{"id":76378,"date":"2025-12-15T15:59:05","date_gmt":"2025-12-15T14:59:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/policy-paper-georgiens-kampf-ums-demokratische-ueberleben\/"},"modified":"2026-01-21T17:27:35","modified_gmt":"2026-01-21T16:27:35","slug":"policy-paper-georgias-fight-for-democratic-survival","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/policy-paper-georgias-fight-for-democratic-survival\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Paper: Georgia\u2019s Fight for Democ\u00adratic Survival"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Georgia is on the path to author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation of power. The systematic restriction of civil society, political compe\u00adtition, and freedom of assembly goes hand in hand with a foreign policy shift away from the EU. An analysis by Nino Chachava and Saba Brachveli (both: Civil Society Foundation, Georgia).<\/h3>\n

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Intro\u00adduction<\/h2>\n

Georgia is under\u00adgoing a profound political trans\u00adfor\u00admation that can no longer be described as mere democ\u00adratic backsliding. The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party is accel\u00ader\u00adating a systemic consol\u00adi\u00addation of power, mirroring the trajec\u00adtories of compet\u00aditive author\u00adi\u00adtarian regimes. The pace and direction of recent devel\u00adop\u00adments indicate a struc\u00adtural shift toward a one-party autocratic system with increas\u00adingly total\u00adi\u00adtarian features. Core democ\u00adratic pillars \u2013 civil society, political pluralism, independent insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly \u2013 are being system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally targeted.<\/p>\n

This internal trans\u00adfor\u00admation is insep\u00ada\u00adrable from Georgia\u2019s foreign-policy reori\u00aden\u00adtation. The adoption of Russian-style legis\u00adlation not only provides tools for internal repression but also signals a delib\u00aderate geopo\u00adlitical shift. As the government consol\u00adi\u00addates author\u00adi\u00adtarian power at home, it is simul\u00adta\u00adne\u00adously distancing itself from Georgia\u2019s tradi\u00adtional Euro-Atlantic allies, escalating its confronta\u00adtional rhetoric toward the EU and the United States, challenging long-standing partner\u00adships, and, increas\u00adingly, echoing Kremlin narra\u00adtives. These internal and external dynamics are mutually reinforcing, reflecting a strategic reposi\u00adtioning that aligns Georgia more closely with author\u00adi\u00adtarian models than with European democ\u00adratic principles.<\/p>\n

Yet despite sustained repression, Georgian society continues to resist in an unprece\u00addented manner. Peaceful demon\u00adstra\u00adtions have persisted without inter\u00adruption for almost a year, with protesters, adapting to escalating police pressure, admin\u00adis\u00adtrative deten\u00adtions, and restrictive legis\u00adlation. Civic activism contin\u00adually finds new forms of expression, demon\u00adstrating both resilience and creativity in the face of author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation. Impor\u00adtantly, public backing for EU integration consis\u00adtently exceeds 70 percent (Georgia annual survey 2025<\/a>), and has thus been able to serve as one of the few remaining democ\u00adratic stabilisers amid the country\u2019s accel\u00ader\u00adating autocratisation.<\/p>\n

Legal and coercive pressures on Georgian civil society<\/h2>\n

Over the past 2 years, the government has intro\u00adduced and opera\u00adtionalised a series of legal, insti\u00adtu\u00adtional, and coercive measures designed to suppress dissent and close down the remaining civic space. The current regression is struc\u00adtural rather than episodic and is driven by a delib\u00aderate and sustained effort to consol\u00adidate power through an increas\u00adingly restrictive legal framework reinforced by punitive enforcement practices.<\/p>\n

Since 2024, civil society organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions (CSOs) have faced an unprece\u00addented escalation of repression. This process began in spring 2024 with the adoption of the \u201cTrans\u00adparency of Foreign Influence\u201d<\/strong> law and inten\u00adsified further with the expanded \u201cForeign Agents\u201d<\/strong> law and amend\u00adments to the \u201c<\/strong>Law on Grants\u201d<\/strong> in April 2025. Collec\u00adtively, these measures have created a hostile operating environment that leaves virtually no space for independent civic activity.<\/p>\n

