{"id":51247,"date":"2022-12-01T15:07:03","date_gmt":"2022-12-01T14:07:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/dont-be-against-the-west-fried-copy\/"},"modified":"2024-06-27T16:32:59","modified_gmt":"2024-06-27T14:32:59","slug":"france-late-autocritique-russia-first-ukraine-second-policy-mendras-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/france-late-autocritique-russia-first-ukraine-second-policy-mendras-2\/","title":{"rendered":"France\u2019s Autocri\u00adtique of Its \u201cRussia First, Ukraine Second\u201d Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Foto: Imago Images<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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French policy towards Russia was based on self-serving delusions that led to dangerous failures and exacer\u00adbated Putin\u2019s paranoia. The West needs to overhaul its policies and build a strong security system in Europe and beyond, writes Marie Mendras.<\/h3>\n

<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message message_box_color=\u201cpeacoc\u201d css=\u201c\u201d]This paper is part of our Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Expert Network Russia<\/a>. Its publi\u00adcation was supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The views expressed are the author\u2019s own.<\/p>\n

Lesen Sie dieses Paper auf Deutsch<\/a>! Download the PDF Version<\/a> of this paper.<\/em><\/p>\n

[\/vc_message][vc_column_text]What did we get wrong? This is a daunting question for the govern\u00adments of France, Germany and several other European countries. When the Ukrainians are liberated from Russian occupation and start recon\u00adstructing their country and their lives, it will be high time for us to engage in a serious overhaul of our conception and practice of security-keeping on our continent. We will need to define a common strategy toward a defeated state and a despondent society in the Feder\u00adation of Russia. Only with a thorough analysis of wrong assess\u00adments and failed policies shall we be able to build a strong, compre\u00adhensive security system in Europe and beyond.<\/p>

\"Portrait<\/p>\n

Dr Marie Mendras<\/a> is a professor at Sciences Po and a researcher with the National Center for Scien\u00adtific Research in Paris.<\/p><\/div>\n

Self-serving delusions at the expense of European security<\/h2>\n

In Germany, as Ulrich Speck under\u00adlines in his paper, the illusion was to \u201cmodernize\u201d Russia. In France, the illusion was to build a new \u201csecurity archi\u00adtecture\u201d with Russia that would counter\u00adbalance American power and prop up our political leadership in Europe. Both ambitions were out of reach and danger\u00adously miscon\u00adceived because they presup\u00adposed that Vladimir Putin was eager to meet them.<\/p>\n

The posture was ambivalent and contra\u00addictory: to carry out an exhausting dialogue of attrition with Putin and defend our economic interests and energy imports, while at the same time imposing more sanctions against Russian top economic actors. This combi\u00adnation led to a blatant failure in smart deter\u00adrence. Worse, we exacer\u00adbated Putin\u2019s obses\u00adsions and contra\u00addic\u00adtions. The Russian leader assumed that Europe was weak and subju\u00adgated to US ambitions, yet a devilish enemy that directly threatened his own power and \u201csphere of privi\u00adleged interest\u201d.<\/p>\n

We exacer\u00adbated the man\u2019s paranoia, as he misread most of our messages as manip\u00adu\u00adlation, or weakness of purpose. For instance, in 2019\u201320, when the French President was urging the Russian leader to talk to his Ukrainian counterpart and come to some compromise in Donbas, he reinforced Putin\u2019s belief that Paris was ready to see Ukraine stay under Moscow\u2019s partial occupation and control. The Macron-Putin meeting at Fort de Br\u00e9gan\u00e7on in late August 2019 was followed by the unsuc\u00adcessful Normandy Format summit in Paris over the Minsk agreement on 9 December. In March-April 2021, Putin set up a big war scare with 100,000 men and heavy weapons deployed at the border with Ukraine.[1]<\/a><\/p>\n

