{"id":78267,"date":"2026-03-26T15:48:01","date_gmt":"2026-03-26T14:48:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=78267"},"modified":"2026-04-01T13:42:04","modified_gmt":"2026-04-01T11:42:04","slug":"policy-paper-georgias-soon-to-be-dictatorship","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/policy-paper-georgias-soon-to-be-dictatorship\/","title":{"rendered":"Policy Paper: Georgia\u2019s Soon-To-Be Dicta\u00adtorship and What Can Still Be Done"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d][\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text]This policy paper was written by authors<\/strong> who wish to remain anonymous[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n

Georgia is at a critical political turning point. As the government increases pressure on civil society, experts warn of growing author\u00adi\u00adtarian tendencies and call for a more decisive response from Europe.<\/h3>\n

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The EU candidate country is facing one of its deepest political crises in recent years. For more than a year, people have been taking to the streets in peaceful protest. At the same time, the Russia-leaning ruling party, Georgian Dream<\/em>, has been hardening its course: repression against civil society, independent media, and the opposition is visibly intensifying.<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, leading repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives from Georgian civil society, academia, media, and politics travelled to Berlin at the invitation of the Center for Liberal Modernity (LibMod). During their visit, they took part in a press breakfast, a hearing in the Committee on European Union Affairs of the German Bundestag, and meetings in both the Bundestag and the Federal Foreign Office, where they also presented the following policy paper.<\/p>\n

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Download Policy Paper as PDF<\/a><\/div> [vc_\u200bcolumn_\u200btext css=\u201c\u201d]\n

Executive Summary<\/span><\/h2>\n

Georgia is on the verge of consol\u00adi\u00addating a one-party dicta\u00adtorship after more than a decade of rule by Georgian Dream, a party that has shifted from a nominally pro-European force to an openly author\u00adi\u00adtarian regime aligned with Russian strategic interests. Since 2023, democ\u00adratic backsliding has accel\u00aderated dramat\u00adi\u00adcally through the adoption of repressive legis\u00adlation targeting civil society, independent media, political opposition, and public protest. The latest legal package from March 2026 further shrinks the space for independent actors. The consensus on the nature of the Georgian Dream\u2019s government, however, is widening inter\u00adna\u00adtionally. The sanctions by the UK on propa\u00adganda media in February 2026 and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism report on the violation of human rights in March 2026, are the two latest devel\u00adop\u00adments, which demon\u00adstrate the potential of the external pressure mechanisms.<\/p>\n

The internal author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation of Georgia is insep\u00ada\u00adrable from a broader geopo\u00adlitical shift. The Georgian Dream has frozen EU accession efforts, adopted anti-Western rhetoric, and increas\u00adingly mirrors Kremlin narra\u00adtives, while advancing policies that objec\u00adtively serve Russian interests. Yet, Georgia is not yet a lost cause. Despite sustained repression, opposition parties, civil society, independent media, and a strongly pro-European public continue to resist. Public support for EU integration remains above 70%, and mass protests demon\u00adstrate that the regime has not succeeded in reshaping societal preferences.<\/p>\n

The central analytical mistake in some Western circles is to view Georgia as already irreversibly captured by Russia. This misdi\u00adag\u00adnosis risks strategic disen\u00adgagement. The primary driver of author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism in Georgia is not Russian control but the domestic logic of regime survival: a ruling elite unwilling to relin\u00adquish power and therefore system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally disman\u00adtling democ\u00adratic pluralism. External engagement still matters because Georgia remains deeply dependent on Western economic, financial, and political ties.<\/p>\n

A more effective Western response requires moving beyond fragmented and reactive measures toward a coordi\u00adnated strategy of deter\u00adrence and support. Sanctions should be embedded in a broader framework of clearly commu\u00adni\u00adcated red lines and conse\u00adquences, combined with incen\u00adtives for de-escalation. At the same time, the West must prioritise the survival of democ\u00adratic infra\u00adstructure (civil society, media, and political actors), whether inside the country or in exile. The window for action is rapidly closing, but Western leverage remains signif\u00adicant. The decisive question is whether it will be used with suffi\u00adcient clarity, coordi\u00adnation, and resolve.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Intro\u00adduction<\/span><\/h2>\n

