{"id":57898,"date":"2023-09-20T17:02:45","date_gmt":"2023-09-20T15:02:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/ich-sehe-eine-revolution-im-iran-noch-nicht-bald-kommen\/"},"modified":"2023-09-21T12:36:18","modified_gmt":"2023-09-21T10:36:18","slug":"i-dont-see-a-revolution-coming-soon-in-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/i-dont-see-a-revolution-coming-soon-in-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cI don\u2019t see a revolution coming soon in Iran\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Israel and Iran: <\/span>Iranian-Israeli<\/span> author Meir <\/span>Javendafar<\/span> in an interview with Till Schmidt about the mutual perception of the two countries, the current situation of protests and Russia\u2019s influence on the nuclear agreement.<\/span><\/h2>\n

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Mr. <\/span>Javendafar<\/span>, you left Iran in 1987, have <\/span>moved to Israel after your studies in the UK and now work as a researcher o<\/span>n Iran-Israel relations. Almost a year ago, the violent death of <\/span>Jina<\/span><\/em> Mahsa Amini sparked a powerful protest movement against the regime in Iran. How did the Israeli public respond?<\/em> <\/span><\/p>\n

With a lot of attention. Because really everyone in Israel \u2014 left or right, pro- or anti-Netanyahu, and even parts of Israeli Arab community \u2014 wants the end of the Iranian regime, given that the Islamic Republic has been calling for the destruction of Israel and funding the murder of Israelis for many years. Every uprising in Iran is reported in detail in the local media and, in my opinion, usually quite broadly and accurately.<\/p>\n

So the hope for a revolution in Iran is there. But I myself do not see it coming so soon. We know from Syria, for example, that such regimes prefer to murder their own people in great numbers, rather than hand over power. And even if the regime falls, it is possible that in the long run, Iran will not turn into a democracy, but rather into a secular dicta\u00adtorship. But even that would be better for Israel, because Iran would stop supporting terrorists while estab\u00adlishing relations with Israel.<\/p>\n

What are the attitudes of the Israeli population toward Iran?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

The regime is seen as an existential threat by some and the biggest strategic threat by others. At the same time, many Israelis feel friendship and solidarity with the Iranian people. Iranians and Persians are almost glorified, especially in comparison to the Arabs. This is because of the ancient civilization of the Persians, the story of the Persian king Cyrus, who saved the Jews from the Babylonian exile, and the positive experi\u00adences that many Israelis had in Iran before the 1979 revolution. Last but not least, contem\u00adporary Iranian cinema has been very successful and well received in Israel.<\/p>\n

Conversely, what can you say about the perception of Israel among the Iranian population?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

<\/a>From my under\u00adstanding and obser\u00adva\u00adtions, Israel\u2019s popularity among ordinary Iranians has increased signif\u00adi\u00adcantly over the past decade. On the eve of the 1979 revolution, it was quite different, which can be explained mainly by the strength of the anti-imperi\u00adalist movement and the much more pronounced religiosity in the Iranian population at that time. Today\u2019s view of Israel is primarily due to hatred of the Iranian regime. Benjamin Netanyahu, and Donald Trump, are more popular in Iran than some would like to believe.<\/a><\/p>\n

This sounds like a classic identi\u00adfi\u00adcation with the enemy of the enemy as a friend. Do <\/span>people <\/span>also <\/span>refer to<\/span> specific aspects of Israeli history, <\/span>culture<\/span> or politics?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

There is some appre\u00adci\u00adation of Israeli technology. But from my obser\u00adva\u00adtions and under\u00adstanding, what the Iranian people like most about Israel, are the military attacks on Iranian targets in Syria. Especially when it hits the Revolu\u00adtionary Guards, since they are so heavily involved in repressing the population in Iran.<\/p>\n

The nuclear conflict remains unresolved. Under Donald Trump, the United States had withdrawn from the nuclear agreement, the Joint Compre\u00adhensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2018. Joe Biden intended to revive the agreement, which <\/span>had been<\/span>negotiated in 2015. Where does Israel stand in the current situation?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Israel is looking at what the United States is doing. There is not much more Israel can do at the moment. Biden wanted to correct Trump\u2019s mistake after he took office. But in the meantime, Iran itself had taken big steps away from the JCPOA. Biden had been counting on a gradual return to a deal \u2014 and expected Iran to play along. But that would have included, for example, Iran answering the Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Atomic Energy Agency\u2019s questions about the nuclear facil\u00adities where traces of uranium enrichment were found. Iran is now enriching uranium to a level, which is close to the 90 percent needed to build a bomb.<\/p>\n

For <\/span>further <\/span>contex\u00adtu\u00adal\u00adization<\/span>, could you outline Israel\u2019s geopo\u00adlitical position <\/span>with <\/span>regard <\/span>to<\/span> the threat<\/span> from the Iranian regime<\/span>?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