Non-compliance with the Foreign Agents law results in criminal liability and severe financial penalties, while the amend\u00adments to the Law on Grants effec\u00adtively prevent organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions from receiving foreign funding without prior government approval. Viola\u00adtions result in fines amounting to double the value of any unautho\u00adrised grant, under\u00admining both the opera\u00adtional autonomy and the financial sustain\u00adability of the organ\u00adi\u00adsation in question. A recent PACE resolution 2624 (2025)<\/a> describes the cumulative effect of these laws as devas\u00adtating, empha\u00adsising that they place the very survival of Georgian civil society at immediate risk.<\/p>\n

The author\u00adities have accorded additional powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), granting it sweeping authority to access sensitive internal documents, commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions, financial records, and data on benefi\u00adciaries. Since spring 2025, the ACB has carried out multiple waves of inspec\u00adtions of NGOs, ultimately encom\u00adpassing approx\u00adi\u00admately 100 organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions<\/strong>. These inspec\u00adtions are widely perceived as polit\u00adi\u00adcally motivated and intended to induce insti\u00adtu\u00adtional paralysis, discourage public engagement, and compel self-censorship.<\/p>\n

Repression inten\u00adsified sharply in August 2025, when author\u00adities froze the bank accounts of seven CSOs<\/strong> as part of a criminal inves\u00adti\u00adgation<\/a>. At issue is the suspected commission of several serious criminal offences including sabotage, attempted sabotage under aggra\u00advated circum\u00adstances, assisting a foreign organ\u00adi\u00adsation or an organ\u00adi\u00adsation under foreign influence in hostile activ\u00adities, and financing actions against Georgia\u2019s consti\u00adtu\u00adtional order and national security. These charges carry penalties ranging from seven years to fifteen years of impris\u00adonment<\/strong>. Author\u00adities claim that the organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions\u2019 funds were used to supply basic protective items to peaceful protesters during the 2024 demon\u00adstra\u00adtions, which were marked by widespread police violence, as well as to cover fines, provide free legal aid, and engage with inter\u00adna\u00adtional partners. Among others, the directors of several CSOs have been <\/strong>summoned<\/strong><\/a> for questioning, while opposition political leaders<\/strong> are already formally charged under similar allegations. <\/strong><\/p>\n

Amidst increasing pressure on civil society, the government has announced a contro\u00adversial reform of<\/strong> higher education,<\/strong> involving changes to the funding of univer\u00adsities, the redis\u00adtri\u00adb\u00adution of faculties, and anopti\u00admi\u00adsation of resources. Concerns have emerged that, given the non-trans\u00adparent and extremely expedited process and the climate of growing hostility toward dissent in academia, the reform may be aimed at estab\u00adlishing political control over univer\u00adsities and further eroding any remaining independent spaces within the academic sector.<\/p>\n

Despite mounting pressures, including the risk of criminal prose\u00adcution, intrusive inspec\u00adtions, asset freezes, and persistent state-orches\u00adtrated defamation, Georgian CSOs continue to operate. Many have adapted by adjusting their strategies, decen\u00adtral\u00adising their opera\u00adtions, and devel\u00adoping alter\u00adnative methods and means to continue their work. However, these measures reflect estab\u00adlished author\u00adi\u00adtarian techniques for constricting civic space, weakening democ\u00adratic account\u00adability, and eroding the insti\u00adtu\u00adtional founda\u00adtions essential for plural\u00adistic gover\u00adnance. The trajectory indicates not merely backsliding but the systematic disman\u00adtling of the civic sector as an independent actor within Georgia\u2019s state system.<\/p>\n

