{"id":50335,"date":"2022-10-25T15:24:10","date_gmt":"2022-10-25T13:24:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=50335"},"modified":"2024-06-27T14:58:48","modified_gmt":"2024-06-27T12:58:48","slug":"network-russia-policy-paper-reiter-poland","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/network-russia-policy-paper-reiter-poland\/","title":{"rendered":"Poland\u2019s Trian\u00adgular Russia Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

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The foreign ministers of France, Germany and Poland \u2014 Fabius, Stein\u00admeier and Sikorski (right), during a meeting in the \u201cWeimar Triangle\u201d format in 2014. Photo: IMAGO<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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Poland\u2019s complex relationship with Russia is deeply inter\u00adtwined with Germany and Ukraine, Janusz Reiter writes.<\/h2>\n

<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message message_box_color=\u201cpeacoc\u201d css=\u201c\u201d]This paper is part of our Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Expert Network Russia<\/a>. Its publi\u00adcation was supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The views expressed are the author\u2019s own.<\/p>\n

Download the PDF version<\/a>. You can read the German original here<\/a>!<\/p>\n

[\/vc_message][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Polish-Russian relations can hardly be under\u00adstood without taking into account two other states: Germany and Ukraine.  Both have, each in a different way, helped shape the relationship between Poland and its large eastern neighbour Russia. They are all asymmet\u00adrical relations. For Poland, Germany and Russia have always been two defining factors \u2014 two enemies for a long time. For Germany, only Russia has been a \u201cdefining partner\u201d. Poland did not have this status. The Ukrainians histor\u00adi\u00adcally define their geopo\u00adlitical position by looking to Russia and to Poland, having shown affection to Germany several times \u2013 but without recip\u00adro\u00adcation. Russia, meanwhile, keeps pinning hopes on Germany, cannot get along with Poland and refuses to accept Ukraine as a state and nation.<\/p>

\"Portrait<\/p>\n

<\/a> \nJanusz Reiter is a former Polish Ambas\u00adsador to Germany and the US. He is the founder and chairman of the Warsaw-based Center for Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Relations and author of numerous articles about Polish foreign policy.<\/p><\/div>\n

Poland\u2019s Russian experience is important for the European debate<\/h2>\n

The complexity of Polish-Russian relations is the result of geography and history. In the Polish perception, this makes for a unique and special relationship. But this is only partly true. Poland\u2019s Russia experience is an important part of the wider European relationship with Russia. In Western Europe, especially in Germany, Poland\u2019 stance was often seen as a kind of psycho\u00adlogical deficiency or exces\u00adsively sensitive and dismissed as polit\u00adi\u00adcally useless. This in turn created a lack of trust in Polish-German relations that could only be amended today.<\/p>\n

Poland\u2019s Russia experience has also contributed to the fact that the idea of a Poland-Russia-Germany triangle is predom\u00adi\u00adnantly a topic for histo\u00adrians. But in current Polish politics, there is a tendency to present such a triangle as a contem\u00adporary geopo\u00adlitical format.<\/p>\n

Since the late 18th century, Poland was caught in a fatal situation, losing its indepen\u00addence for 123 years. There were always conflicts of interest between Germany and Russia, but the rejection of Poland as a sovereign state united these two great powers, even as late as September 1939. It was not until 1989\/\u200b90 that Poland was able to redefine its geopo\u00adlitical situation. Since then, it is no longer a country between Russia and Germany but a member of the Western community, even if some in the right-wing spectrum of Polish politics portray Germany as a threat rather than a partner.<\/p>\n

The self-liber\u00adation from Soviet rule happened peace\u00adfully, so that the strategic Polish-Russian antag\u00adonism lost some of its drama. Both countries tried to influence the West\u2019s decision on opening NATO to the East. Poland won the upper hand, benefiting of course from Russia\u2019s political weakness, but without provoking it. Moscow, after all, seemed to distance itself from its imperial tradition, even showing sympathy for the concept of liberal democracy.   Some in the new Polish elite began to hope that recon\u00adcil\u00adi\u00adation was possible between Poland and Russia, as had happened between Poland and Germany. However, even the greatest optimists agreed that only a Poland firmly anchored in the West could achieve a settlement with Russia. A neutral Poland would sooner or later provoke Russia to re-establish its regional dominance. German policy\u00admakers also feared that an unaligned Poland could become subject to power rivalries.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s presence in Poland declined drasti\u00adcally in the 1990s. The traumatic memories of Russian rule did not fade away, but they largely lost their emotional impact. Even Vladimir Putin\u2019s accession to power in 1999 was not an immediate \u201cgame changer\u201d. Poland was preoc\u00adcupied with EU membership negoti\u00ada\u00adtions, for which Moscow in turn showed relatively little interest. 1 May 2004, the day of Poland\u2019s EU accession, seemed to be the symbolic end of the chapter of Polish history that had begun in the 18th century. The recon\u00adstruction of Polish geopol\u00aditics seemed complete.<\/p>\n