In 2026, Georgia entered its fourteenth year of rule by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, which once positioned itself as a pro-Western political force committed to EU-oriented reforms and democ\u00adratic trans\u00adfor\u00admation. Little more than a decade ago, Georgia was widely regarded as a frontrunner in post-Soviet democ\u00adra\u00adti\u00adsation and as a committed aspirant to EU and NATO membership. Today, it can be described as a country just five minutes away from a one-party dictatorship.<\/p>\n

In recent years, Georgia\u2019s progress along the trajectory from being a reform-oriented young democracy towards a system charac\u00adterised by increas\u00adingly formalised author\u00adi\u00adtarian practices has accel\u00aderated. The rollback of reforms and the adoption of repressive legis\u00adlation have been accom\u00adpanied by a delib\u00aderate shift in foreign policy away from the country\u2019s Euro-Atlantic partners. The country\u2019s political environment increas\u00adingly resembles a total\u00adi\u00adtarian system: opposition political parties are soon to be banned; opposition leaders and activists face arrest, prose\u00adcution, or exile; civil society and independent media are under permanent legal and financial pressure; party loyalists have captured courts and security insti\u00adtu\u00adtions; and nominally independent state bodies are subject to partisan and political control. The Georgian Dream also engages in internal political and admin\u00adis\u00adtrative purges, a feature typical of author\u00adi\u00adtarian regimes.<\/p>\n

In Georgia, as in many other states of the region, democ\u00adratic decline has led to a shift in foreign policy. Foreign policy goals have shaped the state\u2019s internal political trajectory since Georgia regained its indepen\u00addence in 1991, with European integration serving as the main struc\u00adtural anchor for democ\u00adratic reforms, at least since 2003. Thus the current retreat from democ\u00adratic trans\u00adfor\u00admation and the shift in foreign policy orien\u00adtation are two inter\u00adre\u00adlated dimen\u00adsions of the same political process.<\/p>\n

Consol\u00adi\u00addation of One-Party Dictatorship<\/span><\/h2>\n

Author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation in Georgia has become more visible since 2023, due to legis\u00adlation targeting \u201cforeign influence\u201d, which restricts civic space and foreign funding. By central\u00adising control over civil society, the media, and inter\u00adna\u00adtional assis\u00adtance, Georgian Dream has sought to neutralise independent actors and limit foreign partners\u2019 engagement, a pattern observed in other autocracies.<\/p>\n

A series of legislative measures adopted since 2024 has system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally targeted freedom of assembly and expression, political parties, media, and, most recently, univer\u00adsities. Large parts of this framework are modelled directly on legal mecha\u00adnisms used in the Russian gover\u00adnance model.<\/p>\n

While democ\u00adratic setbacks are not uncommon in young democ\u00adracies, Georgia\u2019s case reflects a sustained, accel\u00ader\u00adating shift toward a one-party rule closely aligned with Russian strategic interests. Impor\u00adtantly, dicta\u00adtorship is not yet a fait accompli<\/em>, but the coming months will be used to complete the process through a variety of means: the inten\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation of prose\u00adcu\u00adtions, exerting financial pressure on independent media through selective funding, adver\u00adtising restric\u00adtions, and regulatory fines, the widening of inves\u00adti\u00adga\u00adtions against civil society, the arrest of civil society leaders, pressure on activists to leave the country, the arrest of the political opponents, and the final\u00adi\u00adsation of measures to ban major opposition parties.<\/p>\n

Key Features of Georgia\u2019s Autocratic System<\/span><\/h2>\n

There are clear similar\u00adities between Georgia\u2019s regime and other author\u00adi\u00adtarian systems, but several features make the Georgian case distinctive:<\/p>\n

