepen\u00addence in Chechnya or public protests in major Russian cities. It is safe to assume that Russia will also blame the West for any continuing armed resis\u00adtance in Ukraine \u2013 and given the degree of Russian brutality, it seems clear that there will be resis\u00adtance. Putin will then use military pressure, including threats of nuclear retal\u00adi\u00adation, in an attempt to intim\u00adidate and deter the West from inter\u00adfering \u201cin Russia\u2019s internal affairs\u201d.<\/p>\n

    If Russia achieves a military victory, it will have to retain a signif\u00adicant Russian army, national guard and FSB presence in Ukraine to keep the conquered terri\u00adtories under control. This personnel will be system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity. This will bind them to the regime, as the prose\u00adcution would be the alter\u00adnative. The troops returning to Russia from Ukraine will have been brutalized. This, in turn, will trigger a further inten\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation of internal repression in Russia and milita\u00adrization of its foreign policy. Whirlwind Europe reaps will not be a \u201cstable\u201d Cold War of the kind we remember from the 1970s and 1980s, but something more along the lines of the unstable 1940s and 1950s, when Stalin was forcing the newly conquered terri\u00adtories into the Soviet empire, crushing all manner of resis\u00adtance and testing the limits of his power with the blockade of Berlin. It is by no means certain that peaceful means will be found to settle or defuse all of the resulting crises.<\/p>\n

    3. Nuclear escalation?<\/h3>\n

    Moscow\u2019s announcement that it had put its nuclear forces into a higher state of alert caused consid\u00aderable uncer\u00adtainty in the West. Yet the announcement was nothing other than an instance of psycho\u00adlogical warfare. There is no indication of any kind that Russian nuclear forces have taken actions beyond the scope of normal exercises (the \u201cGrom 2022\u201d nuclear forces exercises were held in recent weeks). The use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine or against the West is extremely improbable at this time.<\/p>\n

    The Russian military can use thermo\u00adbaric weapons to achieve a similar degree of destruction and intim\u00adi\u00addation without incurring the inter\u00adna\u00adtional stigma that would come with the use of nuclear weapons. Under sanctions from the West, Russia needs the states in the rest of the world (India, Vietnam, Israel, etc.) to maintain their neutral stance. Using nuclear weapons would jeopardize this neutrality without providing any additional military benefit. The problem of radioactive \u201creper\u00adcus\u00adsions\u201d for Russia would arise.<\/p>\n

    Russian use of nuclear weapons against NATO is improbable as well. Such an act would trigger the immediate entry of the alliance into the war. Russia, with its army now tied down in Ukraine, cannot afford that militarily. Large portions of Russia are militarily exposed, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly the Eastern Military District in the Far East. To ensure that its own territory could not be conquered, Russia would have to escalate immedi\u00adately to the level of strategic nuclear war, which would be the equiv\u00adalent of suicide.<\/p>\n

    Putin and Russia\u2019s military intel\u00adli\u00adgence service (GU, formerly GRU) are afraid of the strategic and nuclear superi\u00adority of the USA. The opera\u00adtional readiness of American strategic nuclear missile launchers is far higher in practice than that of their Russian counter\u00adparts. Moreover, American missile defence capabil\u00adities are overes\u00adti\u00admated in Russia. The war in Ukraine has provided impressive testimony regarding the extent to which the American intel\u00adli\u00adgence services can obtain infor\u00admation concerning Russian opera\u00adtional plans. Thus, it would be difficult for Russia to surprise the USA with a nuclear attack. In Russian thinking, was it to see indica\u00adtions that prepa\u00adra\u00adtions for such an assault were underway, the USA could order a preventive nuclear strike that would wipe out most of Russia\u2019s existing capabil\u00adities. The US missile defence system would then be able to bring down individual Russian inter\u00adcon\u00adti\u00adnental missiles.<\/p>\n

    That this scenario is based on an overes\u00adtimate of both American resolve and American technical capabil\u00adities is of little relevance here: scenarios like this one are already built into the belief system at the Kremlin, as is the belief that Ukrainians and Russians are one and the same people. This makes it very improbable that Russia would reach for its nuclear arsenal.<\/p>\n

    According to Russian principles of nuclear deter\u00adrence and based on the analysis of obser\u00adva\u00adtions of Russian military exercises, specialist publi\u00adca\u00adtions and discus\u00adsions, the option of nuclear escalation is reserved for the case of a direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO. Arms deliv\u00aderies, sanctions and other forms of support for Ukraine fall well below the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The use of these weapons would only become a realistic possi\u00adbility if NATO were to intervene in the war with military forces in closed forma\u00adtions \u2013 multiple tank divisions, for example \u2013 and even then, only if the resulting military situation developed into one posing a serious threat to Russia\u2019s interior.<\/p>\n

