{"id":58126,"date":"2023-09-27T12:21:19","date_gmt":"2023-09-27T10:21:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=58126"},"modified":"2024-05-23T19:21:07","modified_gmt":"2024-05-23T17:21:07","slug":"network-russia-policy-paper-ukraine-war-fried","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/network-russia-policy-paper-ukraine-war-fried\/","title":{"rendered":"Success for Ukraine and the Free World: What it means and how to get there"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n

President Zelenskyy and his wife Olena with President Biden and First Lady Jill Biden at the White House, September 21, 2023. Photo: IMAGO<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n

Ukraine is fighting for its national survival and for its future as part of a united Europe, the transat\u00adlantic alliance and the Free World. Europe and the United States must help Ukraine in this fight for the sake of Europe\u2019s security, the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order and against the designs of Vladimir Putin, writes Dan Fried<\/em>.<\/h2>\n

<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message css=\u201c\u201d]This paper is part of our Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Expert Network Russia<\/a>. Its publi\u00adcation was supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The views expressed in the paper are the author\u2019s own.<\/p>\n

Download the PDF here<\/a>.<\/p>\n

A German<\/a> and a Russian<\/a> version are published on Russlandverstehen.eu<\/a><\/p>\n

[\/vc_message][vc_column_text]Wars can accel\u00aderate history. At its Vilnius Summit in July, pressed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, NATO declared its intention to welcome Ukraine into its ranks. Wrangling inside NATO about that decision \u2013 whether it went far enough and whether it was too caveated \u2014 attracted much attention and obscured its signif\u00adi\u00adcance. In fact, NATO\u2019s affir\u00admation of Ukraine\u2019s ultimate membership in the Alliance (more credible than the rough compromise language from the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit), in parallel with the European Union\u2019s decision to advance Ukraine\u2019s EU accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions, signify that the United States and Europe are coming to see Ukraine as family: part of an undivided Europe and undivided Western alliance and not a part of a Russian Empire or Moscow\u2019s sphere of domination.<\/p>

\"Portrait<\/p>

Daniel (Dan) Fried<\/a> is a retired US diplomat and a distin\u00adguished fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington DC.<\/p><\/div>\n

The how and when of NATO and EU acces\u00adsions are not yet clear and challenges remain enormous.  Putin has chosen aggressive war to show that if Russia cannot dominate Ukraine, Russia will make a wasteland of it. Ukraine\u2019s NATO accession has advanced but is not a done deal and accession while a war is ongoing is fraught. The war is not the only challenge. Even if it ends with Ukrainian victory, Ukraine will still have to make the grade on its reforms \u2013 democ\u00adratic and systemic \u2013 and these will have to be as trans\u00adfor\u00adma\u00adtional as those under\u00adtaken by Ukraine\u2019s neighbors to its West after 1989. Ukrainian accession to the EU even after the war will be a heavy lift: quite apart from deep Ukrainian reforms, it would require deep and difficult reforms to EU mecha\u00adnisms and budgets.[i]<\/a><\/p>\n

Never\u00adtheless, both Ukraine and its transat\u00adlantic friends have never been clearer about their respective strategic objec\u00adtives toward one another; fortu\u00adnately, and at last, these goals are in parallel.<\/p>\n

The long road to a common goal<\/h2>\n

It took a long time for Ukraine and the West to decide what they wanted their relations to be.<\/p>\n

In roughly the first ten years of its indepen\u00addence from Moscow in 1991, with Russia relatively weaker and its leadership more benign, Ukraine stagnated at home, with few reforms, much less an internal trans\u00adfor\u00admation, and a limited vision of its place in Europe. Ukraine\u2019s aspira\u00adtions to join Europe grew in stages as Ukrainians appeared to grow impatient with stagnating living standards and autocratic rule. The supporters of the Orange Revolution of 2004\u20135 and especially the Revolution of Dignity of 2013\u201314, sought domestic democ\u00adra\u00adti\u00adzation and the rule of law plus integration with the EU. The Revolution of Dignity began as a protest over then-President Yanukovych\u2019s sudden refusal, under Kremlin pressure, to sign an Associ\u00adation Agreement with the European Union[ii]<\/a>; the protesters in Maidan Square in Kyiv were carrying EU flags. As captured by these popular movements, 21st<\/sup> century Ukrainian national identity, as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it[iii]<\/a>, started crystal\u00adizing in a pro-democ\u00adratic and pro-European form. Yanukovych responded to the protests with violence, lost support of Ukrainian society and even many of Ukraine\u2019s oligarchs and fled. Pro-European and pro-reform leaders took his place.<\/p>\n