    \n
  • Informal rule:<\/strong> Bidzina Ivanishvili exercises de facto control over the state, despite holding no formal government office. This creates great challenges in terms of account\u00adability and limits external leverage on him due to the lack of access and his informal capacity.<\/li>\n
  • Rapid author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation:<\/strong> Georgia has nearly completed its transition from a functioning, EU-oriented democracy to a formalised autocratic system in an unusually short period. What took other states a decade has been achieved by the Georgian Dream in less than two years.<\/li>\n
  • Russian alignment:<\/strong> The Georgian Dream government is functionally in unison with Russian strategic interests.<\/li>\n
  • Persistent societal resis\u00adtance:<\/strong> Almost 500 days of street protests are evidence of a strong pushback from the public.<\/li>\n
  • Resilient democ\u00adratic actors:<\/strong> Civil society, independent media, academia, and opposition parties continue to defend democ\u00adratic space despite severe pressure.<\/li>\n
  • Enduring pro-European support:<\/strong> Public backing for European integration remains overwhelm\u00adingly high, consis\u00adtently exceeding 70%, highlighting the tension between author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation and the population\u2019s European orientation.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    Latest Major Blow to Civil Society and Political Activism<\/span><\/h2>\n

    On 4 March 2026, Georgian Dream adopted a new legislative framework, in addition to the existing Trans\u00adparency of Foreign Influence Law, the Foreign Agents Regis\u00adtration Act (FARA), and the Law on Grants. The new legislative package is poised to deal a poten\u00adtially fatal blow to civil society, independent media, and political activism.<\/p>\n

    Broad defin\u00adition of grants: <\/em><\/strong>The legis\u00adlation dramat\u00adi\u00adcally broadens the defin\u00adition of a grant. The term grant now encom\u00adpasses any transfer of foreign funds<\/u>, monetary or in-kind, that may be used (read: inter\u00adpreted) in the belief or with the intent of influ\u00adencing government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, public policy, or any part of society. This includes activ\u00adities related to shaping or changing domestic or foreign policy, as well as initia\u00adtives connected to the public or political interests of foreign govern\u00adments or political actors. This effec\u00adtively means that no media products, public policy analyses, public posts, or other output from think tanks or civil society can be produced by anyone who receives any foreign funding for any (even unrelated) purpose.<\/p>\n

    Thus, the law now equates funds associated with service contracts, donations, and technical assis\u00adtance with grants. Transfers involving knowledge, expertise, technology, or profes\u00adsional services are automat\u00adi\u00adcally categorised as grants if they fall within the expansive political defin\u00adition. This elimi\u00adnates the previ\u00adously existing distinction between project-based grants and contractual service arrange\u00adments, thereby including an entire range of legit\u00adimate profes\u00adsional and academic cooper\u00adation in its scope. In short, the GD is casting an all-encom\u00adpassing net over any activ\u00adities that they may decide to consider \u201cpolitical\u201d, threat\u00adening to crimi\u00adnalise them if they are in any way linked to a foreign financial source.<\/p>\n

    Mandatory prior government approval<\/em><\/strong>: <\/em>All such \u201cgrants\u201d (read: trans\u00adferred sums) require the prior approval of the Government of Georgia \u2013 effec\u00adtively that of the State Audit Office, which is staffed by prose\u00adcutors and headed by the prede\u00adcessor of the current prose\u00adcutor general. This requirement applies not only to domestic organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions but also to branches or repre\u00adsen\u00adtative offices of foreign legal entities (such as German founda\u00adtions) operating in Georgia. Even funding trans\u00adferred inter\u00adnally within an inter\u00adna\u00adtional organisation\u2019s structure triggers the oblig\u00adation to obtain approval. This law prohibits all cross-country cooper\u00adation on matters of policy and political activ\u00adities concerning Georgia. Organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions must either submit their activ\u00adities for political vetting or risk severe sanctions. The absence of clear proce\u00addural guarantees and objective criteria for approval further exacer\u00adbates the risk of arbitrary or polit\u00adi\u00adcally motivated decisions.<\/p>\n