    However, Russia realizes that the fear of nuclear war offers the best tool it has to deter the Western public from supporting Ukraine, now that all the other tools to wage the infor\u00admation war and influence opinions have failed. Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, sheer ignorance concerning all aspects of nuclear deter\u00adrence is the rule, including in the ranks of political decision-makers in the West. Russia\u2019s threats and attempts to sow uncer\u00adtainty are aimed right at that gap \u2013 but at this stage, they serve purely as a way to exert psycho\u00adlogical pressure and are without substance.<\/p>\n

    The only<\/u> use of weapons of mass destruction that appears realistic at this time would be the use of primitive chemical warfare agents (chlorine gas, etc.) or radioactive substances (radio\u00adlogical dispersal devices), with the intention of placing respon\u00adsi\u00adbility on Ukraine, i.e. claiming that Ukraine had used such substances in an assault or had an accident at storage for them. The aim would be to discredit the Ukrainian leadership in the eyes of the Ukrainian populace and in the West.<\/p>\n

    4. Assessment of the offensive<\/h3>\n

    Russia started the war with a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d aimed at swiftly seizing control of Kyiv, the capital, and other major cities and thereby forcing Ukraine to surrender. This phase of the campaign failed miserably within the first few days. The Russians had entirely under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated the scale of Ukrainian resis\u00adtance. The conse\u00adquences of this mistake are still playing out militarily today.<\/p>\n

    Russia deployed around 120 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) against Ukraine at the beginning of the war. A BTG comprises the first battalion of a motor rifle or tank regiment, reinforced by the first company of each of the combat support battalions from the same brigade or division: a tube artillery battery, a rocket artillery battery, an antitank company, an anti-aircraft battery, a combat-engineer company, and a number of logistic support units (transport, equipment and materiel, medical assis\u00adtance). The reason for the detachment of the first (and sometimes also the second) battalions\/\u200bcompanies from the rest of their regiment\/\u200bbrigade is that these forces are made up of profes\u00adsional and what are called \u201ccontract\u201d soldiers. The means used to \u201cpersuade\u201d conscripts to enlist for another 12-month stint of service are not always very gentle, but once they do so they are contract soldiers. Then they are, on paper at least, volun\u00adteers and can be sent to war.<\/p>\n

    This system enables Russia to form up and mobilize forces quickly, and to do so without using conscripts and reservists, which is polit\u00adi\u00adcally contro\u00adversial in Russia. A lack of the necessary will and financial resources meant that the system was not imple\u00admented until after the war in Georgia, but it is based on experi\u00adences in the Chechen wars. And therein lies the problem: the BTG system is well suited for \u201cshow of force\u201d opera\u00adtions and for gener\u00adating troops for colonial conflicts like those in Chechnya or Georgia, but it is less well suited for a large-scale higher-intensity war, like the one being fought in Ukraine.<\/p>\n

    Groups of 12 to 20 BTGs form a corps (opera\u00adtional manoeuvre group), each of which is led directly by an army commander. These corps are too unwieldy in terms of tactical leadership and coordi\u00adnation. The army commanders have too many units to deal with; they are quasi serving as corps commanders and brigade commanders at the same time. Important position infor\u00admation is being missed, orders are issued too late. The problem is exacer\u00adbated by poor radio equipment. This means that the commanding generals have to go forward to get a picture of the situation for themselves, making them an easy target for enemy attacks. The false pretexts offered up for the war (many soldiers had not been told that they were marching into a real war) had already dealt a heavy blow to troops\u2019 morale and confi\u00addence in their commanders, and the organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtional chaos did not improve matters.<\/p>\n

    The coordi\u00adnation problems are even greater when it comes to the combat support troops, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly the anti-aircraft troops. Four batteries thrown together do not a battalion make. The absence of battalion and regiment command and control is partic\u00adu\u00adlarly problematic here, as they are normally the ones coordi\u00adnating sectors of fire with air forces. In their absence, the Russian anti-aircraft forces do not know whether aircraft movements are enemy or friendly, which causes them to hesitate (whereupon they are attacked by Ukraine\u2019s Bayraktar drones). The Russian air force, for its part, can hardly provide effective close air support when it has to worry about being shot down by its own anti-aircraft systems. Moreover, Russia and Ukraine now use the same medium-range systems, which means that Russian air support has to exercise caution when striking radar and fire control systems lest it takes out its own anti-aircraft systems by mistake. All of these weaknesses are advan\u00adtages to be exploited by Ukrainian defenders, who have shown a good deal of tactical finesse in adapting to meet their enemy.<\/p>\n

