{"id":65431,"date":"2024-08-15T14:10:27","date_gmt":"2024-08-15T12:10:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/laesst-sich-die-situation-in-nahost-noch-deeskalieren\/"},"modified":"2024-08-19T10:26:51","modified_gmt":"2024-08-19T08:26:51","slug":"laesst-sich-die-situation-in-nahost-noch-deeskalieren","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/laesst-sich-die-situation-in-nahost-noch-deeskalieren\/","title":{"rendered":"Can the situation in the Middle East still be deesca\u00adlated, Ali Vaez?"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Foto: Imago<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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The situation in the Middle East is at the brink of escalation. While observers are waiting for Iran and its proxies to start their announced attack on Israel, diplo\u00admatic crisis inter\u00advention is running at full speed in order to prevent a full-blown regional confla\u00adgration. In his interview with Till Schmidt, Ali Vaez analyzes the current situation.<\/h3>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201d.vc_custom_1724056008397{border-top-width: 5px !important;border-right-width: 5px !important;border-bottom-width: 5px !important;border-left-width: 5px !important;padding-top: 20px !important;padding-right: 20px !important;padding-bottom: 20px !important;padding-left: 20px !important;background-color: #bdede0 !important;border-radius: 10px !important;border-color: #bdede0 !important;}\u201d]Ali Vaez is Iran Project Director at the Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Crisis Group. In the past, he was advisor for the 2015 negoti\u00ada\u00adtions over a nuclear deal with Iran and has served as Senior Political Affairs Officer in the UN. Vaez is a professor at Georgetown University and Fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Studies.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n

During the past days, the pace towards escalation between Israel and Iran has been speeding up dramat\u00adi\u00adcally: <\/em>We witnessed the Houthi drone attack on Israel\u2019s soil followed by the killing of Hezbollah\u2019s senior member Fuad Shukr in Beirut, and the targeted killing of the Hamas\u2019 leader Ismail Haniyeh in Teheran. Later, Israel announced the assas\u00adsi\u00adnation of Hamas\u2019 senior commander Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar became Haniyeh\u2019s successor. <\/em>As we speak on the afternoon of Monday 12th, how do you charac\u00adterize the current situation in the whole region, Ali Vaez?<\/em><\/p>\n

The region has never been closer to the verge of an all-out regional confla\u00adgration. Since the beginning of the war in Gaza there was always the fear that it would expand and spill over. But that was avoided for mainly two reasons: One was the reluc\u00adtance of all parties to escalate horizon\u00adtally. The second was a degree of behind-the-scenes diplomacy aimed at trying to contain the tensions. A good example of that is how the US tried to manage the exchange of fire between Iran and Israel in April. On the one hand, it made sure that the degree of potential damage and casualties as part of Iran\u2019s retal\u00adi\u00adation for Israel\u2019s attack on its diplo\u00admatic facility would be minimized.  At the same time, it held Israel back from further escalating the cycle of violence. All these mecha\u00adnisms and elements are now at their breaking point.<\/p>\n

How do you explain that?<\/em><\/p>\n

The US ability to influence Israeli decision making has become much more limited because President Biden has only little capability of acting right now. Prime Minister Netanyahu has become less risk averse. Furthermore, Iran and Hezbollah believe that they are at a stage where, unless they take control of the escalation ladder, Israel is going to continue to push the envelope at their expense.<\/p>\n

Where do you see possi\u00adbil\u00adities, strategies and leverage for regional deescalation?<\/em><\/p>\n

Regional deesca\u00adlation would require to extin\u00adguish the source of the current tensions which is the war in Gaza. The US is the only actor which could enforce such a solution. But it would require to use some of its points of leverage that so far they have proven reluctant to deploy: limiting offensive military aid to Israel or condi\u00adtioning it on Israel agreeing to an immediate ceasefire deal and pushing for a binding UN Security Council resolution to the same purpose.<\/p>\n

To what extent does Biden\u2019s withdrawal and Kamala Harris\u2019 candidacy for presi\u00addential elections change the picture?<\/em><\/p>\n

President Biden\u2014both because of his own personal commitment to Israel but also because of political calcu\u00adla\u00adtions especially in the run-up to the elections\u2014has been loath to put pressure on Israel as a key US ally. I am sure that the White House is now concerned that any policy that Biden would pursue could also backfire on Harris and her chances of victory in November. But the reality is that there is also a political price domes\u00adti\u00adcally and within the Democ\u00adratic Party associated with inaction or failure to get a ceasefire.<\/p>\n

Netanyahu seems to have calcu\u00adlated that with Biden no longer running for reelection, Harris would pursue her own agenda. That means that the US would even be more paralyzed than before to act and put pressure on Israel. But the current admin\u00adis\u00adtration could have turned this argument on its head and actually put pressure on Israel through President Biden, who has very little to lose now. Vice President Harris could actually take a distance from that policy, empha\u00adsizing that she is not the ultimate decision maker. In comparison, it does appear that Harris has more empathy for the plight of the Pales\u00adtinians and is more critical of Israel\u2019s negli\u00adgence of the rules of war and inter\u00adna\u00adtional human\u00adi\u00adtarian law. But when it comes to using US leverage, we\u2019re talking about a few degrees of difference. Washington is going to remain on tiptoes when it\u2019s dealing with Israel.<\/p>\n

