[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d] Download this paper as PDF<\/a><\/span> ...<\/span> Lesen Sie das Paper auf Deutsch<\/a><\/p>\n Wersja polska (PDF)<\/a><\/p>\n [\/vc_column_text][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736301963030{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 50px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n [\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n Each section was prepared jointly by a Polish and a German or Austrian author.<\/em><\/p>\n Why this paper?<\/strong><\/a> Intro\u00adduction \u2013 What is at stake<\/strong><\/a> Chapter 1 \u2013 Polish and German Russia policies then and now<\/a> <\/strong> Chapter 2 \u2013 Defence: Deep rethinking required<\/a> <\/strong> Chapter 3 \u2013 Russia\u2019s hybrid war against the West<\/a> <\/strong> Chapter 4 \u2013 What sanctions can do<\/a> <\/strong> Chapter 5 \u2013 Why lasting peace is only possible with political change in Russia <\/strong><\/a> Conclu\u00adsions and recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions<\/a> <\/strong> Publisher and authors<\/strong><\/a>[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cwhy\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359006659{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n Can German-Polish cooper\u00adation become the driving force behind a new European Russia strategy? Obviously, a strong tandem with Warsaw and Berlin would make the West much more resilient and capable of action, but their policies have so far failed to come together. In view of all the historical and political ups and downs in German-Polish relations, their policy towards the Kremlin was and is one of the key issues that tradi\u00adtionally divides Warsaw and Berlin.<\/p>\n It is not despite these differ\u00adences that the inevitability for a coordi\u00adnated Russia strategy between Germany and Poland is essential, but precisely because of them. If these conflicting perspec\u00adtives resulting from different historical experi\u00adences were to find common ground in their Russia policy, the founda\u00adtions of the common European house would become signif\u00adi\u00adcantly stronger. On the threshold of the fourth year of the full-scale invasion Ukraine is fighting for survival. If Kyiv is to have any chance of repelling the attack and ending the war on its own terms, a joint strategy by two major European supporters is essential.<\/p>\n While the gap between the way Germans and Poles view Russia has narrowed after the 2022 attack, signif\u00adicant differ\u00adences and even estrangement remain: While Poland has consis\u00adtently argued for decisive Western action to achieve a defeat of the Russian regime in Ukraine, German policy up to now remains much less deter\u00admined. Unlike the Polish position, the German Chancellor has never made up his mind to promote a victory for Ukraine.<\/p>\n Poland\u2019s geopo\u00adlitical weight has grown and, thanks to its resolute approach to Russia, Warsaw is now able to forge new security partner\u00adships in Europe\u2019s Central and Northern dimension. It is building a \u2018coalition of the willing\u2019 with like-minded Scandi\u00adnavian and Baltic states. Poland is waiting for the outcome of the parlia\u00admentary elections in Germany to see whether a joint approach to the Russian challenge could be feasible. The Polish EU presi\u00addency in the first half of 2025 can add to the Polish impetus at this crucial moment for Ukraine and Europe. At a time when the future of Europe is at stake in the face of Russia\u2019s aggression, it is even more important that Germany and Poland undertake a joint effort for a new European Russia policy. Precisely because the Franco-German engine as the former key to Western European integration has lost traction and thus the potential to integrate the diverging interests in an enlarged Europe that includes Central Eastern Europe since 2004.<\/p>\n If Poland and Germany can find common ground on their policy towards Russia despite their entrenched differ\u00adences, this will greatly facil\u00aditate a European accord. Their lingering antag\u00adonism makes a common Polish\u2013German policy on Russia all the more compelling for the other member states. Finding common ground must not neces\u00adsarily mean meeting half-way between different stand\u00adpoints. A new start should arise from shared insight and interests, if there only is the political will to cooperate.<\/p>\n Our paper aims to contribute to this endeavor.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cintroduction\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359026374{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n The outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian war will determine the future of the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order, in particular the future pathway for Europe, and thus define the condi\u00adtions in which our societies will have to live perhaps for decades to come. It is therefore in Europe\u2019s vital interest that the outcome of the war will be favourable to Ukraine. This means that Ukraine: 1) must preserve its indepen\u00addence, i.e. the ability to determine its inner and outer destiny, in particular the right to join NATO and the EU; 2) should re-establish its control over the terri\u00adtories within its inter\u00adnationally recog\u00adnized borders.<\/p>\n One may dismiss this as \u201cmaximalist goals\u201d However, what is at stake is nothing less than the core principles of inter\u00adna\u00adtional law and the European peace order. In fact, these goals can only be achieved by supporting a military victory for Ukraine \u2013 or at least putting it in a position that enables Kyiv to negotiate with Russia from a position of military strength.<\/p>\n There should be no illusion that the Kremlin will accept some kind of a negotiated end of the war below a de-facto submission of Ukraine, as long as it believes that victory is within its grasp. And as long as the West will not demon\u00adstrate by deeds that it has the political will to defeat Russian revisionism, the Kremlin will have all the incen\u00adtives to continue the war as long as it has suffi\u00adcient human and material resources. The idea of a compromise agreement based on the principle of \u201cpeace for territory\u201d, which is often discussed in the West, is based on a funda\u00admental misun\u00adder\u00adstanding of the Kremlin\u2019s key war aims, namely to deprive Kyiv of its sover\u00adeignty by limiting its right to conduct foreign and security policy (neutral\u00adization and demil\u00adi\u00adta\u00adrization) and to acquire a formal right to intervene in Ukraine\u2019s internal politics (\u201cdenaz\u00adi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d).<\/p>\n Putin and his entourage are deter\u00admined to achieve its aims because it sees victory in this war as a necessary condition for their own political survival. They believe that control over Kyiv is absolutely essential both for ensuring the security of the regime and for rebuilding Russia\u2019s position as a great power. They believe \u2013 not without reason \u2013 that a stable and prosperous democracy in Ukraine will undermine their autocratic system.<\/p>\n Putin has repeatedly claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are essen\u00adtially one people and questioned Ukraine\u2019s right to exist as an independent state. According to this imperial logic, the unrestricted brutality of Russia\u2019s warfare against Ukraine is punitive action against a breakaway colony and against all Ukrainians who refuse to be part of the \u201cRussian world\u201d. Finally, taking into account the Kremlin\u2019s record of violating inter\u00adna\u00adtional agree\u00adments (among others the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, The Good Neigh\u00adbourhood Treaty with Ukraine of 1997, the INF Treaty, The Chemical Weapons Convention), neither Kyiv nor Western capitals can be confident that Moscow will not violate any war-ending agreement as soon as it deems it conve\u00adnient. Therefore, the stakes in the Russo-Ukrainian war are extremely high. A Russian victory will have far-reaching consequences:<\/p>\n \u2022 It will mean the end of Ukrainian sover\u00adeignty and of Ukrainian democracy. It will also mean that millions of Ukrainian citizens living under Russian occupation will be subjected to state terror, forcible de-Ukrainization and Russification.<\/p>\n \u2022 Among Ukrainians, a Russian victory could trigger an anti-Western backlash. While many may remain committed to the idea of Ukrainian indepen\u00addence and democracy, other Ukrainians may conclude that the West betrayed them. Moscow is likely to exploit this anti-Western resentment for its own purposes<\/p>\n \u2022 An end to the war on Putin\u2019s terms will demor\u00adalize democ\u00adratic actors in the entire region, who have worked hard to strengthen their countries\u2019 indepen\u00addence by engaging with the West. It will heighten their fear that Russia might use military coercion with impunity if they cross the Kremlin\u2019s red lines.<\/p>\n \u2022 In the wider region, a failure of the West will also be widely inter\u00adpreted as a confir\u00admation of the Kremlin\u2019s propa\u00adganda, claiming that liberal democ\u00adratic systems are unable to compete with author\u00adi\u00adtarian regimes in providing security for their citizens and allies.<\/p>\n \u2022 The Kremlin will treat Kyiv\u2019s surrender as a victory over the West, and as proof that the latter is incapable of mobilizing and using its superior resources to defend itself and its allies. Moscow will be emboldened to provoke or confront the West with demands similar to those it presented in December 2021, which included a ban of NATO forces on the territory of eastern flank Alliance states. Moscow aims at a total revision of Europe\u2019s post-Cold War security arrangements.<\/p>\n \u2022 With any success of its aggression against Ukraine, the Kremlin will surely further intensify its hybrid warfare against the West. If the Kremlin comes to the conclusion that key NATO states (in particular the U.S., Germany, France) are unwilling to respond militarily to Article 5 contin\u00adgencies in Central Europe and the Baltics, Russia might be tempted to stage a military invasion into Eastern flank states. Moscow might take such a risky step despite being militarily weaker than the West as long as it enjoys relative superi\u00adority on NATO\u2019s eastern flank. Such an attack would create a political dilemma for the West by forcing it to choose between either accepting a new status-quo where Article 5 guarantees can no longer be relied on, or to getting involved in a military conflict with Russia, in which the latter might resort to using tactical and inter\u00adme\u00addiate nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n \u2022 More broadly, Moscow will seek a \u201cmulti\u00adpolar\u201d inter\u00adna\u00adtional order, where great powers would have a right to use force to \u201cdisci\u00adpline\u201d their neigh\u00adbours, to change borders and to establish spheres of influence by imposing their will on other states and limiting their sovereignty.<\/p>\n \u2022 On the global stage, this would encourage Russia, China and other author\u00adi\u00adtarian powers like Iran to challenge the West on all fronts and aggres\u00adsively pursue her hegemonic agenda. There is no question that the Chinese leadership will be encouraged to more force\u00adfully assert its claims against Taiwan, Japan and the Philip\u00adpines, perhaps even India. This, in turn, will create additional pressure on the U.S. to reduce their military commit\u00adments to Europe, which at this stage will be facing increased threat from Russia. In a worst-case scenario, an armed conflict involving China and the U.S. in East Asia will provide additional incen\u00adtives for the Kremlin to resort to military force to impose its terms on Europeans.<\/p>\n \u2022 A Russian success in Ukraine is also likely to trigger nuclear prolif\u00ader\u00adation, especially in Asia, where states like South Korea, Japan and perhaps others would seek to guarantee their security with nuclear weapons as the only reliable deterring factor, after their Western allies demon\u00adstrated a lack of deter\u00admi\u00adnation and extreme risk-aversion when challenged by a major rival. A Russian success in Ukraine will not secure peace in Europe but increase the danger of an even greater war. With Ukraine defeated, the ratio of forces will be less advan\u00adta\u00adgeous for the West. For all these reasons, it would be an error of historic propor\u00adtions for the West to push Ukraine into an agreement on Russia\u2019s terms.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n There are only two realistic scenarios for ending this war that would be desirable for the West. We would call them a \u201cGermany November 1918\u201d scenario and a \u201cRussia February 1917\u201d scenario. Under the November 1918 scenario, Ukrainian armed forces would inflict such defeats on the Russian army that its command realizes that the war is lost, even though Russian forces would still be in possession of Ukrainian territory. Under the February 1917 scenario, the economic and social strains of war would provoke a split in the ruling elite and a grassroot rebellion in the armed forces, followed by the collapse of the Putin regime. Both scenarios presuppose that Ukraine will be able to go on the military offensive and Russia\u2019s hope for victory will be broken.<\/p>\n At the moment, we are very far from either scenario. Western support for Ukraine \u2013 partic\u00adu\u00adlarly in Washington and Berlin \u2013 has been constrained by two fears: first, that Putin might resort to the use of nuclear weapons and expand the war to NATO territory when he is on the verge of defeat; and second, that the Russian regime might collapse, setting free chaos in a state with thousands of nuclear warheads.