    One final point worth noting is that in-theatre mainte\u00adnance facil\u00adities (mechanic shops, etc.) have not been deployed in the conflict zone. These are brigade- and division-level facil\u00adities manned by conscripts. Some of the Russian forces had been out on exercises since October, and there is routine mainte\u00adnance work that did not get done. Some of their equipment (wheels, chains, lubricant in engines and gearboxes, etc) is in corre\u00adspond\u00adingly poor condition, and this has resulted in high levels of equipment failure.<\/p>\n

    In addition, a number (probably a large number) of \u201cvolun\u00adteers\u201d who signed up under duress deserted after crossing the border.<\/p>\n

    The Russian army has said that it has 168 BTGs at its disposal. On 24 February, somewhere in the area of 110\u2013120 of these were deployed against Ukraine. On that day, at least 34 BTGs approached Kyiv and 24 approached Kharkiv, another 13 BTGs joined with the forces of the DNR and the LNR from Donbas, at least 20 BTGs from Crimea moved against Kherson and towards Mariupol. The Russians held back around 20- 30 BTGs as reserves; these were not deployed until the second week of the war. At least another 10 other BTGs (probably more) have already been trans\u00adferred to Ukraine or are currently en route there.<\/p>\n

    Even with this massive force deployment, the Russian army was not able to achieve any of the goals it had defined going in. It cannot deploy more than another 38 BTGs without bringing in conscripts or reservists. Given that the army has lost forces from about 30 BTGs through combat activity, desertion and surrender, 38 additional BTGs is not a lot. Enough to continue the war with, yes, but not enough to be strate\u00adgi\u00adcally decisive in the short term.<\/p>\n

    5. New forces?<\/h3>\n

    This makes mobil\u00adising new forces of particular impor\u00adtance to Moscow. The arrival of Wagner merce\u00adnaries (some 4000 of them) and the troops recruited from the Middle East and Africa will not suffice to close the gaps in the dispo\u00adsition of Russian forces, either because they are too small in number (Wagner) or because they are not up to the job in terms of combat strength, training and morale (cannon fodder from Syria). Partial mobil\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions are underway in rural regions (Dagestan) with the aim of compen\u00adsating for losses by detaching additional profes\u00adsional and contract soldiers from training and peacetime opera\u00adtions. But there are limits to what can be achieved this way as well.<\/p>\n

    The war propa\u00adganda machine is running at full speed, along with other efforts to stir up enthu\u00adsiasm for the war. The regime is still wary about deploying conscripts though: there are signif\u00adicant political risks associated with confronting broader swathes of society with the reality of the war in Ukraine. Whether the current propa\u00adganda will succeed in gener\u00adating the appro\u00adpriate level of resolve in the populace is unclear at this time. A full Russian mobilization would decide the war, but it might do so at the expense of the stability of the regime in Moscow. Putin and the Kremlin entourage are weighing potential risks and rewards now: the outcome is uncertain.<\/p>\n

    The first of April 2022 is the key to the question of whether Russia is going to be able to continue the war in its current scope. Hundreds of thousands of military conscripts will be inducted into the armed forces on that date \u2013 and just as many conscripts are due to be discharged on that date. The latter (partic\u00adu\u00adlarly those of the serving in critical elements that the BTGs have lacked up to now, naturally) will be \u201crecruited\u201d as contract soldiers so that they can be deployed in the war. At that point, the army could send the mechanics facil\u00adities and other equipment along with the fully trained personnel into Ukraine. Thus, the Russian situation can be expected to improve in both quali\u00adtative and quanti\u00adtative terms after 1 April 2022.<\/p>\n

    Therefore, the aim of the West should be to use the time remaining before that date to support the Ukrainian army to an extent enabling it to withstand this new assault and to cripple the Russian economy before that date by means of swift, severe and broad sanctions.<\/p>\n

    6. Ukrainian Defence<\/h3>\n

    The Ukrainian defenders have proven to be not only extremely coura\u00adgeous but also tacti\u00adcally and opera\u00adtionally savvy and flexible. Even the most optimistic did not expect them to still be opera\u00adtional combat aircraft and functioning medium-range anti-aircraft systems on day 15. However the Ukrainian Army has also suffered losses, and depleting ammunition stocks are becoming a problem as the war continues.<\/p>\n

