{"id":50137,"date":"2022-10-24T20:33:37","date_gmt":"2022-10-24T18:33:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=50137"},"modified":"2024-06-27T15:04:41","modified_gmt":"2024-06-27T13:04:41","slug":"network-russia-policy-paper-ulrich-speck-zeitenwende","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/network-russia-policy-paper-ulrich-speck-zeitenwende\/","title":{"rendered":"Zeiten\u00adwende: Towards a New German and European Russia Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

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German Chancellor Gerhard Schr\u00f6der and Vladimir Putin during a visit to the Nord Stream hub in Vyborg 2009. Photo IMAGO<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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Germany\u2019s decades-long policy of political partnership with Russia is in tatters \u2014 instead of a friendly democ\u00adratic country it got an aggressive dicta\u00adtorship. To avoid future failures, we need strength and resilience, writes ULRICH SPECK<\/a>.<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message message_box_color=\u201cpeacoc\u201d css=\u201c\u201d]This paper is part of our Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Expert Network Russia<\/a>. Its publi\u00adcation was supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The views expressed are the author\u2019s own.<\/p>\n

Download the PDF version<\/a> here \u2014 Read this paper in German\/\u200bRussian<\/a><\/p>\n

[\/vc_message][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Germany\u2019s Russia policy of the last decades has failed \u2013 it has not only failed to achieve its stated goal of modern\u00adizing the country but ended up at the opposite. Instead of becoming a democ\u00adratic, plural\u00adistic country with a diver\u00adsified economy, and a constructive inter\u00adna\u00adtional player that seeks \u201cwin-win\u201d solutions with others, Russia has turned into an author\u00adi\u00adtarian state that imposes its rule at home by force and that increas\u00adingly defines itself to the outside world as an empire that relies above all on war as a means of domination.<\/p>

\"Portrait<\/p>\n

Ulrich Speck is a geopo\u00adlitical analyst and a columnist for the Neue Z\u00fcrcher Zeitung. He is a former fellow of Carnegie Brussels, the Transat\u00adlantic Academy Washington and the German Marshall Fund of the United States.<\/p><\/div>\n

Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has developed a close relationship with Russia. Three chancellors, Helmut Kohl (1982\u20131998), Gerhard Schr\u00f6der (1998\u20132005) and Angela Merkel (2005\u20132021) have put their hopes on a political partnership with Moscow. The political relationship was under\u00adpinned by economic ties, namely in the energy sector. And vice versa, Germany was one of Putin\u2019s most important partners for two decades.<\/p>\n

In view of this close relationship, Germany must now ask itself what part German policy towards Russia played in the country\u2019s devel\u00adopment into an author\u00adi\u00adtarian and aggressive actor that threatens the European peace order \u2014 what mistakes were made and what must be done differ\u00adently in the future. Only when it is clear what went wrong can there be a real new start.<\/p>\n

The old paradigm: between the end of the Cold War and the Zeitenwende<\/h2>\n

The way the Cold War ended has shaped Germany\u2019s Russia policy for three decades. That Gorbachev, after long hesitation, was persuaded by Helmut Kohl and George H.W. Bush to accept German unifi\u00adcation within Nato, that in the following years the remaining Soviet troops were withdrawn from East Germany as promised, all this led to great relief and gratitude in Germany. One must not forget that the risks of the unifi\u00adcation process were enormous, and that a great deal depended on having a partner in Moscow who stuck to his promises.<\/p>\n

That Russia proved to be a constructive partner in this process was the formative experience of those years, leading quite organ\u00adi\u00adcally to a \u201cRussia-first\u201d policy. In the coming decades Germany focused primarily on Russia and mostly ignored the rest of the post-Soviet space. On the one hand, because the German government worried that the relationship with Russia could fall back to a state of hostility. The gains in security since the end of the Cold War depended on Moscow continuing to behave construc\u00adtively. On the other hand, it was also hoped that Russia would become a respon\u00adsible player in a new, peaceful world order, as a close partner of Germany and Europe. And last but not least, Russia\u2019s economic potential, especially in the energy sector, played a consid\u00aderable role by under\u00adpinning the political relationship with tangible material gains.<\/p>\n