<\/p>\n However, appeasing the Putin regime at the expense of Ukraine and European security cannot be the answer to the fear of escalation. This would only increase the risk of a direct clash between Russia and NATO later. Rather, the West must counter the Kremlin\u2019s threats with a credible policy of deter\u00adrence that leaves no doubt about NATO\u2019s readiness to defend itself and the rule based inter\u00adna\u00adtional order. Weakness emboldens Putin, strength deters him.<\/p>\n Regarding further devel\u00adop\u00adments in Russia, the West should fear to strengthen the Putin regime more than its failure. The current regime is not a factor of stability, either exter\u00adnally or inter\u00adnally, quite the opposite. The West should rather encourage those forces in Russia that see Putin\u2019s wars as a threat to the country\u2019s future. A change of power in Moscow will highly likely strengthen those Russian voices who do not support the aggressive foreign policy of the current regime and seek some kind of arrangement with the West.<\/p>\n The war is now approaching its decisive phase. Despite Ukraine\u2019s resilience and impressive techno\u00adlogical advances, its outcome is largely in the hands of the West. It is not yet too late to turn the tide in Ukraine\u2019s favour. Clarity is urgently needed regarding our strategic goals about the outcome of the war. This applies all the more in view of Donald Trump\u2019s comeback as US President. If there is a chance that America will continue to stand by Ukraine\u2019s side, then only with decisive European action. And if Trump will scale back U.S. support for Ukraine, it will be all the more urgent for the European democ\u00adracies to step up to the plate.<\/p>\n Even if the liber\u00adation of all Russian-occupied terri\u00adtories and millions of Ukrainians living there cannot be achieved in the short term, Ukraine\u2019s full political sover\u00adeignty, including its right to integrate with the European Union and NATO, must not become bargaining chips in a diplo\u00admatic game with the Kremlin. This is the minimum that the West owes to Ukraine and to itself. Washington as well as European govern\u00adments must not yield to the temptation of following an \u201ceasy\u201d and \u201ccheaper\u201d path of accom\u00admo\u00addating Russia at the cost of Ukraine. In view of the stakes involved and the Kremlin\u2019s long-term objec\u00adtives, the full-fledged support for Ukraine is actually the best \u2013 and by the way also the least costly \u2013 option for the West.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cchapter1\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359047905{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n For many years, Germany organized its thinking about relations with Russia around the question how Moscow could be included in order to build a mutually beneficial European security system. The rationale was that deepening ties would lead to an alignment of interests. Germany\u2019s weight allowed it to largely shape the EU\u2019s stance, symbolized by the \u201cPartnership for Modern\u00adization\u201d first formu\u00adlated by then Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Stein\u00admeier in 2008. Successive Polish govern\u00adments have long warned against such a \u201cRussia-first\u201d approach. The Eastern Partnership, proposed by Poland and Sweden, was supposed to balance this by turning Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine from countries-in-between into common neigh\u00adbours with agency. This balancing act worked only partially.<\/p>\n Warsaw has pointed to Moscow\u2019s failure to come to terms with its total\u00adi\u00adtarian past, to the resur\u00adgence of militarism and revan\u00adchism in Russia, and to systemic corruption and a slide toward an increas\u00adingly author\u00adi\u00adtarian system \u2014 that grew more aggressive exter\u00adnally and more repressive inter\u00adnally. Following the annex\u00adation of Crimea, Poland called for a thorough policy shift. However, what ensued was rhetorical revolution and a mere facelift of policy. A striking illus\u00adtration of this was the signing of the agreement to construct Nord Stream 2 in 2015, just one year after Russia\u2019s aggression.<\/p>\n The \u201cRussia-first\u201d camp based its policy over the last two decades on a set of erroneous assump\u00adtions that led to flawed choices. They need to be discarded and replaced.<\/p>\n 1) The first flawed premise was that a stable security order is only possible with Russia, never without it, let alone against it. Thus, Russia was given special treatment and attention. In fact, Western policy should be focused on building a sustainable security order without the self-imposed prereq\u00aduisite of normal\u00adizing relations with Russia. The invasion of Ukraine marks a funda\u00admental change in the security environment. Russia will remain a threat for years to come, so the West should pursue a new security policy not just without it but against it. Obviously, this should include a long-term perspective for a negotiated end of Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine through strength and deter\u00adrence and in accor\u00addance with inter\u00adna\u00adtional law. For it is Russia that excluded itself from the community of law-abiding nations.<\/p>\n 2) The second assumption was that Russia was essen\u00adtially like the West and sought roughly the same things. But Russia is not like the West. It has a different vision of inter\u00adna\u00adtional relations and no desire to change this. Russian elites genuinely believe they are at war with the West. Russian society has been shaped by this idea for a long time. And this will not disappear with Putin. A quarter-century of his rule, super\u00adim\u00adposed on tsarist and Soviet legacies, has solid\u00adified the regime. Its democ\u00adra\u00adti\u00adzation or de-imperi\u00adal\u00adization is unlikely. (1)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Russia seeks security (of its regime) through corruption, coercion or co-optation in order to subjugate (as in Belarus) or, when that fails, to desta\u00adbilize (as in Georgia and Moldova) or even eliminate (as in Ukraine) the countries in its orbit. Lasting insta\u00adbility among them has very often been a desirable situation for Russia. Not only does it open a range of oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities for hostile inter\u00adference, it also allows Russia to portray itself as a stabi\u00adlizing force. Russia\u2019s irritation with NATO- and EU-enlargement does not stem from geopo\u00adlitical fears but from \u2018security interests\u2019, specif\u00adi\u00adcally the survival of its klepto\u00adcratic regime. Integrating Ukraine (and other Eastern Neigh\u00adbourhood countries) with the EU and NATO would remove an important bargaining chip for Moscow. One of the goals of containing Russia should be to foster stable political systems, well-functioning economies, capable armed forces and well-organized societies in neigh\u00adbouring countries.<\/p>\n 4) The fourth assumption was that inade\u00adquate commu\u00adni\u00adcation was the reason for tensions, and that more dialogue, trade and pipelines could mitigate that. This was exemplified in the Wandel durch Handel slogan, which suggests that inter\u00adde\u00adpen\u00addence leads to change. In reality, more ties brought more tensions. This approach was partially debunked after 24 February 2022, when summits, minis\u00adterial meetings and joint insti\u00adtu\u00adtions were suspended. Dialogue for the sake of dialogue was proven futile.<\/p>\n The belief in the benign effects of inter\u00adde\u00adpen\u00addence must be abandoned, because for an author\u00adi\u00adtarian state with imperial ambitions, inter\u00adde\u00adpen\u00addence is a form of leverage, a \u201cweapon\u201d, while for its democ\u00adratic partners, it is a source of vulner\u00ada\u00adbility. For years, Russia\u2019s key exports to the EU have been deception, disin\u00adfor\u00admation, corruption, uncer\u00adtainty and now fear. These \u2018products\u2019 were supported by an infra\u00adstructure built on oil, gas, financial and personal connec\u00adtions. Today, those channels have weakened, but Russia no longer pretends to be kind \u2014 it is openly inter\u00adfering in states\u2019 internal affairs. The West therefore needs to increase the cost of such hostile actions by expanding sanctions.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n A new compre\u00adhensive Russia policy poses a political challenge, because it requires a profound shift in attitudes deeply entrenched among leaders and the public in Germany.<\/p>\n Three devel\u00adop\u00adments will be crucial in the coming months. The first is the possible reduction of American support for Ukraine and NATO allies. The second are the efforts led by Poland and other NATO members to create a European structure that could partially fill the void. The third is which policies will Germany conduct after the February parlia\u00admentary elections.<\/p>\n Many expect that the new U.S. admin\u00adis\u00adtration will not be prepared to continue spending money for the defence of Ukraine and Europe to the same extent as its prede\u00adcessor. Yet, the size of the cuts is unknown. In the best case, reasonable support will remain \u2013 if the Europeans also increase their share. In the worst case, the US might remove its nuclear umbrella from Europe. In either case, European allies will have to fill the vacuum.<\/p>\n Poland is leading these efforts. There is broad consensus inside the country that the time for decisive all-European action is now and that simply muddling through is not an option. Warsaw will increase its defence budget from 4.3 per cent of GDP in 2024 to a staggering 4.7 per cent in 2025 and is trying to form a group of countries that might take the lead.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n The core of such a \u201ccoalition of the willing\u201d seems to be forming among Nordic and Baltic states, including Poland, but at this stage without Germany.<\/p>\n The Joint Statement after the Nordic-Baltic summit in Harpsund in late November 2024 set the goal to \u201cwork together to constrain, contest and counter Russia\u2019s aggressive and highly confronta\u00adtional actions as well as to ensure its full inter\u00adna\u00adtional account\u00adability for the crime of aggression.\u201d (2)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n The countries on NATO\u2019s eastern flank are key to the continent\u2019s security. They are committed to signif\u00adicant invest\u00adments in this effort and will not tolerate free riding by more complacent partners to the West. This is where Germany, with its economic potential, is expected to step in and to invest in a lasting and stable security environment instead of conducting ad-hoc telephone diplomacy.<\/p>\n Germany\u2019s aid to Ukraine has been large in absolute numbers, but much more modest when consid\u00adering the size of its economy. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy\u2019s Ukraine Support Tracker, it ranks at 14 with 0.4 per cent of GDP, while Denmark and Estonia provide the biggest share with 1.9 per cent each. (3)<\/span><\/a> This might change though. After the February elections, the new government will have to decide whether it will join the leading group. While some in the Social Democ\u00adratic Party still hope that peace with Russia is possible without much military spending, the Christian Democrats are more deter\u00admined to strengthen the Bundeswehr and help Ukraine \u2013 and polls indicate that they might win. The Greens are also staunchly pro-Ukrainian.<\/p>\n To convince German voters to support pro-Ukrainian positions, two arguments are central:<\/p>\n 1) Failure to ramp up defence and support for Ukraine might result in costs far beyond those of an adequate effort to contain Russia. One immediate effect of a Russian victory will be that the country\u2019s huge armament production will no longer be destroyed at the front but will accumulate and threaten European allies. In the worst case, a war-hardened Russian military will stand at the eastern borders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Defence against such a threat will cost multiple times more than present military expen\u00additure, while future US engagement in NATO is uncertain. That might lead some European allies to jump ship by offering the US or Russia separate agree\u00adments. All this would be detri\u00admental to Germany.<\/p>\n 2) Even without the US and large allies like France and the UK, the most deter\u00admined countries can face up to Russia: This potential group together has a GDP of 4.7 trillion euros, more than twice that of Russia (2.2 trillion). If Germany joined, that figure would increase to 8.8 trillion. Their total population would be 205.6 million, as compared to Russia\u2019s 143.8 million.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n If Germany chooses to team up with Poland, the group\u2019s most populous nation joins the most deter\u00admined. Here, there is bad and good news: The bad is that traces of the old pater\u00adnal\u00adistic attitude towards its eastern neigh\u00adbours are still present in Germany. The good news is that the relationship can improve if an old-school Atlanticist, nursed on deter\u00adrence and containment, comes to power in February.<\/p>\n If Germany and Poland align, a domino effect might follow. France is unlikely to want a new centre of gravity without being part of it. This could motivate Paris to finally transform the Weimar Triangle from mere phrases into reality. If the UK also joins, such a future European club would include two nuclear powers.