Emmanuel Macron was never candid about Vladimir Putin\u2019s eagerness to fight on foreign soil. He holds a big grudge against the Wagner merce\u00adnaries in francophone Africa, notably Mali, where they have pushed out the French anti-terrorist Barkhane mission. In an interview on 19 November 2022 in Tunisia, Emmanuel Macron denounced a \u201cpredatory project\u201d that combined disin\u00adfor\u00admation and armed disruption: \u201cA number of powers, who want to spread their influence in Africa, are doing this to hurt France, hurt its language, sow doubts, but above all pursue certain interests.\u201d France\u2019s influence in Africa has dimin\u00adished in recent decades.<\/p>\n

Never\u00adtheless, the French President wanted to convince Putin not to wage a full war against Ukraine. Before and after the Russian aggression of 24 February 2022, he invested much of his time and authority in lengthy dialogues of the deaf with his Russian counterpart. Even after the horrific crimes in Bucha and elsewhere, the destruction of hospitals and residential buildings, he was hoping to maintain a line of commu\u00adni\u00adcation with the Kremlin and would not set up a date to visit Kyiv.<\/p>\n

On 10\u201311 March 2022, Emmanuel Macron convened his European partners at the Versailles Palace. The final decla\u00adration did not mention arms deliv\u00aderies to Ukraine, nor the possi\u00adbility of granting EU candidate status to Ukraine. Macron proposed a \u201cwaiting room\u201d alter\u00adnative, a European Political Community composed of the 27 plus 14 neighbors, including Turkey.[2]<\/a> A few weeks later, he reversed his position. In Mid-June, he traveled to Ukraine with the German Chancellor, the Italian Prime Minister and the President of Romania. And on 23 June, a week before the end of the French EU presi\u00addency, all 27 countries voted to give candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova. Around the same time, Finland and Sweden confirmed their will to join NATO.<\/p>\n

Emmanuel Macron\u2019s path<\/h2>\n

France\u2019s ambivalent position cannot be merely explained by pressure from indus\u00adtrial lobbies, conser\u00adv\u00adative media, or pressing demands from segments of the political spectrum to \u201cgo back to normal\u201d (Retour \u00e0 la normale<\/em>). As early as March 2022, it was crystal clear that no business as usual would ever be possible with Putin\u2019s men, some of them already suspected of war crimes. Most companies had left Russia, all university exchanges had stopped, and most European and North American expatriates had gone home.<\/p>\n

Presi\u00addential and legislative elections may explain in part Emmanuel Macron\u2019s wavering attitude. On 24 April, he was reelected in a runoff against Marine Le Pen. But two weeks earlier, 55 per cent had given their vote to a \u201cPutin-friendly\u201d candidate.[3]<\/a> On 16 June, a new National Assembly was elected. The \u201cpresi\u00addential majority\u201d, composed of several parties, failed to secure a majority of seats.<\/p>\n

In mid-October 2022 Emmanuel Macron was asked in a TV interview whether he would continue to reach out to Vladimir Putin. He replied that the time will come to \u201csit around a table\u201d and negotiate with Russia \u2014 on Ukraine\u2019s watch. But this was a contra\u00addiction in terms, as President Zelenskyy had clearly stated his position: peace talks will start with a new Russian government, when the whole of Ukraine is liberated and war repara\u00adtions are on the table. A week earlier in Prague, the French president had spoken more positively about the European allies\u2019 total support to Ukraine until the aggressor is defeated. This is telling about the different message to a domestic audience, which the Elys\u00e9e \u2014 rightly or wrongly \u2014 believes is eager for an end to the war, even if Ukraine remains partly occupied.<\/p>\n