In response, Putin invaded Crimea and then the Donbas. Once ambivalent about NATO membership and reasonably well disposed toward Russia, Ukrainian society became fiercely supportive of NATO accession and hostile to Russia. That shift was a product of Russia\u2019s dirty war; it was neither inevitable nor the work (as Kremlin propa\u00adganda would have it) of Western machinations.<\/p>\n

U.S. and European views of Ukraine were likewise slow to develop. Neither the U.S. nor most European govern\u00adments expected indepen\u00addence in 1991; most foreign policy experts saw Ukraine through the prism of relations with Russia.[iv]<\/a> In the 1990s and early 2000s, when the U.S. and its European allies sought to build an undivided Europe by opening NATO and the EU to the newly self-liberated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, few had Ukraine in mind. The strategic mental map of most U.S. and European policy makers shifted, albeit after some hesitation, to include Central Europe and the Baltic countries as part of Europe, but this shift did not extend to Ukraine.<\/p>\n

This Western view of Ukraine changed because Ukraine changed, devel\u00adoping and acting upon a self-conception as a European country with aspira\u00adtions to join European and transat\u00adlantic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions. Ukrainian leaders, both President Zelenskyy and his team and many in Ukraine\u2019s political opposition and independent civil society, have made the powerful case that Ukraine is fighting for the same values that underpin the transat\u00adlantic alliance, the European Union, and the Free World. They want Ukraine to have the same oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities as other nations in Central and Eastern Europe to join that community. U.S. and European leaders now say they agree.<\/p>\n

 What does the Kremlin want?<\/h2>\n

Putin intended his \u201cSpecial Military Operation\u201d against Ukraine to be a swift, surgical effort to remove its leadership and restore Moscow\u2019s domination over the country. That failed in spectacular fashion due to Ukraine\u2019s resis\u00adtance, Russia\u2019s initial military overcon\u00adfi\u00addence and incom\u00adpe\u00adtence (especially in the campaign against Kyiv), and rapid U.S. and European provision of weapons and economic support for Ukraine plus economic pressure on Russia through inten\u00adsified sanctions.<\/p>\n

\n
Putin seems to be bent less on conquest of Ukraine and more on destruction and terror.<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
<\/div>\n

Despite its failures on the battle\u00adfield, Russia\u2019s war aims in Ukraine remain maximal. It is difficult to discern whether the Kremlin has any thoughts of lesser aims amid its torrent of threats, lies, bluster, and complaints, A former (and uniden\u00adtified) U.S. official eager to explore a diplo\u00admatic solution to the Russo-Ukraine War, complained a few weeks ago that the senior Russian officials with whom he was in contact were unable to artic\u00adulate what they wanted.[v]<\/a> It does seem clear, however, what the Kremlin doesn\u2019t want: Ukraine with a European and transat\u00adlantic future. Putin seems to be bent less on conquest of Ukraine and more on destruction and terror, seeking to grind down Ukraine\u2019s economy and will to continue resisting, to outlast Ukraine\u2019s Western supporters, and thus to reduce Ukraine to a vassal state.<\/p>\n

How could the war end?<\/h2>\n

Ukraine can win the war by forcing the Russians out of Ukraine entirely, an outcome that appears unlikely but cannot be dismissed. Russia\u2019s military position may be brittle and could unravel if the Ukrainians achieve a break\u00adthrough in the South. Ukraine could also win by breaking the land bridge to Crimea, a possible best-case outcome of the ongoing Ukrainian offensive, or, with even greater likelihood, by advancing enough in the south to bring Crimea within the range of Ukrainian long-range artillery and missiles.<\/p>\n

