{"id":52161,"date":"2023-01-26T11:51:22","date_gmt":"2023-01-26T10:51:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=52161"},"modified":"2024-06-27T15:01:25","modified_gmt":"2024-06-27T13:01:25","slug":"network-russia-policy-paper-domanska","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/network-russia-policy-paper-domanska\/","title":{"rendered":"Reinventing Russia: How the West Should Prepare for the Post-Putin Period"},"content":{"rendered":"

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A burnt out russian tank in Kherson. Photo: IMAGO<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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The war in Ukraine is putting the future of Russia more and more in our hands. A decisive victory of Ukraine makes an end to the Putin regime more likely. The West needs to prepare for this moment because it may offer a short oppor\u00adtunity to encourage the country to embark on a more democ\u00adratic and law-abinding path, writes Maria Domanska.<\/h3>\n

<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message css=\u201c\u201d]This paper is part of our Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Expert Network Russia<\/a>. Its publi\u00adcation was supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The views expressed are the author\u2019s own.<\/p>\n

Read this paper in RUSSIAN<\/a>! \u2013 Lesen Sie dieses Paper auf DEUTSCH<\/a>! \u2013 Download the PDF!<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

[\/vc_message][vc_column_text]ABSTRACT<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russia will pose an existential threat to the West as long as it remains author\u00adi\u00adtarian. Its blatant viola\u00adtions of inter\u00adna\u00adtional law are a direct conse\u00adquence of the lack of rule of law in the country. Its full-scale aggression against Ukraine, war crimes and nuclear blackmail have turned it into a rogue state. It is, therefore in the West\u2019s existential interest to see the current model of government in Russia perma\u00adnently dismantled.<\/em><\/p>

\"Portrait<\/p>\n

Maria Doma\u0144ska PhD<\/a> is a senior fellow at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw, Poland.<\/p><\/div>\n

Putin\u2019s departure from the presi\u00addency will open up a short-term window of oppor\u00adtunity for political change. Contrary to widespread fears, the end of Russia\u2019s autocratic \u2018stability\u2019 may be less of a threat and more of a chance for sustainable peace in Europe. For this moment, the West must be well-armed. Before the new leadership consol\u00adi\u00addates its power, our priority should be to widen the window of oppor\u00adtunity and prevent it from closing again for decades.<\/em>[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d border_width=\u201c2\u201d accent_color=\u201c#1ad8c5\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n

I. War as an extension of domestic-political goals<\/h2>\n

There is much to suggest that Russia\u2019s leadership decided to invade Ukraine and launch a proxy war against NATO primarily for domestic political reasons. The invasion was intended as \u2018forward defence\u2019 against liberal democracy, which Russian state propa\u00adganda hints at as \u2018Nazism\u2019. The Kremlin saw the political empow\u00aderment of Ukrainian society as a poten\u00adtially conta\u00adgious example to the Russians. A final warning for the Kremlin probably came in late 2021, when polls revealed unfavourable trends in public mood vis-\u00e0-vis the regime.[i]<\/a> It became clear that a further erosion of Putin\u2019s legit\u00adimacy would only be a matter of time. War was supposed to stoke \u2018patriotic\u2019 hysteria about external and internal enemies, as well as the \u2018besieged fortress\u2019 syndrome, and make Russians firmly unite around the dictator. Inter\u00adna\u00adtional isolation was considered an acceptable price and an oppor\u00adtunity to cement the dicta\u00adtorship through unprece\u00addented domestic repression.<\/p>\n

Ukraine must now obtain all necessary military assis\u00adtance to defeat the aggressor and promptly restore its terri\u00adtorial integrity. It must also receive adequate war repara\u00adtions and see Russian war criminals tried by inter\u00adna\u00adtional tribunals, no matter how long it will take. Russia\u2019s impunity would have disas\u00adtrous conse\u00adquences for global security and the political-economic order for decades to come. The risk of nuclear arms prolif\u00ader\u00adation will rise. China will learn lessons from this conflict and Moscow\u2019s victory will encourage Beijing to pursue its revan\u00adchist ambitions.<\/p>\n