The most important conven\u00adtional threat is the Iranian-provided Hezbollah missile arsenal in Lebanon, which can reach to any part of Israel. This is a threat that no prime minister of Israel can ignore. Add to that the bombard\u00adments in Syria that Israel has been conducting for many years to ensure that the country does not become another missile base for Iran like Lebanon.<\/p>\n

What has Israel recently done to <\/span>counter<\/span> the nuclear threat from Iran?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

At the moment, it is working together with the U.S. and Europe. In addition, it is monitoring Iranian activ\u00adities and passing on relevant infor\u00admation. But as soon as Israel learns that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has given the order to build a nuclear weapon, in my opinion, Israel would indepen\u00addently and immedi\u00adately bomb Iran\u2019s nuclear facilities.<\/p>\n

For a long time, it looked as if Israel would ally itself more with Saudia Arabia because of the threat from Iran. Now the Saudis and Iran have moved much closer together in the spring. What is your assessment of this?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

The Saudis do not want to give Iran a reason to attack them in the event of a war between Israel and Iran. Iran agreed to the deal merely because of pressure from China. Xi Jinping pressured Iran to reach the agreement with the Saudis, because their ongoing conflict was under\u00admining the oil market and stability in the Middle East, both of which are important to Chinese economic interests.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the Saudis are not investing in Iran, which is under sanctions, nor is there any political support from them. In other words, the deal is not a game changer. The Saudis are still extremely concerned about a nuclear Iran. They just don\u2019t say it that openly anymore. Furthermore, it is very likely that Saudi intel\u00adli\u00adgence cooper\u00adation with Israel will continue.<\/p>\n

What other geopo\u00adlitical changes are currently contributing to the estab\u00adlishment of a multi\u00adpolar world order in the Middle East?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

In the region, people are realizing that the U.S. has more important prior\u00adities: namely China, Russia, and domestic issues. Conse\u00adquently, some countries are improving their diplo\u00admatic relations with Israel. Others are turning to China. China\u2019s economic involvement in the region is unprece\u00addented. However, the U.S. remains the preferred source of technology, the most important partner for economic cooper\u00adation, and also the most popular desti\u00adnation for students from the region. Concerned that the U.S. is turning away, many countries are balancing their relations with China by moving closer to it.<\/p>\n

How is Putin\u2019s regime influ\u00adencing the devel\u00adopment of the nuclear <\/span>dispute<\/span>?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

Russia\u2019s veto is one reason why Iran\u2019s diplo\u00admatic relations with the U.S. have not improved and the nuclear agreement has not been revived. Iran has been Russia\u2019s most important arms supplier since the war of aggression against Ukraine. Iran has chosen Russia \u2013 thus moving away from returning to the JCPOA \u2013 for three reasons.<\/p>\n

First, there is its difficult position in the nuclear dispute. Khamenei seems reluctant to answer the IAEA\u2019s questions about uranium enrichment at certain facil\u00adities because Iran could be found to have violated its respon\u00adsi\u00adbil\u00adities to the IAEA. Second, if the nuclear agreement is revived, Khamenei fears a U.S. charm offensive. He is worried that U.S soft power in the longer term, may cause the downfall of his regime. Last, Putin is seen as someone who defends his allies who face the prospect of regime change: see Assad in 2015 in Syria, Lukashenko in 2020 in Belarus, and Tokayev in 2022 in Kazakhstan.<\/p>\n

How is Israel\u2019s strategic position perceived <\/span>in light of<\/span> the <\/span>dispute <\/span>over judicial reform?<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

As weak. In politics, perception is more important that reality. Thus, the rift in Israeli society that Netanyahu and his government are deepening ultimately plays into the hands of the Iranian regime, Hezbollah, and other enemies of Israel. For a long time, the threat of war with Hezbollah has not been as high as it is now.<\/p>\n

The refusal of large numbers of Israeli Air Force reservists to report for duty does not only negatively impact Israel\u2019s defense capability. It also weakens the U.S. negoti\u00adating position in the nuclear dispute, since it implies that the Israeli Air Force may not be part of the solution, if all else fails.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, I even see parallels between Netanyahu and Khamenei\u2019s political behaviour. Both judicial reform and the nuclear program are not prior\u00adities of their respective popula\u00adtions and cost more than they benefit. Both projects serve to strengthen the leadership\u2019s power and that of their allies. Iran\u2019s nuclear program will go down in national history as the most wasteful, corrupt and destructive project. In Israel, the intended judicial reform is dividing the country in an unprece\u00addented way and is immensely damaging society, the economy and, very likely, the security situation. <\/a>It is likely to be remem\u00adbered in Israeli history, in the same way that Iran\u2019s nuclear program will be remem\u00adbered in Iranian history books.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Dr. Meir Javedanfar is an Iranian-Israeli author, commen\u00adtator and adjunct professor at Reichman University in Herzliya, Israel. He is co-author of the Ahmadinejad biography \u201cThe Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran,\u201d which has been published in four languages. Javedanfar has published in Foreign Affairs, Al-Monitor, The Diplomat, The Guardian, among others.<\/em><\/p>\n

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