Macron still clings to this \u201cyes, but\u201d posture, similar to Olaf Scholz\u2019s attitude. In September-November 2022, the official message from Paris and Berlin was in a nutshell: \u201cYes, Ukraine must win the war and regain its terri\u00adtorial integrity, but Russia should not be humil\u00adiated. Yes, Europeans must support Ukraine, but we cannot weaken \u201cnational defense\u201d by sending too many of our weapons.\u201d Yet, both govern\u00adments have increased arms deliv\u00aderies that the Ukrainian military badly needs to fight back and protect its population and infra\u00adstructure. The emergency of war should take prece\u00addence over ambiguous political narra\u00adtives, which continue to permeate domestic politics and media coverage.<\/p>\n

Why trust an author\u00adi\u00adtarian leader who has long demon\u00adstrated his propensity to go to war?<\/h2>\n

\u201cOf course, we do not trust Putin\u201d, Elys\u00e9e Palace officials would respond in private to journalists and experts. But Emmanuel Macron remained confident that he could convince the autocrat to make a deal. He was not fully alerted to Vladimir Putin\u2019s incapacity to listen, negotiate, or think ratio\u00adnally. It took a good six months before the French government started to speak of \u201cPutin\u2019s criminal war\u201d, rather than \u201cRussia\u2019s aggression\u201d. This was the long-awaited step toward acknowl\u00adedging the leader\u2019s illegit\u00adimacy, rogue methods, and criminal aims.<\/p>\n

On 30 November 2022, The French National Assembly voted a historic resolution that sets France\u2019s position very clearly, condemns Russia\u2019s crime of aggression and calls for full support to Ukraine.[4]<\/a> On the same day, the French Government confirmed its engagement to implement the European Commission\u2019s decision to create a Special Tribunal to judge Russia\u2019s \u201ccrimes of aggression\u201d.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

Why such a late awakening to Putin\u2019s brutal methods and unhidden obsession to annihilate Ukraine? There had been many signs of unreal\u00adistic propo\u00adsi\u00adtions wrapped up in a revengeful discourse coming from the Kremlin. The political and military escalation during the year 2021 culmi\u00adnated in the aggressive \u201ctreaties\u201d delivered by the Kremlin to the US and NATO in December 2021, that called for immediate demil\u00adi\u00adta\u00adrization of Eastern European member states, and a commitment by Ukraine to never join NATO. By that time, the US had warned its European allies that Russia was actively preparing for war.<\/p>\n

Encouraged by the French and German lenient attitudes, Putin was led to believe that he could fool them around because of their irrepressible desire to come to some agreement with him. And he repeated his lie to whomever would listen: \u201cRussia will not invade Ukraine\u201d. A good number of French decision-makers wanted to believe that Ukraine belonged to the Russian world, culture, space, language, and \u201chistorical post-imperial sphere\u201d. It was conve\u00adnient for them not to care for the security and well-being of Ukrainians, Belarus\u00adsians, Armenians, Georgians. Not to get involved directly was the motto. It would appease the Kremlin\u2019s men, who would stop fearing foreign influence in their former republics.<\/p>\n

Worse, many influ\u00adential politi\u00adcians, \u201cexperts\u201d, journalists, businessmen, simply dismissed Ukraine and its 45 million inhab\u00adi\u00adtants as a promising country, that could bring much benefit to Europe if it could make its way to full indepen\u00addence, good gover\u00adnance, economic prosperity together with its western neighbors. Political parties from left to right have not done a serious autocri\u00adtique about Putin\u2019s Russia. But positions are moving. During a debate at the National Assembly on 11 October 2022, the left-wing party La France insoumise<\/em> supported the Ecolo\u00adgists\u2019 call for the government to augment aid and arms deliv\u00aderies to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

The good news is that public opinion is overwhelm\u00adingly in support of Ukraine and welcoming refugees. Macron\u2019s ambivalent discourse unitl October 2022 did not meet much public under\u00adstanding, as people were confused about what to expect from Moscow, and what would happen if parts of Ukraine remained perma\u00adnently under Russian occupation.<\/p>\n