Seizing and holding Crimea appears to be one of Putin\u2019s principal objec\u00adtives, a goal he appears to have long cherished; as early as April 2008, in his speech at the NATO-Russia Summit in Bucharest, he claimed Crimea for Russia[vi]<\/a>. Crimea has resonance for Russian nation\u00adalists: it was an early Russian Imperial conquest, a sign of Russia\u2019s ascen\u00addency over the Ottomans who had previ\u00adously held Crimea. Possession of Crimea gives Russia signif\u00adicant military leverage over Ukraine: through Crimea, Russia can more easily strike at the Ukrainian heartland and ports and exert greater control over the Black Sea. If Ukraine were to compromise Moscow\u2019s hold over Crimea, forcing Russia to abandon it or even making its hold unsus\u00adtainable, it would gain the upper hand in the war.<\/p>\n

Putin could respond to the loss or potential loss of Crimea by escalating, including by threat\u00adening to use nuclear weapons. But his options for conven\u00adtional escalation may be few: if he had them, he probably would be employing them. Nuclear threats are easier made than used success\u00adfully. The Kremlin had earlier threatened the use of nuclear weapons and some Russian officials e.g., former President Medvedev, and pro-regime commen\u00adtators like Dmitry Trenin and Sergey Karaganov, regularly do so now. Russia\u2019s use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine cannot be ruled out but seems unlikely given the probable conse\u00adquences: alien\u00adation of China, Russia\u2019s strongest quasi-ally, and most of the Global South; even deeper alien\u00adation of Europe; and the possi\u00adbility of a strong U.S. response. The Kremlin made threats of nuclear use last fall but retreated in the face of what appear to have been serious and credible warnings from the Biden Admin\u00adis\u00adtration[vii]<\/a>, both public and, according to some Admin\u00adis\u00adtration officials, additional ones in private.<\/p>\n

Ukraine might not win. The current Ukrainian offensive could stall and bring stalemate on the ground. Continued Russian missile and other air attacks on Ukrainian infra\u00adstructure and civilians could grind down the Ukrainian economy. Fatigue in Ukraine, and in Europe and the U.S. could mount. Pressure could build for forcing Ukraine into negoti\u00ada\u00adtions on the basis, as the Kremlin says, of Ukrainian accep\u00adtance of \u201cexisting terri\u00adtorial realities,\u201d meaning Russian conquests. Putin may be counting on that and on the U.S. election season strength\u00adening Trumpian neo-isola\u00adtionism, meaning U.S. abandonment of Ukraine and accep\u00adtance of a tacit (or overt) recog\u00adnition of Russian domination over Ukraine.<\/p>\n

What must the U.S. and Europe do?<\/h2>\n

First, help Ukraine win the war. That means providing the weapons needed to make Ukraine\u2019s current offensive a success. Much has been written about the potential for ATACMS (a ground-based tactical missile system) or other systems to help. The prolonged discussion within the US Admin\u00adis\u00adtration about ATACMS and other systems has become a metaphor for the U.S. commitment (or lack thereof) to help Ukraine. There is even a cynical view that the U.S. wants to supply Ukraine with suffi\u00adcient munitions and weapons to fight but not to win. That seems off. The Admin\u00adis\u00adtration has worked diligently and steadily to provide Ukraine enormous quantities of weapons systems and ammunition. It faced criticism, both inter\u00adna\u00adtionally and from its own political supporters, for deciding to provide cluster munitions to Ukraine, but did so anyway out of an assessment of their military utility. Arguments that one or another weapons system would be a game changer or war winner are unconvincing.<\/p>\n

(ATACMS) could help at the margin, and it is sometimes at the margin that military campaigns are decided.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

That said, however, the U.S. and some European allies, including Germany, do seem to have a convo\u00adluted and time-consuming decision-making process on providing some weapons systems. Repeated examples of initial refusal to provide one or another weapons system followed by prolonged debate, followed by an eventual decision to send them has fed skeptical narra\u00adtives. Arguments from the Biden Admin\u00adis\u00adtration that a system like ATACMS would not be decisive may be accurate but seem defensive and not the point. ATACMS or other weapons systems may indeed not be decisive. But they could help at the margin, and it is sometimes at the margin that military campaigns are decided. If some in the Admin\u00adis\u00adtration are frustrated by the focus on ATACMS, it could both provide them in the qualities possible, determine what other weapons systems would do the most good and provide those as well and promptly.<\/p>\n

