{"id":57252,"date":"2023-08-31T13:57:29","date_gmt":"2023-08-31T11:57:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=57252"},"modified":"2023-10-16T16:30:45","modified_gmt":"2023-10-16T14:30:45","slug":"expert-network-russia-disintegration-milov","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/expert-network-russia-disintegration-milov\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Russia\u2019s Disin\u00adte\u00adgration a Realistic Prospect?"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

Russland besteht aus mehr als 80 Regionen; Grafik: Shutterstock<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

In the light of Vladimir Putin\u2019s military failures in Ukraine and discus\u00adsions about Russia\u2019s possible future after Putin, there has been much discussion recently about Russia \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgrating\u201d or \u201cfalling apart\u201d into separate countries. Is that a realistic possi\u00adbility? Vladimir Milov<\/em> does not think so.<\/h3>\n

<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message]This comment was published in the framework of our Center\u2019s Expert Network Russia<\/a>. For a related analysis, read \u201cPutin\u2019s Wunder\u00adwaffe<\/a>\u201d by Maria Domanska.[\/vc_message][vc_column_text]The problem with the rhetoric about a future \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration of Russia\u201d is that it is almost never based on facts or thorough analysis. No realistic \u201cblueprint for disin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d exists beyond just some generic rhetoric. The arguments are often driven mostly by emotions (negativity towards Russia as an aggressive imperi\u00adal\u00adistic country and wishful thinking about its future disap\u00adpearance as a solution to the problem of Russian imperi\u00adalism) or light\u00adweight extrap\u00ado\u00adlation from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. <\/p>

\"Portrait<\/p>

Vladimir Milov<\/a> is a Russian opposition politician, publicist and energy expert.<\/p><\/div>\n

This article provides a number of arguments, which suggest that the discussion about the prospect of \u201cRussia falling apart\u201d is not based on a realistic assessment, but really is a total waste of time. Even if Russia does indeed disin\u00adte\u00adgrate into separate countries, there will be a powerful drive to bring those separate lands back together, essen\u00adtially recre\u00adating a \u201cre-unified Russia\u201d after some time.<\/p>\n

Drasti\u00adcally reduced role of ethnic minorities<\/h2>\n

To begin with, many commen\u00adtators often base theories about a possible terri\u00adtorial disin\u00adte\u00adgration of Russia on compar\u00adisons with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But this is not a relevant comparison at all. The situation in modern-day Russia is drasti\u00adcally different from the last years of the Soviet Union. Take the ethnic compo\u00adsition: In the late Soviet Union, only about 50 per cent of the population were ethnic Russians; the country\u2019s disin\u00adte\u00adgration was driven by the national republics, dominated by titular nation\u00adal\u00adities, where Russians were a minority. None of the former Soviet republics were dominated by Russians in their ethnic make-up \u2013 Russians were always a distinctive minority.<\/p>\n

The situation in today\u2019s Russia differs sharply. Ethnic Russians comprise 81 per cent of the population \u2013 which means that the country is ethni\u00adcally far more homoge\u00adneous than the Soviet Union was. Most Russian regions \u2013 partic\u00adu\u00adlarly those indus\u00adtrially developed \u2013 are terri\u00adtories vastly dominated by ethnic Russians, who have little or no demand for separatism (the issue of ethnic Russian separatism is discussed in more detail further below).<\/p>\n

Moreover, the share of native ethnic minorities in Russia\u2019s total population really is much lower than the 19 per cent non-ethnic Russians in the total population. About 5 per cent of the total population are ethnic\u00adities which have their own statehood outside Russia \u2013 Ukrainians, Belaru\u00adsians, Armenians, Azeris, Georgians, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Koreans, etc. These peoples largely are not concen\u00adtrated in compact areas but spread across the country, so they cannot qualify as ethnic\u00adities which may claim \u201cindepen\u00addence\u201d. That leaves us with just under 15 per cent of the Russian population which can be qualified as ethnic minorities who compactly reside in certain terri\u00adtories of Russia. Even if we hypothet\u00adi\u00adcally assume that they all separate, that would hardly amount to \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d, because the lion\u2019s share of the territory, dominated by ethnic Russians, remains intact.<\/p>\n

