{"id":55455,"date":"2023-07-31T14:43:45","date_gmt":"2023-07-31T12:43:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=55455"},"modified":"2023-08-01T14:26:57","modified_gmt":"2023-08-01T12:26:57","slug":"state-of-implementation-of-the-commitments-on-de-oligarchization-and-anti-corruption-by-georgia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/state-of-implementation-of-the-commitments-on-de-oligarchization-and-anti-corruption-by-georgia\/","title":{"rendered":"State of Imple\u00admen\u00adtation of the Commit\u00adments on De-Oligarchization and Anti-Corruption by Georgia"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia has not been given candidate status to EU-Membership in June 2022. In order to receive it, the country must fulfill twelve recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions of the EU Commission, including reforms in the areas of deoli\u00adgarchization and anti-corruption. In his policy brief, Sergi Kapanadze analyzes the current status in both areas and makes concrete recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions for action.<\/h2>\n

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Intro\u00adduction:<\/h3>\n

In June 2022, the European Union proposed twelve prior\u00adities<\/a> for Georgia to address as precon\u00addi\u00adtions for receiving EU candidate status. The Georgian Dream Government immedi\u00adately pledged to implement all of the condi\u00adtions fully. To this end, working groups were set up in Parliament, and several legislative amend\u00adments were intro\u00adduced. Civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions and opposition parties published papers describing their visions for imple\u00admenting the 12 condi\u00adtion\u00adal\u00adities that same summer and also put forth specific legislative initiatives.<\/p>\n

In July 2023, the ruling party of Georgia declared<\/a> that all condi\u00adtion\u00adal\u00adities had been imple\u00admented. The European Commission did not share its optimism, however. The Commission gave oral briefings<\/a> on Georgia\u2019s progress on imple\u00admenting the condi\u00adtion\u00adal\u00adities (as well as on that of Ukraine and Moldova) to the European Council in Brussels (at the ambas\u00adsadorial level) and Stockholm (at the informal minis\u00adterial level) on 21 and 22 June. For this purpose, the Commission used a five-point scale (no progress, limited progress, some progress, good progress and completed) to describe the extent of imple\u00admen\u00adtation of prior\u00adities. In Georgia\u2019s case, the Commission judged the imple\u00admen\u00adtation of three (ombudsman, ECtHR judgments, gender equality) of its twelve prior\u00adities to have been completed. On one priority (media freedom), the Commission saw no progress at all; on another (de-oligarchization), it identified only \u201climited progress\u201d. Regarding the remaining eight prior\u00adities, the Commission reported that \u201csome progress\u201d had been made.<\/p>\n

The views of the Georgian civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions monitoring progress on the 12 prior\u00adities largely coincide with the European Commission\u2019s assessment. According to the CSO assessment done regularly through the Candidacy Check<\/a>, at least five condi\u00adtions (de-polar\u00adization, indepen\u00addence of judiciary, de-oligarchization, media freedom and cooper\u00adation with the civil society) have yet to be fulfilled, whereas some progress has been made on the remaining seven. The trans\u00adpo\u00adsition of the ECtHR judgments and greater gender equality come closest to being fully implemented.<\/p>\n

These Brief attempts to sketch out the challenges of imple\u00admenting Georgia\u2019s commit\u00adments to de-oligarchization and the fight against corruption.<\/p>\n

In June 2022, the EU called on Georgia \u201cto implement the commitment to \u2018de-oligarchization\u2019 by elimi\u00adnating the excessive influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life\u201d. This request was also repeated in the condi\u00adtions for Moldova and Ukraine, albeit with different wording. In its oral report in June 2023, the European Commission welcomed the announcement by Georgian Dream leadership that it would not be adopting the draft law on de-oligarchization. Though, in fact, the ruling party only deferred the adoption of the legis\u00adlation until late 2023 and stated<\/a>that it would not adopt the law only if the European Commission removed the issue from 12 condi\u00adtion\u00adal\u00adities. EU, in turn, urged Georgia to adopt a \u201csystemic approach\u201d to de-oligarchization. Unfor\u00adtu\u00adnately, no systemic efforts of this kind have been under\u00adtaken by the Georgian Government thus far.<\/p>\n