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cchapter2\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359068958{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n The last two and a half years of Western military aid have barely allowed Ukraine to survive and maintain a defensive posture, but not to drive Russia back. The reasons for this are numerous \u2013 fear of escalation, budgetary and domestic constraints, wishful thinking \u2013 but the effects are clearly visible: After more than two years of short-feeding amid hopes the conflict might end in some sort of settlement, Ukraine has lost a tremendous amount of skilled and experi\u00adenced military personnel. Its armed forces have degraded so far that rebuilding them so that they can apply offensive pressure on Moscow has become ever more difficult. And there is no indication that this can happen soon.<\/p>\n If Russia were to win the war in Ukraine, it would not only complete its genocidal policies of eradi\u00adcating the Ukrainian nation and culture. Large swaths of its security apparatus (not only the armed forces, but also the FSB, National Guard and other police forces) will be deployed to occupied areas in order to impose russi\u00adfi\u00adcation. Settlers brought to occupied Ukraine by Russia will own their security, property and social rise to Putin\u2019s new empire, and hence try to preserve it at all cost. Any outcome other than a Russian strategic defeat is likely to strengthen the present revisionist and imperial regime in Moscow \u2013 including a \u201cfrozen\u201d front with large parts of Ukraine under occupation.<\/p>\n Poland\u2019s position is that only Ukrainians can decide about themselves and that they are fighting not only for their indepen\u00addence, but also for the possi\u00adbility of integration with Western insti\u00adtu\u00adtions (NATO and EU). The role of the West should be to enable Ukraine not only to defend itself, but also to support its integration process. Only NATO accession can provide credible security guarantees and deter\u00adrence against another Russian invasion. At the same time, Warsaw perceives Russia as an existential threat, prompting it to begin the largest trans\u00adfor\u00admation and moderni\u00adzation of armed forces in post-Cold War Europe.<\/p>\n Poland\u2019s strategic goal is to develop armed forces capable of engaging in a full-scale conflict with Russia, but this process is expected to take at least another decade and is subject to various vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities. For now, there is widespread agreement within Polish society and across the political spectrum to allocate more than four percent of GDP to defence in the coming years. However, it remains uncertain whether this consensus will hold in the long term, and whether Polish citizens will continue to be as enthu\u00adsi\u00adastic about volun\u00adteering for military service. Volun\u00adteers (44,450 are expected in 2024) are crucial not only for boosting the active military but also for expanding the reserve forces. Another challenge is the relatively weak indus\u00adtrial base, which limits the country\u2019s capacity for ammunition production, equipment mainte\u00adnance, and scala\u00adbility. Overcoming these limita\u00adtions will be both time-consuming and difficult.<\/p>\n Germany, like most countries in Western Europe, is driven by a \u201cGermany first\u201d policy that prior\u00adi\u00adtizes the recre\u00adation of its armed forces and defence within NATO over Ukraine\u2019s needs. On the former, there indeed would be potential room for deeper Polish-German cooper\u00adation in NATO to coordinate and strengthen defences in the Baltics and the Eastern Flank\u2019s northern part. This would mainly concern the estab\u00adlished joint commands Multi\u00adna\u00adtional Corps Northeast (ground forces) and Commander Task Force Baltic (naval forces), plus subor\u00addi\u00adnated Enhanced Forward Presence forces \u2013 Germany\u2019s brigade in Lithuania. Joint exercises between both armed forces could further strengthen bilateral ties and improve defensive capa\u00adbilities vis-\u00e0-vis Russia.<\/p>\n The Bundeswehr\u2019s state, after 30 years of pivoting towards expedi\u00adtionary warfare, leaves a lot to be desired (see below). The next German government will face the need to reorganize the Bundeswehr to meet NATO\u2019s integrated force planning goals to deter Russia and enable allied opera\u00adtions in the Baltics. The plans are sound, but two major problems stand in the way of their imple\u00admen\u00adtation. One is financing \u2013 they would require a budget of roughly 80 billion euros per year. Second is personnel \u2013 the Bundeswehr has problems with recruiting more soldiers. A debate about reintro\u00adducing conscription has fizzled out in 2024, but may reappear after the Bundestag elections 2025.<\/p>\n For Germany to become the military hub and enabler for defensive opera\u00adtions on the Eastern Flank would require Berlin to be a trust\u00adworthy and reliable partner and ally in the eyes of Warsaw \u2013 which to a large extent depends on the country\u2019s practical support towards Ukraine. And in this test, Germany has failed dramat\u00adi\u00adcally. Not only because the military support \u2013 although large in absolute terms \u2013 was small in comparison to the country\u2019s indus\u00adtrial capac\u00adities. But also because of the political framing as \u201cprudent\u201d (besonnen according to Chancellor Scholz). Germany refused to commit its capable military land vehicle and machining sector to the war effort, because Scholz feared German tanks driving through Europe would undermine Germany\u2019s \u201canti-militarist\u201d tradi\u00adtions. (4)<\/span><\/a> Aside from the fact that Western Germany was a well-armed NATO member, this uncon\u00addi\u00adtional pacifism calls to question Germany\u2019s commitment to European defence. If NATO were to be defended, German tanks would be all over the place as well.<\/p>\n 1) Surviv\u00adability<\/strong>: In a possible war with Russia, European armed forces would \u2013 regardless of high profes\u00adsional standards \u2013 sustain manoeuvre warfare for roughly a week. Then, Russian drones would have damaged and destroyed so many vehicles that manoeu\u00advring would be impos\u00adsible. Lack of electronic warfare (EW) systems, air-defence, and drones to defend against a veritable drone army, will cause crippling losses among soldiers and equipment. Moreover, our logistics heavily rest on a handful of civilian enter\u00adprises to maintain and repair the current fleets of vehicles and aircraft, all of which would be subject to missile and drone bombard\u00adments in the event of war.<\/p>\n 2) Sustain\u00adability<\/strong>: The Bundeswehr not only lacks the ammunition reserves to sustain a war \u2013 current artillery ammunition would last a few days, and building up larger stock\u00adpiles is hampered by the lack of safe storage sites \u2013 it also lacks reserve capabil\u00adities of men and material. Ukraine thus far has lost 3,107 armoured fighting vehicles of all kinds in the war, and replen\u00adishing the losses becomes a problem for the West supporting Ukraine. But even if the materiel was there, Europe lacks the personnel reserves to replenish possible losses, in particular officers and specialists. While forced mobil\u00adi\u00adsation could generate a lot of soldiers on paper, there would be insuf\u00adfi\u00adcient officers to train them and lead them in combat.<\/p>\n 3) Scala\u00adbility<\/strong>: Constraints in personnel and materiel will also affect other western European armies\u2019 efforts to scale up their capabil\u00adities. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine\u2019s armed forces consisted of 29 manoeu\u00advrable brigades (20 in the land forces, seven air mobile and two naval infantry brigades). 31 terri\u00adtorial defence brigades were just created on paper and had barely formed. Now, in the third year of the war, the Ukrainian armed forces have ballooned to over 150 brigades of all types. Despite all modern technology, force density, especially the avail\u00adability of infantry to control territory, retains a key role: low density of Russian forces facil\u00adi\u00adtated Ukraine\u2019s Kursk (2024) and Kharkiv (2022) offen\u00adsives, while high Russian force density was pivotal in denying the Ukrainian summer offensive of 2023. If NATO as such would be attacked, the necessary space of opera\u00adtions would be even larger. Furthermore, the European rear and the critical infra\u00adstructure that needs protection by terri\u00adtorial defence forces are also larger.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cchapter3\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359081950{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n For more than a decade, Russia has waged a hybrid war against the West. Putin\u2019s strategic aim is to build a new version of the Russian empire (or at least a Russian zone of influence), and to this end he is striving to weaken the West in every way possible. The goals and elements of this hybrid war are well-known \u2013 polar\u00adizing Western societies and under\u00admining trust in democracy and its insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, fostering the rise of populists, extremists and separatists, eroding support for Ukraine by playing up the fear of escalation and appealing to ingrained pacifist senti\u00adments, bolstering the legit\u00adimacy of the Putin regime and allowing it to enjoy the benefits of access to Western markets. Fear of escalation is already working as can be seen in the withholding of military support, as described in Chapter 2. The essence of the Kremlin\u2019s hybrid tactics is \u2013 at the current stage \u2013 to stay below the attri\u00adbution radar to avoid an open military confrontation with NATO which is feared by Putin\u2019s regime. This allows Moscow to test the West\u00b4s resolve and cohesion and exploit its weak spots.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s hybrid war has become even more aggressive since the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Hybrid warfare has many facets, including a full-scale infor\u00admation war against our countries, massive inter\u00adference in elections, such as in Romania, cyber-attacks against our politi\u00adcians, public insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and infra\u00adstructure. Spying has become ever more abundant. There is sabotage and attempts at elite capture. The list of attacks attributed to Russia is growing fast \u2013 ranging from arson and the destruction of equipment, cyber and physical attacks on railways and the armament industry, to assas\u00adsi\u00adnation attempts. The regime has estab\u00adlished dedicated struc\u00adtures for hybrid warfare \u2013 such as the General Staff Main Direc\u00adtorate for Deep Sea Research (GUGI) or media outfits like the Social Design Agency (SDA). Moscow is becoming more reckless and brazen \u2013 there are credible reports that its sabotage attempts (see strong suspi\u00adcions of recent targeting Finnish water supplies and planting explo\u00adsives on German cargo planes) are endan\u00adgering the lives of many people in Europe. The latest case from November 2024 also points to growing evidence of Russia using Chinese help in suspected cases of cutting undersea cables between Sweden and Estonia and Germany and Finland. All those incidents come on top of a long-term series of cyber-attacks, GPS jamming and other forms of hybrid actions aimed at stoking fears and insecurity. The situation has become so serious that the Finnish government has publicly mentioned the possi\u00adbility of invoking Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO\u2019s doctrine envisages such a possi\u00adbility in response to foreign hybrid attacks).(5)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Poland and Germany are prime targets in Russia\u2019s anti-Western crusade. As heavy\u00adweights in the EU and NATO, they have a strong bearing on Western policies on issues crucial for Russia, such as sanctions and military support to Ukraine. Germany is the main logistics hub for NATO (e.g. it houses key military instal\u00adla\u00adtions, US troops and US European command), while Poland plays such a role for the eastern flank and military assis\u00adtance to Ukraine. Russia spares no effort to manip\u00adulate both Poland, and Germany, from within. There are common themes like the attempt to weaken the solidarity and support for Ukraine and the denigration of inter\u00adna\u00adtional insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, especially NATO and the EU. There are also crucial differ\u00adences such as the appeal to Germany\u00b4s peace movement and deeply rooted anti-American senti\u00adments in some social strata \u2013 both have no equiv\u00adalent in Poland. Yet overall, for all our differ\u00adences in the approach to Russia, the extent of Putin\u00b4s hybrid war has been severely under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated in both countries.<\/p>\n To illus\u00adtrate this obser\u00advation: both states have been attacked during Operation Doppel\u00adgaenger which was inves\u00adti\u00adgated, inter alia by the FBI and the Counter Disin\u00adfor\u00admation Network (CDN). This campaign was conducted by the SDA media company at the Kremlin\u00b4s behest; according to the FBI its clear goal was to \u201cescalate internal tensions ... in order to promote the interests of the Russian Feder\u00adation,\u201d as well as \u201cto influence real-life conflicts and artifi\u00adcially create conflict situa\u00adtions\u201d via fake articles, influ\u00adencers, as well as targeted posts and comments on social media.<\/p>\n Poland has been a key target of Russian disin\u00adfor\u00admation and hybrid attacks for decades. Polish society is more resistant to Russian manip\u00adu\u00adlation than countries further west due to better under\u00adstanding of Russian history and policies. But even though pro-Russian senti\u00adments are difficult to generate in Poland, the country is not immune to cyber-attacks and other forms of hybrid opera\u00adtions. And those have been escalated recently to such an extent in Poland that arson, recon\u00adnais\u00adsance, and disruption of key transport routes are openly attributed to Russia. In October 2024, the Polish Foreign Ministry ordered the closure of the Russian Consulate in Pozna\u0144, citing acts of sabotage.