    Criminal liability<\/em><\/strong>: <\/em>The most conse\u00adquential aspect of the amend\u00adments is the replacement of admin\u00adis\u00adtrative liability with criminal liability \u2013 impris\u00adonment of up to 6 years. Engaging in grant-related activ\u00adities without prior autho\u00adri\u00adsation may result in fines, community service, or up to 6 years\u2019 impris\u00adonment. This reclas\u00adsi\u00adfi\u00adcation elevates viola\u00adtions to the category of serious crimes, enabling the use of intrusive inves\u00adtigative techniques such as searches, seizures, and covert surveil\u00adlance.  By crimi\u00adnal\u00adising what was previ\u00adously a regulatory offense, the legis\u00adlation intro\u00adduces a powerful chilling effect. Civil society actors, donors, and individual experts face the prospect of prose\u00adcution, asset freezes, and long-term impris\u00adonment for engaging in activ\u00adities that are recog\u00adnised inter\u00adna\u00adtionally as legit\u00adimate forms of civic participation.<\/p>\n

    Retroactive impli\u00adca\u00adtions<\/em><\/strong>:<\/em> The amend\u00adments include a clause requiring entities that previ\u00adously received grants which were not subject to approval at the time to apply for retroactive approval within 1 month of the law\u2019s entry into force. During this period, the use of received funds of this kind is prohibited. This retroactive appli\u00adcation under\u00admines legal certainty and places organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions in an impos\u00adsible position: previ\u00adously lawful agree\u00adments may suddenly expose them to criminal liability.<\/p>\n

    Impact on donors and inter\u00adna\u00adtional organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions<\/em><\/strong>: <\/em>These amend\u00adments impose liability not only on recip\u00adients but also on donors and other funding providers. Employees of foreign organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions may face criminal conse\u00adquences if they engage in funding activity that has not been approved. This creates signif\u00adicant opera\u00adtional uncer\u00adtainty for inter\u00adna\u00adtional donors, including multi\u00adlateral insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and devel\u00adopment agencies. To mitigate risks, donors may be forced to withdraw, reduce their level of engagement, or resort to opaque inter\u00adme\u00addiary mecha\u00adnisms. Such outcomes would undermine long-standing partner\u00adships supporting legal aid, inves\u00adtigative journalism, election monitoring, and social services. The new restric\u00adtions are also in clear violation of Georgia\u2019s oblig\u00ada\u00adtions under the EU-Georgia Associ\u00adation Agreement.<\/p>\n

    Restric\u00adtions on political partic\u00adi\u00adpation<\/em><\/strong>: <\/em>The legislative package contains provi\u00adsions whose scope extends beyond civil society to include political actors. Senior officials of political parties may face criminal liability for accepting foreign funding. Individuals employed by organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions that receive more than 20 percent of their annual income from foreign sources are prohibited from party membership for the next eight years. These provi\u00adsions erect the wall between civic engagement and partisan activity, effec\u00adtively disqual\u00adi\u00adfying a signif\u00adicant segment of active citizens from partic\u00adi\u00adpating in politics.<\/p>\n

    Impact on business and entre\u00adpre\u00adneurs<\/em><\/strong>: A new admin\u00adis\u00adtrative offense intro\u00adduced into the Code of Admin\u00adis\u00adtrative Offenses applies to business enter\u00adprises that engage in public political activ\u00adities unrelated to their core business activity. The sanction in this case is an admin\u00adis\u00adtrative fine of 20,000 GEL (around 7,000 EUR), and repeated viola\u00adtions result in criminal liability, effec\u00adtively barring a business from supporting civil movements and initiatives.<\/p>\n

    Crimi\u00adnal\u00adi\u00adsation of \u201cnon-recog\u00adnition\u201d of consti\u00adtu\u00adtional bodies<\/em><\/strong>: amend\u00adments to the Criminal Code intro\u00adduced penalties for \u201csystematic and public\u201d calls to defy government bodies, create alter\u00adnative author\u00adities, or question the legit\u00adimacy of the consti\u00adtu\u00adtional order. Sanctions include fines, community service, or up to three years\u2019 impris\u00adonment. Moreover, \u201cnon-recog\u00adnition\u201d of this kind as a motivating factor will also serve as an aggra\u00advating circum\u00adstance for other offenses that can result in a longer sentence. The vague and expansive wording grants the author\u00adities broad discretion, raising concerns that ordinary political speech \u2013 including refer\u00adences to the ruling party as a \u201cregime\u201d or refusal to acknowledge officials as legit\u00adimate \u2013 could be treated as criminal conduct.<\/p>\n