On the subject of anti-corruption measures, the EU requested Georgia to \u201cstrengthen the indepen\u00addence of its anti-corruption agency bringing together all key anti-corruption functions, in particular, to address high-level corruption cases rigor\u00adously; equip the new Special Inves\u00adtigative Service and Personal Data Protection Service with resources commen\u00adsurate to their mandates and ensure their insti\u00adtu\u00adtional indepen\u00addence.\u201d In its oral assessment<\/a> on 21 June, the European Commission stressed that full imple\u00admen\u00adtation of this priority would require measures ensuring that Georgia\u2019s anti-corruption agency operates indepen\u00addently and noted that Georgia should consult the Venice Commission regarding the relevant draft legis\u00adlation. The Commission also asked Georgia to recon\u00adsider withdrawing from the OECD anti-corruption network.<\/p>\n

1. THE DE-OLIGARCHIZATION PRIORITY (5THPRIORITY)<\/h3>\n
1.1 One sole oligarch, or many oligarchs?<\/h6>\n

De-oligarchization is considered one of the most contro\u00adversial and ambiguous prior\u00adities, mainly because the European Commission has not been clear about who Georgia\u2019s oligarchs are. Bidzina Ivanishvili is considered to be an oligarch by 35% of the Georgian respon\u00addents in a recent survey<\/a> conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC). Mr. Ivanishvili is the founder of the Georgian Dream party and a former prime minister. Although he hasn\u2019t held any political post since 2013, many Georgians believe that the reclusive billionaire continues to rule behind the scenes. In contrast, only 3% of the respon\u00addents in the CRRC survey believed that former President Mikheil Saakashvili is an oligarch, and only 2% agreed that Mamuka Khazaradze, the founder of the TBC Bank and the political party Lelo, could be considered as such. The European Parliament clearly identified Bidzina Ivanishvili as an oligarch in resolu\u00adtions adopted in June<\/a> 2022 and December<\/a> 2022. Civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions and opposition parties also believe that Bidzina Ivanishvili is Georgia\u2019s \u201csole oligarch\u201d.<\/p>\n

While there is no doubt about who is regarded as an oligarch in Georgia, the Georgian Dream swiftly moved to deflect arrows aimed at Bidzina Ivanishvili. Georgian Prime Minister Garib\u00adashvili even sent<\/a> an open letter to the European Commission\u2019s President, arguing that Mr. Ivanishvili was no longer involved in politics and that calling him an oligarch insulted him and the country. For the Georgian Dream party, the oligarchs in Georgia are individuals linked with the opposition parties and the critical media.<\/p>\n

1.2 The \u201claw\u201d that does not solve the problem of oligarchic influence<\/h4>\n

In the summer of 2022, the Georgian Dream pledged to adopt legis\u00adlation on de-oligarchization, echoing a similar pledge made by Ukraine. Though initially hesitant to send the draft legis\u00adlation to the Venice Commission, the Georgian Dream \u201creluc\u00adtantly agreed\u201d to do so towards the end of 2022, following the passage of the draft law after its first reading in Parliament. In its final opinion on the proposed legis\u00adlation, released<\/a> in June 2023, Venice Commission strongly recom\u00admended that the Law on De-oligarchization be abandoned, as it embraced a \u201cpersonal\u201d approach, whereas a \u201csystemic\u201d approach was preferable for tackling the de-oligarchization issue.<\/p>\n

Georgian civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions opposed<\/a> adopting the de-oligarchization legis\u00adlation right from the outset, making it clear in July 2022  that carrying out a de-oligarchization agenda using legal instru\u00adments would not be possible in a country ruled by an oligarch. The CSOs made an alter\u00adnative proposal: that the fulfilment of all 11 condi\u00adtions that do not directly address de-oligarchization ought to be considered as collec\u00adtively fulfilling the de-oligarchization condition as well. Their rationale was that the influence of the oligarch would automat\u00adi\u00adcally be reduced by effective action to strengthen the judiciary, reduce polar\u00adization, make state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions more accountable, ensure free and fair elections, establish parlia\u00admentary oversight and power-sharing, guarantee a free and independent media environment and ensure the indepen\u00addence of both the anti-corruption agency and the person appointed as Ombudsperson. Smaller opposition parties, i.e. Lelo, Strategy the Builder, Droa and Girchi, agreed with the CSOs and joined them in calling on the Government to abandon the de-oligarchization legis\u00adlation and focus on the other 11 condi\u00adtion\u00adal\u00adities. Several EU member states also pointed out that the EU had never called on the Georgian government to adopt such legislation.<\/p>\n