However, Russia\u2019s de-facto war against NATO will not end with Ukraine\u2019s victory on the battle\u00adfield. Even a military defeat, if not followed by a deep economic crisis and anti-regime political devel\u00adop\u00adments inside Russia, would merely lead to a temporary setback in Moscow\u2019s aggressive actions. Given the revan\u00adchist nature of Putinism, peaceful coexis\u00adtence with Russia will be impos\u00adsible. Only permanent (and costly) military deter\u00adrence would prevent Russia\u2019s militarism from spilling beyond the country\u2019s borders again. Contrary to what Berlin or Paris may think, seeking \u2018compromise\u2019 with Moscow will bear no fruit. The only \u2018security guarantee\u2019 Putin would accept is the unrav\u00adelling of NATO and the EU as centres of democ\u00adratic values and global political clout.<\/p>\n

Even if Russia will never get on the Western bandwagon in terms of its interests and goals, aggression and war crimes must disappear from its foreign policy arsenal.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The only way to avoid severe turbu\u00adlence in Europe in the future is to address the very source of the security threats. In Russia\u2019s current political system, a narrow group can make decisions crucial to inter\u00adna\u00adtional security beyond any control by the broader elite and society. Thus, we will need not only a change of political leadership in Russia but also a sustainable disman\u00adtling of author\u00adi\u00adtarian rule. The long-term goal of the West should be that decision-making processes in the Kremlin are brought into compliance with the inter\u00adna\u00adtional law and subjected to scrutiny by domestic actors (interest groups in the ruling elite and the public). Even if Russia will never get on the Western bandwagon in terms of its interests and goals, aggression and war crimes must disappear from its foreign policy arsenal.<\/p>\n

So far, the West has never actually tried to change Russia and it founded its policies on three false assump\u00adtions. The first was that we could influence an author\u00adi\u00adtarian system through economic cooper\u00adation. In fact, Western money has only helped the regime suppress those few sprouts of democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions that emerged in the Gorbachev-Yeltsin period. Second, there still prevails a belief that democ\u00adratic culture of dialogue can peace\u00adfully redesign Russia\u2019s political and strategic culture, which is based on violence and the logic of a zero-sum game. Third, human rights in Russia were not considered a vital issue for European stability: Western decision\u00admakers gravely under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated the domestic-foreign policy nexus. The West continues its self-restraint towards Russia because \u2018inter\u00adference in Russia\u2019s domestic affairs\u2019 remains a taboo for many Western experts and politi\u00adcians. However, this approach will only make our democ\u00adracies more vulnerable vis-\u00e0-vis author\u00adi\u00adtarian regimes in Europe and beyond.<\/p>\n

Russians must experience an unequivocal failure of Putinism as a neo-imperial project<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

As long as Putin remains in power, Russia\u2019s voluntary surrender in Ukraine or political liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation is out of the question. However, it is possible to prepare the ground in advance for Russia\u2019s future trans\u00adfor\u00admation. First and foremost, Russians must experience an unequivocal failure of Putinism as a neo-imperial project. Only a prompt and complete military defeat can convince the Russian political estab\u00adlishment that war is counter\u00adpro\u00adductive, either as a foreign policy tool or a means of building domestic-political legit\u00adimacy. Also, the economic-financial base of the regime must be consis\u00adtently weakened by tougher sanctions to prevent the government from replen\u00adishing its military potential. Currently, the sanctions regime remains highly incon\u00adsistent, both in terms of range and in terms of enforcement.<\/p>\n

Secondly, we need Ukraine\u2019s recon\u00adstruction as soon as possible. The country must become a robust and stable democracy and a market economy within the EU and NATO. The NATO umbrella over Ukraine will guarantee that EU recon\u00adstruction funds will not burn up in another aggression. EU membership will provide effective instru\u00adments to control expen\u00addi\u00adtures and prevent possible large-scale corruption.<\/p>\n

