{"id":57874,"date":"2023-09-20T15:34:22","date_gmt":"2023-09-20T13:34:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=57874"},"modified":"2024-01-17T11:29:46","modified_gmt":"2024-01-17T10:29:46","slug":"expert-network-russia-disintegration-domanska","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/expert-network-russia-disintegration-domanska\/","title":{"rendered":"Putin\u2019s Wunder\u00adwaffe: The Bugbear of Russia\u2019s Collapse"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

Wagner fighters in Rostov-on-Don, June 2023. The merce\u00adnaries\u2019 mutiny is a stark reminder that Putin\u2019s regime does not guarantee stability. Photo: IMAGO<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

Russia is unlikely to disin\u00adte\u00adgrate soon, but its current leadership can no longer guarantee stability. The war against Ukraine and the Wagner mutiny have shown that Putin\u2019s regime is both a threat to inter\u00adna\u00adtional security and to the cohesion of Russia itself, writes Maria Doma\u0144ska<\/em>.<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message]This analysis was published in the framework of our Center\u2019s Expert Network Russia<\/a>. For a related comment, read \u201cIs Russia\u2019s Disin\u00adte\u00adgration a Realistic Prospect?<\/a>\u201d by Vladimir Milov.[\/vc_message][vc_column_text]One of the widespread concerns expressed by Western politi\u00adcians and experts is that Russia\u2019s stability and terri\u00adtorial integrity is threatened in the event of a regime change. Political turmoil resulting from the decom\u00adpo\u00adsition of the current model of government (as a result of Vladimir Putin\u2019s death, a palace coup, or \u2013 highly unlikely \u2014 a \u201ccolour revolution\u201d) is often seen as a potential path to state disin\u00adte\u00adgration or civil war. Under\u00adstandably, this prospect raises the spectre that Russia\u2019s nuclear arsenal will fall into unreliable hands. It also resembles widespread fears from before the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led George Bush to decry Ukrainian \u201csuicidal nation\u00adalism\u201d in his infamous Chicken Kyiv Speech in August 1991. Against this backdrop, a contin\u00adu\u00adation of the author\u00adi\u00adtarian model in a post-Putin Russia is perceived as the \u201clesser evil\u201d.<\/p>

\"Portrait<\/p>\n

Maria Doma\u0144ska PhD<\/a> is a senior fellow at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw, Poland.<\/p><\/div>\n

Indeed, Putin is likely to be gone during the current decade and Russia will again stand at the cross\u00adroads between author\u00adi\u00adtarian path-depen\u00addence and an oppor\u00adtunity for pluralism and political liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation. Once the person\u00adalist dicta\u00adtorship is gone, the system may become unstable and chaotic indeed. However, there is no reason to doubt that the new rulers would be inter\u00adested in securing Russia\u2019s nuclear arsenal to no lesser extent than the post-Soviet nomen\u00adklatura was in the 1990s.<\/p>\n

The biggest mistake we can make is to cling to the fear that the collapse of the autocratic regime will be worse than the current status quo<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

The biggest mistake we can make is to cling to the fear that the collapse of the autocratic regime, which has been waging constant wars and hybrid opera\u00adtions against its neigh\u00adbours during the last two decades, will be worse than the current status quo. Our fear is playing directly into Putin\u2019s hands and needs to be replaced by rational reflection on best-case and worst-case scenarios and by the elabo\u00adration of toolkits to handle them.<\/p>\n

Why are we so afraid of Russia\u2019s collapse?<\/h2>\n

The spectre of a post-Putin breakup of Russia has been \u2013 to large extent \u2013 artifi\u00adcially created and highly politi\u00adcized. It occurs in two main contexts.<\/p>\n

First, the Kremlin has long tried to justify its increas\u00adingly harsh domestic political course by the need to maintain domestic stability and prevent Russia\u2019s disin\u00adte\u00adgration. The main negative point of reference is the collapse of the Soviet Union triggered by Mikhail Gorbachev\u2019s reforms.<\/p>\n

Second, this theme resonates quite strongly in the West. Although the Soviet collapse ended neither in a bloody civil war nor with the prolif\u00ader\u00adation of nuclear weapons, the spectre of Russia\u2019s possible disin\u00adte\u00adgration keeps many Western experts and decision-makers awake at night. While some of these fears seem sincere, at the same time they provide an easy excuse not to develop funda\u00admen\u00adtally new and ambitious strategies towards Russia, based on compre\u00adhensive support for pro-democ\u00adratic players. As a result, we may again be caught off guard when the regime falters, without scenarios prepared beforehand to effec\u00adtively deal with new domestic political challenges.<\/p>\n