Poland did not share Germany\u2019s skepticism over Ukraine<\/h2>\n

But as it turned out, the reality was much more compli\u00adcated. Under Putin, Russia became an increas\u00adingly aggressive revisionist power. While Warsaw and Berlin basically agreed over this, they often disagreed over the political conse\u00adquences. Unlike Warsaw, Berlin believed it could pursue a \u201ctrans\u00adfor\u00admative\u201d Russia policy. The other big open question was about the future of the countries that lie between NATO\/\u200bEU and Russia. Here, too, there were differ\u00adences between Poland and Germany and Western Europe, although initially without much influence on actual policy.<\/p>\n

The new Polish elite was anti-Soviet but not anti-Russian. However, it also followed the political tradition to support the indepen\u00addence aspira\u00adtions of its eastern neigh\u00adbours \u2014 especially Ukraine. The rationale was both moral and, above all, strategic: the forces that emerged from the Solidarity movement could not deny their neigh\u00adbours the rights they had previ\u00adously claimed for their own country. Strate\u00adgi\u00adcally, it was also clear that it was in Poland\u2019s interest not to become the Western community\u2019s eastern borderland. The democ\u00adratic devel\u00adopment of these countries would be a contri\u00adbution to Poland\u2019s security. Warsaw endorsed the thesis formu\u00adlated by the Polish-born eminent US security expert Zbigniew Brzezinski, that Ukrainian indepen\u00addence would have decisive influence on Russia\u2019s political identity. Only an independent Ukraine could prevent Russia from returning to its imperial traditions.<\/p>\n

How much he was right can be seen in all clarity today.<\/p>\n

The German view was different. The majority of the German public and also the elites lacked above all an under\u00adstanding for the largest country in the region, Ukraine. Many denied it national identity and thus also any statehood. Germany was not alone in this position, but the political conse\u00adquences of German skepticism were partic\u00adu\u00adlarly relevant.<\/p>\n

As early as the 1990s, Poland was committed, with varying degrees of success, to the democ\u00adratic and market-economy devel\u00adopment of Ukraine. However, this commitment did not dominate Polish politics, whose clear preference were NATO and EU accession, which absorbed almost all political energy.<\/p>\n

Relations with Russia turned sour over Ukraine<\/h2>\n

Moscow could hardly influence Poland\u2019s political course, but it had an indirect instrument of pressure at its disposal: refusal of dialogue. Russian diplomacy spared no effort to discredit Poland in Western Europe as a \u201cRusso\u00adphobic\u201d country. That was a clever tactic. Simply because of its geography, Poland, as a NATO and EU member, wanted to partic\u00adipate in shaping Western relations with its eastern neigh\u00adbours, including Russia. Moscow\u2019s refusal to talk painfully weakened Warsaw\u2019s foreign policy instru\u00adments in this area. Moscow wanted to label Poland as a mere recipient of American orders and deny it agency over shaping European policy in Eastern Europe.<\/p>\n

In 2002, dialogue still seemed possible. Vladimir Putin visited Poland and expressed confi\u00addence about the future. As a sign of goodwill, Putin and his Polish host Aleksander Kwasniewski announced the formation of a \u201cPolish-Russian group on difficult issues\u201d. Its main purpose was to contribute to a better under\u00adstanding of the compli\u00adcated Polish-Russian history, which it partly succeeded in doing, but without having the envisaged political consequences.<\/p>\n