Last but not least, compre\u00adhensive support for Russian civil society and free media in exile should become an element of a broader, long-term strategy vis-\u00e0-vis Moscow. It should be one of the paths to attain a political change in Russia for Europe\u2019s stability. Although political \u00e9migr\u00e9s will not bring about the regime\u2019s collapse on their own, they can, on their return home, provide an invaluable ideological and organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtional base for reforms.<\/p>\n

II. A post-Putin window of opportunity<\/h2>\n

Putin\u2019s departure will not automat\u00adi\u00adcally lead to signif\u00adicant changes in the political system. So far, Russian author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism has easily repro\u00adduced itself owing to its deep founda\u00adtions: the patri\u00admonial notion of the state as being the personal property of the leader and the logic of patron-client relations as the main factor organ\u00adising the sphere of socio-political inter\u00adac\u00adtions.[ii]<\/a> Moreover, as compar\u00adative studies have shown, transition from person\u00adalist rule (like that in Russia) is less likely to result in a democracy than transition from other forms of author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism.[iii]<\/a><\/p>\n

With Putin\u2019s exit, however, a window of oppor\u00adtunity will briefly open. The trauma of war and its negative economic and social conse\u00adquences can create fertile ground for political-economic reform. The new leadership will be weaker than the current one and therefore more vulnerable to external and internal pressures. Their pursuit of a better inter\u00adna\u00adtional image, external legit\u00adimacy, and a broad base of support at home may lead to two quali\u00adtative shifts. First, Russia may temporarily abandon its aggressive foreign policy in return for sanctions relief. Second, we will likely see a liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation of the neo-total\u00adi\u00adtarian domestic policy. The latter is now based on a person\u00adality cult, mass indoc\u00adtri\u00adnation, wartime censorship, and the state\u2019s intrusion into citizens\u2019 private lives.<\/p>\n

Due to the heavy burden of author\u00adi\u00adtarian path-depen\u00addence, a democ\u00adra\u00adti\u00adsation of Russia is unreal\u00adistic in the foreseeable future. However, the intro\u00adduction of pluralism into the political system would be relatively easy to achieve at an early stage. Before the new leadership consol\u00adi\u00addates power, the West\u2019s priority should be to widen the window of oppor\u00adtunity for reform and keep it from shutting again for decades. We can expect strong resis\u00adtance from groups directly respon\u00adsible for war crimes and political repression; which is why without constant pressure from below and outside reforms may be prevented for a long time. The West must learn lessons from its mistakes vis-\u00e0-vis Russia committed in the 1990s.<\/p>\n

Our toolkit needs to be based on trans\u00adparent bench\u00admarks and contain a carefully designed mix of carrots and sticks. Its details should be discussed in advance and take into account the interests and needs of Russian society at large. EU and NATO members should only recognise a new government once it abolishes censorship and other polit\u00adi\u00adcally-motivated repressive laws, releases all political prisoners, allows independent media to operate freely and organises free elections under inter\u00adna\u00adtional obser\u00advation. We should impose another package of sanctions if the new leadership continues to violate human rights. The cost of new restric\u00adtions for the West will be negli\u00adgible because, by that time, we will have ended our depen\u00addence on Russian raw materials. Conversely, the successful imple\u00admen\u00adtation of reforms should, among other things, lead to a gradual liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation of the trade regime with Russia. In the longer term, the West should engage in building an insti\u00adtu\u00adtional framework to safeguard the continued trans\u00adfor\u00admation and guarantee political freedoms to the opposition and civil society.<\/p>\n

A western strategy needs to be based not so much on investing in a single political figure (a \u2018new Yeltsin\u2019) but on dialogue with political forces across the board \u2013 except for those involved in war crimes and political repression. The West must also develop intense contacts with the broader public, which may create a buffer against possible future political tensions.<\/p>\n

However, before changes can occur in the opera\u00adtional sphere of Western policies, we need to revolu\u00adtionise our way of thinking about Russia. It is often based on fears and false beliefs promoted by Kremlin-sponsored propa\u00adganda. They make us self-restrain in terms of military assis\u00adtance for Ukraine and discus\u00adsions on the role of the West in Russia\u2019s future political transformation.<\/p>\n