Old habits, new problems<\/h2>\n

The war against Ukraine has shattered the unstable balance that charac\u00adterized the French strategy toward Putin\u2019s Russia. In retro\u00adspect, it is aston\u00adishing that the final wake-up call needed be the full-scale aggression of a large country in Europe, and the systematic destruction of civilian buildings, schools, hospitals and vital infrastructure.<\/p>\n

Presi\u00addents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy were \u201cfriends of Vladimir\u201d and attended his birthday parties. Their successor Fran\u00e7ois Hollande never shared this inade\u00adquate person\u00adal\u00adization of relations with the Kremlin leader. Yet, he did not initiate a thorough \u2013 and much needed \u2013 revis\u00aditing of the Paris-Moscow relationship. President Macron wanted to believe that Putin was a reasonable man, and that he would go along with a pragmatic policy of dialogue.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n

For years, the \u201ceconomy first\u201d posture of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and other govern\u00adments, contrasted with the \u201csecurity first\u201d position of the British, Balts, Finns and Poles. Among the latter, the consensus was simple: Putin\u2019s dicta\u00adtorship conduced to war, and war meant more arbitrary rule and excep\u00adtional powers for the siloviki (<\/em>the military, security services and all other agencies autho\u00adrised to use force) and for Putin himself. Their strategic under\u00adstanding and vision proved absolutely right.<\/p>\n

From early 2021 to the present, the French President has been strug\u00adgling with the Russia-Ukraine issue at a time of disaf\u00adfection from many French to his presi\u00addency, and very low popularity of his party. In a 2020 analysis for the Center of Liberal Modernity<\/a>, I under\u00adlined the miscon\u00adcep\u00adtions in Paris about the benefits of a close relationship with Moscow, despite the dangerous nature of Putin\u2019s regime. The French political and indus\u00adtrial elites tend to have a soft spot for imperial history, big states, strong leaders, military power, and national \u201crayon\u00adnement\u201d, i.e. the outreach of the French language, culture, mode de vie<\/em>, and statist tradi\u00adtions. This attitude blurred the under\u00adstanding of crude realities, and dangers to come. Also, there remains an under\u00adlying distrust of the United States\u2019 inten\u00adtions, and of the American-British liberal conception of \u201cThe West\u201d.<\/p>\n

Since the 1950s, French presi\u00addents have wanted their country to be a central state between East and West, the \u201cbalancing actor\u201d between the two super\u00adpowers. They had a more positive attitude towards the European community than to NATO and its military structure. Moscow gladly played along the French reser\u00adva\u00adtions in the 1960s and 1970s, as it drove a wedge between Atlantic Alliance. Also, Paris has a lingering problem with its nuclear power status and membership in the UN Security Council Permanent Five. This dominant position nurtures a blindness to France\u2019s real place in Europe and the world \u2011France no longer is a primus inter pares in Europe- and a counter-productive attitude of preserving a status rather than pushing for new thinking and reforms.<\/p>\n

Like the other nuclear powers, the French author\u00adities have long evaded an urgent reassessment of the military factor and of nuclear deter\u00adrence in national and inter\u00adna\u00adtional security. They are reluctant to recon\u00adsider the very matter of security, which today encom\u00adpasses all domains of human existence and state protection from subversion and cyber\u00adat\u00adtacks, economic and energy black\u00admails, inequal\u00adities and migra\u00adtions, corruption and transna\u00adtional crimi\u00adnality, tyrannic and revan\u00adchist regimes, merce\u00adnaries, and rogue armies. Maybe the Russian fast walk into a milita\u00adrized dicta\u00adtorship has encouraged us to cling to outdated models and strategies.<\/p>\n

