{"id":77835,"date":"2026-03-16T16:12:44","date_gmt":"2026-03-16T15:12:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/john-lough-und-ralf-fuecks-zum-verhaeltnis-zwischen-china-russland-und-europa\/"},"modified":"2026-03-19T21:25:27","modified_gmt":"2026-03-19T20:25:27","slug":"the-relationship-between-china-russia-and-europe","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/the-relationship-between-china-russia-and-europe\/","title":{"rendered":"The relationship between China, Russia and Europe"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n

Foto: Imago<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n

At the Munich Security Conference, John Lough spoke with Ralf F\u00fccks about the evolving triangle between China, Russia, and Europe. The conver\u00adsation explores the strategic logic behind the Beijing\u2013Moscow partnership, Europe\u2019s struggle to assert its agency, and Germany\u2019s search for a new economic and security strategy. Can Europe turn a moment of geopo\u00adlitical pressure into one of strategic renewal?<\/h3>\n

 <\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d] John Lough<\/strong>: As we\u2019ve heard from the panel and we can read in the NEST Centre report, the Russia-China partnership is founded on a <\/em>congruence of interests on the part of two powers that are trans\u00adac\u00adtional and oppor\u00adtunistic. In an increas\u00adingly unstable world, it looks like a solid partnership, at least, for now, even if its asymmetry is growing to the disad\u00advantage of Russia. There is also no shortage of contra\u00addic\u00adtions in their interests and the way they pursue them. Given the fluidity in global affairs at present, and the extreme unpre\u00addictability of US foreign policy, can you see shifts of power that could change the dynamic between Beijing and Moscow? <\/em><\/p>\n

Ralf<\/strong> F\u00fccks:<\/strong> First, I would underline the congruence of interests between Russia & China, despite their mutual mistrust and Moscow\u2018s deeply rooted fear of Chinese supremacy over Russia. They may not build a strategic alliance, but for now and the foreseeable future, both regimes share common strategic interests. First and foremost: Breaking US-political, military and economic dominance and replacing the global liberal order by what they call a multi\u00adpolar world. The defining element of this brave new world are not rights and rules, but power. Maybe China wants to establish a new normative order \u2014 but defin\u00adi\u00adtively according to its own rules.<\/p>\n

Neither Beijing nor Moscow sees Europe as an equal. Even worse: They see us as a bunch of declining small and medium nations. They share a lack of contempt for liberal values \u2014 and for European democ\u00adracies as the guardian of the liberal idea. This morning, on the stage of the MSC, the Chinese Foreign Minister rejected the notion of strategic rivalry between Europe and China. But this is not just a pragmatic relationship. The systemic conflict between liberal democracy and author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism is the under\u00adlying dynamic.<\/p>\n

With regard to the US: For now, Trump is assisting Putin and Xi in achieving their wildest dreams:  Demol\u00adishing the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order essen\u00adtially created by the US; separating the US from Europe (which was always the strategic goal of Russia) and discred\u00aditing the US as a reliable ally all over the world. But I doubt, if Moscow and Beijing would risk their alliance in exchange for a realignment with Washington. Russia and China remain strategic rivals to the US. This will not change in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n

John Lough: <\/em><\/strong> Does Europe have agency? The EU is under pressure from three direc\u00adtions: It has lost the US security blanket and faces a US admin\u00adis\u00adtration that regards it as a hostile actor. It has broken off trade relations with Russia at consid\u00aderable cost and is now having to carry substan\u00adtially more of the weight to keep Ukraine in the fight and ensure that it remains a viable independent state. At the same time, the EU is trying to re-balance trade with China and de-risk in areas criti\u00adcally important for security. Is Europe really as weak as it is being made to feel by China, Russia and the US?<\/em><\/p>\n

Ralf F\u00fccks: <\/strong>If we take into account Europe\u2019s economic and military potential, we are definitely stronger than Russia and could also act confi\u00addently toward the US and China. But I\u2019m afraid that we are still a long way from realizing this potential. Europe is not a political entity, but a colourful bunch of nations with different and sometimes conflicting interests and political prefer\u00adences. Econom\u00adi\u00adcally, we are in danger of being left behind by both China and the US. With a few excep\u00adtions, Europe lacks dynamism, innovation, and entre\u00adpre\u00adneurial spirit. And, above all, we lack political determination.<\/p>\n

Nowhere is this more evident than in Ukraine. Although Europeans are now almost single-handedly providing military and financial support to Ukraine, we are not sitting at the table when the Americans negotiate with Putin and Zelenskyi about ending the war. And we have still not been able to put Ukraine in a position of military strength by a joint European effort. After four years of war, we are still in the \u2018too little, too late\u2019 mode.<\/p>\n