Most of Russia\u2019s 21 ethnic republics and four autonomous districts are such in name only, and are, in fact, dominated by ethnic Russians. The share of ethnic Russians in their total population is as high as 98 per cent in the Jewish Autonomous District, 82 per cent in Karelia, 80 per cent in Khakassia, 68 per cent in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District, 66 per cent in the Nenets Autonomous District, 65 per cent in the Komi Republic, 64 per cent in Adygea and Buryatia, 62 per cent in Udmurtia and the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District respec\u00adtively, 57 per cent in the Altai Republic, 54 per cent in Chukotka, and 53 per cent in Mordovia.<\/p>\n

In two other national republics \u2013 Bashko\u00adr\u00adtostan and Mari El \u2013 ethnic Russians are not a majority, but a plurality visibly larger than the titular nation\u00adality, consti\u00adtuting 36 and 45 per cent respec\u00adtively. In the capital and largest city of Bashko\u00adr\u00adtostan, Ufa, only 17 per cent of residents actually identify as Bashkirs \u2013 while 50 per cent are ethnic Russians.<\/p>\n

The total territory of those ethnic republics dominated by a non-Russian population (Chechnya, Chuvashia, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Tatarstan and Tuva) make up just 2.5 per cent of the Russian Federation\u2019s total territory. If one adds Bashko\u00adr\u00adtostan, Buryatia and Mari El \u2014 where ethnic minorities are far from a majority, but still constitute a sizable part of the population \u2013 that would make it 5.6 per cent. Assume that these republics all separate from Russia \u2013 that won\u2019t even remotely qualify as \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d.<\/p>\n

Another separate question is the Republic of Sakha, commonly known as Yakutia. It has a population of about 1 million people, and its territory takes up 18 per cent of Russia\u2019s total. Yakutia is also rich in natural resources like oil, natural gas, gold, diamonds and coal. 55 per cent of local residents are Yakut by nation\u00adality, with only 32 per cent being Russian. Thus, theoret\u00adi\u00adcally, a separation of Yakutia could deal a serious blow to Russia\u2019s terri\u00adtorial integrity and to its natural resource reserves.<\/p>\n

In reality, however, Yakutia consists of two very distinctive parts, which are not even properly connected with each other. In the southern districts Mirny, Lensk, Aldan and Nerungry, ethnic Russians make up a 70\u201380 per cent majority of the population. Southern Yakutia is also far more indus\u00adtrially developed and connected by railroad and paved roads to the adjacent Russian-dominated regions of Irkutsk, Zabaykalsky Krai and Amur. Here\u2019s where most of Yakutia\u2019s gold, diamonds and coal are mined. The Chayanda gas field, the main source for the Power of Siberia pipeline which supplies gas to China, is located in Yakutia\u2019s southern Lensk district, where 78 per cent of the population are ethnic Russians.<\/p>\n

The areas dominated by ethnic Yakuts are way up in the North and poorly connected to the rest of the region (including the capital Yakutsk) \u2013 there is no rail connection, no bridge over the river Lena and roads are poor. 19 out of 35 Yakutian districts, mostly those dominated by ethnic Yakuts, lack paved roads and have poor (or no) transport connec\u00adtions with the rest of Russia.<\/p>\n

Under these circum\u00adstances, it is very hard to imagine that Yakutia\u2019s southern districts \u2013 where natural resources and industry are concen\u00adtrated and which are dominated by ethnic Russians \u2013 will follow the call, if the Yakut-dominated north \u2013 econom\u00adi\u00adcally far less self-sustainable \u2013 declared a desire to secede from Russia. Northern Yakutia has no effective instru\u00adments to impose its will upon the Russian-dominated south. But even if the whole of Yakutia \u2013 hypothet\u00adi\u00adcally \u2013 separates from Russia, that would still mean that over 75 per cent of Russia\u2019s territory remained intact.<\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s hidden ethnic diversity: A myth<\/h2>\n

There also is little evidence to support specu\u00adlation that the large share of ethnic Russians is a result of \u201cforced Russi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d of other peoples and that there is a much bigger ethnic diversity hiding behind official population figures.<\/p>\n

The share of ethnic Russians in Russia\u2019s total population has not increased in the past decades. Instead, it has shrunk somewhat, from 83 per cent in the Russian Soviet Republic (RSFSR[i]<\/sup><\/a>) in 1939\u20131979, to 81,5 per cent in 1989, to a stable 81 per cent in the censuses of 2002, 2010 and 2021.<\/p>\n