A Russian defeat in Ukraine would bring compli\u00adca\u00adtions of its own, but these are in the category of good problems to have, certainly better than the problems a Russian victory would bring. Russian history suggests that defeat in an aggressive war, one that does not involve defense of the Russian heartland, can trigger domestic unrest and a change of course. Russia\u2019s political stability is questionable after the Prigozhin Mutiny in June and the Kremlin\u2019s wavering response both at the time and after. While regime change in the Kremlin is not and should not be a U.S. or European objective, Russia\u2019s defeat in Ukraine could lead to political change, even to Putin\u2019s ouster. A post-Putin leadership need not be reformist or liberal to want to stabilize Russia\u2019s inter\u00adna\u00adtional position by ending Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. Stalin\u2019s illiberal successors, acting out of their perception of Soviet interest, helped end the Korean War and lowered tensions in Europe.<\/p>\n

If there is no Ukrainian near- or mid-term victory, that is, if Ukraine cannot through its current offensive liberate much more of its territory or undermine Russia\u2019s hold on Crimea, the U.S. and Europe still have options to help Ukraine and achieve strategic success, meaning a free, secure Ukraine on the road to integration with the EU and NATO.<\/p>\n

A longer-term strategy for success, regardless of the outcome on the battle\u00adfield, includes longer-term military assis\u00adtance such as G7 countries offered at the time of the Vilnius NATO Summit.[viii]<\/a> This process should move fast. The U.S. has held a first round of talks with Ukraine and other friends of Ukraine need to start. Because of its impor\u00adtance to the defense of Ukraine and its major contri\u00adbu\u00adtions so far, Poland should have been brought into the G7 group from the outset; it should be part of the process now.<\/p>\n

The Kremlin may seek to use a military stalemate on the ground to shift to a prolonged degra\u00addation of Ukraine\u2019s economy, to win through grinding down Ukraine and outlasting its supporters. Appar\u00adently to this end, Russia has inten\u00adsified its attacks on Ukrainian civilian infra\u00adstructure and population. One option to counter that strategy is to help Ukraine increase its ability to strike at Russian military targets, including in Russia. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is correct in pointing out that Ukrainian attacks on Russian military targets inside Russia are lawful. [ix]<\/a> The U.S. position on such opera\u00adtions has been under\u00adstandably cautious: the government does not encourage such attacks nor provide the means to carry them out. If providing direct assis\u00adtance to Ukraine to enable it to strike military targets inside Russia is too much, there may be other ways to assist Ukraine, possibly working through third countries, to develop a capacity to sustain its own strategic campaign against Russian military targets. The objective would be to deprive Russia of the option to pounding Ukraine indef\u00adi\u00adnitely at little cost to itself.<\/p>\n

A second area of longer-term effort should include economic support for Ukraine, including use of the $300+ billion of immobi\u00adlized Russian foreign exchange reserves that the G7 locked down in the days following the February 24, 2022 invasion. The legal and prece\u00addential objec\u00adtions to such a course are many. But given the scale of the war, including the many Russian war crimes, and under\u00adstandable pressure from U.S. and European publics not to use taxpayer resources when Russian resources are available, this should be pursued. Legal options appear available.[x]<\/a> One challenge might be to gain the support or tacit accep\u00adtance of such a course from key stake\u00adholders outside Europe and the G7, including Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries, and African countries affected (and angered) by Russia\u2019s blockade on Ukraine\u2019s Black Sea grain exports. To make the case, the U.S. and Europe could use the format estab\u00adlished through the Copen\u00adhagen and Jeddah meetings this June and August, respec\u00adtively, that included senior officials from European, BRICS, and other Middle Eastern, Asian, and African govern\u00adments, but not Russia.[xi]<\/a><\/p>\n

\n
Sanctions .. can work if applied over time and with suffi\u00adcient diligence.<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n
<\/div>\n

