{"id":76252,"date":"2025-12-11T11:19:52","date_gmt":"2025-12-11T10:19:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/fast-vier-jahre-vollinvasion-ein-zukunftsweisender-blick-zurueck\/"},"modified":"2026-01-13T22:35:46","modified_gmt":"2026-01-13T21:35:46","slug":"almost-four-years-of-full-scale-invasion-a-historical-look-into-the-future","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/almost-four-years-of-full-scale-invasion-a-historical-look-into-the-future\/","title":{"rendered":"Almost four years of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion: A historical look into the future"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Foto: Imago<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

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Almost four years after the start of Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion, historian Jan Claas Behrends (ZZF\/\u200bEuropean University Viadrina) takes a histor\u00adi\u00adcally informed look back\u2014and warns against illusions about quick negotiated solutions. He shows how imperial tradi\u00adtions, violent politics, and the structure of Putin\u2019s regime are shaping the war and why conces\u00adsions to Moscow encourage escalation.<\/h3>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has already lasted almost as long as the German-Soviet war (1941\u20131945); in total, we are looking at twelve years. Never\u00adtheless, there is often still a lack of a deeper, histor\u00adi\u00adcally grounded under\u00adstanding of the war. This was most recently demon\u00adstrated by the reaction to US President Trump\u2019s negoti\u00adation initia\u00adtives \u2013 it seems unreal\u00adistic to me that this constant appeasement of Moscow will have a positive influence on the conflict. On the contrary, when the West shows weakness, Russia has always escalated the conflict further. Looking back, we can see that this is a likely scenario for the future. So let\u2019s look at the reasons for the war in order to better under\u00adstand its present and future.<\/p>\n

The historical causes of the war in Ukraine<\/h2>\n

As a historian, I see a toxic mix of several factors that make the conflict between Russia, Ukraine, and the West a funda\u00admental one. Some of these factors are deeply rooted in Russian history, some stem from the Soviet era, and some are related to the current Russian leadership.<\/p>\n

The first point I would mention is the deeply entrenched imperial tradition among Russia\u2019s elites and population. After the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western observers under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated the persis\u00adtence of this imperial thinking and overes\u00adti\u00admated the changes initiated during perestroika. Funda\u00admen\u00adtally, however, Russian elites continue to define their country and its politics in terms of its claim to be a great power with unlimited sover\u00adeignty and its own sphere of influence. Although Moscow signed the Charter of Paris in 1990, Russia\u2019s elites never really embraced the idea of a Europe consisting of sovereign nation states. Rather, the Kremlin always viewed the sover\u00adeignty of other, smaller states with reser\u00advation. On the contrary, Russia\u2019s rulers continued to see themselves as the only great power in the post-Soviet space and sought to regain their status as a global power. For those who govern Russia, this imperial mission outweighs other concerns, such as modern\u00adizing the country or foreign trade. This, too, has often been misun\u00adder\u00adstood in the West. Initially, Chancellor Merkel offered trade in exchange for better relations, and in recent months President Trump has acted along these lines. However, this approach is doomed to failure as long as Putin and his circle continue to prior\u00aditize their revisionist mission.<\/p>\n

Russia is thus driven by both imperial legacies and revisionist ambitions.<\/p>\n

War and violence as common means of foreign policy<\/h2>\n

Second, Russia has a funda\u00admen\u00adtally different relationship to war and violence than the West has had since 1945. Histor\u00adi\u00adcally and in the present, Russia considers the use of military force and diplo\u00admatic coercion to be legit\u00adimate means of foreign policy. Since 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan \u2013 that is, for almost five decades \u2013 Moscow has been at war almost contin\u00adu\u00adously: from the Hindu Kush to the Caucasus, Moldova, and Abkhazia to Chechnya, from Georgia and Syria to the current war against Ukraine. In these wars and conflicts, Soviet and Russian forces have mostly fought in consistent disregard of inter\u00adna\u00adtional law. Many of these conflicts were accom\u00adpanied by atroc\u00adities or genocidal acts. Under President Putin, Russia has also revived the Soviet tradition of accom\u00adpa\u00adnying its aggression with massive propa\u00adganda campaigns \u2013 both at home and abroad \u2013 in our countries. Russian wars have many dimensions.<\/p>\n

A funda\u00admen\u00adtally total\u00adi\u00adtarian state<\/h2>\n

Thirdly, Russian statehood is defined in a completely different way from the modern state in the West: at its core, it remains the apparatus of coercion that emerged during the revolution and civil war at the beginning of the 20th century. This total\u00adi\u00adtarian core of Russian statehood was not dismantled despite Gorbachev\u2019s perestroika and the collapse of 1991. Although the Communist Party was dissolved in 1991, the two remaining pillars of the dicta\u00adtorship \u2013 the army and the secret police \u2013remained in place. What\u2019s more, neither of them has ever been reformed. Today, the army and the secret services form the corner\u00adstones of Putin\u2019s regime. Their funda\u00admental beliefs and practices, their lawlessness and crimi\u00adnality, date back to the Soviet era and continue to shape the present. As long as they exist in this form, these instru\u00adments of violence will remain a threat to European security, even under different leadership elites. Russia\u2019s army and secret police are and will remain criminal and violent institutions.<\/p>\n