Erosion of Political Pluralism in Georgia: Legal and Insti\u00adtu\u00adtional Mechanisms<\/h2>\n

By 2025, the political environment in Georgia has deteri\u00ado\u00adrated dramat\u00adi\u00adcally. State actions against opposition leaders reached levels incom\u00adpatible with democ\u00adratic gover\u00adnance and the rule of law. Seven leaders, repre\u00adsenting all the major opposition parties, <\/strong>are in detention or have been convicted, with some serving several months in jail for non-compliance with summonses issued by a one-party parlia\u00admentary inves\u00adtigative commission, which is widely regarded as a partisan tool and lacking proce\u00addural legitimacy.<\/p>\n

In November 2025, the Prosecutor\u2019s Office brought new criminal charges<\/strong><\/a> against eight opposition leaders<\/strong>, including sabotage<\/em>, <\/em>collab\u00ado\u00adration with foreign powers<\/em>,<\/em> and attempting to overthrow the consti\u00adtu\u00adtional order<\/em>.<\/em> Opposition leaders now face the prospect of long-term impris\u00adonment on charges for activ\u00adities that clearly fall within the bound\u00adaries of legit\u00adimate political participation.<\/p>\n

At the same time, the ruling party has been advancing legislative measures that directly threaten political pluralism. On 16 October 2025, the one-party parliament adopted, through an expedited procedure, a package of amend\u00adments enabling the prohi\u00adbition of political parties<\/strong><\/a> and the indef\u00adinite depri\u00advation of political rights for individuals associated with them. The intent and effect of these measures was to preemp\u00adtively exclude the ruling party\u2019s political competitors from partic\u00adi\u00adpation in public life. The legislative changes were immedi\u00adately followed by a consti\u00adtu\u00adtional appeal<\/strong> requesting the banning of three major opposition parties.<\/strong><\/p>\n

The legal justi\u00adfi\u00adca\u00adtions presented are broad and polit\u00adi\u00adcally charged, including claims that opposition parties have questioned the legit\u00adimacy of the government, actions related to the 2008 August war, decisions to boycott elections.<\/p>\n

On 17 November, the ruling party intro\u00adduced further amend\u00adments to the Election Code<\/a>, effec\u00adtively depriving Georgian citizens residing abroad of their right to vote in parlia\u00admentary elections, claiming that these citizens are \u201csubject to pressure from foreign govern\u00adments\u201d. This step consti\u00adtutes yet another measure contributing to the consol\u00adi\u00addation of increas\u00adingly author\u00adi\u00adtarian gover\u00adnance, further weakening societal and political pluralism.<\/p>\n

The combined use of criminal prose\u00adcu\u00adtions, restrictive legis\u00adlation, and consti\u00adtu\u00adtional litigation demon\u00adstrates a coordi\u00adnated strategy to consol\u00adidate one-party dominance through judicial and admin\u00adis\u00adtrative means. These devel\u00adop\u00adments consol\u00adidate author\u00adi\u00adtarian control, effec\u00adtively elimi\u00adnating the condi\u00adtions for genuine political compe\u00adtition and plural\u00adistic governance.<\/p>\n

Targeting of freedom of assembly in Georgia<\/h2>\n

Since spring 2024, and especially during the November\u2013December protests, Georgians have come under an escalating attack on freedom of assembly, with increas\u00adingly aggressive policing. Widespread abuse has been documented, including the unlawful and dispro\u00adpor\u00adtionate use of special means resulting in serious injuries, arbitrary arrests conducted by uniden\u00adti\u00adfiable police and special forces, physical violence during arrests, transport, and detention, denial of medical care and obstruction of emergency services, systemic impunity due to the failure of the Special Inves\u00adtigative Service and the judiciary to fulfill their mandates (Human Rights Crisis in Georgia [November 2024 \u2013 February 2025]: A Joint Report by Eleven Georgian Civil Society Organi\u00adza\u00adtions<\/em>, Tbilisi, 14 May 2025)<\/p>\n