    New Restric\u00adtions on Assem\u00adblies: Crimi\u00adnal\u00adising Pavement Protests<\/span><\/h2>\n

    In late December 2025, the Georgian Parliament passed another set of amend\u00adments to the Law on Assem\u00adblies and Manifes\u00adta\u00adtions and to the Admin\u00adis\u00adtrative Offences Code, which further tightened restric\u00adtions on public protests. The amend\u00adments expand the scope of prohibited conduct to include \u201cobstructing people\u2019s movement\u201d in pedes\u00adtrian areas, including pavements (sidewalks), whereas previ\u00adously only the blocking of roads was punishable. This change trans\u00adformed even non-disruptive protest tactics, such as standing or chanting on a pavement, into an offence carrying up to 15 days\u2019 admin\u00adis\u00adtrative detention and harsher penalties for repeat offences. More than 20 persons have appeared in court on this charge, and more than 16 have been sentenced to 4\u20135 days in jail. This is the first time in Georgia\u2019s history that people have been arrested for simply standing on a pavement during an anti-government demonstration.<\/p>\n

    Viewed against the background of other repressive measures adopted throughout 2025, these recent measures testify to broader strategy aimed at narrowing the scope for civic engagement: curtail\u00adments that may appear minor on paper have severe conse\u00adquences in practice, turning active partic\u00adi\u00adpation in public life into grounds for arrest and sentencing.<\/p>\n

    The 2026 OSCE Moscow Mechanism<\/span><\/h2>\n

    On 12 March 2026, the OSCE Office for Democ\u00adratic Insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and Human Rights (ODIHR) published a report under the Moscow Mechanism, highlighting a sharp deteri\u00ado\u00adration of human rights and funda\u00admental freedoms in Georgia. Invoked in January 2026 by 24 partic\u00adi\u00adpating states, the mechanism-one of the OSCE\u2019s strongest and oldest tools found author\u00adi\u00adtarian practices in Georgia that include restric\u00adtions on assembly, harassment of opposition figures and journalists, polit\u00adi\u00adcally motivated prose\u00adcu\u00adtions, laws limiting civil society and media freedoms, and arbitrary detention and ill-treatment.<\/p>\n

    Under\u00adscoring the serious erosion of democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions in the country, the report urges Georgian author\u00adities to take urgent corrective measures and calls on OSCE member states to monitor imple\u00admen\u00adtation and consider targeted sanctions or the involvement of inter\u00adna\u00adtional legal mecha\u00adnisms, such as the ICC, the ECHR, the UN Committee against Torture, and the ICJ.<\/p>\n

    Geopo\u00adlitical Repositioning<\/span><\/h2>\n

    The author\u00adi\u00adtarian turn in Georgia\u2019s domestic policy has been accom\u00adpanied by a broader geopo\u00adlitical recal\u00adi\u00adbration. Georgian Dream is not only adopting Russian-style methods at home but also, increas\u00adingly, repro\u00adducing the Kremlin\u2019s anti-Western propa\u00adganda narra\u00adtives and mirroring its stance toward Western actors. In addition to concrete steps like suspending the EU accession process and scaling down its engagement with NATO, the Georgian government has been portraying the EU and other inter\u00adna\u00adtional allies as \u201cdeep state\u201d (whatever that might mean) and as hostile powers intent on inter\u00adfering in Georgia\u2019s internal affairs and under\u00admining its sover\u00adeignty. The government-controlled propa\u00adganda media amplify anti-Western narra\u00adtives designed to discredit the liberal democ\u00adratic community and to reframe European integration as a threat rather than a national objective.<\/p>\n