In 2004, Ukraine, whose image had hitherto been dominated by post-Soviet, corrupt elites, first formu\u00adlated its democ\u00adratic and European claims. This made it clear, even if not yet to everyone in the West, that Europe\u2019s trans\u00adfor\u00admation that had begun in 1989 was unfin\u00adished work. Polish President Kwasniewski used his authority to exert a moder\u00adating influence on the tense situation in Ukraine. Moscow never forgave him for this, although Kwasniewski was anything but an anti-Russian zealot \u2013 and actually played an important mediating role in Ukraine\u2019s coming crises.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s rulers hardly fulfilled the hopes of the 2004 Orange Revolution. Poland found itself in a highly uncom\u00adfortable situation. While Germany benefited econom\u00adi\u00adcally and polit\u00adi\u00adcally from its \u201cchange through trade\u201d strategy towards Russia, Poland was left pretty much alone with the then thankless role of Ukraine\u2019s advocate. Without channels of commu\u00adni\u00adcation to Moscow, Warsaw was at a strategic disad\u00advantage. The Tusk government tried to initiate a factual, pragmatic dialogue with Russia.<\/p>\n

In 2009, after intensive diplo\u00admatic efforts, Putin visited Poland again. On the Wester\u00adplatte in Gdansk, where the Second World War began on 1 September 1939, he gave a short but powerful speech. Putin even recalled the Treaty of Versailles and the \u201chumil\u00adi\u00adation\u201d of Germany that contributed to the Second World War. He also praised Russian-German relations \u201cbased on cooper\u00adation and partnership and not on historical settle\u00adments\u201d as a model for Polish-Russian relations. His speech was both a provo\u00adcation and a lure. He must have known that the Treaty of Versailles, which he condemned, had opened the way for Poland to regain indepen\u00addence. He also knew that the model of rapprochement from above, as between Russia and Germany, was met with skepticism in Poland. Warsaw preferred recon\u00adcil\u00adi\u00adation from below, as with Germany. Putin praised the \u201creasonable\u201d Germany and suggested that Poland could also follow this example. He did not elaborate on what Poland should do, but there was little doubt, that he had Ukraine in his mind, which he considered a Russian zone of influence and where he did not want Polish involvement.<\/p>\n

The US \u201cReset\u201d with Russia was short-lived<\/h2>\n

These messages were coded, but under\u00adstandable. No one in Warsaw had any illusions about Putin. But could Poland never\u00adtheless open a channel of commu\u00adni\u00adcation with Moscow, as all the larger European states had long done? Washington had just declared a \u201creset\u201d in relations with Russia, which was met with skepticism in Warsaw, but was an undeniable reality. Couldn\u2019t the geopo\u00adlitical dispute over the future of Ukraine, in which no quick solution could be expected at the time, be separated from limited, pragmatic cooperation?<\/p>\n

That exper\u00adiment was short-lived. The separation of the geopo\u00adlitical conflict over Ukraine and pragmatic cooper\u00adation with Russia proved unreal\u00adistic. The domestic political situation in Ukraine was coming to a head. The pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych came under increasing pressure from the pro-Western public, which was waiting hopefully for an agreement with the EU. When Yanukovych refused to sign the agreement, popular anger erupted in mass demon\u00adstra\u00adtions. Poland had to step back into its mediating role, but it was not alone. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski travelled to Ukraine with his German counterpart Frank-Walter Stein\u00admeier, and their French colleague Laurent Fabius joined in, not without hesitation. The message was that Warsaw was no longer alone, but moving in the mainstream of European politics.<\/p>\n

From the Weimar triangle to the Normandy format<\/h2>\n

But even this method had its limits. On 1 April 2014, the foreign ministers of Poland, Germany and France met in Weimar and declared that they were powerless in the face of the annex\u00adation of Crimea that had taken place shortly before. Stein\u00admeier made it clear that he was against the admission of Ukraine to NATO, while Sikorski expressed his wish to see two heavy NATO brigades stationed in Poland soon. The \u201cWeimar Triangle\u201d, in which Poland, Germany and France had tried to work together since 1991, was rather helpless.<\/p>\n

Only a few weeks later, two of the Weimar Triangle countries, France and Germany, decided to negotiate with Russia and Ukraine in the so-called Normandy format. Warsaw was surprised and disap\u00adpointed, but the signal was clear: Russia did not want Poland at the negoti\u00adating table and the two Western European partners were obviously not prepared to jeopardise the new format because of Poland. The fact that the Normandy format was no more successful in the end than the Weimar Triangle became apparent later, but it no longer had any signif\u00adi\u00adcance for Poland. Russia could fall back on the old method of refusing to talk to Poland.<\/p>\n