However, not everyone involved took this position. The EU Delegation to Georgia and EU Commis\u00adsioner V\u00e1rhelyi (Neigh\u00adbourhood and Enlargement) both indicated<\/a> that a law that was approved by the Venice Commission would be a positive devel\u00adopment. And while United National Movement, the largest opposition party, disagreed in principle with the substance of the draft law proposed by the Georgian Dream, rather than rejecting the idea of law altogether, it came up with an alter\u00adnative proposal<\/a> for legis\u00adlation targeting solely Mr Ivanishvili. Unsur\u00adpris\u00adingly, the UNM\u2019s bill was neither debated in the Parliament nor sent to the Venice Commission but was quietly voted down at the Legal Committee session in early 2023.<\/p>\n

Going on record as condoning a legislative approach to the problem of oligarchic influ\u00adences proved to be a tactical mistake by the United National Movement and several high-ranking EU officials. A mistake that Georgian Dream capitalized on, shifting the discourse to the nature of the draft law and which the Venice Commission\u2019s earlier recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions should be taken on board. This took the pressure off of Georgian Dream and put them in a position to bargain. As one of the Georgian Dream leaders quipped in late 2022, if everyone, including the EU and the opposition, agreed and asked the Georgian Dream not to pass the law, they would withdraw it\u2013 on the condition that this move would count towards successful imple\u00admen\u00adtation of the fifth conditionality.<\/p>\n

In June 2023, the Venice Commission issued<\/a> a final report on the Law on De-oligarchization, which warned against adopting the law in its current form. The European Commission also welcomed this assessment. Georgian Dream initially planned to adopt the legis\u00adlation nonetheless but later backtracked and pledged to defer its adoption, implying that it would not scrap the legis\u00adlation if the European Union removed the condition of \u201cde-oligarchization\u201d altogether.<\/p>\n

1.3 What does the draft law say?<\/h4>\n

Under the initial version of the draft law<\/a>, which is nearly identical to the corre\u00adsponding Ukrainian, persons who had been desig\u00adnated oligarchs by the Government would have been subject to multiple restric\u00adtions on their political and financial activ\u00adities, for example, barring them from making donations to political parties and political activ\u00adities, or rallies, and from involvement in the priva\u00adti\u00adzation of the state assets. However, some of these provi\u00adsions were scrapped after negative feedback from the Venice Commission in its interim<\/a> opinion (March 2023). The current draft would impose an oblig\u00adation on individuals partic\u00adi\u00adpating in public life to report any contact with persons desig\u00adnated as oligarchs and bar such individuals from partic\u00adi\u00adpating in processes priva\u00adtizing state assets, but it would not prohibit them from financing political parties and activ\u00adities or owning media companies. At this time, it is unclear what the sanctions for viola\u00adtions of the reporting duty would be. Under the current draft, the recently estab\u00adlished National Anti-Corruption Agency, the NACA, would decide who is an oligarch. The head of this agency, which has no inves\u00adtigative functions, is appointed by the prime minister.<\/p>\n

In its final<\/a> opinion on the draft law (released in June 2023), the Venice Commission recom\u00admended that Georgian not adopt the law. This is something the Commission rarely does, and the wording it used was of unprece\u00addented sternness. Even before this devel\u00adopment, though, it appeared that adopting the draft law would be unwise even with all the recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions taken on board. If such a law were passed, it would be largely ineffective in reducing oligarchic influ\u00adences. This is chiefly because the law would not have applied to Mr. Ivanishvili, which is something Georgian Dream leaders made clear from the very start. The law would only be used<\/a> to target individuals who supported the opposition political parties and critical media: when Georgian Dream leaders talk about oligarchs who exert influence on Georgian politics and economy, they name people like David Kezerashvili, the owner of Formula TV and a supporter of the United National Movement; Koba Nakopia, an MP from the United National Movement who holds shares in the private television company Mtavari TV, and Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze, founders of the TBC Bank and leaders of the Lelo political party. Thus the EU\u2019s call for Georgia to reduce oligarchic influence in the political and economic life of the country might be trans\u00adformed in the hands of the Government into a tool with which to punish political opponents, independent media and civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions, which Georgian Dream frequently accuses of being in cahoots with various alleged oligarchs.<\/p>\n