All this prepared the ground for Putin to move the relationship to a new level. In his speech in the German Bundestag in September 2001, delivered in German, Putin, who had been stationed in Dresden as a KGB agent from 1985 to 1990, made Germany the offer of a close partnership. Russia \u201calways has special feelings towards Germany\u201d, he declared. Europe could only become a \u201cpowerful and independent centre of world politics\u201d if it united with the \u201chuman, terri\u00adtorial and natural resources\u201d as well as the \u201ceconomic, cultural and defence potential of Russia\u201d. Although we speak of a partnership, Putin added, we have \u201cstill not learned to trust each other\u201d. But today, \u201cwe must declare once and for all: The Cold War is over\u201d.<\/p>\n

The offer fell on fertile ground. An especially close relationship developed between Putin and the then German Chancellor Gerhard Schr\u00f6der. Putin saw the oppor\u00adtunity to build a personal relationship, a \u201cfriendship\u201d, with Schr\u00f6der when the German chancellor fell out with Washington over the Iraq war in 2003. For a moment, Schr\u00f6der stood quite alone on the inter\u00adna\u00adtional stage \u2013 until the Russian President jumped to his side and backed him and from then on, in a series of joint meetings with French President Jacques Chirac.<\/p>\n

From that moment on, Schr\u00f6der was closely associated with the Russian leader. Shortly before the 2005 federal election that led to his ouster, Schr\u00f6der and Putin signed a memorandum of under\u00adstanding to build a gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea that would directly connect Russia and Germany: Nord Stream 1. After his election defeat, Schr\u00f6der then became head of the super\u00advisory board of the operating company \u2014 a well-paid lobbyist who used his political weight not only for the construction of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, completed in 2011, but also for the second pipeline, Nord Stream 2.<\/p>\n

Angela Merkel, who succeeded Schr\u00f6der in 2005, did not share Schr\u00f6der\u2019s enthu\u00adsiasm for Putin. But despite her critical distance from the Kremlin, she did not question the main principles of Germany\u2019s Russia policy. Her decision to stick to this policy was also encouraged by Schr\u00f6der\u2019s former closest collab\u00ado\u00adrator, Frank-Walter Stein\u00admeier, who twice became foreign minister under Merkel (2005\u201309 and 2013\u201317) in a \u201cgrand coalition\u201d between Merkel\u2019s CDU and SPD. For Stein\u00admeier (SPD), \u201cinter\u00adweaving\u201d (verflechten) Germany with Russia as an instrument to modernize Russia was his central foreign policy project. Putin received him as a foreign minister personally time and again, and he had regular, trusting exchanges with Sergei Lavrov. Sigmar Gabriel, SPD\u2019s party leader from 2009 to 2017 and Minister of Economics and briefly Foreign Affairs under Merkel, was also one of the leading advocates of a close partnership with Moscow; Gabriel was very much engaged in favor of the construction of Nord Stream 2 in the crucial years since 2015.<\/p>\n

After Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine in 2014 \u2013 the annex\u00adation of Crimea and covert attack on the Donbas \u2013 Merkel was one of the driving forces for Western sanctions against Russia. But she left the paradigm of partnership with Russia untouched. On the one hand, she was putting her hopes on diplomacy with the Kremlin; in numerous talks with Putin in various formats Merkel tried to convince the Russian president that he was on the wrong track. On the other hand, she was not prepared to abandon the idea of ever closer economic inter\u00adde\u00adpen\u00addence and agreed to the construction of Nord Stream 2.<\/p>\n

At least in retro\u00adspect, it becomes clear how naive Merkel\u2019s hope for a diplo\u00admatic solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine \u2013 the so-called Normandy format \u2013 has been. For Putin, the talks were merely an attempt to achieve at lower cost what he was deter\u00admined to achieve: control over Ukraine, a country that in his view had no right to an independent existence outside the Russian orbit.<\/p>\n

