{"id":48527,"date":"2022-08-15T14:58:33","date_gmt":"2022-08-15T12:58:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/lukaschenkas-krieg-gegen-eigenes-volk-ackermann-copy\/"},"modified":"2022-08-17T16:15:43","modified_gmt":"2022-08-17T14:15:43","slug":"xi-xinping-does-not-have-an-interest-in-peaceful-reunification-sadeler","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/xi-xinping-does-not-have-an-interest-in-peaceful-reunification-sadeler\/","title":{"rendered":"The visit was seen as a signal that Taiwan is not alone"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Foto: Ceng Shou Yi \/\u200b Imago Images<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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China reacted to Nancy Pelosi\u2019s visit to Taiwan with military exercises. Christina Sadeler spoke to I\u2011Chung Lai, a senior adviser to the Taiwan Thinktank about Taiwanese perspec\u00adtives on the visit and the efforts to repel Chinese coercive diplomacy.<\/h2>\n

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The interview was conducted for LibMod by Christina Sadeler<\/p>\n

Debates inside Taiwan<\/h3>\n

Let\u00b4s start with the debates inside Taiwan. It was noticeable that local media in Taiwan had started very late with its reporting, while inter\u00adna\u00adtionally the debates have already started and heated long in advance. How has this visit been perceived and debated in Taiwan among the public, within expert circles, and among politi\u00adcians? And has the focus or assess\u00adments changed by now?<\/em><\/p>\n

The discus\u00adsions regarding Nancy Pelosi\u00b4s visit to Taiwan should be seen in the context of the timing of China\u00b4s military threats. In the beginning, the debates about the potential visit have basically followed the discus\u00adsions in the United States. Because there were some voices within the U.S. saying the visit is unnec\u00adessary, or the timing is not good. Biden himself even said that the U.S. military does not recommend the trip.<\/p>\n

Later, when China started to react furiously, the whole debate within the U.S. changed regarding whether Pelosi really should continue or rather delay her visit. And also how this decision then will be viewed by China as whether the U.S. is compro\u00admising or yielding to pressure from China.<\/p>\n

So the domestic discus\u00adsions here were not so much focused on those questions in the beginning. Only later on, when Pelosi\u00b4s visit started to become a possible reality, newspapers began to pick up the Western debate regarding the timing and the potential conse\u00adquences for Taiwan.<\/p>\n

As for the general public, most people basically welcomed that another important U.S. politician is visiting Taiwan. They viewed it as a strong signal that the U.S. is not abandoning Taiwan.<\/p>\n

The experts, however, were mostly talking about the conse\u00adquences, about what the aftermath of China\u00b4s reaction will be. They were divided mainly into two camps: One was trying to alert people to be cautious and to avoid unnec\u00adessary provocative actions that could endanger Taiwan.<\/p>\n

The other camp basically held the view that China wants to stop Taiwan from its inter\u00adna\u00adtional engagement and that we should not give in to this pressure. We should refuse to link Pelosi\u00b4s visit with potential reactions by China. We believed that Pelosi\u00b4s visit to Taiwan is the right of the U.S. and it is the right of Taiwan to receive her. If we would allow other parties to veto those kinds of visits, we won\u00b4t be able to receive more inter\u00adna\u00adtional parlia\u00admentary delega\u00adtions later. So we believed Pelosi\u00b4s visit would actually also bring benefits, including the evidence about U.S.\u00b4 commitment as well as inter\u00adna\u00adtional support, although those were rather gestural. So we were in the position that we needed to support this.<\/p>\n

Are the main political parties inter\u00adnally divided about this?<\/em><\/p>\n

The DPP is not divided, it is all supportive of this visit. But there could be a split within the KMT. There are some people within the KMT, who believe Taiwan should unite together now because Nancy Pelosi\u00b4s visit is not for the DPP. She is here for the whole of Taiwan. But there are also some other voices saying that it is really bad timing now and who were against the visit. So within the KMT the opinions are more evenly distributed.<\/p>\n