    Before the war, the Ukrainian army had about 70 battalions of combat troops (tank forces, mecha\u00adnized infantry, infantry). These still build the hardcore of the defence on all sections of the fronts. Added to that are another 50,000 activated reservists and 100,000 Terri\u00adtorial Defence Force personnel, plus volun\u00adteers from Ukraine and abroad. Thus Ukrainian forces grew dramat\u00adi\u00adcally in number in recent days. However, the newly added forces are comprised of light infantry: they can only hold out against Russia\u2019s mecha\u00adnized forces on terrain that favours defenders \u2013 in this case, cities. They cannot do so outside of the cities, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly in the flat farmland in southern Ukraine.<\/p>\n

    Another problem for Ukrainian defenders is that they do not have the forces necessary to cover the space that they have to defend. Russian troops keep finding gaps between the Ukrainian defenders allowing them to push past and penetrate deep into the Ukrainian\u2019s rear. The defenders are then forced to deploy reserves with armoured fighting vehicles to cut them off from reinforce\u00adments and destroy them. They have been quite successful at this, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly around Kyiv and Chernihiv. But it takes a toll on power and materiel, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly those of Ukraine\u2019s mecha\u00adnized reserves.<\/p>\n

    No matter how many anti-tank weapons Ukraine obtains, it will not be able to maintain a defence with infantry alone, if for no other reason than the terrain. In order to continue defending itself, Ukraine urgently needs to be resup\u00adplied with heavy equipment as well \u2013 tanks, artillery, infantry fighting vehicles and the ammunition for them.<\/p>\n

    The same applies to air defence. Last week, Ukraine managed to inflict more losses on the Russian air force than the latter had suffered since World War II. It must be said, though, that the bad weather and thick cloud cover helped: Russian pilots had to fly below the clouds to identify and attack targets, thus exposing themselves to fire from Ukrainian anti-aircraft units, which had plenty of shoulder-fired missiles (Stinger, Igla and Polish Grom). A high-pressure zone has now settled in over Ukraine, however, and Russian aircraft can use higher altitudes for their assaults.<\/p>\n

    Ukraine still has medium- and long-range surface-to-air missile systems that are opera\u00adtional, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly Buk-M1 and S\u2011300 systems. And its air force is still flying intercept missions. As long as these weapons systems continue to pose a threat to high-flying Russian aircraft, the Russian air force will hold back those systems that it does not want to expose to high risks. In particular, this means its bombers (Tu-22M3, Tu-95\/142, Tu-160). These form the backbone of Russian air-based nuclear deter\u00adrence, and they are also used for the area bombardment of cities under low-risk condi\u00adtions (as in Syria). The continuing avail\u00adability of weapons systems of this kind has a decisive, direct influence on the human\u00adi\u00adtarian situation.<\/p>\n

    7. What kind of military assistance<\/h3>\n

    The Ukrainian army needs our immediate support, i.e. extensive, unbureau\u00adcratic and direct assistance.<\/p>\n

    Forms of assis\u00adtance that can be imple\u00admented in the short term consist primarily of the transfer of equipment and ammunition that can be put into use immedi\u00adately without requiring any logis\u00adtical prepa\u00adration or training beforehand. The armed forces of our partners to the east possess a lot of equipment of the kind that Ukraine needs and has the ability to operate, ranging from Kalash\u00adnikov assault rifles to RPG-7s (plus ammunition), to battle tanks (T\u201172, PT-91), infantry fighting vehicles (BMP\u20111\/\u200b\u200b2) and armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB, BTR). It also includes MiG-29 fighter aircraft, as well as Finnish Buk-M1, Slovakian and Greek S\u2011300 and Polish and Greek 9K33 Osa surface-to-air missiles.<\/p>\n

    Supplying armoured fighting vehicles is partic\u00adu\u00adlarly important for the mainte\u00adnance of mecha\u00adnized reserves. Supplies of guided anti-aircraft weapons will make it possible to maintain the threat these pose to Russian bombers. These would have to come primarily from Germany\u2019s eastern allies, although there is a lot of old NVA equipment for which German export licence could be issued. Germany should provide direct help to those of its NATO partners who transfer resources away from their own armies and deplete their ammunition stocks to supply this assis\u00adtance, both in terms of procuring replacement equipment and materiel and by stationing troops to maintain security locally.<\/p>\n