On 1 December 2025<\/strong><\/a>, the BBC <\/strong>reported<\/strong><\/a> finding evidence suggesting that Georgian author\u00adities may have used prohibited chemical substances against protesters during the demon\u00adstra\u00adtions that started on 28 November 2024. If this did indeed occur, it would constitute a severe violation of inter\u00adna\u00adtional norms, human rights oblig\u00ada\u00adtions, and Georgia\u2019s commit\u00adments under inter\u00adna\u00adtional conventions.<\/p>\n

Instead of providing trans\u00adparency about the chemical agents used against peaceful protesters, the State Security Service of Georgia has begun summoning individuals featured in a BBC documentary, including doctors and human rights defenders, for questioning as part of an inves\u00adti\u00adgation into alleged \u201cassis\u00adtance to foreign entities\u201d and \u201cabuse of official powers.\u201d<\/p>\n

Although hundreds of cases of ill-treatment of demon\u00adstrators in November and December 2024 have been reported, none of the incidents has been inves\u00adti\u00adgated. Following the violent crack\u00addowns, the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community responded by imposing targeted sanctions and travel bans on high-ranking police officials and judges, several of whom were dismissed later. After mid-December, large-scale physical violence declined, and the author\u00adities appeared to shift their tactics from the widespread use of force to legal, admin\u00adis\u00adtrative, and financial forms of pressure, a shift that may have been influ\u00adenced, among other factors, by the sanctions and the prospect of further inter\u00adna\u00adtional action<\/p>\n

Over the past year, legal framework and policing practicesfor peaceful assembly in Georgia has undergone successive waves of restrictive amend\u00adments, trans\u00adforming partic\u00adi\u00adpation in protests into a high-risk and heavily penalised activity. The process began in December 2024, with the most recent amend\u00adments adopted in October 2025. Each legislative package has responded directly to emerging protest tactics: fines for protest-related acts were raised 20 to 30 times<\/strong>, reaching 5,000<\/strong>\u202f<\/strong>GEL<\/strong> \u2014 which is approx\u00adi\u00admately 2.5 to 3 times the average monthly income,<\/strong> and thus effec\u00adtively unaffordable for ordinary citizens. Funds which previ\u00adously provided financial assis\u00adtance to people fined during the ongoing anti-regime protests or dismissed from their jobs due to their civic activism have also been frozen. The widespread imposition of these heavy fines has placed a dispro\u00adpor\u00adtionate financial burden on partic\u00adi\u00adpants, producing a chilling effect on the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly.<\/p>\n

The maximum period of admin\u00adis\u00adtrative detention has been extended from 15 to 60 days,<\/strong> thus surpassing compa\u00adrable limits in Russia and Belarus (15 days). The October 2025, new amend\u00adments intro\u00adduced admin\u00adis\u00adtrative detention<\/strong> for first-time viola\u00adtions of assembly rules and criminal liability<\/strong> for repeat offences. The first case under the new rules has already been initiated. Under this new framework, even failure to comply with a lawful order from law enforcement can result in criminal charges and impris\u00adonment. Fines have largely been replaced by detention, meaning that partic\u00adi\u00adpants may now face up to 15 days of impris\u00adonment<\/strong> for actions such as covering their faces during a protest, partially or fully blocking roads, or creating obstacles to pedes\u00adtrian or vehicle movement.<\/p>\n

Following the intro\u00adduction of the new amend\u00adments, 5 to 10 people were detained daily<\/strong> for acts such as obstructing traffic<\/strong>. Police began physi\u00adcally preventing road-blocking, prompting protesters to shift from static rallies to mobile marches. Despite these adapta\u00adtions, systematic arbitrary arrests continued<\/strong>, often targeting individuals simply for walking in groups or standing on sidewalks, and frequently based on absurd or fabri\u00adcated accusa\u00adtions, including alleged disobe\u00addience to police orders. In October 2025, Trans\u00adparency Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Georgia documented<\/a> the detention of eleven media repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives under admin\u00adis\u00adtrative charges.<\/p>\n