(6)<\/span><\/a> The last few years saw inten\u00adsified weaponization of migration. Moscow has been working together with Minsk in an operation using illegal migrants to exert pressure on Poland\u2019s (and the EU\u2019s) eastern border \u2013 tellingly 90 per cent of those trying to cross illegally have a Russian visa.<\/p>\n The case of Pavel Rubtsov, a Russian agent masquerading as a Spanish journalist who was caught and jailed in Poland before being exchanged in the August 2024 prisoner swap, exposed the weaknesses of Poland\u2019s democ\u00adratic openness and legis\u00adlation, allowing Putin\u2019s regime to recruit some influ\u00adencers and gather infor\u00admation of sensitive nature.<\/p>\n Due to the turbulent nature of Polish-Ukrainian history, Moscow is relent\u00adlessly trying to play up any diver\u00adgences between Warsaw and Kyiv, aiming to undermine Polish resolve in helping Ukraine. The presence of a large Ukrainian refugee diaspora (often Russian-speaking and using Russian commu\u00adni\u00adcation platforms) compli\u00adcates the task of identi\u00adfying Russia\u2019s malign influence opera\u00adtions. Numerous Ukrainians living in Poland have for example been recruited by Moscow for a variety of disin\u00adfor\u00admation and sabotage activities.<\/p>\n Russia has been manip\u00adu\u00adlating public debates in Germany for years and system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally fostered mistrust during the migration crisis, the COVID-pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Moscow has also actively promoted and supported anti-Western and pro-Russian parties like the AfD and B\u00fcndnis Sahra Wagenknecht and unleashed a formi\u00addable digital tsunami in social media. Russian secret services have murdered people in Berlin in broad daylight and are suspected to have plotted attacks against military facil\u00adities and the CEO of the Rhein\u00admetall arms manufac\u00adturer. Yet despite Moscow\u2019s undis\u00adputable culpa\u00adbility in the war against Ukraine, surveys and election results show that pro-Russian convic\u00adtions are on the rise in Germany.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n We need to realize the full scope of Russia\u2019s hybrid war and impose a cost on the perpe\u00adtrators. Russia is attacking the core of our democracy. It manip\u00adu\u00adlates our opinions, our debates, our elections \u2013 and we still treat this as a side issue. This cannot go on. Hybrid warfare must be treated as a priority security issue.<\/p>\n Our govern\u00adments need to devote far more attention and resources to this challenge. We need to develop a broad toolbox of defensive and offensive measures that mirror the weapons of the aggressor. We also need effective mecha\u00adnisms that enable us to adopt the best possible counter\u00admea\u00adsures nationally and internationally.<\/p>\n Short-term actions should include a strategy to increase digital platforms\u2019 respon\u00adsi\u00adbility to take down Russian infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation. This calls for enforcing national and European law, active debunking and pre-bunking of dis\u00adinformation and propa\u00adganda. At the same time, a more robust protection of critical infra\u00adstructure (energy, IT, defence industry estab\u00adlish\u00adments), including counter-drone security, and a more direct signalling to Russia on red lines (e.g. threat\u00adening retal\u00adi\u00adation against Russian assets in case of cyber\u00adat\u00adtacks) are necessary. Govern\u00adments may be well advised to reuse some of the public campaigns from the past, raising awareness of the real and current threats of Russian hybrid opera\u00adtions (e.g. using posters, TV and video ads etc.). Government, intel\u00adli\u00adgence and the police should actively commu\u00adnicate the risks of manip\u00adu\u00adlation and inter\u00adference in upcoming elections.<\/p>\n A new approach should focus directly on the weaknesses of the Putin regime by exposing regime members\u2019 corruption (what Alexei Navalny used to do), tight\u00adening or creating counter-espionage laws, tight\u00adening sanctions against individuals and companies, by publi\u00adcizing Russian state failures (rising crimi\u00adnality and social depri\u00advation due to the war against Ukraine), increasing pressure on reluctant partners of Russia by openly explaining the costs of aligning with the Kremlin and by strength\u00adening efforts to reach out to Russian society, e.g. via the European Endowment for Democracy and support for independent Russian media.<\/p>\n Long-term work must involve struc\u00adtural projects and political initia\u00adtives, such as building up resilience through e.g. legis\u00adlation tackling elite capture (anti-corruption, creation of a foreign-influence trans\u00adparency register, devel\u00adoping and policing imple\u00admen\u00adtation of regulation on enforcing counter-disin\u00adfor\u00admation culture of digital platforms), projects promoting media literacy, investing in civil society and promoting cooper\u00adation with businesses to defend against hybrid activities.<\/p>\n Poland and Germany should establish a joint group to analyze the conduct of Russia\u2019s hybrid war and propose concrete measures to counter it. They should carefully study Russia\u2019s actions today (such as sabotage and manip\u00adu\u00adlation in the digital sphere including artificial intel\u00adli\u00adgence) and draw applicable lessons from the Cold War, especially those which success\u00adfully addressed Soviet patterns of hostile activ\u00adities, now continued in a modernised format by the Putin regime (push-back against propa\u00adganda, degrading of Moscow\u2019s ability to infil\u00adtrate Western insti\u00adtu\u00adtions etc.). Proposals should include measures streng-thening counter\u00adin\u00adtel\u00adli\u00adgence and counter-hybrid capabil\u00adities against Russia. Both countries should also take a lead in building a European consensus for meaningful restric\u00adtions placed on movements of Russian officials within the Schengen zone. In view of advanced forms of economic inter\u00adde\u00adpen\u00addence between Poland and Germany there is both a need and a scope for conducting joint resilience exercises, involving represen\u00adtatives of the private sector (a good model is offered by the Nordics and Czechia).<\/p>\n The Weimar Triangle framework could be used to develop and promote 2\u20133 initia\u00adtives where there is clear agreement between three capitals (e.g. early warning and response system on infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation, pooling resources on countering cyber-attacks, exposing sabotage networks used by Russia against France, Germany and Poland). Bearing in mind the extensive use of the Telegram platform for planning, recruitment and conduct of hybrid opera\u00adtions, the case opened against its founder Pavel Durov in Paris might lend itself to trilateral cooper\u00adation. Other themes include devel\u00adoping policies for AI and democracy in the EU, promoting education on media literacy.<\/p>\n If possible, Berlin and Warsaw should jointly lobby for a logical inter\u00adna\u00adtional division of labour in terms of responses \u2013 NATO\/\u200bEU\/\u200bG7 to lead with devel\u00adoping more robust policies, standards and agree on response measures, then implement those which fall within their purview (e.g. NATO looking after physical security, while the EU works on legis\u00adlation and provides funding for resilience projects), while individual states pick up imple\u00admen\u00adtation which is within their mandate (Telegram case).[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n Past experience and expertise points to a strong corre\u00adlation between weak (or absent) responses to Russian hybrid opera\u00adtions and Moscow\u2019s intent to intensify such attacks. If the problem is assigned low priority and generates only verbal, pro-forma responses, it will not go away \u2013 on the contrary, it will get worse. Good analysis helps, but is not enough at this stage. In some domains \u2013 e.g. security of military instal\u00adla\u00adtions (NATO bases) \u2013 the Kremlin is still focused on the recon\u00adnais\u00adsance phase. When it comes to elements of critical infra\u00adstructure (undersea cables), it has already moved to actual sabotage. We cannot allow it to believe that it can move to even more brazen forms of attacks. With political will we have the means and capabil\u00adities to deter it. Germany and Poland should take the lead in this task.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cchapter4\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359109929{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n Western sanctions and the escalating costs of war are desta\u00adbi\u00adlizing the Russian economy. The imposed measures were intended to work through several channels, each with its own timeline for impact. Financial sanctions, such as those (partially) cutting off Russia from inter\u00adna\u00adtional finance, often have immediate and poten\u00adtially signif\u00adicant effects in the short run, as was witnessed in initially strong volatility in the rouble exchange rate. Trade sanctions, on the other hand, especially targeting techno\u00adlogical investment goods or other inventory-dependent items, take longer to manifest econom\u00adi\u00adcally beyond their direct impact on imports and exports.<\/p>\n Given that Russia is a relatively large economy, studies suggest that even the most extreme hypothetical scenario of a total global embargo would yield a cost on the Russian economy in the range of a 20 per cent fall in GDP in the medium term. Countries like Iran or North Korea demon\u00adstrate that even under harsh sanctions economies do not collapse \u2014 and even Ukraine\u2019s economy \u2014 where the war is actually taking place \u2014 has not collapsed. Thus, the expec\u00adtation of a rapid collapse of the Russian economy due to sanctions alone was unreal\u00adistic from the outset and in fact never their aim.<\/p>\n Instead, the sanctions are intended to weaken Russia\u2019s ability to finance the war<\/strong>. Hence, we should not ask if the Russian economy has collapsed, but rather what would the situation be today without sanctions? By this metric, the sanctions have indeed increased the costs of waging war for the Kremlin, albeit with some limitations.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n While Russia\u2019s macro\u00adeco\u00adnomic numbers suggest growth \u2014 GDP was up 3.6 per cent in 2023, and a similar rate is projected for 2024 \u2014 it is crucial to look beneath these figures. Reported GDP growth is largely driven by public spending related to the war effort, which has barely had a positive effect on the welfare of ordinary Russian citizens. Increased armaments production does not translate into an improved quality of life \u2014 no Russian is better off because of a newly manufac\u00adtured rocket destined for the front lines. Hence, GDP growth figures reveal little about the true condition of the economy and living standards in Russia. Even with this big caveat, not all figures look rosy: Rosstat reported annual inflation at around 8.5 per cent in early November 2024 and the Central Bank interest rate is 21 per cent. (7)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n In 2024, total war-related spendings, including on national defence and internal security \u2014 the National Guard and the Federal Security Service among others \u2014 are expected to consume around 40 per cent of the budget, equiv\u00adalent to 10 per cent of GDP. A further increase is planned in 2025. As a result, the Kremlin\u2019s prior\u00adi\u00adti\u00adzation of war efforts is absorbing the country\u2019s financial, productive, and human resources, weakening the civilian sector. In the sectors that seem to show growth, state-owned companies produce, and the state procures, at arbitrary prices, which are likely to contain substantial hidden inflation. Thus, it is inaccurate to call it real growth \u2014 exactly as was the case in Soviet times \u2014 when hidden inflation was later assessed at 3 per cent of GDP each year.<\/p>\n As a result, the civilian sector, heavily impacted by sanctions and finan\u00adcially drained by the state, is unable to meet growing domestic demand. Following the withdrawal of many Western investors, the Russian market is now filled with expensive, often lower-quality imported goods. Additionally, Russia encourages the bypassing of sanctions by so-called parallel importing through neigh\u00adbouring countries like Belarus, Turkey and Kazakhstan. This practice, sometimes dubbed the \u201eEurasian Round\u00adabout,\u201c involves rerouting sanctioned goods through inter\u00adme\u00addi\u00adaries before they reach Russia. While this does allow some necessary imports to continue, these goods are far more expensive \u2014 often up to 40 per cent above pre-sanction prices. Additionally, the overall quantities imported are far less than pre-sanctions imports directly from Western countries, and the higher costs add signif\u00adicant strain to the economy. Overall, China has become Russia\u2019s main supplier, accounting for about 40 per cent of Russian imports in the first half of 2024. However, China primarily provides finished goods rather than compo\u00adnents needed for domestic production. Russian raw material exporters, cut off from Western markets, are also facing signif\u00adicant challenges. The mining industry, critical to Russia\u2019s economy, has been in decline since 2023. Although many exporters have found new buyers outside the West, their profitability has sharply decreased due to higher costs of logistics, cross-border financial opera\u00adtions, and lower prices because of a weakened bargaining position.