Thus, it is clear that the draft law, if passed, will not address the oligarch\u2019s influence in Georgian politics as the Government itself is dominated and controlled by the oligarch. Prominent ministers, including the prime minister, are personal loyalists of Mr Ivanishvili (who previ\u00adously held positions in the latter\u2019s Kartu Bank), just as many political leaders in Parliament. Moreover, if the law is enacted, this will show blatant disregard for the Venice Commission\u2019s and European Commission\u2019s positions.<\/p>\n

1.4 De-oligarchization: an unful\u00adfilled conditionality<\/h4>\n

Thus, to put it bluntly, the Georgian Dream has treated the EU\u2019s condi\u00adtion\u00adality of de-oligarchization as a joke. The Venice Commission and European Commission have clarified that the law will be counter-productive and that the Georgian Government should take a systemic approach to tackling the problem. The draft law, if passed, will do more harm than good.<\/p>\n

The European Union\u2019s insis\u00adtence that Georgia takes effective de-oligarchization measures springs from a legit\u00adimate concern. There can be no doubt about Mr. Ivanishvili\u2019s influence on major political issues and policies, such as arresting political opponents, attacking free media, not joining sanctions on Russia, maintaining cold relations with Ukraine, restoring direct flights to and from Russia, maintaining polar\u00adization as a political tool to help those with political power to keep it, and most impor\u00adtantly, maintaining harsh anti-Western rhetoric.<\/p>\n

2. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRIORITY (4TH PRIORITY)<\/h3>\n

2.1. NACA \u2013 a new agency with new functions<\/h4>\n

Georgian Dream created<\/a> a new entity, the National Anti-Corruption Agency (NACA), to address the fourth priority. According to the legis\u00adlation estab\u00adlishing the NACA, the agency\u2019s main task is to facil\u00aditate the fight against corruption by providing oversight of the national anti-corruption strategic documents and action plans, ensuring the coordi\u00adnation of the activ\u00adities of the relevant agencies, monitoring the asset decla\u00adra\u00adtions of high-ranking public officials, improving safeguards for whistle-blowers and monitoring the financing of political parties.<\/p>\n

The Anti-corruption Agency is accountable to the Parliament and to the inter-agency National Anti-corruption Council through its oblig\u00adation to report to both of these bodies regularly. As its mandate consists primarily of analytical and infor\u00admation-gathering tasks, NACA has often been referred to as a think tank-type agency, and many observers doubt its ability to effec\u00adtively address high-level corruption of the kind that the EU has called for.<\/p>\n

It is possible that the NACA will be given an additional function in connection with creating a registry of oligarchs. If the Georgian Dream decides to ignore the negative feedback from the Venice Commission and the European Commission and pass its draft law on de-oligarchization after its third reading in 2023, then NACA will be put in charge of desig\u00adnating individuals as oligarchs and enforcing some aspects of the legislation.<\/p>\n

2.2 Curbed indepen\u00addence and limited functions of the NACA<\/h4>\n

The head of the NACA is appointed by the prime minister, which raises serious questions about the institution\u2019s indepen\u00addence. Georgian Dream never even considered adopting a model that would require the approval of a 2\/\u200b3 majority in the Parliament or grant substantial powers to civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions (CSOs) concerning the nomination of candi\u00addates for this post. Some of the opposition parties proposed that Parliament should decide on the appointment with a 2\/\u200b3 majority, which would require the ruling majority and the opposition to agree on a joint candidate. Georgian Dream rejected this proposal outright, though. In its oral report in June 2023, the European Commission stressed that the indepen\u00addence of the NACA was an essential criterion for assessing the implan\u00adtation of this priority.<\/p>\n