Forced Russi\u00adfi\u00adcation did indeed happen in certain conquered terri\u00adtories in past centuries (e.g. in Ukraine) and should be condemned. But it is worth noting that many terri\u00adtories east of the Volga River were histor\u00adi\u00adcally scarcely populated. Although local peoples did suffer oppression in multiple instances, which should be acknowl\u00adedged by histo\u00adrians, the majority of the ethnic Russian population is generally not a product of \u201cforced Russi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d but a result of ethnic Russians reset\u00adtling in scarcely populated terri\u00adtories further east. According to Western experts\u2019 estimates[ii]<\/sup><\/a>, the population of Siberia grew from some 270,000 indigenous people and settlers at the end of the 17th<\/sup> century to over a million by 1795 and over two million by 1830 \u2013 mainly due to reset\u00adtlement from the European part of Russia. The migration to Siberia in the late 19th<\/sup> and early 20th<\/sup> centuries, when about three million peasants crossed the Urals, paral\u00adleled the mass migration from Europe to the United States in the same period. As a result, the population of Siberia grew to more than ten million by 1914.<\/p>\n

In areas with histor\u00adi\u00adcally large concen\u00adtra\u00adtions of ethnic minorities \u2013 the Volga region, North Caucasus and North Yakutia \u2013 these minorities continue to dominate local popula\u00adtions to this day.<\/p>\n

In past decades \u2013 partic\u00adu\u00adlarly since 1990 \u2013 \u201cforced Russi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d has not happened at all. Instead, many national republics were governed by repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives of titular nations well beyond their actual share in the population. For instance, in Tatarstan, ethnic Russians are given less than a quarter of minis\u00adterial posts in the regional government, despite the fact that their share in Tatarstan\u2019s ethnic make-up is some 40 per cent. In Buryatia, Russians have less than 50 per cent of minis\u00adterial posts, but their share in the local population is two thirds. Bashko\u00adr\u00adtostan has effec\u00adtively been ruled by ethnic Bashkirs since 1957, despite them being only the third largest local ethnicity up until the 2002 census, when they overtook ethnic Russians and landed on second place.<\/p>\n

Thus, official figures of Russia\u2019s ethnic compo\u00adsition largely reflect reality \u2013 there are no reasons to believe that signif\u00adicant numbers of minorities remain hidden under the \u201cethnic Russian\u201d label.<\/p>\n

No signs of ethnic Russian separatism<\/h2>\n

All the above means that any separation of ethnic minorities from Russia would not amount to the country\u2019s \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d. Russia would lose some terri\u00adtories and population, but not too much. Any real \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d would mean a very different thing: the estab\u00adlishment of separate Russian states inhabited predom\u00adi\u00adnantly by ethnic Russians.<\/p>\n

This is something which is often misun\u00adder\u00adstood by some foreign commen\u00adtators \u2013 many of them automat\u00adi\u00adcally imply that, because Russia has multiple ethnic minorities and national republics, their separation would mean the country\u2019s \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d \u2013 just as with the Soviet Union. But the situation in Russia is drasti\u00adcally different: Russia is signif\u00adi\u00adcantly more ethni\u00adcally homogenous than the Soviet Union, and even the complete separation of those terri\u00adtories dominated by non-Russian minorities would not qualify as \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d \u2013 because most of the country would remain intact. For the country to really \u201cbreak apart\u201d, a separation of Russian-dominated terri\u00adtories would be required.<\/p>\n

Is that a realistic prospect? First, there are practi\u00adcally no recorded separatist trends nor evidence of separatist thinking gaining traction in the regions dominated by ethnic Russians. In some Russian regions, there are groups of activists who mull separatism (Kalin\u00adingrad and \u201cIngria\u201d in the Leningrad Region and St. Petersburg), but these groups are small, and show no signs of signif\u00adicant public influence.<\/p>\n

Much of the public specu\u00adlation about the past attempts to establish Russian-speaking \u201crepublics\u201d like a Urals Republic and a Far East Republic, are based on misin\u00adter\u00adpre\u00adta\u00adtions of actual historic events. The \u201cUrals Republic\u201d of 1993 was no genuine bottom-up separatist movement but an admin\u00adis\u00adtrative attempt by then Yekater\u00adinburg Governor Eduard Rossel to elevate his region\u2019s status from oblast to republic, which then had more budgetary autonomy. The attempt was quickly dropped after the 1993 Consti\u00adtution was adopted, which abolished key repub\u00adlican privi\u00adleges. By contrast, the Far East Republic was a Bolshevik-sponsored puppet state in the early 1920s, far from a genuine attempt to establish a separate Russian-speaking state.<\/p>\n