Putin fanta\u00adsizes about Russia as the Soviet super\u00adpower of the 1970s<\/h2>\n

Fourth historical factor: The geopo\u00adlitical position of the late Soviet Union and the collapse of the USSR in 1991 shape the thinking of Putin\u2019s gener\u00adation. Today\u2019s leadership and Putin himself are products of the late Soviet Union and the 1990s. Vladimir Putin was socialized in the late 1960s and early 1970s \u2013 a time when the West was weak and the USSR was a global super\u00adpower. For Vladimir Putin and many of his peers, this is the status they want to regain: they want to act on an equal footing with the US, even if that is unreal\u00adistic. Russia is therefore an aggressive revisionist power that wants to achieve more than just the destruction of independent Ukraine. Rather, the Russian leadership wants to play a role in a multi\u00adpolar world similar to that of the USSR in the 1970s. This has been the goal of Putin\u2019s gener\u00adation since it came to power in the 1990s. In addition, Putin and his entourage were shaped by the post-communist chaos, crime, and corruption of the years after 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they learned that only the unscrupulous \u2013 the most unscrupulous \u2013 can prevail on a completely uneven playing field. They applied this lesson to the field of foreign policy and began to harass the West quite success\u00adfully. It is completely unreal\u00adistic to expect the Putin gener\u00adation, which has been shaped in this way, to change once it is in power.<\/p>\n

Negoti\u00ada\u00adtions without leverage lead to war and conflict<\/h2>\n

Fifth and final point: The West has been sending the wrong signals in its dealings with Putin for 20 years. After the end of the Cold War, the West, especially the Europeans, abandoned deter\u00adrence and containment in favor of dialogue and trade \u2013 both with Russia and with China. The under\u00adlying idea was that Moscow\u2019s integration into the rules-based inter\u00adna\u00adtional order would be attractive to both sides. However, Russia, which lacks the rule of law and binding rules at home, never had any intention of accepting inter\u00adna\u00adtional law and regula\u00adtions \u2013 especially when those laws conflicted with the Kremlin\u2019s interests. The West responded to Russian aggression and viola\u00adtions of the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order with repeated attempts to remain in dialogue \u2013 think of Obama\u2019s \u201creset,\u201d Minsk I and II, or more recently, the summit between Trump and Putin in Alaska. All these attempts failed spectac\u00adu\u00adlarly. Why? The Kremlin inter\u00adprets our offers of dialogue as a sign of weakness. Russia responds with escalation on the battle\u00adfield. We saw this in Minsk, and we saw the same thing in Ukraine this summer. Negoti\u00ada\u00adtions without leverage are a path to more war and conflict.<\/p>\n

The West must signal strength in order to be taken seriously<\/h2>\n

That is why the West should finally stop sending signals of weakness; we must learn to project our strength again. Only the strong are taken seriously in the Kremlin; the weak are despised. In Putin\u2019s world, as in Stalin\u2019s world during the Cold War, the weak deserve to be beaten. Russian political culture is based on ruthlessness, and being ruthless is considered a virtue \u2013 especially, but not only, in times of war. We must begin to acknowledge this reality and stop imagining a Russia that does not exist.<\/p>\n

Only by consid\u00adering the historical devel\u00adop\u00adments I have outlined here can we move forward in our analysis of the present. No war happens without precon\u00addi\u00adtions. Where are we now at the end of 2025?<\/p>\n

An existential war for Ukraine and Russia<\/h2>\n

To under\u00adstand the historical dimen\u00adsions of Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine, we must realize that this is an existential war for both sides. To this end, it is worth taking a look at the respective belief and conviction systems of Ukraine and Russia. For Ukraine, this is a struggle for survival \u2013 the survival of the state itself and Ukrainian culture is at stake. The majority of the population in all parts of the country under\u00adstands this and supports this struggle.<\/p>\n

For Putin\u2019s Russia, this war is primarily about bringing Ukraine back into the Russkii<\/em> Mir<\/em>. If Putin cannot achieve this goal, he is prepared to destroy Ukraine \u2013 which is why this war has genocidal tendencies. But beyond that, the conquest of Ukraine is only the first step in Russia\u2019s attempt to reshape the European and, if possible, the global order. By accepting enormous losses, Putin has made this war his own. Personally, he can no longer accept compromise \u2013 the stakes are too high: He is threatened with losing power. And we should under\u00adstand that in the third year of the war, the Russian dictator is ultimately fighting for his political and possibly also his physical survival.<\/p>\n