The handling of the plane crash near Smolensk on 10 April 2010, which killed Polish President Lech Kaczynski and 95 others, including top politi\u00adcians and officials, naturally cast another shadow over Polish-Russian relations. Russia\u2019s refusal to return the plane wreckage to Poland was, and remains to this day, a delib\u00aderate humil\u00adi\u00adation of Poland. When the PiS Law and Justice Party came to power in 2015, the Smolensk tragedy was instru\u00admen\u00adtalised for domestic political purposes. However, this could hardly harm Polish-Russian relations, because they had become almost empty anyway.<\/p>\n

At the same time, Poland began to distance itself from its European partners. This was especially true of its Western neighbour Germany.  However, the fully justified criticism of Germany\u2019s Russia policy, and in particular of Nord Stream 2, overshot the mark. The ruling right seems to see Poland as a country between two enemies, criti\u00adcizing Germany with a partic\u00adu\u00adlarly striking emotionality.<\/p>\n

Wide support for sanctions and disen\u00adgagement from Russia<\/h2>\n

The Russian attack on Ukraine has only partially changed this picture. All political forces are united in their condem\u00adnation of Moscow. This is also the case with regard to the sanctions. Poland already advocated tough sanctions against Russia after the annex\u00adation of Crimea. This policy was not painless. For many Polish companies, Russia was an attractive market. The agricul\u00adtural sector was only one of them, but the one with the strongest lobby. Never\u00adtheless, it did not dare to openly question the sanctions regime. At the same time, Poland quite consis\u00adtently pursued a policy of detachment from energy depen\u00addence on Russia. It was supported by all relevant parties, which is rather unusual, and helped the country to soften the energy shock after the Russian attack on Ukraine. The most difficult part was the renun\u00adci\u00adation of Russian coal, which comple\u00admented the more expensive and scarce Polish coal. However, this problem should be overcome relatively quickly because coal is a globally traded commodity.<\/p>\n

The perception of the Russian threat became more intense than ever since 1989. At the same time, Ukraine was newly discovered. It had been present in Poland for several years through hundreds of thousands or even more workers, but little noticed. This changed with the wave of refugees, which triggered great sympathy and solidarity. Ukraine\u2019s defence also shaped the country\u2019s image. Not only the courage but also the intel\u00adli\u00adgence and efficiency of the Ukrainians were met with respect and admiration. In the long history of Polish-Ukrainian relations, this is undoubtedly a high point.<\/p>\n

Self-isolation weakens Warsaw as Kyiv\u2019s ally<\/h2>\n

Whether this also marks the beginning of a new partnership will only become clear after the war is over. The experience of solidarity in adversity will play a role. Above all, however, Ukraine will need effective political and economic support. The extent to which Poland can provide this will largely depend on whether it can win partners in the EU and NATO for this purpose. The policy of self-isolation now being pursued will consid\u00aderably weaken Poland\u2019s position as an ally of Ukraine. The more the country distances itself from the West \u2014 especially from its Western European partners \u2014 the less attractive it will be to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Critics accuse the Polish government of steering eastwards. The ruling right\u2019s anti-Western cultural criticism can give this impression. Fortu\u00adnately, it does not translate into real politics. Even an oppor\u00adtunistic Russia policy a la Viktor Orban is hard to imagine in Poland. Historical experience protects Poland from this. They faded after 1989 but were revived by Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Should Ukraine assert itself as a sovereign, successful state, while Russia loses the power to threaten its neigh\u00adbours, this could mean a historic turning point in Polish geopol\u00aditics. For this to happen, however, two important condi\u00adtions would have to be met: Europe and the transat\u00adlantic community emerge stronger from the current conflict and Poland contributes to this because it sees its future in this community. Poland has often been isolated in Europe with its policies versus Russia. This can change now if Poland itself contributes to strength\u00adening the West.<\/p>\n

\"Textende\"<\/p>\n

\n

This paper is published in the framework of the project \u201eRussia and the West: Europe\u2019s Post War Order and the Future of Relations with Russia\u201c, which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry.  The views are the author\u2019s own.<\/em><\/p>\n

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