III.   The fetish of Russia\u2019s stability: an intel\u00adligent weapon against the West<\/h2>\n

Many Western experts and politi\u00adcians express a fatal\u00adistic belief that the demise of Russian author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism would lead to the state\u2019s collapse and a serious desta\u00adbil\u00adi\u00adsation of Eurasia. However, a broad spectrum of options lies between dicta\u00adtorship and dangerous chaos. To discard them a priori is to play Putin\u2019s game that has effec\u00adtively worked for years. It is based on the dogma that Putin\u2019s Russia is the only possible Russia; since it is impos\u00adsible (or extremely risky) to change it, there is no choice but to strike \u2018pragmatic\u2019 deals with the aggressive regime. We have been paying the price of this manip\u00adu\u00adlation since 24 February 2022. The advocates of \u2018stability above all\u2019 seem to forget that Russia had never been as \u2018stable\u2019 as it was just before the war when the author\u00adities had ultimately destroyed all political opposition. \u2018Perfect stability\u2019 (which is in fact artificial \u2013 see below) was necessary for launching armed aggression against Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Within the broad spectrum of political scenarios, a genuine feder\u00adation with a robust local self-government system is the most desirable and realistic. Non-violent mecha\u00adnisms for artic\u00adu\u00adlating and resolving conflicts can only emerge in a decen\u00adtralised political system. Decen\u00adtral\u00adi\u00adsation of political power and financial resources would thus make a future Russia more predictable, stable, and law-abiding. In Russia, \u2018democracy\u2019 as a system of values, insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and proce\u00addures may not resonate much among the public. However, sociol\u00ado\u00adgists, econo\u00admists, and civic activists have for years reported on the growing demand for self-gover\u00adnance of local popula\u00adtions, and for legal account\u00adability of state officials, including in the provinces.<\/p>\n

The empow\u00aderment of local and regional popula\u00adtions, including ethnic minorities, may become an effective vaccine against the resur\u00adgence of Russian imperial revan\u00adchism. The cure for the imperial disease is to offer citizens a \u2018normal\u2019 life and a sense of co-ownership of the state, owing to free elections and a broad public discussion on the shape of the new consti\u00adtution. So far, the West has utterly ignored Russia\u2019s ethnic and cultural diversity, thus manifesting a colonialist mindset (which until 2022 also prevailed vis-a-vis Ukraine, taking the form of the \u2018Russia-first\u2019 policy).<\/p>\n

There is not much rationale behind the fear that possible insta\u00adbility related to political changes, elite infighting or adverse economic impact of reforms would lead to the collapse of Russian statehood. None of the regions inhabited by ethnic minorities has a potential for secession. They face one or multiple barriers to successful separatist tendencies. First, regional govern\u00adments are neither legit\u00adimate nor do they genuinely represent the interests of local popula\u00adtions. Second, the model of \u2018state capitalism\u2019 has led to heavy financial depen\u00addence of regional budgets on the federal one, while regional economies remain under\u00adde\u00adveloped. Third, most of these regions do not have borders with other countries. Last but not least, the non-Russian ethnic groups are often a minority in their \u2018national republics\u2019 or they lack a solid historical, cultural and linguistic identity, the latter having been delib\u00ader\u00adately suppressed by the federal centre. Although anti-Moscow senti\u00adments have long been percep\u00adtible in the regions, they do not have much in common with separatist moods. Instead, they mostly reflect opposition against the federal bureau\u00adcracy with its excessive powers and greed for local resources. Also, negative memories of the Soviet collapse still work against radical scenarios.[iv]<\/a> Paradox\u00adi\u00adcally, the threat of the break-up of the state and the feeling that \u2018Russia may be gone\u2019 may even strengthen reformist tendencies to resolve federal-regional tensions.<\/p>\n