There is much talk about some kind of separate \u201cUrals\u201d or \u201cSiberian\u201d identity, but in reality, whereas the popula\u00adtions of both regions clearly have certain distinctive cultural specifics, the absolute majority of them identify themselves as (ethnic) Russians and there is no real separate \u201cUrals\u201d or \u201cSiberian\u201d national identity. There are no major signs of ethnic Russian groups searching for a different identity. Attempts to find \u201cbreakaway identities\u201d among ethnic Russians are not based on academic evidence.<\/p>\n

In the absence of real separatist trends, one may safely assume that if major Russian-speaking regions somehow become separated, that would trigger a political movement to bring them together again. This would be similar to 20th<\/sup> century Yugoslav irredentism (which aimed to unite Bulgaria, Albania and parts of Greece, Italy and Austria with Yugoslavia), but much stronger \u2013 because this would be about a nation of one ethnic identity artifi\u00adcially broken apart. A movement to \u201cbring the broken nation back together\u201d would be a massive stimulus for chauvinists and revan\u00adchists, fostering a strong imperi\u00adalist mindset. If successful, a reinte\u00adgrated Russia, driven by resentment, would more likely be posed to attack its neighbors again. Such a situation would also strengthen revan\u00adchist forces who could reasonably argue that reinte\u00adgration would reduce economic woes and barriers created by disintegration.<\/p>\n

Thus, when foreign commen\u00adtators speculate about a break-up of Russia with the purpose of rendering it weaker and unable to attack its neighbors again, they should bear in mind that this logic may only work in the short term. In the longer term, it would create dangers of feeding chauvinist resentment for decades \u2013 fueling revan\u00adchists with powerful incen\u00adtives to \u201cbring Russian lands together again\u201d \u2013 because any separation into independent states creates uncom\u00adfortable economic and social barriers between them. Building democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions would be much harder in a broken-up Russia, while nation\u00adalist resentment and irredentism would thrive \u2013 probably a far more dangerous environment than the one that led to Putin\u2019s regime in the 2000s.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the thought that it would be a good if separate Russian regions fight each other, so they won\u2019t attack Russia\u2019s neighbors\u201d, really is a dangerous illusion not supported by historic experience. Yugoslav irredentism in the 20th<\/sup> century resulted in major inter\u00adna\u00adtional conflicts more than once. Hostil\u00adities between different Arab states in the Middle East did not prevent their collective threat against Israel. And even Russia\u2019s own civil war of 1918\u20131922 (exactly after an initial \u201cbreak-up into separate states\u201d) did not stop Russia attacking its neighbors. Inciting such internal fighting as a means to prevent outside aggression is a bad idea, which is not supported by historic experience.<\/p>\n

Should the separated ethnic Russian states manage to become peaceful, democ\u00adratic and not dominated by politics of resentment, their only reasonable way forward to achieve progress and devel\u00adopment would be to create a common market, common travel space, harmo\u00adnized legis\u00adlation, ultimately leading to\u2026 recre\u00adating just another form of re-unified Russia. So, both ways \u2014 either if revan\u00adchists or democrats win in the separated Russian states \u2014 Russia will be moving towards re-integration in the future, simply because that makes economic and practical sense, while artificial barriers between terri\u00adtories inhabited mostly by ethnic Russians do not make any sense in the long run.<\/p>\n

Months into public debate about Russia\u2019s possible \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d, the propo\u00adnents of this theory have been unable to move beyond general rhetoric on the subject and of outlining even the basics of how such disin\u00adte\u00adgration may look like in practice. They have also failed to explain what sense it would make for Yekater\u00adinburg to declare separation from Chelyabinsk or Tyumen, or for the Perm Kray to separate from neigh\u00adboring Kirov Region. By contrast, the Soviet republics had real motivation to secede in the early 1990s. All were dominated by titular nation\u00adal\u00adities, Russians were a clear minority, and some even had limited inter\u00adna\u00adtional sover\u00adeignty \u2013 the democ\u00adratic West did not recognize the occupied Baltic States as part of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republics retained formal seats at the United Nations. And the Soviet Consti\u00adtution allowed the republics to secede.<\/p>\n