In April, the Iranian attack on Israel has been restrained also through effective regional collab\u00ado\u00adration. In the current situation, where do you see other states of the region using their leverage to deescalate?<\/em><\/p>\n

All these regional countries urging Iran to demon\u00adstrate restraint in April are doing the same thing now. Some facil\u00adi\u00adtated indirect discus\u00adsions between Iran and the United States, like Oman and Qatar. I think those efforts are continuing. At the end of the day, the problem is that none of these countries have suffi\u00adcient leverage to be able to change the dynamics which have become intol\u00aderable for Iran now. Iran is very much afraid of losing the credi\u00adbility of its own deter\u00adrence mechanism when Israel is going to continue with the opera\u00adtions it has carried out recently.<\/p>\n

Iran has put that deter\u00adrence in place in the form of having partners and proxies away from its own border to deter a direct attack on its soil. Yet none of the countries in the region can do anything that would restore the deter\u00adrence between Iran and Israel that has existed until October 7th. The other countries of the region can try to get themselves out of the line of fire or, at best, they can try to shoot down Iranian drones and missiles. But beyond that, there is not much that they could do.<\/p>\n

How do you contex\u00adtu\u00adalize the current dynamics within the past and possible future confronta\u00adtions between Iran and Israel?<\/em><\/p>\n

The Islamic Republic\u2019s animosity toward Israel doesn\u2019t have much strategic justi\u00adfi\u00adcation. Rather, it has been used for ideological reasons as a rallying call inside the country. As a result of its own weakness in conven\u00adtional military capabil\u00adities, Iran has also realized that it does require to engage in asymmetric means of defence through partners and proxies in the region. That purpose requires an ideological glue that the Iranians found in the \u201cPales\u00adtinian cause\u201d, which allows the Iranians to transcend inherent limita\u00adtions that the country has as a Persian nation among the Arabs and Turks and as a Shia nation among Sunnis.<\/p>\n

From the Israeli perspective, Iran is the only country in the region that can limit Israel\u2019s room for maneu\u00advering. No other country in the region dares to strike Israel or even support groups that are seeking Israel\u2019s destruction with arms and training. That\u2019s why it is under\u00adstandable that from the Israeli perspective weakening and under\u00admining the Iranian regime is a major priority. Over the past few decades, both sides have maintained the strategic rivalry within a framework that was manageable for both sides. But now it is quickly arriving at a stage where it would be very difficult for either party to make sure that these tensions do not spin out of control.<\/p>\n

Above the current dynamics of further escalation is the question whether Iran decides to take the final step towards building a nuclear weapon. How do you charac\u00adterize the current status quo in the nuclear dispute?<\/em><\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s nuclear program is closer than ever to the verge of weaponization. It is now able to break out towards enriching enough uranium for a single weapon in less than a week and without the immediate detection by the UN watchdog IAEA. Iran can have enough nuclear material for an arsenal of nuclear weapons in the course of a month. Weaponization can happen in secret facil\u00adities throughout the country, leaving the West and Israel in particular with no good options to stop the process at that point. So the risk is real in terms of the facts on the ground. We are just one political decision away from Iran deciding to cross the Rubicon and devel\u00adoping nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n

 Within that decision, what are the main factors that count?<\/em><\/p>\n

One factor is Iran\u2019s threat perception. The more Israel succeeds in weakening Iran\u2019s regional deter\u00adrence, the more it fails because it pushes Iran towards its ultimate deterrent in the form of nuclear weapons. A second factor in the Iranian calculus is the prospect of being able to use its nuclear leverage for getting out from US sanctions. The more the diplo\u00admatic process appears hopeless and the more cynical the Iranians become in believing that effective and sustainable sanctions relief is not possible, the more incentive they have to use their nuclear capabil\u00adities for weaponization. The decision to get very close to the threshold but not cross it has been made by Ali Chamenei, the 85-year-old supreme leader of Iran. No one knows for sure who and what comes after him. His successor might not have the same calculation.<\/p>\n

What to expect from Masoud Pezeshkian, the newly elected president of Iran?<\/em><\/p>\n

The presi\u00addency in Iran is not irrel\u00adevant to the country\u2019s foreign policy. Because he can shape policy decisions and is also in charge of imple\u00admenting aspects of it in diplomacy, for example. So, their tone and their approach have an impact. Just look at the difference in the presi\u00addencies of, let\u2019s say, Ahmadinejad and Khatami. Pezeshkian came to power on the promise of trying to rebalance and improve Iran\u2019s relations with the West and the East and try to narrow the gulf that had emerged in Iran\u2019s relations especially with Europe. For him, the recent round of escalation with Israel could not be worse in terms of its timing. Because it nips that possi\u00adbility in the bud. Pezeshkian does not yet even have his cabinet in place. His ability, as a diplo\u00admatic novice, to be able to have a huge impact on the current decisions in the coming crucial weeks are limited.<\/p>\n