Another widespread fear among the Western expert community and political estab\u00adlishment is that \u2018someone worse than Putin\u2019 may come to power in case of domestic political turmoil. However, it is difficult to imagine someone worse than a leader who has unleashed an aggressive war in the middle of Europe, turned Russia into a rogue state based on violence and lawlessness, and resorts to nuclear blackmail to remain unpun\u00adished. After Putin is gone, compromise figures will likely come to power to calm the situation rather than further escalate. The usual bugbears: the belligerent leader of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, or the notorious sponsor of the Wagner merce\u00adnaries, Yevgeny Prigozhin, are more Putin\u2019s tools than autonomous political players. Even though they may try to influence the power games with their private armies, they will be unable to gain support from the broader political-business estab\u00adlishment. It is also unlikely that the powerful but deeply divided repression apparatus (the siloviki<\/em>) will unite and play an independent role in power games. However, a part of it can become a scale-tipping factor. In case of violent infighting between the political-business clans, the  primary concern for the West should be the safety of Russia\u2019s nuclear arsenal. It needs to be put in reliable hands \u2013 which is not the case under Putin\u2019s rule.<\/p>\n

The experience of violence as the primary regulator of relations within the Russian state has become an essential element of collective identity.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Genuine risks for Russia\u2019s neigh\u00adbours do not lie in the country\u2019s possible \u2018desta\u00adbil\u00adi\u00adsation\u2019. Instead, they stem directly from Putin\u2019s pseudo-stability, based on repression, mass indoc\u00adtri\u00adnation, and top-down crimi\u00adnal\u00adi\u00adsation of the state. The Kremlin has delib\u00ader\u00adately \u2018outsourced\u2019 the state\u2019s monopoly on violence into the hands of criminal groups and private armies (including the notorious Wagner Group). The banality of violence and degra\u00addation of the value of human life will remain a long-term social problem: the experience of violence as the primary regulator of relations within the Russian state has become an essential element of collective identity. The mass influx of weapons and trauma\u00adtised war veterans from Ukraine will exacerbate this challenge. Russians have also been poisoned by the Kremlin-sponsored propa\u00adganda dissem\u00adi\u00adnating genocidal hate speech. It has destroyed language as a tool for explaining reality, in order to make \u2018zombified\u2019 citizens question the very existence of truth. None of these malaises can be cured under \u2018stable\u2019 author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism. As time passes and Russia closes off from the outside world, they will only fester.<\/p>\n

IV. Russian society: fatal\u00adistic, pragmatic but not \u2018genet\u00adi\u00adcally authoritarian\u2019<\/h2>\n

The Russian public\u2019s suscep\u00adti\u00adbility to imperial discourse is largely due to two factors. The first is the lack of pluralism in the media and the absolute dominance of state propa\u00adganda in the public sphere. The second is the fact that historical propa\u00adganda, great power rhetoric and geopo\u00adlitical revan\u00adchism have served for decades as compen\u00adsation for the political disem\u00adpow\u00aderment of citizens, economic hardships and the lack of a vision for the future. However, this vicious circle can be broken through political liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation, free elections and economic growth.<\/p>\n

A major obstacle in devel\u00adoping an appro\u00adpriate commu\u00adni\u00adcation strategy towards Russian society is the lack of reliable tools to measure public opinion. At times, the very idea of conducting opinion polls under Putin\u2019s neo-total\u00adi\u00adtarian rule is questioned. However, the available socio\u00adlogical data shows that Russian society is not a monolith. Shocking examples of pro-Kremlin jingoism are only one side of the coin. They easily find their way into the media, but are charac\u00adter\u00adistic of a minority estimated at less than 20 percent of the population. Radical opponents of the Kremlin make up another 20 percent, while the rest are \u2018hiber\u00adnating\u2019 and hope to wait out the difficult times. Moreover, Russians are polit\u00adi\u00adcally divided along gener\u00ada\u00adtional lines: the youth is much more anti-Putin, pro-Western and anti-war than the 50+ generation.<\/p>\n

