{"id":57591,"date":"2023-09-05T10:38:28","date_gmt":"2023-09-05T08:38:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/das-ist-auch-unser-krieg\/"},"modified":"2023-09-07T16:02:13","modified_gmt":"2023-09-07T14:02:13","slug":"it-is-our-war-too","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/it-is-our-war-too\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cThis is Our War Too\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

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In an Op-Ed for spiegel.de, Ralf F\u00fccks and Marieluise Beck present 10 propo\u00adsi\u00adtions about what is at stake in Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine and what needs to be done.<\/h3>\n

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We just returned from our third trip to Ukraine since the Russian invasion began. We held political talks and met old friends in Kyiv and visited Kharkiv, where people demon\u00adstrated remarkable resilience. Just like in many other of the country\u2019s regions. During our last visit in June 2022, the atmos\u00adphere was oppressive; the city was half empty, the military situation uncertain. Now it is full of life again, even though nothing is normal \u2014 Russian missiles can fly in just 40 seconds from across the border. In the town of Izyum we learnt what Russian occupation means: arbitrary rule, mass graves, torture and sexualised violence. The many impres\u00adsions made it clear to us what is at stake \u2013 not only for Ukraine, but for the future of Europe.<\/p>\n

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  1. Let\u2019s not mince words: German politics are partly respon\u00adsible for this European catastrophe. From the chumminess between Chancellor Gerhard Schr\u00f6der and Vladimir Putin through Angela Merkel\u2019s years to February 2022, Berlin downplayed signs of danger and sent the wrong signals towards Moscow. The list of mistakes is long: The caution after the Russian invasion of Georgia, the embar\u00adrassed silence after the large-scale hacker attack on the Bundestag, the stubborn illusions about a \u201cdiplo\u00admatic solution\u201d after the annex\u00adation of Crimea and the occupation of swaths of east Ukrainian territory in 2014, the ignorance of Putin\u2019s historical revisionist pamphlets, the stubborn adherence to the \u201cenergy partnership with Russia\u201d, the shrugging accep\u00adtance of Russian war crimes in Syria \u2014 all this reassured Putin and his entourage that no serious resis\u00adtance could be expected from Germany. With oil and gas imports from Russia, we financed the regime\u2019s arms build-up while weapons for Ukraine were declared a taboo in order \u201cnot to provoke Russia\u201d. In effect, we lowered the threshold for Russian aggression.<\/li>\n
  2. That is the prequel. But the outcome of this war also affects us directly. Putin is not only attacking Ukraine, but the transat\u00adlantic alliance and the European order. All we have to do is finally take seriously what the Russian leadership demanded on the eve of the attack: a revision of NATO\u2019s eastward enlargement and a return to Yalta, the conference at the end of World War II that assigned eastern Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence. If the West now presents itself as weak, what will prevent Putin from testing NATO in the Baltics once Russia feels militarily strong again? Either Russian neo-imperi\u00adalism is stopped in Ukraine \u2013 or the next war will take place on NATO territory. Poland and the Baltic countries know this.<\/li>\n
  3. Full support for Ukraine is not just about solidarity. This war affects our very own interests: Inter\u00adna\u00adtional law must not be replaced by the law of the jungle; wars of aggression must be outlawed and the equal sover\u00adeignty of all states respected; collective security can only exist with the renun\u00adci\u00adation of violence. If we prove incapable of defending these principles, it will encourage author\u00adi\u00adtarian regimes worldwide to use violence as a means of politics. At the same time, any success by Putin in Ukraine, however small, will deepen the rifts in the transat\u00adlantic alliance and within the EU. Regimes ready for war despise those showing aversion to conflict as weak. Peace and security must be defended against them with a policy of strength.<\/li>\n
  4. Conse\u00adquently: This is our war too. This does not mean that we should send the Bundeswehr to Ukraine and risk a big Russia-NATO showdown. The Ukrainians are ready to fight for us, too. It is in our very own interest that they win. Winning the war means defending Ukraine\u2019s full terri\u00adtorial integrity and political sover\u00adeignty. The vast majority of Ukrainians are deter\u00admined to do so, despite all the sacri\u00adfices the war demands. They know what it means to live under Russian occupation: Tyranny, mass graves, torture, arbitrary arrests, depor\u00adta\u00adtions, eradi\u00adcation of the Ukrainian language and culture. No one must force Ukraine to surrender millions of people. And no one must pressure Ukraine into \u201cterri\u00adtorial conces\u00adsions\u201d that perma\u00adnently undermine its security and economic viability.<\/li>\n