There is also a lack of strategic consis\u00adtency when it comes to China. Instead, European govern\u00adments and the Commission are pursuing a zigzag course: On the one hand, they proclaim a policy of de-risking, reducing our depen\u00addency on China with regard to critical raw materials and technologies, and the protection of core European indus\u00adtries against Chinese predatory compe\u00adtition. At the same time, in the face of Trump\u2019s threats, European leaders are making pilgrimages to Beijing to improve bilateral relations. Suddenly, China is seen as the lesser evil compared to Trump\u2019s aggressive behaviour.<\/p>\n

I consider this a fatal mistake: Just because the Chinese leaders appear more rational than Trump, that does not make them a reliable partner. Beijing is seeking economic and political dominance; depen\u00addency is weakness. Instead of jumping out of the US frying pan into the Chinese fire, we must rely on our own strengths and strike new alliances with like-minded partners around the globe.<\/p>\n

Germany\u2019s role<\/h2>\n

John Lough: <\/em><\/strong>Germany \u2014 It\u2019s easy to see a dark scenario of continued low growth despite the fiscal stimulus from increased defence spending, and the strength\u00adening of the far right and the far left that will make governing the country increas\u00adingly difficult. Germany\u2019s business model has been progres\u00adsively upended over the past five years. Does the German political class see the scale of the change required? What should the strategy be vis a vis China, Russia and the US?<\/em><\/p>\n

Ralf F\u00fccks<\/strong>: Well, it is now widely accepted that Germany needs a U\u2011turn (\u2018Zeiten\u00adwende\u2019) in its security policy. But when it comes to the equally urgent economic take off, a large part of society and politics is still in a state of denial. Our economy has been stagnating for three years, investment is signif\u00adi\u00adcantly lower than in the pre-COVID years, produc\u00adtivity stands still, and Germany\u2019s capital account is negative. More capital is flowing out than is being invested from abroad.<\/p>\n

We are losing compet\u00adi\u00adtiveness, especially to China, which is attacking German core indus\u00adtries: automotive, machine engineering, and chemicals. This calls for a bold move: Companies\u2019 energy and labour costs must be reduced, bureau\u00adcracy must be cut back, and we must catch up in terms of digital\u00adization and infra\u00adstructure. Chancellor Merz under\u00adstands this and says so, but his agenda is being trans\u00adlated too slowly into real policy.<\/p>\n

Up to now, the German economy has been heavily focused on China and the US. Added to this were the special relations with Russia. In future, we will need to diversify on a global scale, deepening our exchange with Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The European single market remains the basis of our economic strength. National barriers must be dismantled here, including in the financial sector. Macron is right when he talks about a \u201cmake or break\u201d moment for Europe. Either we quickly build up our strength both econom\u00adi\u00adcally and in terms of security policy, or we will become a punching ball for the big powers.<\/p>\n

Germany and Russian sanctions<\/h2>\n

John Lough: <\/em><\/strong> We hear occasional noises from the German indus\u00adtrial lobby about the desir\u00adability of restoring gas supplies from Russia when the war is over in Ukraine. These are arguments based on economic pragmatism rather than the old vision of business relations constraining the Kremlin\u2019s great power instincts. Wholesale gas prices have dropped signif\u00adi\u00adcantly since the early days of the war, but they\u2019re still over 30% higher than in 2021. It\u2019s difficult to see how NordStream2 can be brought into operation any time soon given the first Trump administration\u2019s opposition to it. Do you think there will be a push to normalize Germany\u2019s relations with Russia regardless of whether there is really an end to the war in Ukraine?<\/em><\/p>\n

Ralf F\u00fccks:<\/strong> I am reasonably confident that there will be no return to the old energy partnership with Russia, even after the end of the war in Ukraine. The shock of 2022 runs too deep.<\/p>\n

After a ceasefire, there will certainly be calls to revive business with Russia \u2013 a demand that is already being made by the far right and the far left. But the majority of the political class and business leaders do not want to become dependent on Moscow again. With the construction of several LNG terminals, we now have a diver\u00adsified gas supply. NordStream is no longer needed.<\/p>\n

The key point is to link the lifting of sanctions against Russia to clearly defined condi\u00adtions. A ceasefire alone is not enough. As long as Russia continues to occupy Ukrainian territory, there can be no \u2018business as usual.\u2019<\/p>\n

We should also talk about additional demands to be made of Putin, such as the withdrawal of Russian nuclear weapons from Belarus and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. If Russia wants to do business with Europe again, it must accept the European peace order.<\/p>\n

\"Textende\"[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator][vc_column_text]Hat Ihnen unser Beitrag gefallen? Dann spenden Sie doch einfach und bequem \u00fcber unser Spendentool. Sie unter\u00adst\u00fctzen damit die publizis\u00adtische Arbeit von LibMod.<\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]