That format may provide a means to put additional pressure on Russia, including through directing its foreign exchange assets for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Economic pressure on Russia \u2013 including sanctions and export controls \u2014 takes time to work. But it can work if applied over time and with suffi\u00adcient diligence. Increasing the effec\u00adtiveness of such measures, especially export controls, will take effort. Sanctions, export controls and the price cap on Russian oil sales must be enforced; violators, both middlemen and Western companies, warned and punished; and laws tightened to help uncover hidden nests of and channels for Kremlin and other Russian funds. The bad news is that sanctions and export controls will never be airtight. There will be a constant race between evasion and enforcement. The good news is that such measures need not work 100 percent to have a strategic impact. The cumulative impact of such measures means that the Russian klepto\u00adcratic system, like the sclerotic Soviet system before it, will be increas\u00adingly hard pressed to fund its aggression and maintain living standards.<\/p>\n

Diplo\u00admatic options may be part of the mix. To borrow from Barack Obama, I\u2019m not against all diplomacy, I\u2019m just against dumb diplomacy.<\/p>\n

Many advocates of diplo\u00admatic approaches with Moscow seem eager, even breathless, and convey the impression that Ukraine should negotiate from a position of weakness or that the mere fact of diplomacy will bring about a reasonable settlement. There is little point in diplomacy for its own sake. But diplomacy should not neces\u00adsarily be regarded as a trap or sign of weakness.<\/p>\n

Talks with Moscow may not be possible at all and should not start by running toward the Kremlin nor by accepting Putin\u2019s current terms, i.e., Ukrainian recog\u00adni\u00adtions of the \u201cterri\u00adtorial realities.\u201d One of the Trump Administration\u2019s better moves in its Ukraine policy was the 2018 \u201cPompeo Doctrine\u201d pledging no U.S. recog\u00adnition of Russia\u2019s purported annex\u00adation of Crimea and consciously modeled on the 1940 Wells Doctrine that pledged no U.S. recog\u00adnition of Soviet annex\u00adation of the Baltic States.[xii]<\/a> That should remain a bottom line for the U.S. and Europe: no recog\u00adnition of annexations.<\/p>\n

Korea and Germany as examples for Prolonged Stalemate<\/h2>\n

It is possible that a prolonged battle\u00adfield stalemate could result in a ceasefire that does not end the conflict but stabi\u00adlizes it. The Korean War ceasefire in 1953 brought neither a solution nor complete peace to the Korean Peninsula. But it brought relative stability and created the condi\u00adtions for South Korea\u2019s democ\u00adratic and free market trans\u00adfor\u00admation. The arrange\u00adments that allowed for a temporarily divided Germany and stabi\u00adlized the Cold War conflict in Europe are another example of imperfect settle\u00adments that worked. Neither example is an exact model for Ukraine. Neither is to be wished for or imposed on Ukraine. But Ukraine may itself decide to consider similar approaches based on its own assessment of the battle\u00adfield outcome. A ceasefire along a line of contact, perhaps supported by inter\u00adna\u00adtional observers, is one option. The danger of any such solution is that it might be nothing more than an oppor\u00adtunity for Russia to rebuild its forces and restart the war. The Korean Peninsula and German examples worked only because they were accom\u00adpanied by real, not paper, provi\u00adsions to maintain the security of South Korea and West Germany.<\/p>\n

Whether Ukraine wins the war or there is a stalemate along with a possible ceasefire, security for Ukraine and Europe will require arrange\u00adments stronger than a verbal pledge (a la the ill-fated Budapest Memorandum of 1994) or even the recent U.S.\/G7 pledges to support Ukraine\u2019s military capacity. The stability of West Germany and South Korea was maintained less by the terms of the ceasefire and more by the presence of U.S. and other troops. West Germany entered NATO in 1955 as a divided country. Whatever the outcome on the battle\u00adfield, NATO should advance Ukraine\u2019s membership in the alliance and the next step should take place at the NATO Summit in Washington, D.C. in July 2024. Whatever the precise formula, NATO needs to give Ukraine a clear and credible road to NATO accession and perhaps an invitation to begin accession talks. As was the case a gener\u00adation ago with Poland and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, EU membership proceeded along with NATO accession and the EU should advance this as well for Ukraine.<\/p>\n