While leaders played a crucial role in Germany\u2019s Russia policy, business and the broader population largely went along. Until the open attack on Ukraine in February 2022, Germany\u2019s policy towards Russia, set on track by Schr\u00f6ders and continued by Merkel, was not very contro\u00adversial. The mantra that ended almost every debate was that Russia was a difficult but indis\u00adpensable partner, without whom there would be no solution to the conflicts in and around Europe. Cooper\u00adation with the Kremlin was also seen as vital for the fight against climate change. Only among the Greens, who maintained close contacts with East-Central European reformers and Russian dissi\u00addents, were there some critical voices.<\/p>\n

The instru\u00adments Berlin used against Moscow consisted almost exclu\u00adsively of \u201ccarrots\u201d, almost never of \u201csticks\u201d, i.e. political or economic pressure. Above all, Berlin was putting its hope on talks with the Kremlin. \u201cKeeping the commu\u00adni\u00adcation channels open\u201d was another mantra. The more aggressive Russia was behaving \u2013 the wars against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014 and the military inter\u00advention in Syria since 2015 \u2014 the more important it became, in the eyes of leading politi\u00adcians in Berlin, to talk to Putin. Yet dialogue mostly was a dead end. What appears reasonable in the eyes of a German politician with a social\u00adi\u00adsation in democ\u00adratic politics, based on bargaining and the idea \u201cwin-win solutions\u201d, not neces\u00adsarily sounds convincing in the ears of a Russian leader who came to power by ruthlessly pushing aside his competitors and was running the country through brute force at home and aggression towards the outside world.<\/p>\n

A tougher course towards Russia, as advocated especially by Poland and the Baltic states, was dismissed in Berlin as counter\u00adpro\u00adductive. Instead, the focus remained on \u201csoft\u201d instru\u00adments and a partnership with Russia. As foreign minister in 2016, Stein\u00admeier still complained about alleged \u201csabre rattling\u201d by NATO towards Russia. Also in 2016, after Russia had already bombed civilian targets in Syria, Stein\u00admeier announced in a speech in Yekater\u00adinburg, Russia, that \u201cespecially Germany and Russia should work hand in hand\u201d in the recon\u00adstruction of Syria.<\/p>\n

Yet it also has to be noted that Merkel\u2019s support for Ukraine since 2014 was sincere and important; she played a crucial role in pushing through economic sanctions against Russia in Europa. And her sympathy for the opposition in Belarus and Russia was genuine \u2014 she helped, for example, save the life of prominent opposition politician Alexei Nawalny by having him brought to a Berlin hospital after his poisoning in Russia in August 2020.<\/p>\n

But at the same time, Merkel continued with the Russia policy that had been put on the track by Schr\u00f6der. Even despite the fact that the gap between the stated goal of Russian modern\u00adization \u2013 towards democracy and market economy \u2013 and the reality of Russian politics was growing wider and wider. At least with the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2014\/\u200b15, it would have been overdue to establish a new, more robust paradigm for Germany\u2019s Russia policy.<\/p>\n

Paradigm lost: Germany\u2019s Russia policy in limbo<\/h2>\n

The end of Germany\u2019s longtime Russia policy wasn\u2019t the result of a strategic decisions. True, some in the new government that took office in December 2021 wanted a different, more distanced approach to Russia, namely the Greens. Chancellor Scholz and his party SPD, on the other hand, weren\u2019t ready to abandon the long-held principles that were guiding Russia policy since two decades.<\/p>\n

It was Putin\u2019s open aggression that made the German Russia policy unsus\u00adtainable: the Russian troop deployment around Ukraine, followed by written ultimatums to the US and to NATO to largely withdraw from the sphere of control claimed by Russia \u2013 Eastern Europe and East Central Europe \u2013 and finally the open attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022.<\/p>\n