Many of the former Soviet Republics (the Baltic States, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus) have experi\u00adenced independent statehood in the past and all of them could engage in inter\u00adna\u00adtional trade, either via the sea or through borders with other countries. By contrast, the majority of Russian regions are landlocked or lack easy access to inter\u00adna\u00adtional maritime routes (commercial shipping in the Arctic remains a signif\u00adicant challenge). The former Soviet Republics\u2019 borders essen\u00adtially had much greater historic signif\u00adi\u00adcance and inter\u00adna\u00adtional recog\u00adnition than the borders of Russian regions, which were mostly drawn artifi\u00adcially and neglected for decades.<\/p>\n

Many Russians remember the time of the early 1990s, when, during a chaotic transition, many regions intro\u00adduced intra-regional barriers for trade or movement, which created a lot of discomfort for the population and later led to the support for Vladimir Putin\u2019s \u201cconsol\u00adi\u00addation\u201d efforts (which went too far). Most Russians hold negative views of the early 1990s \u201cseparation\u201d experience and see it as something artificial and inconvenient.<\/p>\n

Demand for feder\u00adalism, not \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d<\/h2>\n

There is, however, a signif\u00adicant and undeniable demand for feder\u00adal\u00adization across Russia, including Russian-dominated regions, which is often mistaken for \u201cseparatism\u201d. Since 2000 the central government has essen\u00adtially taken away all the major powers from the country\u2019s regions, leaving almost no room for self-gover\u00adnance. Before Putin, Russian regions retained about 50 per cent of the regional tax revenue in their budgets \u2013 this share has now dropped to just 35 per cent (whereas 65 per cent goes to the federal center). Putin also abolished the direct election of regional governors in 2005, only to return them later in much more controlled form, effec\u00adtively depriving the regions from the ability to freely elect its own leadership. When voters in the Khabarovsk region managed to elect an opposition governor in a rare contested race in 2018 and a regional assembly without repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives of the ruling United Russia party in 2019, Putin arrested the governor and dismantled the election results.<\/p>\n

Other major powers like policing or licensing natural resources have been taken away from the regions since 2000. Governors and parlia\u00admentary speakers were stripped of the right to represent their regions in the upper chamber of parliament, the Feder\u00adation Council, in 2000.<\/p>\n

Thus, when people across the Russian regions demand more devolution of powers from the federal center, they essen\u00adtially demand a return to a more equal distri\u00adb\u00adution of powers between regions and the center. This should not be inter\u00adpreted as \u201cseparatism\u201d or a desire to break away from Russia.<\/p>\n

Emigrant groups advocating seces\u00adsions from Russia should bear in mind that Russia is experi\u00adencing a severe crisis of popular repre\u00adsen\u00adtation. The country has not seen a free and fair nationwide election for more than two decades. People are tired of being run by self-appointed officials, who have never been popularly elected, or were last elected in an open contest more than 20 years ago.<\/p>\n

In this situation, the appearance of opposition figures, who were never publicly elected by anybody, but claim popular legit\u00adimacy or some repre\u00adsen\u00adtation (including of ethnic minorities) and advocate regional secession, is extremely counter\u00adpro\u00adductive and creates confusion.<\/p>\n

It prompts many people in Russia to think of politics not as compe\u00adtition of dicta\u00adtorship vs. democracy, but as a contest of various self-appointed people from various sides (from Putinists to seces\u00adsionists), who don\u2019t really care about voters, but are driven by their own selfish agendas.<\/p>\n

Undoubtedly, raising awareness of the interests and rights of ethnic minorities, fighting racism and xenophobia, promoting discussion about the self-deter\u00admi\u00adnation of Russia\u2019s ethnic minorities, and a true feder\u00adal\u00adization of Russia, is good. But claiming false legit\u00adimacy and repre\u00adsen\u00adtation that does not exist, is bad and will actually make the opposition less, not more attractive in the eyes of Russia\u2019s population \u2013 including ethnic minorities. When self-appointed players put forward the idea of \u201cRussia\u2019s disin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d as given, that scares many people in Russia \u2013 including the ethnic minorities, many of whom do not want any secession. And it actually helps Putin\u2019s propa\u00adganda, which can easily pick up the topic as a major threat to the country.<\/p>\n

