{"id":77028,"date":"2026-02-04T11:34:51","date_gmt":"2026-02-04T10:34:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/warum-deutschland-beim-eu-beitritt-der-ukraine-politisch-fuehren-muss\/"},"modified":"2026-02-04T15:55:19","modified_gmt":"2026-02-04T14:55:19","slug":"the-strategic-role-of-a-german-led-coalition-of-the-willing-in-ukraines-eu-accession-process","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/the-strategic-role-of-a-german-led-coalition-of-the-willing-in-ukraines-eu-accession-process\/","title":{"rendered":"The Strategic Role of a German-Led Coalition of the Willing in Ukraine\u2019s EU Accession Process"},"content":{"rendered":"

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EU accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions with Ukraine are hitting struc\u00adtural and political limits in times of war\u2014both in Kyiv and in Brussels. Techno\u00adcratic proce\u00addures and exclu\u00adsively positive EU rhetoric undermine the necessary incen\u00adtives for reform, analyzes Liubov Akulenko and proposes a Germany-led \u201ccoalition of the willing\u201d to delib\u00ader\u00adately advance blocked reforms through confi\u00addential dialogue.<\/h3>\n

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DOWNLOAD PDF<\/a><\/div> [vc_\u200bcolumn_\u200btext css=\u201c\u201d]EU accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions with Ukraine do not fit the typical pattern of EU enlargement, as seen in 2004, in the accession of states in Central and Eastern Europe. There are several reasons for this on the Ukrainian side. First, negoti\u00ada\u00adtions are taking place under the unprece\u00addented condi\u00adtions of an ongoing war that is taking a constant toll on human and financial resources. This weakens Ukraine\u2019s admin\u00adis\u00adtrative capacity, which was already insuf\u00adfi\u00adcient prior to the full-scale invasion.\n

In addition, the balance of power between the president, the government and the parliament has been gradually shifting towards the concen\u00adtration[1]<\/a> of authority in the presi\u00addential office, and this poses challenges for imple\u00admen\u00adtation of reforms. These devel\u00adop\u00adments result in a constant pressure on the reform process within the framework of the accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions, as successful reform imple\u00admen\u00adtation entails more than just formal legal harmo\u00adnization with the EU acquis. A strong system of gover\u00adnance with suffi\u00adcient human and financial resources is essential for the effective imple\u00admen\u00adtation of pro-European reforms.<\/p>\n

In addition to the factors on the Ukrainian side mentioned above, certain trends on the EU side are also of relevance. The delib\u00ader\u00adately cautious public messaging from Brussels,[2]<\/a> intended to secure continued support for Ukraine during the war from EU member states, does not suffi\u00adciently incen\u00adtivise Ukraine\u2019s political elites to pursue polit\u00adi\u00adcally costly reforms. The EU member states should be encour\u00adaging such reforms, in order to avoid future crises similar to the NABU and SAPO episode in July.<\/p>\n

The challenge is that when public, constructive criticism is not considered feasible, the EU member states need alter\u00adnative instru\u00adments that they can use to encourage difficult political reforms in Ukraine. The recent reshuffle within the Presi\u00addential Office of Ukraine repre\u00adsents a unique oppor\u00adtunity to introduce such an instrument and to push political elites toward the imple\u00admen\u00adtation of challenging political reforms in the framework of the EU accession negoti\u00adation process.<\/p>\n

A consis\u00adtently positive public messaging toward Ukraine from the EU started with the imple\u00admen\u00adtation of the seven require\u00adments for maintaining candidate status in 2022. This was necessary in the early phase of Russia\u2019s war of aggression to ensure political unity. As the war has dragged on, however, this approach has increas\u00adingly taken on a life of its own. The combi\u00adnation of uncon\u00addi\u00adtional public solidarity and the widespread renun\u00adci\u00adation of political criticism has changed the incentive structure for far-reaching reforms. Thus far, the Ukrainian government has been able to postpone polit\u00adi\u00adcally sensitive but insti\u00adtu\u00adtionally crucial reform steps without incurring any noticeable conse\u00adquences within the accession process. Devel\u00adop\u00adments surrounding NABU and SAPO in 2025 make it clear that this approach has reached its limits.<\/p>\n

The war has shifted the insti\u00adtu\u00adtional balance between the presi\u00addency, the cabinet, and the parliament. Meanwhile, the reform of Ukraine\u2019s public admin\u00adis\u00adtration remains incom\u00adplete, and civil service profes\u00adsionals are leaving the service more than it was before the full-scale invasion. This under\u00admines the state\u2019s ability to act, which is all the more problematic as Ukraine is simul\u00adta\u00adne\u00adously waging war and preparing complex accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions. Bottle\u00adnecks in key ministries are less an isolated admin\u00adis\u00adtrative problem and more a systemic risk for the entire enlargement process.<\/p>\n

The European Commission can only address these challenges to a limited extent. Its mandate is primarily technical in nature, and the political situation makes it unwilling to engage in public confrontation which might undermine the unity of the EU. The limita\u00adtions of technical support instru\u00adments become quickly apparent when informal power relations, the logics of political decision-making, or insti\u00adtu\u00adtional blockages determine the progress of reforms. This creates an imple\u00admen\u00adtation gap between formal condi\u00adtion\u00adality and political reality.<\/p>\n

Taking these tendencies into consid\u00ader\u00adation, EU member states, and partic\u00adu\u00adlarly Germany, should modify the approach they have taken for negoti\u00ada\u00adtions with Ukraine thus far. Germany should initiate a closed high-level political dialogue with Ukraine on political reform and should lead that dialogue within the framework of a new kind of \u201ccoalition of the willing\u201d. This coalition should consist of EU member states that actively support Ukraine\u2019s accession to the EU and are prepared to take on political respon\u00adsi\u00adbility on more than a symbolic level. Rather than fuelling division on European enlargement policy, such a format would strengthen it by affording a platform for those member states that are prepared to bring political substance to the process.<\/p>\n

The platform would be explicitly designed to complement the work of the European Commission, and its activ\u00adities would be carried out in close consul\u00adtation with the EC. Its added value would consist in the creation of a confi\u00addential political space in which reform blockages could be openly identified, realistic reform paths developed, and political expec\u00adta\u00adtions clearly communicated\u2014without public escalation and without calling Europe\u2019s solidarity with Ukraine into question. Meetings at realistic intervals, e.g., of about every three months, would enable continuous but not overloaded political steering.<\/p>\n

The dialogue should bring together high-level repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives of the German cabinet and parliament, repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives of the EU states in the coalition of the willing, and repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives of the Ukrainian presi\u00addential admin\u00adis\u00adtration, cabinet, and parliament, as well as a limited number of selected civil society actors with proven expertise in European integration. The civil society role would be analytical in nature: its experts should provide evidence-based assess\u00adments, evaluate reform options, and provide factual support for political decision-making processes.<\/p>\n

Objec\u00adtives of the platform:<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n