<\/p>\n The negative impact of cutting off Russia from Western technology through trade restric\u00adtions will intensify in the long term. For the past 30 years, Western countries \u2014 especially EU member states \u2014 have been the primary source of high-tech goods for Russia. Currently, countries that have not joined the sanctions either lack the technologies Russia needs or are unwilling to share them, viewing Russia as a competitor or fearing secondary Western sanctions, with China being a prime example. The loss of Western technology suppliers poses a particular threat to the devel\u00adopment of new, often hard-to-reach, Russian oil reserves, and to maintaining the high production levels necessary to finance the war. Growing pressure from the U.S. is also increas\u00adingly hindering the devel\u00adopment of Russia\u2019s LNG sector. With Gazprom facing challenges in pipeline gas exports, liquefied natural gas was supposed to provide flexi\u00adbility to the sector and help rebuild Russia\u2019s position in the global market.<\/p>\n Financial restric\u00adtions have also proven to be relatively effective. Since 2014, Russia has been unable to raise inter\u00adna\u00adtional capital. Their imple\u00admen\u00adtation and enforcement are easier compared to trade sanctions, partly due to compliance require\u00adments for banks like the \u201eknow your client\u201c rule. The effec\u00adtiveness of these sanctions is further enhanced by fear among banks in China, Turkey, and the Gulf states of being cut off from the U.S. financial market through secondary sanctions if they cooperate with Russian clients. As a result, in the first half of 2024, Russian entities have faced increasing diffi\u00adculties with inter\u00adna\u00adtional payments and access to foreign currencies, which in turn hampers their ability to import goods. In the second half of the year, problems with export payments inten\u00adsified. Thus, limited currency inflows to Russia are weakening the rouble and further exacer\u00adbating infla\u00adtionary pressures.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n With shrinking government reserves, the cost of the war is increas\u00adingly being felt by businesses and the public. Russia\u2019s liquid reserves in its national wealth fund had shrunk to 56 billion dollars or 2.8 per cent of GDP in November 2024, and Russia has a steady budget deficit of 2 per cent of GDP that needs financing. Thus, Russia\u2019s reserves could run out in late 2025 and the Kremlin is not likely to raise much more in tax revenues, forcing it to cut public expen\u00addi\u00adtures more severely. Vladimir Putin is counting on the West\u2019s willingness to support Ukraine running out faster than his money to fund the war. However, we should not let him do that.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n At present, a steady source of funding for the war comes from revenues generated by export of energy resources. Russia continues to earn from exporting oil to the European Union (due to exemp\u00adtions from sanctions) and gas (due to the absence of restric\u00adtions). Moreover, since mid-2023, Russian oil has been exported at prices exceeding the price cap of 60 dollars per barrel, often with the support of Western entities. Estimates suggest that by mid-2024, about 35 per cent of seaborne oil exports were trans\u00adported by tankers owned or insured by countries inside the price cap coalition, while the rest was carried by the so-called shadow fleet. This fleet poses a signif\u00adicant threat to maritime safety and the environment, as many of its tankers are outdated and sail with inexpe\u00adri\u00adenced crews.<\/p>\n The effec\u00adtiveness of the trade sanctions is severely under\u00admined by their circum\u00advention through third countries. This is partic\u00adu\u00adlarly damaging in the case of goods and technologies essential to the arms sector. In 2023, alongside a decline in EU exports to Russia, there was a marked increase in exports to countries neigh\u00adbouring the Russian Feder\u00adation, especially Belarus, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, there was a noticeable uptick in deliv\u00aderies from these so-called connector countries to Russia, suggesting they were being used to bypass sanctions. These trends were partic\u00adu\u00adlarly visible in Germany\u2019s and Poland\u2019s foreign trade.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n The current effec\u00adtiveness of sanctions can be strengthened along four clear lines.<\/p>\n 1) While financial sanctions have proven to be highly effective, strin\u00adgency across countries could strengthen their impact. The United States is the leader in their use, but the European Union should also actively expand and enforce them, as well as apply secondary sanctions against third-country actors who engage in sanctions\u2019 evasion. Further tight\u00adening of financial sanctions by Brussels \u2014 including cutting off more Russian insti\u00adtu\u00adtions (including Gazprombank) from the EU financial market, forcing European banks to withdraw from Russia and threat\u00adening third countries with secondary sanctions for supporting Russia \u2014 will adversely affect Russia\u2019s financial stability. Poland and Germany could lobby to hit payments for Russian energy exports, which would be partic\u00adu\u00adlarly damaging to Russia\u2019s budget.<\/p>\n 2) Trade restric\u00adtions can be tightened. Histor\u00adi\u00adcally, Europe has been Russia\u2019s primary trading partner \u2014 in exports (oil and gas), but also in imports, ranging from high tech indus\u00adtrial goods to consumer products. This also means that Europe\u2019s rigorous policies are respon\u00adsible for the vast majority of the impact of the imposed trade restric\u00adtions. (8)<\/span><\/a> Other Western countries, including the U.S., have had very little trade exposure with Russia before, and thus play only a minor role in lever\u00adaging this form of economic power. Specif\u00adi\u00adcally, author\u00adities should enhance detection mecha\u00adnisms for unusual trade patterns. Shipments to countries adjacent to Russia with different pre-war trade patterns should be system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally flagged, especially for dual-use goods. Coordi\u00adnating these efforts at the EU level would ensure that loopholes are harder to exploit. (9)<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n 3) The respon\u00adsi\u00adbility of European companies to comply with EU sanctions by their subsidiaries in third countries must be strengthened. The \u201cbest efforts\u201d oblig\u00adation (enshrined in the 14th sanctions package) is not suffi\u00adcient. The EU Commission\u2019s guidance clari\u00adfying the \u2018best efforts\u2019 principle is not legally binding, and each member state may take different positions on these measures\u2019 scope and application.<\/p>\n 4) With a view towards achieving their ultimate aim of contributing to an end of the war, European policy\u00admakers should provide clarity on condi\u00adtions for lifting sanctions. In light of the Kremlin\u2019s actions, the Western coalition should, of course, for now focus on expanding sanctions and decou\u00adpling itself from the Russian economy. However, to be effective, the Western coalition must clearly commu\u00adnicate condi\u00adtions for removing the measures: For example, any lifting of financial sanctions should be condi\u00adtional upon the restoration of Ukraine\u2019s terri\u00adtorial integrity, and all trade sanctions could only be lifted once repara\u00adtions are paid. This clarity serves as both a deterrent and an incentive for Russia, providing specific steps it must take to normalize relations and have economic isolation reduced. Conversely, the West should not agree to weaken the sanctions regime in exchange for Russia merely halting its military action against Ukraine, as the Russian side has repeatedly demanded. This would allow the Kremlin to rebuild its economic and military potential, likely leading to an inten\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation of its aggressive policy towards its Western neigh\u00adbours in the future.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cchapter5\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359130246{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n There is an intrinsic connection between the Russian regime\u2019s character and its revan\u00adchist foreign policy. As long as the author\u00adi\u00adtarian, klepto\u00adcratic and over-centralised regime remains in power in Moscow, no innov\u00adative political, social and economic devel\u00adopment seems possible. Any substantial moderni\u00adsation would require political liberalisation,which the Kremlin perceives as an existential threat. Retaining lifelong political power is the ruling elite\u2019s overar\u00adching goal because it secures material wealth and personal safety.<\/p>\n During Putin\u2019s seemingly stable rule, Russia was governed in a permanent \u201especial operation\u201c mode. The Kremlin used military conflicts (from Chechnya to Ukraine) and economic crises to change the language of commu\u00adni\u00adcation between government and society and to shift the bound\u00adaries of what is acceptable in domestic and foreign policy. The anti-Putin protests of 2011\/\u200b12 have strengthened the Kremlin\u2019s resolve to crack down on any pro-democracy movement, both in Russia\u2019s neigh\u00adborhood and within its borders. The systematic suppression of civil society, freedom of expression and any kind of democ\u00adratic opposition was a prereq\u00aduisite for Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the rapid suppression of any signif\u00adicant anti-war protests. The regime is using the war to expand its neo-total\u00adi\u00adtarian practice of unprece\u00addented inter\u00adference in the private lives of citizens, mass censorship, indoc\u00adtri\u00adnation of children and youth and digital surveillance.<\/p>\n The brutal war against Ukraine, with its destructive conse\u00adquences also for the Russian population, is only possible in an atomized society without political agency.<\/p>\n In more than three decades of post-Soviet statehood, Russia has been unable to develop a post-imperial national identity. This would have required a serious confrontation with its total\u00adi\u00adtarian past \u2013 something that is intrin\u00adsi\u00adcally incon\u00adsistent with the regime\u2019s domestic goals. To legit\u00adimize its growingly oppressive rule, the regime promotes a revan\u00adchist imperial idea, which draws on the imperial tradi\u00adtions of Russia and the Soviet Union. Driven by an inferi\u00adority complex and resentment of the West due to Russia\u2019s defeat in the Cold War, it is glori\u00adfying Soviet history and appealing to the pre-Soviet imperial past.<\/p>\n This narrative portrays the country as a thousand-year-old civilization facing an eternal threat from the West. Russia is presented as a last bastion defending \u201etradi\u00adtional values\u201c against \u201cdestructive\u201d and \u201cdecadent\u201d liberal democracy. To restore Russia\u2019s great power status, the leadership reclaims a geographical cordon sanitaire. Its role is to keep the West at distance and to prevent democ\u00adratic ideas from conta\u00adm\u00adi\u00adnating Russian society.<\/p>\n Militarism and violence are seen as integral with Russian heritage. Military inter\u00adven\u00adtions in neigh\u00adbouring states are presented as \u201epreventive\u201d defence against the West.<\/p>\n The concept of Russia as the \u201cbesieged fortress\u201d widely resonates among the Russian population. Deprived of civic autonomy and political agency, it seeks compen\u00adsation in the imperial might of the state. The regime justifies the war against Ukraine and the \u201ccollective West\u201d as a reincarna\u00adtion of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany \u2013 a powerful narrative that largely unites Russians and has become an effective way to mobilise patriotic support for the government and distract from repression and corruption. The world\u2019s fear of Russia\u2019s destructive power offers Russians a sense of national pride.<\/p>\n In addition to these narra\u00adtives, generous transfers and privi\u00adleges to select groups have created new benefi\u00adciaries of the war. They range from members of the defence sector, the repressive apparatus and from those who profit from creeping economic nation\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation and the seizure of Russian and foreign companies\u2019 assets to partic\u00adi\u00adpants in the war and their families. The latter often come from poverty-stricken provinces and are now seeing unprece\u00addented social and financial advancement. This boosts the Kremlin\u2019s narrative that war is not just normal but a profitable business and a path to prosperity.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n As long as its current power structure persists, Russia will pursue an aggressive foreign policy and remain a major threat to the European security order.<\/p>\n That is why Western Russia policy should aim at (A) making Vladimir Putin\u2019s imperial project fail and (B) promoting funda\u00admental political change in Russia.<\/p>\n While developed democracy is not a realistic prospect for Russia any day now, liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation, decen\u00adtral\u00adization and pluralism are achievable \u2013 albeit not easily. The realistic minimum would be to allow for broader political compe\u00adtition within the ruling elite and between key influ\u00adential groups. That would create some balance of power to prevent a narrow group of rulers from taking decisions crucial for the global security order, without any scrutiny from the broader elite and the public. The revocation of repressive laws, the release of political prisoners and the lifting of media censorship should be core elements of this process.