China\u00b4s immediate reactions<\/h3>\n

Could you briefly describe with which measures China has reacted and how you assess this?<\/em><\/p>\n

There were of course the strong military actions. Rockets and missiles were fired into the restricted zones on the first day of the announced exercises. And we also saw many fighters and other aircrafts in the north- and south-west entering Taiwan\u00b4s air defense identi\u00adfi\u00adcation zone (ADIZ) and some of them even crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait.<\/p>\n

On the second day, we no longer saw the firing of missiles, but China dispatched their vessels surrounding Taiwan. And the aircrafts started to concen\u00adtrate on the north-western side of Taiwan, especially in the zone close to Taoyuan, a city in the north-west.<\/p>\n

Also on the third day, we saw a high concen\u00adtration of aircrafts and vessels in the north-west of Taiwan and a regular entering into ADIZ and some crossing of the median line.<\/p>\n

Of course, this is only a rough summary and not a compre\u00adhensive list of all the opera\u00adtions. Also, the exercises continued even beyond the initially announced timeframe.<\/p>\n

In addition to the military exercises, there were many cyber-attacks against Taiwan, which already started before Nancy Pelosi arrived. Furthermore, we faced a strong disin\u00adfor\u00admation and narrative campaign, as well as heavy economic sanctions.<\/p>\n

China reacted with military exercises that included the firing of missiles and the dispatching of warships and \u2011planes. How has Taiwan\u00b4s government responded to this so far?<\/p>\n

Taiwan\u00b4s government is sending vessels and aircraft in order to repel China\u2019s assets back and to try to maintain the median line. The primary actions were meant to prevent China from claiming that they have already estab\u00adlished a new status quo.<\/p>\n

With regard to the disin\u00adfor\u00admation campaign, various ministries and other organi\u00adza\u00adtions tried to quickly publish alerts, warning people about fake news. However, concerning the economic sanctions, the government has not fully discussed any counter\u00admea\u00adsures at this point. The primary focus was on how to respond to military threats.<\/p>\n

A couple of days after China\u2019s military exercises started, Taiwan\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Ministry of National Defense became more active in their commu\u00adni\u00adcation, not only to the Taiwanese public but also internationally.<\/em><\/p>\n

Yes, because we saw that the situation changed dramat\u00adi\u00adcally. China initially announced to conduct military exercises from August 4th to August 7th, later extended to August 8th. But because China then continued exercises beyond that schedule and because we have already witnessed over 150 cancel\u00adla\u00adtions of inter\u00adna\u00adtional flights and a good number of commercial ships that tried to bypass Taiwan, the ministries decided to go public about these issues and to express their hope for support from the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community.<\/p>\n

Potential impli\u00adca\u00adtions and inter\u00adna\u00adtional support<\/h3>\n

From your perspective what will be the potential impli\u00adca\u00adtions for Taiwan, for Cross-Strait relations, and the region?<\/em><\/p>\n

There are several dimen\u00adsions of course.<\/p>\n

Concerning Cross-Strait relations, China\u2019s show of force showed the whole world, including the Taiwanese people, that Xi Jinping no longer has an interest in \u201cpeaceful reuni\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d. China\u00b4s Taiwan Affairs Office yesterday published a new White Paper saying that \u201cpeaceful reuni\u00adfi\u00adcation is still the ultimate goal\u201d, but it also says \u201cthe use of force will not be renounced\u201d. The strong military reaction shows that China is willing to either coerce Taiwan into submission or to take it militarily, should the Taiwanese people opt not to \u201cunify\u201d. This seems to be Xi Jinping\u00b4s message and signal toward Cross-Strait relations.<\/p>\n

The previous assessment that a Chinese military attack against Taiwan will not happen anytime soon, needs to be readjusted. To us, China\u00b4s military exercises looked as if they have used this oppor\u00adtunity to practice a blockade scenario. Our past judgment about the possi\u00adbility of peace, right now, has been totally shattered. The issue is now, how long it will take and how we can repel the coercive diplomacy set up by China to restore the status quo.<\/p>\n