    Other types of equipment that could be of immediate use include winter uniforms, protective vests, helmets, night-vision and thermal imaging devices, anti-tank weapons of all kinds, portable surface-to-air missiles (MANPADS), small drones with thermal imaging cameras, drone jamming devices, anti-tank mines, engineering and construction equipment.<\/p>\n

    The value of passing on recon\u00adnais\u00adsance infor\u00admation should not be under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly the sharing of infor\u00admation from intel\u00adli\u00adgence sources, situa\u00adtional-picture infor\u00admation derived from satellite imagery or electronic surveil\u00adlance of Russian commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions and radar signals, and airspace data, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly any giving early warning concerning impending airstrikes. Urgent action should be taken towards the inten\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation of NATO recon\u00adnais\u00adsance activ\u00adities in this area on the part of the Bundeswehr and Germany\u2019s Federal Intel\u00adli\u00adgence Service (BND).<\/p>\n

    The supply of armed drones and the ammunition for them, as well as loitering munition (weapons that wait to attack until they have identified a target), would be an effective way to increase the reach of the Ukrainian artillery and enable Ukraine to attack high-value targets in the enemy\u2019s rear (reserves, command posts, ordnance, siege and missile artillery). However, Germany has wasted the past 20 years in fruitless debate over a ban on such weapons. A ban was never realistic in the first place but based solely on wishful thinking perpet\u00aduated by \u201cpeace researchers\u201d, the disar\u00admament lobby and politi\u00adcians with no military expertise whatsoever. Germany, therefore, has nothing useful to offer in this respect. At best it could provide funding for their acqui\u00adsition from other sources.<\/p>\n

    Swedish Strix mortar rounds for anti-tank weapons would be an effective support for Ukrainian infantry engaged in combat in urban areas. Only Sweden and Switzerland have this ammunition though.<\/p>\n

    More will be required in the medium term, however. The war in Ukraine is going to continue for consid\u00aderably longer than was origi\u00adnally assumed, and Russian military occupation of the western oblasts appears to be nearly impos\u00adsible at this time. Thus, there will be both the time and oppor\u00adtunity to train Ukrainian personnel in the operation of more techni\u00adcally complex weapon systems and to deliver them to the country. The infra\u00adstructure necessary to maintain these systems could be built up in western Ukraine. If Germany would jettison the red-tape for once and remember that the Ukrainians would not be working only 40 hours a week on this, it could be achieved even more quickly than in peacetime \u2013 depending on the systems.<\/p>\n

    Systems of medium complexity existing in European stores include, for instance, various itera\u00adtions of the Leopard 1 and 2 battle tanks, the M\u2011109 tank howitzer, various itera\u00adtions of the M\u2011113 and similar vehicles and other armoured personnel carriers. Among the munitions still in German arsenals, the LARSs (light artillery rocket systems) and Scorpion mine launchers, both of which are capable of firing AT\u20112 anti-tank mines, would be worth consid\u00adering. Air defence is the most problematic area, as modern Western systems are charac\u00adterized by consid\u00aderable complexity, and many are still in the testing and pilot-production phase. However, Washington has already started thinking about what could be done, consul\u00adta\u00adtions with other allies able to deliver supplies will be necessary. Appro\u00adpriate prepa\u00adra\u00adtions should be set in motion now though so that they can be put into effect in a few months\u2019 time.<\/p>\n

    The Patriot systems, a frequent subject in public debate, are not well suited for Ukraine. The various itera\u00adtions of the Patriot system are overly complex and operating them involves a good deal of logis\u00adtical work and requires lengthy training (especially the older systems). Moreover, the system is too static for the type of mobile war being fought by the Ukrainians (who constantly have to evade Russian missile attacks). The French VL-MICA and SAMP\/\u200b\u200bT (Aster) systems are consid\u00aderably easier to operate and more mobile, but for their use to be feasible, France would have to provide direct logis\u00adtical follow-on support in Poland. Decisions on these matters would have to be made now though because if such systems are going to be supplied, there is a consid\u00aderable amount of training and logis\u00adtical prepa\u00adra\u00adtions that have to be done beforehand.<\/p>\n

    8. NATO force posture<\/h3>\n

    The war in Ukraine and the deployment of forces in Belarus and Crimea repre\u00adsents a direct threat to the security of Germany\u2019s eastern neigh\u00adbours. Russia has already threatened to attack aid supplies or weapons trans\u00adports, even refugees, and not just those at the border but even in NATO territory.<\/p>\n