Currently, the nomination procedure creates a selection committee with members repre\u00adsenting various state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and CSOs, with the majority of the committee seats being held by the Government. The selection process is based on an open compet\u00aditive procedure open to any and all candi\u00addates. The selection committee reviews the appli\u00adca\u00adtions and then nominates several candi\u00addates to the prime minister, who then appoints one of them to a six-year term as the head of the NACA. A selection procedure held in early 2023 resulted in the appointment of Mr Razhden Kuprashvili to the post. Mr. Kuprashvili has led the Legal Aid Service (another state agency) since 2019. Trans\u00adparency Inter\u00adna\u00adtional, which took part in the selection process, did not observe any signif\u00adicant viola\u00adtions or foul play during the process; however, various CSOs have expressed doubts about the indepen\u00addence of Mr. Kuprashvili, the first person to hold this post, as he is known to be a close acquain\u00adtance of the prime minister.<\/p>\n

The most signif\u00adicant deficit of the newly estab\u00adlished NACA is its lack of inves\u00adtigative functions, which precludes effective action on its part in a law-enforcement role. The main focus of criticism from opposition parties and civil society about the NACA has concerned these two deficits \u2013 lack of indepen\u00addence and inves\u00adtigative functions.<\/p>\n

2.3 Previous initiatives<\/h4>\n

Before adopting the legis\u00adlation that estab\u00adlished the NACA, several opposition parties had submitted earlier legislative initia\u00adtives on this issue, inspired by the relative success of the independent anti-corruption entities in Romania and Ukraine. The opposition party Lelo for Georgia, for instance, intro\u00adduced a legislative package of this kind in 2021. However, Georgian Dream never even discussed the package. Several former Georgian Dream MPs had also submitted a set of bills on this subject in the previous Parliament. This package, which was initiated by ex-MPs Tamar Chugoshvili, Tamar Khulordava, Irine Pruidze, Nino Goguadze, Dimitri Tskitishvili and Trans\u00adparency Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Georgia, was shelved right at the start and never was taken up in Parliament.<\/p>\n

In October 2022, Lelo requested<\/a> that Parliament turn its attention back to the legislative package about the anti-corruption agency submitted by the opposition in 2021. The \u201cnational anti-corruption agency\u201d estab\u00adlished under that proposal would have been an independent government insti\u00adtution with inves\u00adtigative functions. It would have been accountable to the Parliament, and its chair\u00adperson would have been elected by the legis\u00adlature for a five-year term. In addition, the State Security Service would have relin\u00adquished its role in the fight against corruption as this role would have been trans\u00adferred to this new agency. The agency would be mandated to prevent public service corruption, monitor public servants\u2019 asset decla\u00adra\u00adtions and watch over political parties\u2019 financing. In addition, the proposed legis\u00adlation would also have provided criminal immunity to the head of the agency unless that person was arrested at a crime scene. Lelo\u2019s proposal provided for the single-term election of the chair\u00adperson. As stated above, this bill was never seriously considered by the Georgian Dream, even though it probably came closer to meeting the EU\u2019s require\u00adments than the approach ultimately adopted.<\/p>\n

2.4. Special Inves\u00adti\u00adgation Service and the Personal Data Protection Service<\/h4>\n

The anti-corruption priority also includes ensuring the indepen\u00addence and provision of adequate resources for the Special Inves\u00adti\u00adgation Service and the Personal Data Protection Service.<\/p>\n

These agencies were created in late 2021 when the Georgian Dream decided to abolish<\/a> the State Inspector\u2019s Service (SIS) and divide up its mandate. It was widely believed this move was motivated by a desire to fire the head of the SIS, Londa Toloraia, who was not averse to taking steps that GD inter\u00adpreted as political and aimed against their party interests. The final straw came in November 2021, when the SIS inves\u00adti\u00adgated<\/a> the allega\u00adtions that Mikheil Saakashvili had been treated inhumanely. The State Inspector\u2019s Service concluded that the Ministry of Justice and the Special Peniten\u00adtiary Service violated the Law on Personal Data Protection by releasing footage and photographs of Mikheil Saakashvili being trans\u00adferred from Rustavi Prison to the Gldani Prison\u2019s medical facility against his will.<\/p>\n