<\/p>\n While only Russians can change their country, Western policy could shape circum\u00adstances conducive to more openness and pluralism. Policies pursuing these aims should focus on the following:[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n The failure of Putin\u2019s neo-imperial project in Ukraine would demon\u00adstrate to the Russian political estab\u00adlishment (and to the broader population) that war is endan\u00adgering Russia\u2019s future. Unless the idea of militarism and reviving the imperial past is funda\u00admen\u00adtally compro\u00admised, future govern\u00adments will likely invoke it to hold onto power. This would stoke tensions and threats to European security for decades to come.<\/p>\n For decades, the West has legit\u00adimized Putin\u2019s increas\u00adingly repressive regime in the eyes of Russian society and the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community. Russia invested Western money in its military and security apparatus, its propa\u00adganda machine, and its subversive opera\u00adtions against Western democ\u00adracies. At the same time, the regime paid little to no price for its massive human rights viola\u00adtions that were a prelude to the full-scale war.<\/p>\n Now it is in the West\u2019s strategic interest to delegit\u00adimize Putin\u2019s regime and promote his departure from power, which would be an oppor\u00adtunity for political change. Resolute military, political and economic assis\u00adtance to enable Ukraine to end the war on its own terms combined with more effective sanctions could lead to internal tensions within the ruling elite and a possible change in political leadership, especially if military morale declines quickly. Attacks against military targets inside Russia, together with growing economic problems in Russians\u2019 everyday lives are likely to fuel doubts about the war\u2019s sense and about Putin\u2019s perfor\u00admance as the guarantor of security and stability.<\/p>\n The West\u2019s goal should be to disrupt the normal\u00adi\u00adsation of the war in the eyes of the Russian public. Debunking anti-Western narra\u00adtives should be part of this strategy. Albeit support for the war and the regime remains high, the picture is not as rosy as the Kremlin likes to draw it. Propa\u00adganda fatigue is gradually growing, and Russians are increas\u00adingly aware of their country\u2019s economic griev\u00adances. Their attachment to the occupied terri\u00adtories of Ukraine is shallow and abstract but their biggest fear, actively stoked by state propa\u00adganda, is that a possible defeat in the war would mean the final decline of Russia.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n There are still millions of independent-minded people in Russia. With political opposition effec\u00adtively illegal, many local activists, public opinion makers, regional journalists and artists work under increas\u00adingly difficult condi\u00adtions to preserve spaces for critical discourse and civic spirit. These people deserve consistent support from the West, based on strategic, long-term planning. This is not just a human\u00adi\u00adtarian endeavour but a political enter\u00adprise contributing to European security.<\/p>\n Two dimen\u00adsions of activists\u2019 work are partic\u00adu\u00adlarly important. First, some independent media are still able to reach Russians despite growing censorship. While those in exile can openly distribute anti-regime and anti-war content, those remaining in Russia must carefully navigate the highly repressive environment and tailor their content to specific audiences. Aesopian language and a focus on Russians\u2019 everyday hardships instead of \u201cbig politics\u201d can often be effective channels of dissem\u00adi\u00adnating anti-war messages. Second, overcoming social atomi\u00adsation and building trust in local commu\u00adnities is a value in itself in an increas\u00adingly total\u00adi\u00adtarian state. Small steps, like formally apolitical initia\u00adtives by activists, can pay off in the future, should repres\u00adsions be eased.<\/p>\n Since 2022, Russia has experi\u00adenced the largest wave of political emigration in its modern history. Among the hundreds of thousands in exile, a relatively small but active group of civic activists, politi\u00adcians, journalists and researchers is in\u00advolved in civil society initia\u00adtives, independent media, and political activism.<\/p>\n Support for democ\u00adratic groups in Russia and in exile needs to be based on clear political criteria: benefi\u00adciaries should act in line with anti-war, anti-author\u00adi\u00adtarian and anti-imperial agendas, even if they are forced to self-censor their public activ\u00adities. Western donors should revisit some of the practices of the fight against Soviet oppression, including the dissem\u00adi\u00adnation of truth about war atroc\u00adities and state crimes against Russians.<\/p>\n Most activists are unlikely to play a decisive role in post-Putin politics. They may, however, play a big role in devel\u00adoping concepts and visions of political liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation and pluralism for their country\u2019s future. They can commu\u00adnicate with Russians about \u201clife after Putin\u201d and \u201clife after the lost war\u201d and the condi\u00adtions for future rapprochement with the West.<\/p>\n Maintaining contact with potential agents of change in Russia and in exile helps to betterun\u00adder\u00adstand the local political landscape and public mood and to tailor the Western approach accord\u00adingly. However, a broader space for their activ\u00adities will only emerge if the regime is signif\u00adi\u00adcantly weakened by military defeat and the adverse effects of sanctions.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n In order to prepare appro\u00adpriate, propor\u00adtionate, and coordi\u00adnated policies, the West needs a sober analysis of Russia\u2019s domestic strengths and weaknesses, as well as of the risks and oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities of possible political change.<\/p>\n Turbulent change (like as a result of Moscow losing the war) is widely perceived in the West as a worst-case scenario, even though it could render Moscow less aggressive and less hostile to the rule-based inter\u00adna\u00adtional order. Regardless of who comes to power, a post-Putin leadership would have less domestic control, at least in the first years.<\/p>\n In reality, he is Russia\u2019s leading nation\u00adalist and an inter\u00adna\u00adtionally wanted war criminal. The damage which the contin\u00adu\u00adation of the current regime does to the global security order is greatly under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated. And it overlooks the fact that Putinism and the struc\u00adtural griev\u00adances it has created pose a signif\u00adicant risk of desta\u00adbi\u00adlizing Russia.<\/p>\n Once his person\u00adalist dicta\u00adtorship is gone, the system can indeed become unstable and chaotic. However, competing rivals will mostly fight each other, not neigh\u00adbouring states. There are also good reasons to believe that the new rulers will be no less inter\u00adested in securing Russia\u2019s nuclear arsenal than the post-Soviet nomen\u00adklatura was in the 1990s \u2013 if nothing else, to gain inter\u00adna\u00adtional legitimacy.<\/p>\n Possible separatist movements are often cited in this context as poten\u00adtially leading to a breakup of Russia. However, while anti-Moscow senti\u00adments do exist in the regions, they have little to do with separatist senti\u00adments. Moreover, Russia is much better equipped than the Soviet Union to deal with major turbu\u00adlence. Russia\u2019s economic model is still largely market-based, the small and medium business sector has been flexible enough to survive despite corrupt state capitalism and the once relatively robust civil society is likely to revive when repression is eased.<\/p>\n Regardless of who comes to power after Putin, a normal\u00adization of relations should be condi\u00adtional not only on Moscow abandoning its aggressive foreign policy and paying compen\u00adsation to Ukraine, but also on a liber\u00adal\u00adization of domestic politics. A future leader will probably be weaker and more suscep\u00adtible to pressure, at least until he or she has consol\u00adi\u00addated power. The Kremlin is likely to view the West as an important source of legit\u00adimacy. Western capitals should be prepared to adopt a zero-tolerance policy toward human rights abuses in order to assist democ\u00adratic groups within Russia.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n By contrast, Poland experi\u00adenced Kremlin-sponsored state terror and atroc\u00adities during the 20th-century Soviet occupation and the 19th-century Russian occupation. Most Poles\u2019 perception of Russia is shaped by the fact that their country regained sover\u00adeignty in 1918 and 1989 only because Moscow was too weak for foreign inter\u00adven\u00adtions. This historical memory signif\u00adi\u00adcantly lowers Warsaw\u2019s concern about possible political turmoil in Russia.<\/p>\n Both Poland and Germany have a long history of promoting democ\u00adratic values in Russia through cooper\u00adation with Russian civil society and the democ\u00adratic opposition. This should help to design effective ways of supporting them under an increas\u00adingly total\u00adi\u00adtarian regime.<\/p>\n Germany tradi\u00adtionally had more extensive civil society relations with Russia than most other EU countries. Since 2022, the German government has under\u00adtaken a compre\u00adhensive review of its policy and now focuses on relations with independent Russian civil society.<\/p>\n Tailored instru\u00adments like schol\u00adarship programmes and human\u00adi\u00adtarian visas for individuals, as well as targeted financial support, have made Germany an important hub for Russian civil society, independent media and the democ\u00adratic opposition in exile. The Foreign Ministry\u2019s Eastern Partnership Programme, which supports cooper\u00adation between German and Russian civil society, is also open to Polish NGOs. (10)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Poland, which has been much more affected by the war and has taken in two million Ukrainian refugees and migrants, has also continued assis\u00adtance for Russian political exiles mainly with human\u00adi\u00adtarian visas and support for diaspora networks.<\/p>\n However, all activ\u00adities to support the Russian democ\u00adratic diaspora are hampered by the ongoing repression in Russia and the crimi\u00adnal\u00adization of many foreign organi\u00adza\u00adtions as \u2018undesirable\u2019. In these circum\u00adstances, regular exchanges and coordi\u00adnation of agendas between the two govern\u00adments, the Polish-German expert community and Russian NGOs and independent media, can contribute to more coherent Western policies towards Russian democ\u00adratic groups and to a long-term strategy for the trans\u00adfor\u00admation of Russia.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cconclusions_recommendations\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359154852{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n This report demon\u00adstrates that German and Polish experts probably more than ever think alike, not only in terms of diagnosing the situation, but also \u2013 and this is crucial \u2013 in terms of recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions for European policy towards Russia. Although the govern\u00adments of Germany and Poland agree on many aspects of their policy towards the war, including the need for continued support and Ukraine\u2019s undeniable need to preserve its sover\u00adeignty, they are signif\u00adi\u00adcantly apart when it comes to their goals regarding the endgame of the war.<\/p>\n Different goals lead to obvious differ\u00adences in the nature, speed and extent of military support for Ukraine. They also result in divergent prefer\u00adences when it comes to specific policies (e.g. sanctions, the degree of isolation of Putin\u2019s regime). Furthermore, up to now, Berlin and Warsaw differ in the response to the \u201cRussian problem.\u201d A rapprochement between the two neighbors therefore presup\u00adposes a profound strategic dialogue and a departure from the tradi\u00adtional German pater\u00adnal\u00adistic view of Poland.<\/p>\n One of the gravest weaknesses in the West\u2019s approach to Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine and its hybrid war against the West has been the lack of a joint goal and of a coordi\u00adnated strategy. At the same time, against the backdrop of Donald Trump\u2019s return to the White House and the volatile political situation in Europe, the political complexity in the West seems to be more challenging than ever. In this critical situation, much greater alignment between Poland and Germany could substan\u00adtially contribute to elaborate a European security consensus.<\/p>\n In view of the critical culmi\u00adnation of the war in Ukraine, it is even more urgent that Berlin and Warsaw (and the West at large) find a common approach to the desired outcome of the war and the steps necessary to achieve it. Even if the Bundestag elections on 23 February may bring the long-awaited change in its policy towards the war, this does not neces\u00adsarily mean that the thinking in both capitals about the way to end the war will converge. A military and diplo\u00admatic victory for Russia would not only have dire conse\u00adquences for European security and the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order but would also provoke massive upheaval in the Western alliance.<\/p>\n 1) Realis\u00adti\u00adcally assess the stakes of the ongoing war. Russia is not only fighting with Ukraine, but also with us. Russia\u2019s ultimate goal is not to grab more territory in Ukraine, but to control the entire country and funda\u00admen\u00adtally reshape the inter\u00adna\u00adtional, in particular the European, security order. We can easily conclude that we are at a turning point in European post-Cold War history. The shape and content of the next political period will depend on us.