    Had NATO begun to respond to Russian troop deploy\u00adments with its own force transfers back in October, Russian fears of Western inter\u00advention would have provided a means of exerting pressure and thus of compli\u00adcating Russian operation planning, and possibly even of deterring it from launching its attack. This oppor\u00adtunity was missed, however.<\/p>\n

    Now, NATO\u2019s task is to play catch-up: it must initiate a credible build-up of NATO forces on its eastern flank that is capable of acting as a deterrent. It is essential to prevent the emergence of a grey area in which Russia can get away with launching a provo\u00adcation without triggering a reaction from NATO. In addition, the direct stationing of troops is necessary to ensure the security of the states that are supplying weapons to Ukraine (see above) and uncov\u00adering themselves in order to do so. This must go well beyond the symbolic stationing of personnel we have seen in the past. Forward deployment of the entire NRF is now imper\u00adative. A unified command under NATO\u2019s command structure for the northeast and southeast theatres should take over command of the allied forces in the region. Additional reinforce\u00adments should be brought in, above all in anti-aircraft and missile defence. The German defence ministry has long promised that it would be able to make even division-strength forces available if a crisis arose. The crisis arose: it has been here for a while.<\/p>\n

    France trans\u00adferred a squadron of combat aircraft to Poland yesterday. The German Air Force could do the same, though an entire wing would be better, of course.<\/p>\n

    Only once the border is absolutely and credibly taboo when it comes to a Russian attack (and this cannot be under\u00adscored with words, but only through military action) will it be possible to extend the \u201ctaboo\u201d zone out to border crossings and refugee convoys on the other side of the border. At that point, one can begin, step by step and situation by situation, to restrict the Russian air force\u2019s freedom of action through the provision of equipment and intel\u00adli\u00adgence support to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

    There is no point in debating a no-fly zone at this time. NATO lacks the forces to enforce such a zone. Nor is the political situation such that one could expect NATO to approve such a decision. Even if it did, Russia would have plenty of oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities to attack NATO aircraft from the ground or the air and thus force NATO, once again, to choose between military escalation or backing down. For the reasons stated above \u2013 no one is eager to slip into nuclear war \u2013 Russia would probably opt for conven\u00adtional escalation. However, if NATO were, for once, to establish a force posture on the eastern front that Russia had to take seriously, then it would be possible at least to raise, diplo\u00admat\u00adi\u00adcally, the issue of the public pressure for a no-fly zone and\/\u200bor inter\u00advention in order to rattle the Russian leadership and bring it to the table for serious talks. Just by having a strong force presence in place, NATO can expand its own room for diplo\u00admatic manoeuvring.<\/p>\n

    9. Sanctions<\/h3>\n

    At present, the Russian calculus is based solely on military logic. This means that coercive economic measures have to be tailored to the military timeline, in terms of both timing and intensity. The notion that sanctions have to be long-term and have enduring effects does not apply in this situation. Putin does not care what is going to happen to the Russian economy five years from now: his decision-making horizon barely extends past the first of April.<\/p>\n

    In this situation, the primary purpose of sanctions must be to hit the Russian economy as hard, as fast and as exten\u00adsively as possible, with the aim of bringing it to a stand\u00adstill. A collapse of the Russian economy and state finances that sets in before the first of April would make it difficult to impos\u00adsible for Russia to expand the war in the manner described above. The domestic conse\u00adquences of doing so would be too great. All other measures should be secondary to this aim.<\/p>\n

    This goal does not require sanctions that can be kept in place over the long term. A complete embargo on Russian oil and gas could be imposed \u201cfor the duration of the fighting\u201d. Oil and gas exports are the most important sources of revenue and foreign currency for the Russian state. Though Russia could diversify its energy exports, it would not be able to do so quickly enough. Collective gas and oil purchases by the Commission (similar instru\u00adments already exist for nuclear fuel rods) would make gas procurement affordable for states with less purchasing power.<\/p>\n

    All of the sanctions and restric\u00adtions already imposed must be extended to the entire Union State (of Russia and Belarus) to prevent the circum\u00advention of sanctions by way of the Belarusian colony<\/p>\n

    Swift action should be taken to extend the banking sanctions in both breadth and depth: e.g. by banning trading in euros with Russian financial insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and by prohibiting banks from either side from maintaining branches in the other\u2019s territory. Extrater\u00adri\u00adtorial sanctions should also be expanded, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly with a view to pressuring Chinese and Indian banks to pull out of the Russian market.<\/p>\n

    If we do not do all we can to support Ukraine\u2019s defence today, we will be fighting on our own behalf tomorrow.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

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