This proved to be one step too far for the Georgian Dream, which immedi\u00adately abolished the SIS, breaking up its personnel into two separate agencies despite criticism from the President of Georgia, the opposition and US and EU partners. The US Embassy to Georgia stated that \u201cby abolishing the State Inspector\u2019s Service, the ruling party under\u00admined the government\u2019s account\u00adability,\u201d while the EU Ambas\u00adsador took an even harsher line, pointing out that the disman\u00adtlement of SIS \u201cput into question the respect for democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and proper democ\u00adratic oversight mechanisms.\u201d<\/p>\n

Georgian Dream appointed two relatively loyal figures to head the newly created agencies. After they and their work cropped up in the EU\u2019s condi\u00adtion\u00adal\u00adities, Georgian Dream strengthened their functions. On 30 November 2022, Parliament expanded the inves\u00adtigative powers of the Special Inves\u00adtigative Service. In particular, the Special Inves\u00adti\u00adgation Service is now empowered to lead inves\u00adti\u00adga\u00adtions launched when the European Court of Human Rights finds a violation enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, a task which formerly fell to the Prosecutor\u2019s Office.<\/p>\n

Parliament also supported a package of legislative amend\u00adments intended to strengthen the Personal Data Protection Service as an insti\u00adtution. The amend\u00adments strengthened social protection guarantees for its employees and imposed a statute of limita\u00adtions for the commission of an admin\u00adis\u00adtrative offence by an agency employee. Changes were also made to the Parlia\u00admentary Rules of Procedure \u2013 in particular, providing for the heads of the Special Inves\u00adti\u00adgation Service and of the Personal Data Protection Service to submit infor\u00admation to Parliament, at Parliament\u2019s request, about legislative short\u00adcomings identified during their work processes, as well as opinions on measures to address these short\u00adcomings and steps to increase the efficiency of the perfor\u00admance of their respective service.<\/p>\n

2.5 Tackling corruption in real life?<\/h4>\n

Several journal\u00adistic inves\u00adti\u00adga\u00adtions carried out by Georgian media have exposed corruption on the part of Georgian Dream members. Recent reports by TV Pirveli unveiled that Prime Minister Irakli Gharib\u00adashvili regularly receives hefty monetary gifts from his father. There have also been numerous reports about his family members receiving properties, including from the state. None of these allega\u00adtions have been inves\u00adti\u00adgated by law enforcement officials. The insti\u00adtution currently in charge of fighting corruption \u2013 the State Security Service, completely ignored these reports, as it always does when the opposition media or civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions uncover foul play in connection with the expen\u00additure of public funds or indica\u00adtions of receiving illegal income by high-ranking officials. In theory, the independent anti-corruption agency should have inves\u00adti\u00adgated such cases; however, the current NACA does not have inves\u00adtigative powers enabling it to react to media reports of this kind, even if they are highly credible.<\/p>\n

It is worth noting that the opposition and civil society assigned little priority to this condi\u00adtion\u00adality. Therefore, Georgian Dream opted to pass the minimum of legislative changes and create the NACA with limited functions, hoping that this would be considered suffi\u00adcient for ticking the box as counting towards the progress on the fourth priority. It appears that this strategy has paid off \u2013 the condi\u00adtion\u00adality was assessed as having been partially completed, even though the missing elements \u2013 indepen\u00addence and inves\u00adtigative functions \u2013 are crucial for fully imple\u00admenting the EU\u2019s fourth priority.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n

The European Commission and the EU Member States will have to take a decision on whether candidacy status for Georgia in late 2023. According to the latest assessment, Georgia has imple\u00admented three of the twelve condi\u00adtion\u00adal\u00adities and has made either limited progress (de-oligarchization) or some progress (remaining eight) on the others. A great deal of political will and effort on the part of the Georgian Dream will be required to persuade the European Commission that the leadership is taking the de-oligarchization and anti-corruption condi\u00adtions seriously and that the steps aimed at their imple\u00admen\u00adtation are tangible and result-oriented rather than mere window dressing.<\/p>\n

Given that the de-oligarchization priority remains un-imple\u00admented and that steps have not been taken to safeguard the indepen\u00addence of the Anti-corruption Agency and empowered to conduct inves\u00adti\u00adga\u00adtions, I believe that the only viable strategy for the European Commission and the Council is as follows:<\/p>\n