It seems that a large part of the Russian public simply has no firm opinion on the war and only agrees with what the government decides.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Never\u00adtheless, the level of declared public support or passive accep\u00adtance of the Kremlin\u2019s war remains high (about 70 per cent). The Russian military\u2019s increasing combat losses and growing awareness that the \u2018special military operation\u2019 is not going according to plan have not led to a signif\u00adicant change of mood. A large part of society is distancing itself from the theme of war and even more from active anti-war protest. A prevailing sense of power\u00adlessness makes people \u2018hibernate\u2019 even more often than fear of repression. At the same time, social transfers from the state budget are often the last hope for millions of families to stay afloat amid economic hardship. It reduces their readiness to express anti-state senti\u00adments even further.<\/p>\n

It seems that a large part of the Russian public simply has no firm opinion on the war and only agrees with what the government decides. If the Kremlin presented a U\u2011turn tomorrow, they too would nod approv\u00adingly. At the end of 2022, the independent polling institute Russian Field<\/a> found that well over half of respon\u00addents would support a new attack on Kyiv (58 per cent) or the signing of a peace agreement (70 per cent).<\/p>\n

A large part of the population does not access infor\u00admation from alter\u00adnative sources, not neces\u00adsarily because of increasing censorship, but simply to avoid cognitive disso\u00adnance. For decades, those in power have sought to atomise society and destroy the horizontal ties between citizens. The lack of confrontation with Soviet total\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism and, in recent years, the blatant glori\u00adfi\u00adcation of the imperial idea have ultimately perpet\u00aduated the role of the state as the binding force for the nation. Kremlin-sponsored nation\u00adalist propa\u00adganda has instilled the messianic notion in the public that Russians are morally superior to other nations because they destroyed Nazism (an \u2018absolute evil\u2019) in 1945. Confronting the massive war crimes committed by the Russian army in Ukraine would destroy collective and individual self-esteem and raise the question of collective political respon\u00adsi\u00adbility. As state TV offers a much more comfortable inter\u00adpre\u00adtation of events than free media, it remains the main source of infor\u00admation for two-thirds of Russians \u2013 even though only 50 per cent trust it and 60 per cent do not believe in the official data about Russia\u2019s combat losses (according to the independent Levada Centre and Russian Field).<\/p>\n

Moreover, the author\u00adities go to great lengths to make citizens believe that resis\u00adtance is futile and that uncon\u00addi\u00adtional supporters of Putin form an overwhelming majority of the public. Anti-government opposition is equated with the violation of social norms or \u2018treason\u2019. It is no coinci\u00addence that one of the frequently used propa\u00adgandist cliches is the denigration of \u2018enemies of the nation\u2019.<\/p>\n

V. A new \u2018smuta\u2019? Possible but not predetermined<\/h2>\n

While Russia\u2019s trans\u00adfor\u00admation will be an arduous and non-linear process, several factors can mitigate the adverse effects of political-economic turbu\u00adlence. Even though the bulk of the Russian economy is state-controlled, its large part still operates on market principles. Small and medium-sized businesses have proven their resilience to shocks under predatory state capitalism. There is a suffi\u00adcient number of skilled bureau\u00adcrats at the federal and regional levels to implement reform blueprints drawn up by leading experts long ago. In addition, Russia has essential intel\u00adlectual resources abroad. The sooner the oppor\u00adtunity for trans\u00adfor\u00admation emerges, the greater the chance emigrants will return and the brain drain, which may have amounted to half a million people in 2022[v]<\/a>, will be partially reversed.<\/p>\n

Another under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated yet invaluable asset is Russian civil society, which can form the organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtional base for political trans\u00adfor\u00admation. Putin\u2019s rule has led to its suppression in the country, but \u2013 as in the case of small and medium-sized businesses \u2013 its previous long-standing vitality proved it would be able to quickly regen\u00aderate under more favourable condi\u00adtions. Moreover, those repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives of Russian civil society who have found themselves in forced exile are currently re-organ\u00adising their work. Many continue their political-civic activ\u00adities, targeting Russian audiences at home and abroad. Most declare they plan to return to Russia once it is safe. They will bring home unique knowledge about best practices of Western grass\u00adroots democracy, self-government, electoral systems, and effective state admin\u00adis\u00adtration \u2013 and will be able to adapt them to Russian realities. However, democ\u00adratic politi\u00adcians opposed to the Kremlin, including those in exile, often under\u00ades\u00adtimate the potential of civil society groups as their natural allies and support base.<\/p>\n