Russian state propa\u00adganda has thus proved quite effective in its reflexive control exerted vis-a-vis Western audiences. Two false beliefs seem firmly entrenched in the debates about Russia\u2019s future.<\/p>\n

First, state stability is equated with the stability of Russian autocracy. According to a widespread stereotype, Russia\u2019s vast and diverse territory can be ruled only with an iron fist and Russians are \u201corgan\u00adi\u00adcally\u201d unfit for democracy. The collapse of the Soviet Union is cited as proof that reforms lead to the country\u2019s decom\u00adpo\u00adsition, while failed attempts to democ\u00adratise the country in the 20th<\/sup> century are pointed to as evidence that \u201cRussia cannot change\u201d. However, two other aspects of the problem are ignored. The more attempts at political reforms are under\u00adtaken, the greater the chance that they will succeed: apart from the learning curve related to past mistakes, each time the circum\u00adstances are different and new factors conducive to a successful change can emerge. Moreover, the post-Soviet trans\u00adfor\u00admation can hardly be called a genuine attempt to democ\u00adratise Russia. Due to catastrophic economic condi\u00adtions and the Soviet Union\u2019s socio-political legacy, the nascent proto-democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions promptly fell victim to Darwinist capitalism and gross political corruption. Amid widespread poverty and rampant crime, a sense of blatant injustice prevailed among the public, which discredited the very idea of trans\u00adfor\u00admation. Western govern\u00adments and businesses contributed greatly to the failure of that proto-democracy, as they uncon\u00addi\u00adtionally supported \u201cdemoc\u00adratic\u201d politi\u00adcians who pursued anti-democ\u00adratic goals with anti-democ\u00adratic methods.<\/p>\n

Second, Putin is consis\u00adtently presented as the last line of defence against radical nation\u00adalists or criminal groups who could come to power if he is ousted. This narrative is primarily intended to stoke fear that the risk of nuclear prolif\u00ader\u00adation will increase dramat\u00adi\u00adcally if Putin\u2019s regime unravels, for instance as a result of a Ukrainian victory on the battle\u00adfield. At the same time, the risks to inter\u00adna\u00adtional security posed by the contin\u00adu\u00adation of the current political regime seem to be gravely underestimated.<\/p>\n

As the genocidal war crimes committed in Ukraine have shown, Putin is an unpre\u00addictable criminal, ready to desta\u00adbilise the entire inter\u00adna\u00adtional security order to maintain his grip on power. Inciden\u00adtally, the Prigozhin mutiny in June 2023 proved that the Russian president is not the strong guarantor of stability that we used to see in him. At the same time, he actually is the leading nation\u00adalist in Russia, whose words and deeds meet the widely recog\u00adnized defin\u00adition of fascism as formu\u00adlated by Umberto Eco.<\/p>\n

\n
The principal risk for Russia\u2019s desta\u00adbil\u00adi\u00adsation is directly related to Putinism and the struc\u00adtural malaises produced by it<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n

In fact, the principal risk for Russia\u2019s desta\u00adbil\u00adi\u00adsation is directly related to Putinism and the struc\u00adtural malaises produced by it. It is currently based on an unprece\u00addented, top-down crimi\u00adnal\u00adization of the state, lawlessness, systemic violence exacer\u00adbated by war-related crimes, ultimate degra\u00addation of state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, depre\u00adci\u00adation of human lives and the cult of death. The longer this system lingers on, the more risks and threats it will generate and can lead to Russia\u2019s future desta\u00adbil\u00adi\u00adsation and unpre\u00addictability to a much larger extent than alter\u00adnative scenarios.<\/p>\n

Is disin\u00adte\u00adgration a probable scenario?<\/h2>\n

Unlike the late Soviet Union, Russia is much better cushioned against major turbu\u00adlence. Its economic model is still largely based on the market economy, the sector of small and medium-sized businesses has been flexible enough to survive amid corrupt \u201cstate capitalism\u201d, and the relatively well-developed civil society was ultimately suppressed only in 2022 (and is now recon\u00adstructing itself in exile).<\/p>\n