  5. Whether Ukraine can win the war crucially depends on us. The West has by far the greater economic, technical and military potential vis-\u00e0-vis Russia. What is lacking is the political will to help Ukraine win. With all due recog\u00adnition for the support provided so far, it was aimed at ensuring that Ukraine can hold its ground at great cost, but not at it gaining the upper hand.<\/li>\n
  6. The political goal deter\u00admines the military means. If the end of this war is to be the liber\u00adation of the occupied terri\u00adtories and the unrestricted sover\u00adeignty of Ukraine, the West must provide all the weapons needed for a successful counter-offensive as quickly as possible. As long as Putin can hope that the West grows tired and forces Ukraine into a \u201ccompromise\u201d with Russia, there is no chance for a peace worth the name. The much repeated formula that Ukraine must decide for itself what conces\u00adsions it is willing to make will remain a hollow phrase if we restrict military aid so much that Kyiv is can choose only between a war of attrition with heavy losses and a ceasefire that cements a division of the country. That would be a tragedy for Ukraine and a devas\u00adtating signal far beyond Europe.<\/li>\n
  7. German policy has come a long way since the start of Russia\u2019s all-out war. We are now Ukraine\u2019s second most important arms supplier \u2013 albeit far behind the U.S. Never\u00adtheless, our support to date follows the pattern of \u201ctoo little, too late\u201d. Chancellor Olaf Scholz calls this prudence. In fact, our hesitation is driving up Ukrainian losses. It contributed to Kyiv\u2019s failure to use the momentum of the successful counter-offensive in autumn 2022 to liberate much of its territory. It gave Russia time to boost its arms production, fortify its front lines and entrench itself behind minefields. The renewed seesaw over the delivery of Taurus guided missiles limits Ukraine\u2019s ability to attack Russian bases, depots and supply routes deep in enemy territory.<\/li>\n
  8. Our fear of a further escalation of the war keeps Ukraine locked in asymmetric warfare. It is attacked from Russia but is supposed to be able to defend itself only on its own territory. However, the right to self-defence, guaranteed under inter\u00adna\u00adtional law, does not stop at the country\u2019s own borders. While Russia uses the entire conven\u00adtional arsenal of a great power, we hesitate at any new weapons system that would put Ukraine in a stronger position. Instead of worrying about Putin\u2019s \u201cred lines\u201d, we should set clear limits. The Kremlin must know that every new missile attack, every attack on Ukrainian grain exports, every attack on energy supplies will be met with increased support for Ukraine. This also includes the message: keep your hands off weapons of mass destruction. Their use would have devas\u00adtating conse\u00adquences for Russia. This is called deter\u00adrence. After all the futile negoti\u00ada\u00adtions, it is the only language Putin understands.<\/li>\n
  9. Negoti\u00ada\u00adtions can only take place when Moscow is ready to respect Ukraine\u2019s full political sover\u00adeignty and withdraw its troops from the occupied terri\u00adtories. Mind you, these are not maximum demands, but the minimum required by inter\u00adna\u00adtional law and the European order. Any sustainable peace also requires that those respon\u00adsible for Russian war crimes be held accountable. Those who unleash a war of aggression against a peaceful neighbour must not be allowed to walk free. A third element of any negotiated settlement must be compen\u00adsation for the destruction Russia has caused in Ukraine. With the Russian Central Bank\u2019s frozen assets, there is a bargaining chip for this. It must also be clear that neither Ukraine\u2019s accession to the EU nor its NATO membership are negotiable. Russia has no right to determine the future of its neighbours.<\/li>\n
  10. Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine is also a test of the strength of Western democ\u00adracies. Future histo\u00adrians will see it as a key moment for the future of Europe and the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order. If we fail this test, we fail not only vis-\u00e0-vis Ukraine. The balance of power will then shift further in favour of author\u00adi\u00adtarian powers that see the \u201cdecadent West\u201d in decline. We should not do them this favour. Conversely, an independent, free Ukraine can become an anchor point for a democ\u00adratic trans\u00adfor\u00admation in the entire region. This also applies to Russia. Those who do not want to write off this country perma\u00adnently should do every\u00adthing to ensure that Russian neo-imperi\u00adalism fails in Ukraine. That is a prereq\u00aduisite for any change for the better.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    This article first appeared at Spiegel.de<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n

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    Spenden mit Bankeinzug<\/h2>\n

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