Until the end, Scholz and Macron had put their hopes on talks with Moscow, directly with Putin, but also in the Normandy format (France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia) \u2013 hoping that Russia would be inter\u00adested in some kind of diplo\u00admatic compromise. And even in the first days of the war, Scholz was still hesitant to take a new course; he initially continued to refuse to send weapons to Ukraine. Only when the pressure from outside and inside became truly overwhelming did the Chancellor decide to change course.<\/p>\n

In a speech in the Bundestag on 27 February, Scholz announced a Zeiten\u00adwende, the end of the old and the start of a new era. His diagnosis was clear, his language frank: Putin has \u201ccold-bloodedly started a war of aggression\u201d because \u201cthe freedom of Ukrainians\u201d is challenging his \u201cown oppressive regime\u201d. Putin is \u201ca warmonger\u201d to whom we must \u201cset limits\u201d. The Kremlin ruler wants to \u201cwipe an independent country off the world map\u201d and \u201cshatters the European security order\u201d. Putin \u201cwants to establish a Russian empire\u201d, he wants to \u201cfunda\u00admen\u00adtally reorder condi\u00adtions in Europe according to his ideas\u201d. For the \u201cforeseeable future\u201d Putin is endan\u00adgering security in Europe, which is why Germany must help Ukraine with weapons and seriously invest in its armed forces.<\/p>\n

With this speech, the German-Russian partnership that had been promoted by Putin so eloquently in the German Bundestag in 2001, and which had guided German Russia policy ever since, was official declared dead.<\/p>\n

But in the following weeks and months, German actions were not as deter\u00admined and powerful as the Chancel\u00adlor\u2019s words in the Zeiten\u00adwende speech had sounded. The expec\u00adta\u00adtions Scholz had raised with his speech weren\u2019t fulfilled. Yes, Germany delivered weapons and ammunition to Ukraine, and it supported Western sanctions against Russia. A policy that was widely supported \u2013 opinion polls showed an overwhelming majority in favor of a confronta\u00adtional course against Russia and massive support for Ukraine, including weapons. Even when it became clear, in late summer, that Russia was trying to weaponize gas deliv\u00aderies against Germany, support for Ukraine remained unchanged. The solidarity of the German population with the attacked country was and remains great.<\/p>\n

Yet when it came to action, the German government remained quite cautious and hesitant. In terms of weapons and ammunition, it was the USA that supplied the lion\u2019s share to Ukraine, followed by Poland and other East-Central European countries as well as Great Britain. When domestic criticism over the chancellors reluc\u00adtance boiled over, Scholz gave an interview in which he publicly warned about the risk of nuclear war, in order to justify his cautious approach. The tensions between those forces in the government that preferred more decisive support for Ukraine and the chancellory that kept defending its hesitancy remained over the summer and the autumn.<\/p>\n

Germany was also putting the brakes on some of the Western sanctions. In particular, Berlin blocked attempts at the EU level to exert massive pressure on Russia through energy sanctions. Worried that the population would not be ready to bear the economic costs of energy sanctions, the German government refrained from using this instrument \u2013 and thus left it to Putin to use gas as a weapon. However, the fact that this weapon proved blunt when Moscow increas\u00adingly started to use it in the summer was also due to the fact that the German government had worked for months to diminish its energy depen\u00addence on Russia.<\/p>\n

Unlike Merkel in 2014\/\u200b15, Scholz did not take a leadership role. Germany was rather on the cautious, slow side, even if it was solidly in the Western mainstream. This rather passive approach was easy for Berlin to take because Washington provided Western leadership on a very profes\u00adsional, strate\u00adgi\u00adcally sound level. Germany, like other European countries, could easily plug themselves into a strategy that Washington had conceived, in close consul\u00adtation with America\u2019s key European allies. For Berlin, there was simply no need to make any major strategic decision of its own \u2013 only to weigh up which of the proposed measures one wanted to partic\u00adipate in and to what extent, and where one preferred to put on the brakes.<\/p>\n