That is why I am convinced that economic incen\u00adtives will not help to end this war \u2013 that was once Merkel\u2019s approach and is currently Trump\u2019s approach. Wrongly so. Because Putin is not inter\u00adested in profit, but in power. If we under\u00adstand these funda\u00admentals of the war \u2013 Ukraine\u2019s existential struggle and Putin\u2019s deeply rooted ideological convic\u00adtions \u2013 then we realize that the prospects for a negotiated solution are slim. A compromise between these two positions is hardly conceivable.<\/p>\n

How can the war be ended?<\/h2>\n

Like most wars in European history, this war will most likely be decided on the battle\u00adfield. It could drag on for a long time. The war will end when one of the two sides collapses \u2013 militarily, econom\u00adi\u00adcally or morally. For Ukraine, this means that the West must continue to support Kiev resolutely, because the collapse of Ukraine would be nothing less than a catastrophe for European security.<\/p>\n

Vladimir Putin will be desperate to avoid a revolu\u00adtionary upheaval in Russia like those of 1917 or 1991. That is why he has turned Russia into a neo-total\u00adi\u00adtarian state, with severe repression against anyone who opposes the war. Stability in Russia depends on the ability of its secret police to maintain order and uphold the dicta\u00adtor\u2019s authority. But we know that every author\u00adi\u00adtarian state collapses the moment the chain of command breaks down. We saw this in part during Prigozhin\u2019s uprising. A similar situation could repeat itself tomorrow \u2013 or there could be years of repres\u00adsively enforced stability. We don\u2019t know, and we must be prepared for both scenarios. Dicta\u00adtor\u00adships are difficult to interpret, and their future is uncertain. Who foresaw the collapse of the GDR in 1987? Hardly anyone \u2013 and yet it happened!<\/p>\n

We should under\u00adstand that it will not be easy to end this war soon. Ukrainians and Russians under\u00adstand this better. For us in the West, it is about ending the war; for Kyiv, it is about survival \u2013 and that means winning the war.<\/p>\n

Asymmetric warfare<\/h2>\n

A minimum level of security for the population and social cohesion are crucial for Ukraine\u2019s economic stability. Without these prereq\u00adui\u00adsites, the country cannot success\u00adfully continue the war. From Ukraine\u2019s perspective, this war must also be fought asymmet\u00adri\u00adcally. Techno\u00adlogical innova\u00adtions must be trans\u00adlated into military successes. Ukraine needs better weapons and better tactics and must continue to inflict heavy losses on the Russian side. Kyiv cannot afford to suffer losses on a scale similar to those of Russia; Ukrainians must fight smart and always stay one step ahead of the Russians. The attacks on Russian energy infra\u00adstructure deep inside the country were an important step \u2013 Russia is a petro-state, and such attacks cause it serious damage. The West should support these attacks in every way possible \u2013 by supplying missiles and providing intelligence.<\/p>\n

While the hot war in Ukraine continues, we in the West face the problem that we do not have the right categories to describe our own situation. Germany and Europe are in a state between war and peace. Putin has been speaking openly about his conflict with the West for a long time, but Berlin has long ignored this. I would suggest that we finally take Putin\u2019s threats and actions seriously. Drones over our airports are not a problem for the police, but for the air force. We must under\u00adstand that hacking, drones, and espionage are only the prelude to a military attack that our armed forces must deter or repel.<\/p>\n

The Ukrainians are fighting our battle<\/h2>\n

There are a few things that can help us under\u00adstand where we are headed. Wars are fought with economic resources and willpower. Unlike Russia and Ukraine, the West is only fighting this war half-heartedly. Under the traffic light coalition, this was sold to the German public as \u201cprudence.\u201d We see the result today. Germany still lives under the illusion that we can leave our social benefits untouched and still fend off Russia. We will have to rethink our prior\u00adities. Because we know from history that wars can be protracted\u2014and that they are always very expensive.<\/p>\n

As far as Russia is concerned, the war that Moscow is waging in Ukraine is, of course, not sustainable. But in the past, the Russians have done things for decades that were not sustainable. It was called communism. Zhukov fought against the Wehrmacht in a way that was hardly sustainable \u2013 but he won nonetheless. So let us accept that Russia will remain a tough opponent that does not play by any rules but is highly motivated to achieve its revan\u00adchist goals. That should be our basic assumption for the coming years.<\/p>\n

As far as Ukraine is concerned, we should reinforce the idea that Ukraine is part of the European security archi\u00adtecture. The Ukrainians are fighting our battle. We can learn resilience, innovation, impro\u00advi\u00adsation, and much more from the Ukrainian armed forces \u2013 and indeed from the entire country. But we must finally accept the historical founda\u00adtions and harsh realities of this war and act accord\u00adingly. Four years of procras\u00adti\u00adnation were four years too many.<\/p>\n

This text is based on a speech given by Jan Claas Behrends at the NATO Opera\u00adtions Analysis Conference at the Julius Leber Barracks in Berlin in early November.<\/em><\/p>\n

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