{"id":48343,"date":"2022-08-05T11:48:01","date_gmt":"2022-08-05T09:48:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=48343"},"modified":"2022-08-08T09:34:06","modified_gmt":"2022-08-08T07:34:06","slug":"fossiles-imperium-russland-daubner-aliyeva","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/fossiles-imperium-russland-daubner-aliyeva\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s post-War Fossil Fuel Future"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Foto: Imago Images<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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The war in Ukraine will throw Russia into an economic crisis, which it will try to combat through fossil fuels reversing the started green transition<\/h2>\n

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Russia dragged Ukraine into <\/span>a <\/span>brutal <\/span>aggressive war <\/span>\u2013 <\/span>and the <\/span>\u2018<\/span>West<\/span>\u2019 <\/span>responded swiftly. The conse\u00adquences for Russia and the world are not yet entirely foreseeable. But it is almost certain that the war slowly depletes Russia\u2019<\/span>s econom<\/span>y, which has already bee<\/span>n stagnating i<\/span>n the past<\/span>.<\/span> The economic and financial sanctions are <\/span>isolating Russia <\/span>from important parts of the global economy. As a result, the Federal State Statistic Service (Rosstat) estimates that Russia, in 2022, will lose about 12 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP), while<\/span> the<\/span> c<\/span>urrent inflation rate stands at almost 20 per cent with core consumer price skyrockets<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Most current analyses draw attention towards <\/span>impli\u00adca\u00adtions <\/span>of the sanctions <\/span>on <\/span>Russia and their effects on the course of the war in Ukraine. However, it is necessary to recall that Russia is one of the leading global carbon emitters and remains a fossil fuel empire, known for its rigorous, non-reformist political and economic culture. The war is an infinite human tragedy. At the same time, the military actions are not only causing environ\u00admental damage on the Ukrainian ground, affecting soil, water, and<\/span> completely destroying ecosystems. They also have negative long-term conse\u00adquences for a green transition of the Russian economy.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Russia\u2019<\/span><\/b>s fossil fuel dependence<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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In the past three years, the Kremlin tenta\u00adtively opened up to the issue of climate protection. The Russian government ratified the Paris-Climate-Agreement in 2019 and Russia seeks to become carbon-<\/span>neutral by 2060. <\/span>Put under pressure by the export-oriented business community, civil society, inter\u00adna\u00adtional climate agree\u00adments, and projects such as the European Green Deal, President Vladimir Putin supported programmes to increase efficiency and reduce emissions. But these initia\u00adtives are now wastepaper. Apart from an urgently needed reduction of Russia<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s contri\u00adbution to climate change, these measures would also have been important to make the Russian economy less dependent on the dominant <\/span>\u2018<\/span>fossil complex<\/span>\u2019<\/span>. Diver\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation and moderni\u00adsation would have been necessary to transform the economy, which is <\/span>s<\/span>tructurally stuck in the 20th century. <\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The fossil fuel-based post-Soviet state capitalism has so far blocked the overdue moderni\u00adsation and diver\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation of the economy.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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As one of the world\u2019s largest exporters of oil, gas, and coal, Russia<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s business model is based on the extraction and the exports of fossil fuels. Although Russia <\/span>\u2013 <\/span>until now <\/span>\u2013 <\/span>contributes only 3 per cent of global GDP and accounts for 2 per cent of the world<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s population, the country produces 10 per cent and consumes 5 per cent of the world<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s fossil energy resources. The fossil fuel-based post-Soviet state capitalism has so far blocked <\/span>an overdue<\/span> moderni\u00adsation and diver\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation of its economy. In contrast to the energy transition speeding up in the EU, Russian state-owned companies have only recently started to act. Players like the Bank of Russia, Sberbank, Rosneft, and the state devel\u00adopment corpo\u00adration Vneshe\u00adconombank <\/span>started to invest<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span> in the low carbon pilot region Sakhalin Island. The nuclear energy giant Rosatom entered the wind energy market in 2018. Unfor\u00adtu\u00adnately, these optimistic and promising devel\u00adop\u00adments in Russia<\/span>\u2019<\/span>s climate agenda vanished since the beginning of the war.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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According to the Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Energy Agency, in 2019, Russian electricity gener\u00adation was composed of 46 per cent natural gas, 19 per cent nuclear, 16 per cent coal, 18 per cent hydropower, and only about one per cent wind and solar power. In the building and heat sector, it was 65 per cent natural gas, 21 per cent coal, and 14 per cent other sources. With the war and a foreseeable economic decline, it is unlikely that the compo\u00adsition of electricity and energy production will change within the next decades. This is accom\u00adpanied by the enormous damage to ecosystems and human health.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Russia\u2019s \u2018<\/span><\/b>reverse indus\u00adtri\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation<\/span>\u2019<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The various sanctions by Western powers already have a strong impact on the overall economic growth of Russia, especially due to the lack <\/span>of fresh <\/span><\/span><\/a>invest\u00adments<\/span><\/span><\/a> and techno\u00adlogical imports. <\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span>Most sensitive to the current lack of foreign technology and invest\u00adments <\/span>are<\/span><\/span> sectors requiring regular moderni\u00adsation of their operative systems such as energy, automotive, and IT. Two out of three Russian wind power market players <\/span>\u2013 <\/span><\/span>Finnish Fortum and Italian Enel <\/span>\u2013 <\/span><\/span>have stopped their new investment projects since the outbreak of the war, with Enel intending to leave the country within a few months. Danish Vestas, which has been producing wind blades in Russia for Fortum projects, also intends to withdraw. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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A<\/span><\/span>ccessible oil reser\u00advoirs, such as in the area around Khanty-Mansiysk, are also almost exhausted. Without special drilling technologies provided by the foreign oil companies, recently drilled oil wells could become of no use. Russia<\/span>\u2019<\/span><\/span>s last hope is China, which in the last four years increased its techno\u00adlogical support such as the <\/span><\/span>Chinese Nanhai drilling rigs<\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span> that were active in the Arctic waters of Murmansk. However, due to the war, these <\/span><\/span>opera\u00adtions <\/span><\/span>were also stopped. In <\/span><\/span>contrast<\/span><\/span> to the energy market, the Russian <\/span>market for <\/span><\/span>technologies is too small for China to get partic\u00adu\u00adlarly involved there. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Russian leading state econo\u00admists are calling for <\/span>\u2018\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f\u2019<\/span><\/b><\/span>, <\/span>a \u2018<\/span><\/b><\/span>reverse indus\u00adtri\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation<\/span>\u2019 <\/span><\/b><\/span>referring to an increased focus on the devel\u00adopment of less advanced technologies, a circular economy, and import substi\u00adtution<\/span>.<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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All in all, it is a grim scenario for the future of the Russian economy as a whole, and<\/span> <\/span>in particular when it comes to the green transition, technical innova\u00adtions, measures for climate change adaptation, and carbon-capture technologies. The required moderni\u00adsation of the energy infra\u00adstructure<\/span>, <\/span><\/span>as well as the import and instal\u00adla\u00adtions of electrol\u00adysers for hydrogen production, the devel\u00adopment of e\u2011mobility, or the instal\u00adlation of heat pumps,<\/span> <\/span>are put on hold. But it is not only capital that is lacking. Apart from a lack of skilled workers, very soon, there will be shortages in high-tech devices, innov\u00adative appli\u00adca\u00adtions, and scien\u00adtific know-how, as well as in basic products, from <\/span>automobile<\/span><\/span> parts to household appli\u00adances. Already now, there are reports of shortages of relevant compo\u00adnents for aerospace and automobile industry, paper, and dental supplies.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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As a counter\u00admeasure to combat the current crisis, the <\/span>Russian populist <\/span><\/span>leadership calls for <\/span>\u2018\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0434\u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0438\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f\u2019<\/span><\/span>, <\/span>a \u2018<\/span><\/span>reverse indus\u00adtri\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation<\/span>\u2019<\/span><\/span> referring to an increased focus on devel\u00adopment of less advanced technologies, a circular economy, and import substi\u00adtution<\/span>.<\/span><\/span> The Soviet-time car manufac\u00adturer Avtovaz (Lada), for example, is expected to have a comeback with its rather low-tech cars. Furthermore, Russia is dependent on imports of seeds, pesti\u00adcides, veterinary medicine, and incubated eggs. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Since the sanctions in the aftermath of the Crimea invasion in 2014, steps have been taken to reduce th<\/span>ese <\/span><\/span>depen\u00addencies<\/span><\/span>, such as the creation of national seed banks and the promotion of domestic pesticide production. In order to develop these sectors, investment in education and innovation is required, which will be very difficult <\/span><\/span>without shared knowledge and experience with the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community. The global isolation will lead to more modern technologies becoming inacces\u00adsible and being replaced by less efficient ones, leading to production ineffi\u00adciency, decline in the product quality, and increased prices.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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A green future is unlikely<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Russia will not achieve its required green transition through targeted reforms, by design <\/i>so to speak, for the next years and probably decades to come. Environ\u00admental and climate policies will hardly have a place in the domestic politics of post-war Russia. Previous successes in reducing air and water pollution will be undone.<\/span> <\/span><\/span>However, the economic decline and the reduced exports of oil and gas due to the lack of techno\u00adlogical know-how and falling demand will reduce Russia<\/span>\u2019<\/span><\/span>s GHGs footprint in the long run, leading to the reduction of the climate impact by disaster<\/i><\/span>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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As long as Putin is not toppled, it is unlikely that the few domestic political forces that have supported moderni\u00adsation and diver\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation will play a role after the war.<\/span><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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As long as Putin is in power, it is unlikely that the few domestic political forces that have supported societal moderni\u00adsation and economic diver\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation so far will play a role after the war. Likewise, civil society will not have the strength to advocate such reforms, as it is already under strong pressure. The somewhat polit\u00adi\u00adcally influ\u00adential middle class will be busy coping with the everyday life. Environ\u00admental protests will be very difficult to voice due to the harsh political oppression.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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The case of Russia shows that an ecological transition can hardly be achieved without economic growth, political trans\u00adfor\u00admation, and inter\u00adna\u00adtional cooper\u00adation. In the deep recession that is now occurring, politics and the economy lack their ability to bring about change.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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At some point, to some degree cooper\u00adation between Russia and Western countries will become necessary. Unfor\u00adtu\u00adnately, it is likely that Putin will try to negotiate sanctions ease in return for GHG reduc\u00adtions at the next inter\u00adna\u00adtional climate conference. Thus, Russia will hold its high CO2 and methane emissions hostage. This is not a good basis for multi\u00adlateral climate negoti\u00ada\u00adtions. One of the few avenues for possible cooper\u00adation after the end of the war could be Putins perception of climate change as a security risk. This perception could be the basis for cooper\u00adation in combating global warming. However, it will take a long time for Russia to give climate policy an appro\u00adpriate status both domes\u00adti\u00adcally and in its foreign policy.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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Dr. Lukas Daubner is Head of Program Green Modernity and Aysel Aliyeva Program-manager at Berlin-based political think tank Center for Liberal Modernity. <\/span><\/i><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

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