In terms of the military exercises, it also seems the U.S. has not been fully attentive to what has been happening here this time. For example, in 1995\/\u200b1996 the US sent warships and two aircraft carriers much closer than today\u00b4s position. They were able to effec\u00adtively push back. This time the US only has one aircraft carrier and in a more distant position. So this time the US hasn\u00b4t really been able to present a very strong signal to China.<\/p>\n

China wanted to utilize the oppor\u00adtunity to show other countries, including Taiwan, that it is not afraid of the US anymore. China-US dynamics have changed. In the past, China and the US still had a lot of possi\u00adbil\u00adities to manage their relationship. Whereas right now it seems China forces US-China relations into one that is very openly compet\u00aditive and even militarily hostile to each other. So the military dimension will increase dramatically.<\/p>\n

And of course, there are also major impli\u00adca\u00adtions for Japan-China relations. Those missiles fired into Japan\u00b4s exclusive economic zone, have been an acute warning for Japan. It showed Japan that anything that happens with Taiwan, will also endanger Japan\u00b4s security.<\/p>\n

As you can see, these military exercises and the show of force will have major impli\u00adca\u00adtions for political devel\u00adop\u00adments in the region. And I haven\u00b4t even mentioned the broader geopo\u00adlitical shifts yet.<\/p>\n

Against the background of these very concerning devel\u00adop\u00adments, what is your opinion on how the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community and especially the EU could or should contribute to de-escalation and support Taiwan?<\/em><\/p>\n

Instead of thinking about de-escalation, the EU should think about how to help Taiwan to restore the status quo, as it was before the Chinese military exercises. Because right now China wants to eliminate the median line of the Taiwan Strait, which in our view is extremely provocative and very dangerous for Taiwan. To restore the status quo, Taiwan needs help from the U.S., EU, U.K., and others.<\/p>\n

The second thing is, the EU really needs to help Lithuania to fight against pressure from China. Because we are antic\u00adi\u00adpating that China will place similar types of sanctions against Taiwan. Because of Lithuania\u00b4s support of Taiwan, China started to boycott every\u00adthing that is \u201cMade in Lithuania\u201d and also pressured companies not to use parts and supplies from Lithuania. Probably in the future, China might employ similar measures for Taiwan. I believe, first of all, that the EU of course needs to support Lithuania with all available measures. And at the same time, it is important to antic\u00adipate similar moves toward Taiwan, to develop precau\u00adtionary measures, and prepare for scenarios on how to react if China decides to use a similar type of sanction.<\/p>\n

Third, the EU\u00b4s economic engagement with Taiwan could be strengthened. Although we have seen an upgrade in exchanges between the EU and Taiwan, but economic and trade relations could be further boosted.<\/p>\n

In addition, I would say the EU should inter\u00adnally discuss \u201caid-to-Taiwan-packages\u201d for the future, including protection of supply lines, supply of material and resources as well as guarding assets to help protect shipments. Because we are going to expect that China will probably have an isolation campaign against Taiwan and could try to send shipments away from Taiwan. So the support and escort of shipments might need to be conducted through the EU itself. And in terms of non-lethal military support sharing intel\u00adli\u00adgence infor\u00admation for example would help Taiwan.<\/p>\n

Lastly, from my point of view, polit\u00adi\u00adcally the EU should counter Beijing\u00b4s claim that Taiwan is part of China. You should artic\u00adulate that you have your one-China-policy, but not support China\u00b4s claim of Taiwan being part of the People\u2019s Republic, like what we see within the UN. This would establish the background for better positioning yourself, if the EU later wants to be involved in inter\u00adna\u00adtional missions.<\/p>\n

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Dr. I\u2011Chung Lai is a senior adviser to the \u201cTaiwan Thinktank\u201d, a public policy think tank based in Taiwan.<\/p>\n

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