On December 10, new restrictive measures emerged, further tight\u00adening control over freedom of assembly. The amend\u00adments signif\u00adi\u00adcantly expand state oversight by requiring organizers to notify the Ministry of Internal Affairs five days in advance of any gathering or demon\u00adstration and by extending assembly restric\u00adtions from roadways to pedes\u00adtrian zones, effec\u00adtively leaving practi\u00adcally no space for protest. Non-compliance can result in admin\u00adis\u00adtrative detention of up to 15 days, while repeat offences carry criminal liability, including impris\u00adonment for up to one year.<\/p>\n

As regards criminal charges related to protest partic\u00adi\u00adpation, Trans\u00adparency Inter\u00adna\u00adtional Georgia reports<\/a> that 148 individuals have faced criminal proceedings <\/strong>since late 2024; 66 remain in pre-trial detention<\/strong>, and 54 have been convicted<\/strong>. In per capita terms, the number of crimi\u00adnalised protesters in Georgia now exceeds compa\u00adrable figures for Russia<\/strong>, reflecting an extremely high level of repression in a country that nominally remains an EU candidate state.<\/p>\n

The cumulative effect of excessive fines, routine admin\u00adis\u00adtrative detention, and criminal liability for repeated offences has created a legal and policing system explicitly designed to eliminate civic mobil\u00adi\u00adsation. By contin\u00adu\u00adously tight\u00adening rules and adapting enforcement to protest tactics, the author\u00adities are not merely responding to dissent, they are actively suppressing peaceful assembly and disman\u00adtling one of the final avenues for democ\u00adratic expression.<\/p>\n

Propa\u00adganda as a pillar of emerging autocracy in Georgia<\/h2>\n

A central pillar of the author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation is the ruling party\u2019s expanding disin\u00adfor\u00admation and propa\u00adganda system, which has become one of the most powerful tools for manip\u00adu\u00adlating public opinion. GD-affil\u00adiated media outlets operate in close alignment with Kremlin narra\u00adtives, system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally demon\u00adising and delegit\u00adimising inter\u00adna\u00adtional partners, EU insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, and democ\u00adratic allies. Critical state\u00adments from the EU, US, OSCE, and other organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions are portrayed as \u201cforeign inter\u00adference\u201d, while domestic critics are framed as \u201cenemies\u201d, \u201ctraitors\u201d, or agents acting against Georgian statehood. This narrative archi\u00adtecture not only seeks to isolate Georgia from its democ\u00adratic partners but also creates a hostile environment in which violence and intol\u00aderance toward dissent are implicitly encouraged. By engineering an \u201cinfor\u00admation siege,\u201d the ruling party reinforces public mistrust in independent voices and strengthens the ideological founda\u00adtions of its emerging autocratic system.<\/p>\n

Policy recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions: coordi\u00adnated inter\u00adna\u00adtional response to the consol\u00adi\u00addation of autocracy in Georgia<\/h2>\n

Georgia\u2019s democ\u00adratic future is still visible, provided those defending it receive the support and protection they need. A coordi\u00adnated inter\u00adna\u00adtional strategy is required to uphold human rights, support civic space, and prevent further author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation in Georgia. Active engagement from the EU and other partner states could make a tangible difference. Specif\u00adi\u00adcally, the EU and other partner states could:<\/p>\n