Usually, national separatisms are invoked as a factor poten\u00adtially leading to Russia\u2019s breakup. However, today there is little left of the socio-political mood of the late 1980s and early 1990s. that led to the Soviet collapse (and even then Russia did not disin\u00adte\u00adgrate). At present, none of the regions inhabited by national minorities (who prefer to call themselves nations of Russia) has a potential for secession. Separatist moods are also absent on terri\u00adtories populated mostly by ethnic Russians, including the Kalin\u00adingrad region \u2013 the exclave where regional identity tends to supersede the all-Russian one[i]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

In the admin\u00adis\u00adtrative units of the Russian Feder\u00adation populated mostly by ethnic-national minorities, regional elites as a hypothetical separatism-driving force are neither legit\u00adimate nor do they genuinely represent the interests of local popula\u00adtions. Due to the lack of free and fair elections, they remain loyal to those who in fact appoint them: the business-political clans linked to the Kremlin. Regional budgets are heavily dependent on the federal one, while regional economies remain under\u00adde\u00adveloped. Moreover, most of these regions are landlocked: they do not have borders with other countries, which makes them rely on adjacent Russian regions for transport, logistics and trade. Last but not least, the non-Russian (nerusskiye<\/em>) ethnic groups often do not constitute a majority in their titular regions and their national, historical, cultural and linguistic identities (that could otherwise underpin separatist tendencies) have largely been suppressed by the federal centre.<\/p>\n

Anti-Moscow senti\u00adments do not have much in common with separatist moods<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Although anti-Moscow senti\u00adments have long been percep\u00adtible in the regions, they do not have much in common with separatist moods. Instead, they mostly reflect opposition against the federal bureau\u00adcracy with its excessive powers and greed for local resources. Negative memories of the Soviet collapse and the two wars in Chechnya still work against radical scenarios, as well as deeply-entrenched passivity of Russia\u2019s population. In the future, the trump card of separatism and ethnic nation\u00adalism can be used mostly as a bargaining chip in negoti\u00ada\u00adtions over the redis\u00adtri\u00adb\u00adution of incomes, prerog\u00ada\u00adtives and political clout between the federal centre and the regions.<\/p>\n

Centrifugal tendencies likely less destructive<\/h2>\n

However, there are two scenarios where local and regional identities (both Russian- and non-Russian speaking), as well as ethnic Russian nation\u00adalism, may play a role and even lead to separatist tendencies. The first source of centrifugal tendencies could be a deep economic crisis, the emergence of a political vacuum in Moscow and an incapacity or unwill\u00adingness by the Kremlin to deliver basic services to the population and pay regional elites for their loyalty. We witnessed a similar situation in 1991, when Soviet Central Asian republics were in fact forced by the federal centre to separate and seek bonds with alter\u00adnative players. However, this time it would be both less probable and less destructive than in the 1990s. Thirty years later, there are proto-democ\u00adratic templates handy and free market experience to build on, while society at large is in a much better financial-economic condition. These factors will likely mitigate the impact of separatist slogans, but a \u201cfunctional\u201d disin\u00adte\u00adgration of the state cannot be ruled out: Russia\u2019s regions will stay within the state but will cut loose from the federal centre.<\/p>\n

Chauvinism and discrim\u00adi\u00adnation on ethnic grounds are systemic<\/h2>\n

Second, if political liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation starts in Russia after a new leadership comes to power, it will likely and naturally unfreeze long-suppressed resent\u00adments and political demands in the regions. The appeals to de-imperi\u00adalise and de-colonise Russia can garner broader public support and the \u201cnational question\u201d can be raised on a scale unseen since the 1990s. This will incur risks of serious political turmoil (armed separatisms on a mass scale are hardly likely though), which can undermine the attempts to reform the state or even provoke another surge in radical imperi\u00adalism. In the latter case, Moscow\u2019s reaction to possible separatisms may be much more a threat than separatisms themselves.<\/p>\n

In the author\u2019s conver\u00adsa\u00adtions with exiled civic-political activists who represent national minorities, the topic of systemic chauvinism and discrim\u00adi\u00adnation in Russia on ethnic grounds was recurrent. This has been confirmed by leading researchers in this field[ii]<\/a>. The activists usually point to:<\/p>\n