At the same time, competent US leadership made it relatively easy for the Europeans to project the appearance of unity and unity to the outside world. Existing fault lines were largely covered up. For much of Western Europe, namely France, Russia remains an important player in European and global geopol\u00aditics \u2013 with whom one must sooner or later cooperate again. French president Macron again and again empha\u00adsises that peace can only be found in negoti\u00ada\u00adtions with the Kremlin. By contrast, in East and Central Europe, in Scandi\u00adnavia and Great Britain the view is dominant that we need to prepare for a long period of tension with Russia \u2013 only if Russia experi\u00adences a clear defeat, the country will it give up its imperial ambitions, which funda\u00admen\u00adtally threaten the European security order. Both of these camps are repre\u00adsented in German politics and the public debate \u2013 the European fault lines run right through Germany.<\/p>\n

The unity and deter\u00admined reaction of the West to Russia\u2019s war of conquest against Ukraine is mainly the product of US leadership. Yet once the barbaric Russian attacks against Ukraine will be less in the focus, old debates about dealing with Russia might simply return. The old ideas and paradigms are not neces\u00adsarily dead. If the situation changes, the mood could change again.  The old policy has failed, yet a new one does not exist yet.<\/p>\n

That is why it is important to build a new Western Russia strategy that takes the Zeiten\u00adwende seriously and draws the conclu\u00adsions from the experience of Russia\u2019s open, full-scale war against Ukraine. The first step towards a new strategic is to realize the mistakes that have been made in the past.<\/p>\n

What went wrong?<\/h2>\n

The original idea behind Germany\u2019s Russia policy remains worthwile: to try to support Russia\u2019s trans\u00adfor\u00admation into a liberal democracy and market economy. The conflict between Russia and Europe is not primarily driven by power politics, it is driven by a systemic conflict. If Russia were a democracy, its claim to a sphere of influence would not immedi\u00adately disappear and conflicts on the level of power politics would not simply vanish. But, as with many other countries that used to be empires, these conflicts could be contained, other interests would move at the forefront.<\/p>\n

In its essence, the conflict of Putin\u2019s Russia with the West is systemic, it is driven by the fear of the autocratic Russian elite Putin has built to be toppled by revolution or democ\u00adratic reform \u2013 the fear of so-called \u201ccolour revolu\u00adtions\u201d, which according to Russian propa\u00adganda are being under\u00adtaken by the West to weaken Russia. This fear very much increases the readiness for conflict with the West.<\/p>\n

With a democ\u00adratic Russia, on the other hand, Germany and the West could cooperate construc\u00adtively in many fields; the disap\u00adpearance of the systemic antag\u00adonism would enable a mutual opening. At the same time, the threat Russia poses to its neigh\u00adbours would be signif\u00adi\u00adcantly reduced, and might even disappear in the longer run. A democ\u00adratic Russia would far more be ready to recognise the borders of the Russian nation state as its terri\u00adtorial limits and respect the sover\u00adeignty of neigh\u00adbours. In other words: Russia would probably go down the way many empires have gone before it.<\/p>\n

The problem with German policy towards Russia in recent decades was thus not the stated goal: to promote Russia\u2019s devel\u00adopment towards liberal democracy. The problem was that German policy towards Russia hardly pursued this goal seriously. Instead, Berlin has engaged closely with the Kremlin, turning a blind eye as Russia moved towards autocracy and neo-imperi\u00adalism \u2013 instead of focussing on political reform. And in the economic sphere, the talk of moderni\u00adsation was little more than a fig leaf to create the space for German businesses to pursue their interests with Russia, especially in the area of energy policy.<\/p>\n

In particular, German policy towards Russia in the last two decades has made three major mistakes:<\/p>\n

Illusions about Russia. <\/strong>With Russia\u2019s war against Georgia in 2008 and the attack on Ukraine in 2014\/\u200b15 it should have been clear that Putin was putting the country on a path of renewed imperial aggression, turning Russia into a threat to the European peace order. And at the latest with the \u201celection\u201d of Putin as president in 2012 again, after Medvedev, it should have been clear that Russia was on the road to hard-line autocracy. Yet instead of changing its strategic, Germany largely choose to ignore that Russia was turning away from the modern\u00adization agenda.<\/p>\n