What does that mean in detail, on the ground?<\/em><\/p>\n

The way the decision making in Iran works about these crucial national security issues is that they\u2019re often made at the table of the Supreme National Security Council. The president is the head of the council and the majority of its members, seven out of 13, are his appointees. The decisions that are made in the National Security Council will become state policy after they receive the Supreme Leader\u2019s impri\u00admatur. But when the assas\u00adsi\u00adnation of Ismail Haniya happened in Teheran and Iran needed to decide, Supreme National Security Council was still comprised of Pezeshkian\u2019s prede\u00adces\u00adsor\u2019s appointees.<\/p>\n

Iran is at an inflection point where the decisions that it will make in the next few days would probably dictate the ability of president Pezeshkian to deliver on his promises of trying to rectify the mistake of the Raisi admin\u00adis\u00adtration. For instance, further escalation of tension between Israel and Iran could render Iran much more vulnerable to US and Israeli counter\u00adat\u00adtacks. The only way that Iran would be able to try to limit the harm that those counter\u00adat\u00adtacks would inflict upon the country is through further cooper\u00adation with Russia. And what Russia wants from Iran is provision of ballistic missiles, which would be crossing the red line especially for the Europeans. So, these inter\u00adlinked issues are now at a stage where they would prede\u00adtermine the direction of Pezeshkian\u2019s admin\u00adis\u00adtration even before he really had a chance of trying to shape them.<\/p>\n

When it comes to the nuclear dispute and its possible settlement, time is really speeding up given the expiration of the UN Security Council Resolution 2231. How do you envision the future of the nuclear dispute?<\/em><\/p>\n

The expiration of the Security Council Resolution 2231 in October 2025 is a very important milestone: The West believes that it would lose one of its last points of leverage, which is the ability to keep Iran\u2019s nuclear dossier at the Security Council. If the resolution expires in October 2025 \u2013 given strained relations between Russia and China on the one side and the West on the other \u2013 it\u2019s probably going to be impos\u00adsible to get the Security Council to be seized of that matter again anytime soon. From the Iranian perspective, October 2025 is the most important sunset clause which allows their nuclear program to be normalized and no longer considered a threat to inter\u00adna\u00adtional peace and security. So, it\u2019s a zero-sum situation. But it also creates pressure on the timeline for negotiations.<\/p>\n

Looking at what comes next \u2014 what is the most important and deter\u00admining factor for future developments?<\/em><\/p>\n

It\u2019s the outcome of the US presi\u00addential elections. In a second Democ\u00adratic admin\u00adis\u00adtration, there would be space for mutually beneficial agree\u00adments, whereas in a second Trump presi\u00addency, there will be a return to maximum pressure policy which is more likely to put Iran on a collision course with the US rather than back on a pathway to the negoti\u00adating table. In a scenario where there is room for diplomacy, a return to the JCPoA (the former nuclear agreement from 2015; editor\u2019s note) no longer seems to be viable. All the facts on the ground have changed.<\/p>\n

Could you further explain that?<\/em><\/p>\n

Iran has made nuclear advance\u00adments that are irreversible just because of the knowledge that Iran has gained. The West has repeatedly proven unable to provide effective and sustainable sanctions relief to Iran. And the P5-plus-one group (the group of six world powers which, in 2006, joined together in diplo\u00admatic efforts with Iran with regard to its nuclear program; editor\u2019s note<\/em>) really doesn\u2019t exist anymore because of tensions between the East and the West. Finally, the compart\u00admen\u00adtal\u00adization which made the 2015 nuclear deal possible is no longer realistic. Now every\u00adthing is inter\u00adlinked, from Iran\u2019s regional policies to its ballistic missile program and its human rights record. All have spillover effects over nuclear negotiations.<\/p>\n

Would you say that there is a need to come up with an entirely new plan?<\/em><\/p>\n

Absolutely. But even in the best-case scenario, assuming that there is interest on both sides to reach a mutually beneficial deal, it is unreal\u00adistic to achieve that in the first ten months of 2025. Therefore I see the only solution by reaching an interim agreement that would provide Iran with a degree of economic reprieve, freezing some of the more prolif\u00ader\u00adation sensitive activ\u00adities of Iran\u2019s nuclear program and buying time to find a more sustainable solution to this crisis. This was done in 2013 in the run up to the 2015 nuclear deal and could be done again. But that requires many stars to align\u2014including that the tensions in the region will not reach a point where Iran and the West are in direct military confrontation and Iran\u2019s relationship with Russia has not reached a point of no return.<\/p>\n

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