Many Russians in exile focus on anti-war protests and organise help for Ukraine or Ukrainian refugees. Many activists and journalists (of Russian and non-Russian ethnic origin) actively reshape the current discourse about Russia and its neigh\u00adbours, decon\u00adstructing imperial, colonial and patri\u00adarchal cliches. If any recon\u00adcil\u00adi\u00adation between Russia and Ukraine is ever possible, it will be co-authored by these people rather than anyone else. Another formi\u00addable task, which awaits them back home, is to lead their fellow citizens through a painful, profound trans\u00adfor\u00admation of collective mentality and identity along non-imperial lines.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

What will a post-Putin Russia be like? Much depends on the West\u2019s deter\u00admi\u00adnation to influence it genuinely. One can compare this challenge only with the construction of European security archi\u00adtecture after World War II. In 1945, no one doubted that the world\u2019s security required a re-invention of Germany. In 2023, we should not refrain from devel\u00adoping a strategy to reinvent Russia. As in Germany, confrontation with the total\u00adi\u00adtarian and imperial past will take decades \u2013 but it will not start without an external impulse.<\/p>\n

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[i]<\/a> After the September parlia\u00admentary election, polls by the independent Levada Centre revealed that support for Putin\u2019s regime was shrinking. For details: M. Doma\u0144ska, Russia 2021: Consol\u00adi\u00addation of a dicta\u00adtorship, OSW Commentary, 8 December 2021, https:\/\/www.osw.waw.pl\/en\/publikacje\/osw-commentary\/2021\u201312-08\/russia-2021-consolidation-a-dictatorship<\/a><\/p>\n

[ii]<\/a> M. Doma\u0144ska, Putinism after Putin. The deep struc\u00adtures of Russian author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism, OSW Studies, Warsaw 2019, https:\/\/www.osw.waw.pl\/en\/publikacje\/osw-studies\/2019\u201310-25\/putinism-after-putin<\/a><\/p>\n

[iii]<\/a> A. Kendall-Taylor, E. Frantz, How Autoc\u00adracies Fall, The Washington Quarterly 37:1, 2014, pp. 35\u201347.<\/p>\n

[iv]<\/a> \u0414\u0435\u043c\u043e\u043a\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u044f \u0432\u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043e \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0430\u0434\u0430. \u0410\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0440 \u041a\u044b\u043d\u0435\u0432 \u2013 \u043e \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438 \u0440\u0435\u0433\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043e\u0432, Radio Svoboda, 3 August 2022, https:\/\/www.svoboda.org\/a\/demokratiya-vmesto-raspada-aleksandr-kynev\u2014o\u2011rossii-regionov\/31968400.html<\/a><\/p>\n

[v]<\/a> \u0414\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0444 \u0410\u043b\u0435\u043a\u0441\u0435\u0439 \u0420\u0430\u043a\u0448\u0430 \u2014 \u0415\u0410\u041d: \u043f\u043e\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0438 \u043e\u0442 \u043c\u043e\u0431\u0438\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0432 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043a\u0430 \u043c\u0435\u043d\u044c\u0448\u0435, \u0447\u0435\u043c \u043e\u0442 COVID, 12.12.2022, https:\/\/eanews.ru\/news\/demograf-aleksey-raksha-poteri-ot-mobilizatsii-v-strane-poka-menshe-chem-ot-covid_12-12\u20132022<\/a><\/p>\n

\"Textende\"<\/p>\n

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This paper is published in the framework of the project \u201eRussia and the West: Europe\u2019s Post War Order and the Future of Relations with Russia\u201c, which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry.  The views in this paper are the author\u2019s own.<\/em><\/p>\n

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