<\/p>\n 2) Deprive Russia of the hope of victory. We must recognize that the Kremlin still hopes that it can win the war because of the West\u2019s internal division, incon\u00adsis\u00adtency, indecision and fear of escalation. The West\u2019s weakness makes Russia stronger, gives the Kremlin additional options and thus prolongs the war. As shown in one of the chapters above, in parallel with increased arms deliv\u00aderies, Europe still has the potential to tighten sanctions against Russia. Part of this should be using of frozen Russian assets \u2013 not only their proceeds \u2013 to support Ukraine.<\/p>\n 3) Build up European military potential as quickly as possible so that Europe\u2019s contri\u00adbution to NATO\u2019s defence capabil\u00adities matches its economic potential. If we want to secure continued US political and military engagement in Europe, we must demon\u00adstrate that we are willing to shoulder our fair share of the burden of defending the West. The situation is likely to worsen as the US is expected to shift its attention away from Europe to the Pacific. There is no reason why Europe \u2013 apart from political inertia \u2013 should be unable to provide for its own defence. Realis\u00adti\u00adcally, we must admit that this will take many years. But first steps should be taken immedi\u00adately. Poland, investing more than 4 % of its GDP in defence, supported by a cross-party and societal consensus, sets a remarkable model to follow.<\/p>\n Germany and Poland should make a joint effort to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and foster a common long-term strategy towards Russia. Germany still is an economic heavy\u00adweight and a key player within the EU, while Poland in recent years acquired signif\u00adicant political credi\u00adbility due to its role in supporting Ukraine and its commitment to increasing its defence capabil\u00adities. To begin, Germany and Poland could use the existing \u201cWeimar Triangle\u201d format, bringing France into the process.<\/p>\n Another strategic option is the formation of a European \u201cCoalition of the Willing\u201d to support Ukraine and strengthen European defence. Such an initiative must reflect the increased role of the Central Eastern European, Baltic and Nordic states. The summit of the \u201cNordic-Baltic 8\u201d in late November was a step in the right direction. This should be followed by the creation of an insti\u00adtu\u00adtion\u00adalized mechanism for security policy coordi\u00adnation and construction of \u201cinter\u00adfaces\u201d between key insti\u00adtu\u00adtions of partic\u00adi\u00adpating countries, dealing with various aspects of the Russian threat. Care should be taken that such initia\u00adtives strengthen the internal cohesion of EU and NATO.<\/p>\n 5) Finally recognize that Russia\u2019s aggressive policy is deeply rooted in its political culture and gover\u00adnance system and be prepared for different scenarios and policies for a Post-Putin Russia. Any future integration of Russia into the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order will require a profound change of its current model of gover\u00adnance, which may take a long time and offers no guarantee of success. For the time being, Russia remains a major threat and challenge to European security. However, the West should be prepared for various scenarios of regime change. The fall of the Assad regime has again demon\u00adstrated how quickly a long-standing dicta\u00adtorship can collapse. While developed democracy is not a realistic prospect for Russia any day now, political liber\u00adal\u00adi\u00adsation, decen\u00adtral\u00adization and pluralism are achievable \u2013 albeit not easy. While only Russians can change their country, Western policy could shape circum\u00adstances conducive to more openness and pluralism. This policy should aim to make Putin\u2019s imperial project fail, to split Russia\u2019s elites and support pluralism and political alter\u00adna\u00adtives among Russians.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n In our view, Europe and the West cannot negotiate:<\/p>\n \u2022 Ukraine\u2019s internal sover\u00adeignty \u2013 Russia has no right to interfere in Ukrainian domestic affairs, e.g. the consti\u00adtution of the country and its government.<\/p>\n \u2022 Ukraine\u2019s external sover\u00adeignty regarding NATO and EU membership \u2022 European security archi\u00adtecture \u2013 definitely there should be no negoti\u00ada\u00adtions about Russia\u2019s demands from December 2021.<\/p>\n \u2022 The West should tie a gradual lifting of sanctions to binding agree\u00adments that go far beyond a mere freezing of the war. These should include European security issues, such as the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine and Russian nuclear weapons from Belarus and Kalin\u00adingrad, the release of all Ukrainian prisoners and political detainees in Russia, as well as the legal account\u00adability of those respon\u00adsible for the war of aggression against Ukraine. Also on the agenda should be Russian financial compen\u00adsa\u00adtions for the vast destruction in Ukraine.<\/p>\n \u2022 In view of the uncer\u00adtainty regarding the future commitment of the Trump admin\u00adis\u00adtration, Europe needs to be ready to contin\u00adu\u00adously strength\u00adening Ukraine\u2019s self-defense.<\/p>\n \u2022 In order to stabilize the situation after a potential ceasefire, Germany and Poland should be prepared for the need of deploying robust European peace\u00adkeeping forces in Ukraine, preferably with a US-contribution.<\/p>\n \u2022 We suggest the estab\u00adlishment of an EU off-budgetary fund for financing military equipment to Ukraine, combined with efforts to strengthen military capabil\u00adities of EU member states in line with NATO prior\u00adities and capability gaps. Only an increased European input into NATO will be able to keep the US engaged in Europe.<\/p>\n \u2022 Although up to now \u2013 not least due to Germany\u2019s repeated resis\u00adtance \u2013 no short-term NATO membership for Ukraine is on the table, the path to NATO should be open and an invitation should be agreed upon by the alliance.[\/vc_column_text][vc_raw_html css=\u201d\u201d el_id=\u201cauthors\u201d][\/vc_raw_html][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736359184039{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 100px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n This paper is a joint project by the Center for Liberal Modernity (LibMod), Berlin .<\/span><\/p>\n The Center for Liberal Modernity stands for the defence and renewal of liberal democracy, for the promotion of ecological modernity, and for in-depth expertise on Eastern Europe. LibMod sees itself as a political think tank, debate platform and rallying point for free spirits of various shades.<\/p>\n .<\/span><\/p>\n The Centre for Eastern Studies is a public insti\u00adtution in Warsaw which provides analytical research on Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Balkans, Germany and other parts of the world, including China and Israel. In addition, OSW carries out specific research on sectors like EU energy policy, transport, trade and European security.<\/p>\n .<\/span><\/p>\n Concept<\/strong> Authors<\/strong> Project Coordi\u00adnation:<\/strong> Maria Sannikova-Franck (LibMod) and Maria Doma\u0144ska (OSW) Polish and German versions will be published at osw.waw.pl<\/a> and russlandverstehen.eu<\/a>.[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736301963030{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 50px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Published December 2024 by <\/span><\/p>\n Zentrum Liberale Moderne +49 (0)30 \u2014 13 89 36 33 This paper is published in the framework of the project New Russia Policy and Support for Russian Civil Society <\/em>(Neue Russland\u00adpolitik und Unter\u00adst\u00fctzung der russischen Zivilge\u00adsellschaft), which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry. All opinions are the authors\u2019 own.<\/em><\/p>\n <\/i> [\/vc_column_text][vc_separator][vc_column_text]Did you like thike this article? If yes, you can support the independent editorial work and journalism of LibMod via a simple donation tool.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20241217161206\/RussianChallenge_Imago_0782510954_q.jpg\")
[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]by Maria Doma\u0144ska, Arndt Freytag von Loring\u00adhoven, Ralf F\u00fccks, Gustav Gressel, Irene Hahn-Fuhr, Julian Hinz, Wojciech Kono\u0144czuk, Robert Pszczel, Witold Rodkiewicz, Maria Sannikova-Franck, Konrad Schuller, Jacek Taroci\u0144ski, Iwona Wi\u015bniewska and Ernest Wyciszkiewicz<\/span><\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20240905142445\/Icon_PDF.png\"){kind=icon}
<\/a><\/p>\nInter\u00adna\u00adtional Expert Network Russia<\/a><\/h4>\n
Russia\u2019s war of aggression against Ukraine is in a critical phase: The Russian military is making terri\u00adtorial gains while future Western support for Ukraine is massively uncertain under incoming US President Donald Trump. In this moment, Europe needs deter\u00admi\u00adnation and political leadership. Precisely because Warsaw and Berlin have hitherto had signif\u00adicant differ\u00adences in their policies versus Russia, both countries should work closer together in the future. That would be a strong signal to the other EU member countries.<\/h3>\n
Our joint strategy paper was written by a Polish-German group of experts in coordi\u00adnation with the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)<\/a> in Warsaw. It recom\u00admends a policy of strength versus Moscow, effective sanctions against Russia\u2019s war economy and a common approach against the Kremlin\u2019s hybrid warfare. And no more fear of regime change: While only Russians can change their country, Western policy could create circum\u00adstances conducive to more openness and pluralism.<\/h3>\n
![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20240905141620\/Logo-OSW-LibMod.jpg\"){kind=logo}
<\/p>\n<\/div>\nCONTENTS<\/span><\/h3>\n<\/div>\n
\nby Irene Hahn-Fuhr, Ralf F\u00fccks and Wojciech Kono\u0144czuk<\/p>\n
\nWitold Rodkiewicz and Ralf F\u00fccks analyze the risks of a Russian victory<\/p>\n
\nErnest Wyciszkiewicz and Konrad Schuller argue that Poland and Germany cannot develop common responses to Russia\u2019s aggression unless Berlin fully revises the basic assump\u00adtions on which it based its Russia policy since 1991. They suggest several concrete ways to develop such common responses.<\/p>\n
\nGustav Gressel and Jacek Taroci\u0144ski identify main weaknesses in Polish and German military capabil\u00adities and sketch out the necessary steps to tackle them and enable Berlin and Warsaw to increase its military support for Ukraine\u2019s defence.<\/p>\n
\nRobert Pszczel and Arndt Freytag von Loring\u00adhoven analyze Russia\u2019s hybrid war against the West and present practical recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions on how Berlin and Warsaw could cooperate to push back effec\u00adtively against this aggression.<\/p>\n
\nIwona Wi\u015bniewska and Julian Hinz (with contri\u00adbu\u00adtions from Anders \u00c5slund) argue that economic sanctions do indeed meet their intended goals and develop recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions on how they can be made signif\u00adi\u00adcantly more effective.<\/p>\n
\nMaria Doma\u0144ska and Maria Sannikova-Franck identify the internal causes of Russia\u2019s external aggression. They argue that funda\u00admental political change in Russia is an indis\u00adpensable condition for the country becoming less aggressive. They propose that Western policy should stimulate such change and how this could be done.<\/p>\n
\nRalf F\u00fccks and Wojciech Kono\u0144czuk conclude with key recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions for a future Russia policy, supple\u00admented by recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions for Western policy on the war in Ukraine, which will largely determine the future of Europe.<\/p>\nWHY THIS PAPER?<\/h2>\n
![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108175924\/PP_D-PL_citation_01.png\")
The \u201cZeiten\u00adwende\u201d that Chancellor Scholz has been calling for immedi\u00adately after the full Russian invasion in February 2022 remains stuck halfway. Because of this, govern\u00adments in Central and Eastern Europe wonder: if they were attacked tomorrow, would Germany be willing and capable of providing effective assistance?<\/p>\nIntro\u00adduction<\/span><\/h4>\n
WHAT IS AT STAKE<\/h2>\n
![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108180052\/PP_D-PL_citation_02.png\")
Russia\u2019s full-scale attack on Ukraine in February 2022 opened a new chapter in European and even world history. It was a culmi\u00adnation of the Russian Federation\u2019s revisionist policies, the aims of which had been clearly laid out in draft treaties presented by Russia to the US and NATO in December 2021. The West\u2019s acqui\u00ades\u00adcence to these terms would create a new, Yalta-style insecurity order in Europe, based on the principle of spheres of influence, where Ukraine and other so-called post-Soviet states would be fully subor\u00addi\u00adnated to the Kremlin. Central and eastern Europe would become buffer states in the shadow of Moscow\u2019s overwhelming military preponderance.<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181132\/PP_D-PL_citation_03.png\")
<\/p>\n
\nBeyond Europe, a \u201cmulti\u00adpolar\u201d great power order is bound to be extremely conflict-prone. Neither Russia, nor China, nor other non-Western powers are willing or capable of ensuring global stability. If Russia manages to vassalize Ukraine, this will become a sign for other powers that inter\u00adna\u00adtional law has been replaced by the rule of the fist. This example is likely to be followed by others. Secondly, the victo\u00adrious alliance of author\u00adi\u00adtarian powers is bound to intensify its subversion of the democ\u00adratic political systems of the West.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\nThe West at a historic crossroads<\/h3>\nChapter 1<\/span><\/h4>\n
CAN WE FIND COMMON GROUND?