The shadow of Minsk<\/h2>\n

Even after the annex\u00adation of Crimea and occupation by proxies of Eastern Donbas, the French government did not fully comprehend the rules violation that led to dangerous insecurity in Ukraine and Europe. It took time for French politi\u00adcians to accept that France had become a medium power which had to cooperate closely with other states in Europe. Russia\u2019s inter\u00adven\u00adtions in Crimea and Donbas in 2014 forced France to acknowledge Moscow\u2019s toxic role in the former Soviet republics. At long last, Paris admitted that the security of Eastern European societies could not be trusted to the Kremlin, and that the EU and NATO had to endorse a major respon\u00adsi\u00adbility in supporting democ\u00adratic, sovereign states in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. We had neglected the security of the in-between states, vulnerable to Moscow\u2019s subversion and military inter\u00advention. We lacked a smart analysis of the trajec\u00adtories of the Baltic States, Poland, and other victims of Soviet brutal domination during and after World War II, countries that joined NATO and the EU in 1999, 2004 and 2007, to the satis\u00adfaction of all partners.<\/p>\n

The French could have fared better as they were not as dependent as Germany on Russian gas. They could have pushed for a strategic overhaul of the EU energy strategy and, beyond gas procurement, a compre\u00adhensive revision of European security in the face of an unreliable Russian regime. In 2017 at the Sorbonne, Emmanuel Macron gave an inspiring speech about the future of Europe. Unfor\u00adtu\u00adnately, domestic issues took their toll, and the French President gave way to short-term national concerns over common European challenges.<\/p>\n

The US attitude toward the Minsk agreement was not helpful, as it created tensions between allies, notably Warsaw, Paris and Berlin. It should not be forgotten that Washington did not wish to be part of the Donbas negoti\u00ada\u00adtions in 2014, and that France and Germany repre\u00adsented the OSCE in Minsk.<\/p>\n

The US factor<\/h2>\n

Successive admin\u00adis\u00adtra\u00adtions have not reassured French opinion and ruling circles about American policies. The Trump years were dismal for the Atlantic Alliance, US-EU relations, and other key issues like climate change and anti-terrorism. But already the Obama presi\u00addency was not helpful because European allies felt treated like a \u201csecond tier\u201d. Also, the American approach based on the \u201cprior\u00adi\u00adti\u00adzation\u201d of problems according to national concerns compli\u00adcated the framing of Western policies toward Russia, China, Middle Eastern countries. Europeans could not focus on China and leave Russia on the back burner. Nor could they adjust to Washington\u2019s at times incoherent involvement and disin\u00advolvement from war-torn countries. In France, and probably more broadly in Europe, there is a sense that the US debacle in Afghanistan in 2021 worsened Moscow\u2019s restlessness to do battle and raised the stakes in Ukraine. One of Vladimir Putin\u2019s vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities is that he has long hoped for an illusory Washington that would reinstate him as a big statesman at the head of a revamped super\u00adpower, on par with the US. Like the French and German govern\u00adments, US admin\u00adis\u00adtra\u00adtions share some respon\u00adsi\u00adbility for Putin\u2019s hare-brained military plans since the aftermath of the war in Georgia 2008 and his 2015 inter\u00advention in Assad\u2019s criminal war against the Syrian people.<\/p>\n

A common platform for ending the war and securing Ukraine<\/h2>\n

This said about national agendas in France, Germany or the US, state policies no longer matter that much. We are beyond national and personal idiosyn\u00adcrasies. As German President Frank-Walter Stein\u00admeier said after his visit to Kyiv in October: \u201cA sham peace would only increase Putin\u2019s hunger\u201d. He publicly expressed what all other European leaders think. Consensus is strong. War is being waged in Europe, and more than fifty countries are supporting the Ukrainians in their resis\u00adtance against the aggressor, and in their recon\u00adstruction effort. Russia\u2019s army and her merce\u00adnaries will be defeated. The question is when and how the defeat will happen, and what we can do to prepare the end and the afterward of the war.<\/p>\n