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  • Actively support an independent inter\u00adna\u00adtional inquiry<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    The recent BBC inves\u00adti\u00adgation into the alleged use of chemical irritants and uniden\u00adtified substances against protesters has heightened concerns about systematic and escalating state violence in Georgia. Opposition parties and civil society organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions have already called for an independent inter\u00adna\u00adtional inquiry, led by credible organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions, to establish the facts, determine respon\u00adsi\u00adbility, and prevent further use of such substances. Supporting such an inquiry should be the initial step, providing a solid eviden\u00adtiary foundation for any subse\u00adquent policy actions.<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Activate inter\u00adna\u00adtional human rights mechanisms<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      The activation of existing inter\u00adna\u00adtional human-rights account\u00adability mecha\u00adnisms is essential. The OSCE Moscow Mechanism, which has been used effec\u00adtively in contexts such as Belarus, is a credible and rapid tool for use in cases where national insti\u00adtu\u00adtions fail to ensure account\u00adability. A fact-finding mission under this mechanism would be able to gather credible documen\u00adtation of human rights viola\u00adtions on the ground. A report to that effect would create a solid ground for evidence-based, targeted inter\u00adna\u00adtional measures.<\/p>\n

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      • Implement coordi\u00adnated restrictive measures<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        Although it may be difficult to arrive at EU-wide unanimity, individual member states can still act in concert with one another to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities respon\u00adsible for repression. Bilateral or coalition-based measures, such as through a Weimar+ format (Germany, France, Poland and like-minded partners), can reinforce the legit\u00adimacy of evidence, ensure account\u00adability despite EU-level gridlock, and impose tangible conse\u00adquences on actors driving democ\u00adratic backsliding. Credible documen\u00adtation from inter\u00adna\u00adtional inves\u00adti\u00adga\u00adtions or OSCE fact-finding missions would form the basis for such targeted measures, aligned with the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (Council Regulation 2020\/\u200b1998).<\/p>\n

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        • Apply financial pressure on author\u00adi\u00adtarian networks<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          Targeted financial measures would be a highly effective tool with which to influence the autocratic leadership. Measures restricting access to assets, financial networks, and opera\u00adtions controlled by oligarchic struc\u00adtures, as well as by pro-government businesses and media outlets, would be partic\u00adu\u00adlarly effective. Such steps would weaken the regime\u2019s resource base, disrupt its propa\u00adganda networks, limit its capacity for repression, and strengthen independent actors and civil society. Imple\u00admen\u00adtation can be bilateral or coordi\u00adnated, depending on legislative possibilities.<\/p>\n

            \n
          • Ensure civil society<\/strong>\u2019s<\/strong> survival and resilience<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

            External pressure should be accom\u00adpanied by robust support for civil society actors, including flexible, rapid-response funding, emergency assis\u00adtance for activists and independent media, continued legal aid for detainees and victims of repression, and measures aimed at protecting journalists, human-rights defenders, and civic activists. Strength\u00adening civil society in this way is essential to maintaining channels for peaceful mobil\u00adi\u00adsation and protecting funda\u00admental rights under increasing state pressure.<\/p>\n

              \n
            • Rethink EU democ\u00adratic leverage in emerging autocracies<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

              As Georgia\u2019s leadership has effec\u00adtively suspended the country\u2019s EU accession, the scope for the Union to apply its core pre-accession tool of condi\u00adtion\u00adality is signif\u00adi\u00adcantly reduced. This under\u00adscores the inade\u00adquacy of existing EU instru\u00adments to address autocratic regimes that renounce EU integration in order to diminish the Union\u2019s democ\u00adra\u00adtising leverage. The situation in Georgia, therefore, neces\u00adsi\u00adtates more serious reflection, a thorough assessment of the realities, and the devel\u00adopment of a more strategic and adaptable approach capable of responding to contexts where an author\u00adi\u00adtarian turn makes current EU democracy-promotion policies ineffective.<\/p>\n

               <\/p>\n

              Authors:<\/strong><\/p>\n

              Nino Chachava (EU- Project\u00adco\u00ador\u00addi\u00adnator, Civil Society Foundation, Georgia) and Saba Bachveli (Human Rights Program Manager, Civil Society Foundation, Georgia)<\/p>\n

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