Distracting demagoguery that should be put to rest<\/h2>\n

When the above arguments are being laid out, propo\u00adnents of the \u201cRussia disin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d theory usually accuse their critics of imperi\u00adalism and the desire to prevent the free will of the people to separate from Russia, instead of proving their case. In reality, however, no one desires to prevent anything. The problem is not with disin\u00adte\u00adgration as such \u2013 if it happens, it happens. The problem is rather that the whole subject is completely unreal\u00adistic and a total waste of time.<\/p>\n

There are no condi\u00adtions for Russia\u2019s disin\u00adte\u00adgration into separate states. The topic of possible statehood for Russia\u2019s ethnic minorities is different: even if they all, hypothet\u00adi\u00adcally, separate from Russia, most of the country\u2019s territory would remain intact, because the share of ethnic minorities in Russia\u2019s population \u2013 and the share of minority-inhabited terri\u00adtories of the country\u2019s territory \u2013 is relatively low. The link between the debate on self-deter\u00admi\u00adnation of ethnic minorities and Russia\u2019s \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d is false, because even a total separation of ethnic terri\u00adtories does not equal disin\u00adte\u00adgration. Real disin\u00adte\u00adgration would mean the creation of separate states dominated by ethnic Russians \u2013 for which there are no real precon\u00addi\u00adtions, and which would not be sustainable, most likely leading to their re-integration into some form of re-unified Russia in the future.<\/p>\n

The totally out-of-touch debate about Russia\u2019s possible \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgration\u201d has already happily been picked up by Putin and his propa\u00adganda[iii]<\/sup><\/a>: it is a very helpful topic for them to help portray Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine as a \u201cdefensive act against Western aggression and attempts to destroy Russia\u201d. This is all the more deplorable because the whole topic has zero basis in actual reality. While Western democ\u00adracies spend sizable amounts of taxpayers\u2019 money to counter Putin\u2019s propa\u00adganda and disin\u00adfor\u00admation, some hothead \u201cdisin\u00adte\u00adgra\u00adtionistas\u201d volun\u00adtarily hand a powerful propa\u00adganda tool to Putin, completely out of nowhere.<\/p>\n

This distracting demagoguery should be put to rest. The propo\u00adnents of the theory of \u201cfuture disin\u00adte\u00adgration of Russia\u201d should better come up with some serious arguments as to why and how this may realis\u00adti\u00adcally happen, or this topic should be dropped out of the public debate once and for all. This will save us the time and energy from discussing fully unreal\u00adistic subjects, and it avoids helping Putin to gain an upper hand in his propa\u00adganda war.<\/p>\n

Editing by Nikolaus von Twickel<\/em><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

 <\/i>[i]<\/sup><\/a> Russian Soviet Feder\u00adative Socialist Republic, in which borders Russian Feder\u00adation continued to exist after 1991<\/p>\n

[ii]<\/sup><\/a> Janet M. Hartley, professor of inter\u00adna\u00adtional history at the London School of Economics and Political Science, \u201cSiberia: Not (always) a freezing wilderness\u201d, 2018, Yale University Press (https:\/\/yalebooks.yale.edu\/2018\/12\/18\/siberia-not-always-a-freezing-wilderness\/<\/a>)<\/p>\n

[iii]<\/sup><\/a> \u201c\u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d \u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0443\u043f\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u043b \u043e \u043f\u043e\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 \u00ab\u043c\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0438\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u0438 \u0443\u0440\u0430\u043b\u044c\u0446\u0435\u0432\u00bb \u0432 \u0441\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0435 \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043f\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0438\u201d, February 26, 2023 (https:\/\/www.forbes.ru\/society\/485381-putin-predupredil-o-poavlenii-moskovitov-i-ural-cev-v-slucae-raspada-rossii<\/a>); \u201c\u041f\u0443\u0442\u0438\u043d \u0437\u0430\u044f\u0432\u0438\u043b, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0417\u0430\u043f\u0430\u0434 \u043f\u044b\u0442\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0440\u0430\u0441\u0447\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0420\u043e\u0441\u0441\u0438\u044e \u0438 \u0441\u0434\u0435\u043b\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0441\u043b\u0430\u0431\u043e\u0439\u201d (https:\/\/tass.ru\/politika\/14092393<\/a>)[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator][vc_column_text]Did you like this article? If yes, you can support the independent editorial work and journalism of LibMod via a simple donation tool.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]