No course is easy. As a condition for a ceasefire, Russia will try to insist on forced neutrality for Ukraine, e.g., a la the 1955 Austrian State Treaty or Cold War Finland. The West shouldn\u2019t buy it. A ceasefire on those terms would indeed mean a breathing space for Russia to regroup and try yet another invasion. Putting Ukraine into a gray zone of strategic ambiguity is no road to peace but an invitation to another war. For Putin, gray zones equal green lights.<\/p>\n

Putin will not willingly accept Ukraine in NATO. He may try to keep the war going by holding if he can maintain his earlier conquests in southern Ukraine, especially the land bridge to Crimea, and keep throwing missiles at Ukraine to keep the war going, degrade Ukraine\u2019s economy, and complicate its NATO membership hopes. The U.S., Europe, and Ukraine need to forestall this by putting Russia under increasing pressure, so that the Kremlin, not Ukraine and its friends, becomes the demandeur in any negoti\u00adating process.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s judgments about the shape and timing of any diplomacy will be key. The Biden Admin\u00adis\u00adtration has done well to apply to Ukraine the old Polish saying, \u201cNothing about us without us.\u201d All the options \u2013 military support, economic and diplo\u00admatic pressure on Moscow, and possible diplo\u00admatic discus\u00adsions \u2013 need to be discussed and deter\u00admined with Ukraine, preferably in confi\u00addence. U.S., European, and Ukrainian judgement and deter\u00admi\u00adnation will be tested in the months ahead.<\/p>\n

Victory for Ukraine could be a win for Biden<\/h2>\n

The U.S. political dynamic could complicate this strategy. While most Repub\u00adlicans in Congress, including in key committee positions, support Ukraine, Donald Trump, the presumptive Repub\u00adlican nominee, and some other Repub\u00adlican candi\u00addates, do not. Trump and others have revived the U.S. foreign policy tradition of \u201cAmerica First,\u201d which in its current version, like its pre-Pearl Harbor version, in fact means indif\u00adference to European security and tolerance or even support for aggressive dictators, Hitler then and Putin now. In addition, some from a so-called \u201cRealist\u201d school of foreign policy argue that Ukraine cannot possibly win the war and that the U.S. should put pressure on Ukraine to negotiate, essen\u00adtially on Russia\u2019s terms. This school recalls the Cold War realists who accepted the Soviet Empire in Europe as an unfor\u00adtunate but necessary price of general peace and dismissed the possi\u00adbility of democ\u00adratic dissi\u00addents in Central and Eastern Europe having an impact on the course of their nations. Both schools of thought essen\u00adtially embrace spheres of influence as an organizing principle of inter\u00adna\u00adtional relations and consign smaller powers, and even some larger ones like Ukraine, to their supposedly inevitable great power overseers.<\/p>\n

President Biden and his Admin\u00adis\u00adtration will face mounting pressure from both schools as the U.S. general elections in November 2024 approach, especially if Ukraine has been unable to make signif\u00adicant advances on the battle\u00adfield. There may be some within White House who want to avoid addressing Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership as long as the Russo-Ukraine War continues because doing so could spur criticism that the U.S. was taking on too much respon\u00adsi\u00adbility, risking war with Russia, and putting its soldiers at risk. On the other hand, support for Ukraine now could increase the chances of Ukraine achieving a successful battle\u00adfield outcome and defeating Putin\u2019s Russia. That would be a strategic success for the U.S. and, probably, a political success for the Biden Presidency.<\/p>\n

U.S. resolve and public support for Ukraine has held so far and at higher levels than many in the U.S. (and probably the Kremlin) antic\u00adi\u00adpated. That deter\u00admi\u00adnation on the part of the U.S. government and society will be tested.<\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s deter\u00admi\u00adnation will likewise be tested, both on the battle\u00adfield and in its ability to continue its systemic trans\u00adfor\u00admation. Fighting in the name of democracy doesn\u2019t mean the work is done (as Americans know from sad recent experience.) Talk of corruption in Ukraine has become politi\u00adcized and abused in the U.S. domestic debate about support for Ukraine. But the challenges are real. U.S. officials known for their support for Ukraine have made known their continued concern over corruption.[xiii]<\/a> So has President Zelenskyy, who recently dismissed all the leaders of Ukraine\u2019s regional military draft offices.[xiv]<\/a> Under the pressure of war, political power in Ukraine has been centralized in Bankova, the Presi\u00addential Admin\u00adis\u00adtration, and Ukraine\u2019s democracy will need to be strengthened. Elections will need to be held. NATO and the EU have made this clear in even their most forth\u00adcoming state\u00adments about Ukraine\u2019s accession.<\/p>\n