Our common position must be clearly stated not to repeat the mistakes of the Minsk agree\u00adments. We will no longer tolerate a grey zone of insecurity between Russia and us. Ukraine, Moldova, Ukraine, and other in-between countries will not remain in a condition of weak sover\u00adeignty that makes them hostage to the Kremlin.<\/p>\n

 <\/strong><\/p>\n

First<\/strong>, we trust President Volodymyr Zelenskyy\u2019s strategy and demands. He is a first-class leader and his strategy has proven right.<\/p>\n

Second<\/strong>, the Russian armed forces must leave the occupied and illegally annexed terri\u00adtories and agree to an uncon\u00addi\u00adtional ceasefire.<\/p>\n

Third<\/strong>, the Ukrainian author\u00adities will accept a negoti\u00adation format, and an agenda, including the question or repara\u00adtions paid by Moscow.<\/p>\n

Fourth<\/strong>, the Russian author\u00adities will acknowledge their respon\u00adsi\u00adbility in starting and waging the war and will accept independent inter\u00adna\u00adtional inves\u00adti\u00adgation into exactions and crimes.<\/p>\n

Fifth<\/strong>, all efforts will be focused on Ukrainian recon\u00adstruction and return of displaced people. The EU will work closely with Kyiv, Moldova and Georgia on their countries\u2019 successful accession process, and support Belarus\u00adsians and Armenians in their fight for their rights to a democ\u00adratic government. NATO will engage a process of enlargement to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Sixth<\/strong>, we Europeans and Transat\u00adlantic partners must prepare for a difficult post-war crisis and transition period in the Russian Feder\u00adation. Europe will only be safe once that all Russians live in a rule-of-law state. We need a concerted policy towards the Russian alter\u00adnative elites and society, inside and outside of the Federation.<\/p>\n

Dr Marie Mendras is a professor at Sciences Po and a researcher with the National Center for Scien\u00adtific Research in Paris.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cfootnotes\u201d]<\/a>[1] M. Mendras, \u00ab Chantage \u00e0 la guerre en Ukraine \u00bb, Esprit<\/em>, May 2021.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[2] The first summit meeting of the European Political Community was held in Prague on 6 October, 2022.  Forty-four countries attended, including Turkey. By then, the political signif\u00adi\u00adcance of this community of states was dimin\u00adished, as the EU had granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status in June.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[3] M. Mendras, \u00ab Voter avec la t\u00eate \u00e0 l\u2019endroit \u00bb, Desk Russie Newsletter<\/em>, 15 April 2022, https:\/\/desk-russie.eu\/2022\/04\/15\/voter-avec-la-tete-a-lendroit.html<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/a>[4] \u00ab R\u00e9solution no 39, affirmant le <\/em>soutien de l\u2019<\/em>Assembl\u00e9e <\/em>nationale <\/em>\u00e0 l\u2019<\/em>Ukraine et <\/em>condamnant <\/em>la <\/em>guerre <\/em>men\u00e9e par la <\/em>F\u00e9d\u00e9ration <\/em>de <\/em>Russie \u00bb, voted on 30 November 2022. One deputy from La France insoumise voted against, other deputies from the left-wing party abstained, together with the far-right Rassem\u00adblement National.<\/p>\n

<\/a>[5] https:\/\/www.diplomatie.gouv.fr\/fr\/dossiers-pays\/ukraine\/evenements\/article\/ukraine-tribunal-special-pour-les-crimes-d-agression-de-la-russie-30\u201311-22<\/a><\/p>\n

<\/a>[6] To keep talking to Vladimir Putin was also Berlin\u2019s position. See Sabine Fischer\u2019s analysis: https:\/\/www.swp-berlin.org\/en\/publication\/peace-talks-between-russia-and-ukraine-mission-impossible<\/a><\/p>\n

\"Textende\"<\/p>\n

This paper is published in the framework of the project \u201eRussia and the West: Europe\u2019s Post War Order and the Future of Relations with Russia\u201c, which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The views are the author\u2019s own.<\/em><\/p>\n

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