Russia first.<\/strong> For three decades, Germany has focused primarily on Russia and largely ignored Russia\u2019s neigh\u00adbours. A telling example: When the then Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski presented his plans for an \u201cEastern Partnership\u201d to German Foreign Minister Stein\u00admeier in 2008 and suggested that this initiative to strengthen EU relations with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan should be a shared one, Stein\u00admeier waved it off. \u201cStein\u00admeier put relations with Russia first and saw the Polish proposal more as a threat to German interests in Russia,\u201d Cornelius Ochmann writes<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Sikorski then pushed ahead with his plans together with Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt \u2014 while Stein\u00admeier focussed on the \u201cmoderni\u00adsation partnership\u201d with Russia.<\/p>\n

What was primarily supported by Germany, but also by the USA, was not the new state system that was emerging in Eastern Europe after the Soviet Union fell apart. Instead, Russia was the privi\u00adleged partner while Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and the South Caucasus were largely ignored. The west was betting on Russia becoming some sort of regional hegemon and ignored the fact that with the \u201cfrozen conflicts\u201d, Russia was weakening the sover\u00adeignty of many of its neighbors.<\/p>\n

Energy depen\u00addence.<\/strong> Berlin\u2019s inability to impose massive energy sanctions against Russia after the Russian attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022 is the conse\u00adquence of a failed policy of economic engagement. Instead of constraining Russia, what was supposed to work as inter\u00adde\u00adpen\u00addence in fact turned out to become a one-sided German depen\u00addence. In addition to that, the construction of Nord Stream 1 and 2 has led to a massive loss of confi\u00addence in Central and Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n

Towards a new Russia policy<\/h2>\n

In view of Russia\u2019s full-scale, open attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the first goal of a new Russia policy must be to contain Russian aggression and consol\u00adidate the European peace order in such a way that Russia is perma\u00adnently deterred from further attacks.<\/p>\n

The first, most urgent priority is massive support for Ukraine, militarily, polit\u00adi\u00adcally and econom\u00adi\u00adcally. If Ukraine wins, Russia may abandon the costly neo-imperi\u00adalist path; perhaps liberal democracy will get a second chance.<\/p>\n

Secondly, the West must focus on strength\u00adening the sover\u00adeignty of the countries of the region, their resilience and their ability to deter Russia militarily. The way to prevent further wars is to consol\u00adidate the order that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The more the countries of the region \u2014 inside and outside NATO \u2014 are able to secure their sover\u00adeignty against an aggressive Russia, the more stable this order will be.<\/p>\n

Third, the West can only success\u00adfully push back against Russian neo-imperi\u00adalism if it builds a position of strength. To do this, the Europeans must become independent of Russian energy, invest in their resilience \u2014 also by fending off disin\u00adfor\u00admation and propa\u00adganda \u2014 and in their military capabilities.<\/p>\n

Fourth, all this can only work together with Washington. The central role of the USA has become visible again. Not only has the US taken the lead and united the West by building a common strategy. It has also become obvious once more that only the US has the strategic and military capabil\u00adities, including in the nuclear arena, to manage such a confrontation with Russia. To maintain American support for European security, Europeans must bear a far greater share of the burden of the joint defense of the west; also with regard to the fact that the US is increas\u00adingly engaged in Asia-Pacific.<\/p>\n

Fifth, the West should not let its guard down, but should at the same time be prepared for change in Russia and develop a vision of what constructive relations with a different Russia could and should look like. The Western interest in seeing Russia transform itself towards liberal democracy and market economy remains strong; an autocrat\u00adi\u00adcally run Russia will always pose a major problem for the security and stability in Eastern and East-Central Europe. If Russia embarks on such a path of trans\u00adfor\u00admation, the West must offer its support very quickly and decisively \u2013 without repeating the mistakes of the past decades.<\/p>\n

\"Textende\"<\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n

This paper is published in the framework of the project \u201eRussia and the West: Europe\u2019s Post War Order and the Future of Relations with Russia\u201c, which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry.  The views are the author\u2019s own.<\/em><\/p>\n

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