Uncer\u00adtainties and diffi\u00adculties abound. But the oppor\u00adtunity for success for Ukraine and the Free World in resisting Russia\u2019s aggression exists. Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S. need to remember in the weeks and months ahead what it is they seek: a united Europe that extends to and includes a free, democ\u00adratic Ukraine. We all need to mean it.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

 <\/i><\/p>\n

[i]<\/a> See, for example, \u201cThe \u2018monumental\u2019 conse\u00adquences of Ukraine joining the EU,\u201d Sam Fleming and Henry Foy, \u201cFinancial Times,\u201d August 6, 2023<\/p>\n

[ii]<\/a> The EU-Ukraine associ\u00adation agreement: a potted history \u2013 POLITICO<\/a><\/p>\n

[iii]<\/a> See The Orange Revolution: A Revolution of Hope | Center for US Ukrainian Relations<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[iv]<\/a> One brief and largely forgotten U.S. exception was the support in late-1918 and early 1919 from President Woodrow Wilson\u2019s national security advisor Edward House for Baltic, Finnish, and Ukrainian indepen\u00addence as the Russian Empire broke up after Russia\u2019s defeat in World War I and the Bolshevik seizure of power  \u201cInter\u00adpre\u00adtation of President Wilson\u2019s Fourteen Points,\u201d Inter\u00adpre\u00adtation of President Wilson\u2019s Fourteen Points \u2014 Wikisource, the free online library<\/a><\/p>\n

[v]<\/a> Former U.S. Official Shares Details of Secret \u2018Track 1.5\u2019 Diplomacy With Moscow \u2014 The Moscow Times<\/a><\/p>\n

[vi]<\/a> Link to the Putin April 2008 speech in Bucharest: Text of Putin\u2019s speech at NATO Summit (Bucharest, April 2, 2008) | UNIAN<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[vii]<\/a> Biden sends a careful but chilling new nuclear message to Putin in CNN interview | CNN Politics<\/a><\/p>\n

[viii]<\/a> Link to G7 statement on long-term military support for Ukraine: G7: Joint decla\u00adration of support for Ukraine \u2014 Consilium (europa.eu)<\/a><\/p>\n

[ix]<\/a> Ukraine has legal right to attack Moscow, says Germany (msn.com)<\/a><\/p>\n

[x]<\/a> Links to pieces by Phil Zelikow, Larry Summers, and Robert Zoellick; and by Frank Kramer: Lawrence Summers, Philip Zelikow and Robert Zoellick on why Russian reserves should be used to help Ukraine (economist.com)<\/a>; Time for the West to seize Russian state assets | The Hill<\/a><\/p>\n

[xi]<\/a> Ukraine\u2019s diplo\u00admatic offensive made important advances in Saudi Arabia \u2014 Atlantic Council<\/a><\/p>\n

[xii]<\/a> https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/international\/archive\/2018\/07\/welles-act-pompeo\/566060\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[xiii]<\/a> Bridget Brink\u2019s X (formally Twitter) post https:\/\/x.com\/USAmbKyiv\/status\/1689581973545660416?s=20<\/a><\/p>\n

[xiv]<\/a> WP article on Zelenskyy move: Zelensky fires military recruitment center chiefs after corruption probe \u2014 The Washington Post<\/a><\/i><\/p>\n

\"Textende\"<\/p>\n

This paper is published in the framework of the project \u201eRussia and the West: Europe\u2019s Post War Order and the Future of Relations with Russia\u201c, which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry.  All views in this paper are the author\u2019s own.<\/em><\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator][vc_column_text]Did you like this article? If yes, you can support the independent editorial work and journalism of LibMod via a simple donation tool.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]