\nPOLISH AND GERMAN RUSSIA POLICIES THEN AND NOW<\/h2>\n.<\/span>
\nFour Erroneous Assump\u00adtions lead to Flawed Policies<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181148\/PP_D-PL_citation_04.png\")
\n3) The third was that Russia had the right to a sphere of legit\u00adimate interests in its proximity, at the expense of inter\u00adna\u00adtional law. This approach, exemplified by NATO\u2019s refusal to give clear membership perspec\u00adtives to Ukraine and Georgia after the 2008 Bucharest summit, the weak response to the subse\u00adquent Russia-Georgia war and in limited support for Ukraine since 2014, was inter\u00adpreted by Moscow as a green light for pursuing revan\u00adchist ambitions. Accepting a sphere of privi\u00adleged interests for Russia amounts to granting it the right to plunder its neigh\u00adbours \u2014 an open invitation to future crises.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\nWanted: A profound shift in attitudes<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\nA Coalition of the Willing<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\nWeimar triangle 2.0?<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181205\/PP_D-PL_citation_05.png\")
Of course, GDP and population do not automat\u00adi\u00adcally translate into military strength. To transform this potential into a deterrent requires will and time. Possibly more time than Russia will grant. Therefore, devel\u00adoping such a group is unthinkable without a minimum of help from the US. Without American nuclear guarantees, and without American boots on the ground at least for some further years, such efforts will fail. But that cannot be an excuse for not trying. The US will find Europe useful, if Europe gets stronger. In America\u2019s compe\u00adtition with China, partners might be welcome. But only if they are assets, not burdens.<\/p>\nChapter 2<\/span><\/h4>\n
DEFENCE: DEEP RETHINKING REQUIRED<\/h2>\n
![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181221\/PP_D-PL_citation_07.png\")
Unlike Western Europe, the Polish Armed Forces have not fully transi\u00adtioned to out-of-area crisis response opera\u00adtions and maintain more armored, and mecha\u00adnized brigades (12 in 2021) than their Western counter\u00adparts. On the downside, the majority of Poland\u2019s tanks, artillery systems, and all infantry fighting vehicles were outdated Soviet-era equipment, some dating back to the 1960s. Additionally, many of these units were under\u00adstaffed. Russia\u2019s 2022 reinvasion of Ukraine spurred Poland to transfer almost all of this obsolete equipment to Ukraine and rapidly purchase a signif\u00adicant amount of modern weaponry, primarily from the United States and South Korea. In response to the conflict, the Polish General Staff devised a plan to transform the Armed Forces by 2035, which is now being updated with a target of 2039. The specifics of this plan remain classified.<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181237\/PP_D-PL_citation_08.png\")
Any agreement with Russia imposed on Kyiv \u2014 attempts made in Budapest and Minsk failed miserably \u2014 would evoke painful memories for Germany\u2019s neigh\u00adbours. For centuries, Berlin, often in collab\u00ado\u00adration with other powers, has disre\u00adgarded its eastern neigh\u00adbours\u2019 sover\u00adeignty, treating them as pawns in the game of great-power politics, as seen in the parti\u00adtions of Poland, the Treaty of Rapallo, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. To prevent repeating this history, Berlin should treat eastern flank countries, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly Poland and Ukraine, as equal partners. This shift could open doors for constructive cooper\u00adation on military support for Ukraine and deter\u00adrence against Russia.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\nWhat is needed?<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181253\/PP_D-PL_citation_09.png\")
Continued military support for Ukraine, devel\u00adopment of the domestic arms industry and the simul\u00adta\u00adneous restoration of capabil\u00adities to wage full-scale war are essential. This is not just a matter of adding military items to a shopping list. It requires deep rethinking and recon\u00adcep\u00adtu\u00adal\u00adising defence as such. The pitfalls go beyond individual items \u2013 they concern the surviv\u00adability, sustain\u00adability and scala\u00adbility of the military as such:<\/p>\nChapter 3 <\/span><\/h4>\n
RUSSIA\u2019S HYBRID WAR AGAINST THE WEST
\nAND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT<\/h2>\nI. Russia\u2019s hybrid war<\/h3>\n
Chancellor Scholz\u2019 Zeiten\u00adwende has brought Germany closer to the Polish view on Russia. Germany scrapped the Nord Stream project and is now Ukraine\u00b4s second biggest military supplier. But differ\u00adences remain in the way that both countries look at Russia. Unlike in Poland, there are strong fears of escalation among Germans and many people, especially in eastern Germany, do not feel that Russia directly threatens their security. Many support opening negoti\u00ada\u00adtions for a peace deal and an end to Germany\u2019s military support to Kyiv. Although reports of Russian fake news, manip\u00adu\u00adlated debates and sabotage attacks have become more frequent in recent months, German society is far from realizing that it has become a top European target in Russia\u2019s hybrid war.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\nII. What is to be done?<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181327\/PP_D-PL_citation_11.png\")
Attri\u00adbution needs to be used more frequently and with less hesitation. There should be proactive publi\u00adcizing of specific cases where there is compelling evidence of Russian culpa\u00adbility \u2013 something the US and more recently, Romania, have started doing. Failure to name Russia as a hostile and criminal state, fear of escalation, the lack of a full under\u00adstanding of the Kremlin\u2019s gangsters\u2019 logic and reluc\u00adtance to push back will only aggravate the Kremlin\u2019s feeling of impunity and invite further acts of hybrid aggression.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181342\/PP_D-PL_citation_12.png\")
III. The cost of non-action<\/h3>\nChapter 4 <\/span><\/h4>\n
WHAT SANCTIONS CAN DO<\/h2>\n
.<\/span>
\nWhat works and what doesn\u2019t<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181358\/PP_D-PL_citation_13.png\")
Increasing investment in the Russian economy, which is growing at around 10 per cent year-on-year in 2024, is largely allocated to the arms sector and the replacement of Western production tools. This techno\u00adlogical regression, combined with Russia\u2019s demographic crisis, is already a major factor hampering economic activity. As a result, production costs will rise, and economic growth will slow down, a trend already seen since the second quarter of 2024. By 2025, GDP growth is projected to drop to below 1.5 per cent. Given these production limita\u00adtions, substantial budget expen\u00additure will mostly fuel inflation rather than stimulate growth.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\n\u201cRussia\u2019s reserves could run out in late 2025\u201d<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\nWeakness of sanctions<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\nStrength\u00adening sanctions<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181413\/PP_D-PL_citation_14.png\")
Furthermore, fully ending imports of Russian oil and gas should be a priority. By lever\u00adaging intra-European burden-sharing, the economic impact of ceasing Russian energy imports can be mitigated, while signif\u00adi\u00adcantly reducing Kremlin revenues that fund the war effort. Additionally, it is in the common Polish-German interest to reduce shadow fleet activity in the Baltic Sea \u2013 which has, at least partially, become the target of the latest EU sanctions package in December 2024. Both countries could also lobby for an embargo on uranium imports from Russia and a ban on cooper\u00adation with Rosatom. Russia\u2019s state nuclear energy corpo\u00adration plays an important role in foreign policy mainly towards countries of the Global South and also provides budget revenue.<\/p>\nChapter 5<\/span><\/h4>\n
Why lasting peace in Europe is only possible with political change in Russia<\/h3>\n
.<\/span>
\nWhat is needed?<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\nI. Discredit Putin\u2019s imperial project and delegit\u00adimize him in Russian society<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181429\/PP_D-PL_citation_15.png\")
The current indecisive Western policy toward Moscow is counter\u00adpro\u00adductive also in this regard. Negoti\u00adating with Putin, while he still believes in military victory due to the West\u2019s perceived weakness, is premature and only strengthens his domestic standing and allows him to mobilize more resources for war. Such negoti\u00ada\u00adtions would show other aggressive, revan\u00adchist states that inter\u00adna\u00adtional law is toothless, that might makes right, and that even genocidal crimes go unpun\u00adished. They would also accel\u00aderate the global decline of democ\u00adracies and the rise of authoritarianism.<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181446\/PP_D-PL_citation_16.png\")
Difficult as it is, the West should work to split Russia\u2019s nomen\u00adklatura. Members of the elites, who publicly condemn the war and credibly side with Kyiv should be offered safety in the West and be exempted from sanctions, provided they have not committed war crimes. Such cracks could break the perception that there is no other regime possible.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\nII. Support pluralism and political alter\u00adna\u00adtives among Russians<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\nIII. Consider different scenarios and policies for a post-Putin Russia<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181503\/PP_D-PL_citation_17.png\")
A common stereotype, upheld by Russian propa\u00adganda, is that Russia\u2019s vast and diverse territory can only be ruled with a heavy hand and that Russians are \u201eorgan\u00adi\u00adcally\u201c incapable of democracy. In addition, Putin is portrayed as the last line of defence against radical nation\u00adalists or criminal groups that might take power if he is overthrown.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\nProspects for coordi\u00adnated Polish-German action<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181523\/PP_D-PL_citation_18.png\")
Although Russia\u2019s attack on Ukraine in 2022 has led to widespread disil\u00adlu\u00adsionment with Russia in Germany, fears that regime change could lead to insta\u00adbility with unpre\u00addictable conse\u00adquences remain widespread.<\/p>\nCONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS<\/h2>\n
![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108181540\/PP_D-PL_citation_19.png\")
Therefore we believe that Europe is facing five main tasks.<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108184409\/PP_D-PL_citation_20.png\")
4) Finally move towards a joint strategy for thwarting Russia\u2019s neo-imperial ambitions. This will require the abandonment of well-estab\u00adlished routines and comfortable, but outdated habits. Pushing back without hesitation, with vigour, including by imposition of real costs, against Russia\u2019s ongoing hybrid warfare must be one of the prior\u00adities. This also includes the issue of extra defence spending on the national and EU level.<\/p>\n.<\/span>
\nThe endgame of the war in Ukraine:
\nSome policy recommendations<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\n1. Finding a common approach to negoti\u00ada\u00adtions with Russia<\/h3>\n.<\/span>
\n2. Securing Ukraine in its de facto borders<\/h3>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108184426\/PP_D-PL_citation_21.png\")
A funda\u00admental question in the context of any political settlement of the war is how to prevent Russia from attacking Ukraine again. We should be aware that Ukraine\u2019s integration with the EU requires robust, reliable security guarantees.<\/p>\nPublisher and authors<\/h3>\n
\nand the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw.
\n\u00a9 Zentrum f\u00fcr die Liberale Moderne, 2024<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20240905145818\/LibMod_Logo_XL-770x329.jpg\"){kind=logo}
<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20250108033035\/OSW_Logo2_RGB-770x331.jpg\"){kind=logo}
<\/p>\n
\nRalf F\u00fccks (LibMod)
\nWojciech Kono\u0144czuk (OSW)
\nIrene Hahn-Fuhr (LibMod)
\nMaria Sannikova-Franck (LibMod)
\nMaria Doma\u0144ska (OSW)<\/p>\n
\nAnders \u00c5slund (Economist and publicist)
\nMaria Doma\u0144ska (OSW),
\nArndt Freytag von Loring\u00adhoven (German Ambas\u00adsador, ret.)
\nRalf F\u00fccks (LibMod)
\nGustav Gressel (National Defence Academy, Vienna)
\nIrene Hahn-Fuhr (LibMod)
\nJulian Hinz (Kiel Institute for the World Economy)
\nWojciech Kono\u0144czuk (OSW)
\nRobert Pszczel (OSW)
\nWitold Rodkiewicz (OSW)
\nMaria Sannikova-Franck (LibMod)
\nKonrad Schuller (Frank\u00adfurter Allge\u00admeine Sonntagszeitung)
\nJacek Taroci\u0144ski (OSW)
\nIwona Wi\u015bniewska (OSW)
\nErnest Wyciszkiewicz (Mieroszewski Centre)<\/p>\n
\nEditor:<\/strong> Nikolaus von Twickel (LibMod)
\nV.\u2009i.\u2009S.\u2009d.\u2009P.:<\/strong> Ralf F\u00fccks for Zentrum f\u00fcr die Liberale Moderne gGmbH<\/p>\n
\nReinhardt\u00adstra\u00dfe 15
\n10117 Berlin
\nGermany<\/p>\n
\ninfo@libmod.de
\nwww.libmod.de<\/p>\n![](\"https:\/\/libmodredaktion.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/20240905143444\/German-Federal-Foreign-Office.jpg\")
[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator color=\u201ccustom\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1736306559098{margin-top: 30px !important;margin-bottom: 50px !important;margin-left: \u201110px !important;}\u201d accent_color=\u201d#A2B0AB\u201d el_id=\u201cfootnotes\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\nFootnotes<\/h3>\n
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