    Just recently, Georgian Dream-controlled media announced a televised debate challenging the rationale for EU integration. This is an unprece\u00addented move, one that targets Georgia\u2019s central foreign policy goal, despite overwhelming public support for and the country\u2019s consti\u00adtu\u00adtional commitment to a European trajectory. At least two artifi\u00adcially created political parties affil\u00adiated with Georgian Dream have been actively calling for the revision of the Consti\u00adtution and for a refer\u00adendum on whether Georgia should still aspire to join the EU. These devel\u00adop\u00adments fit perfectly with Russia\u2019s long-term strategic interests in relation to Georgia and the wider region.<\/p>\n

    Russia has been pursuing its strategic goals in Georgia, which are to strengthen and expand its influence over both domestic and foreign policy there. It has a sophis\u00adti\u00adcated set of hybrid tools that it uses to deepen political polar\u00adi\u00adsation, spread disin\u00adfor\u00admation, promote democ\u00adratic erosion, and further isolate Georgia from its Western partners.<\/p>\n

    Georgia\u2019s political debate often centres around the same tired question: is Georgian Dream \u201cpro-Russian\u201d? Are its leaders controlled by Moscow? Are they Russian agents or cynical pragma\u00adtists? This kind of language has lost its value. It invites denial, hair-splitting, and propa\u00adganda games. The reality is simpler and more dangerous: Georgia\u2019s internal political model, foreign policy posture, and infor\u00admation environment have become functionally aligned with Russia\u2019s interests<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

    Over the past several years, virtually every signif\u00adicant political, legal, and foreign policy move taken by the Georgian Dream government has either advanced or protected Moscow\u2019s interests: from the disman\u00adtling of NATO inter\u00adop\u00ader\u00adability struc\u00adtures and the halting of EU-integration reforms to the crimi\u00adnal\u00adi\u00adsation of civil society, the adoption of Kremlin-style legis\u00adlation, the weapon\u00adising of propa\u00adganda, and the work preparing the ground for historical revisionism.<\/p>\n

    This alignment with Moscow\u2019s interests is visible both in the government\u2019s foreign policy behaviour and in its strategic decision-making. Substantive work on EU accession has been frozen and EU-requested reforms have been reframed and decried as \u201cexter\u00adnally imposed inter\u00adference\u201d. A parlia\u00admentary commission has revised the narrative of the 2008 war in a way that shifts respon\u00adsi\u00adbility away from Russia and toward internal \u201cprovo\u00adca\u00adteurs.\u201d Fulfilling a long-standing Russian demand, the government also abolished the temporary admin\u00adis\u00adtration for South Ossetia \u2013 a structure in place for 18 years that was designed to portray the conflict as an inter\u00adstate one between Georgia and Russia.<\/p>\n

    The reori\u00aden\u00adtation is also apparent in the way that Georgia\u2019s ruling party speaks about the West. Pro-government outlets increas\u00adingly portray the EU and the United States as seeking to drag Georgia into war, undermine its tradi\u00adtions, and control its politics through NGOs and media, which are also core elements of Russian disinformation.<\/p>\n

    The change of foreign policy vector is also reflected in some of Georgia\u2019s strategic economic and security choices. Georgian Dream halted the Anaklia deep-sea port project, rejecting Western (including American) investment and influence over the Black Sea. As one former Anaklia investor recalls, Ivanishvili argued that there was \u201cno place for Americans in the Black Sea\u201d \u2013 precisely echoing a strategic objective that Moscow has pursued for decades.<\/p>\n

    Most impor\u00adtantly, this change of trajectory has helped achieve another of Moscow\u2019s long-term objec\u00adtives: Georgia\u2019s gradual disap\u00adpearance from the Western diplo\u00admatic agenda. \u201cGeorgia fatigue\u201d and \u201cGeorgia is a lost cause\u201d have become a kind of shorthand for inaction. For Russia, erasing Georgia from Western political discourse has always been a strategic goal: Georgian Dream has become an instrument for achieving that goal.<\/p>\n

    Why Georgia Is Not Yet a Lost Cause<\/span><\/h2>\n

    One argument gaining traction in some Western circles holds that Russia\u2019s control over Georgia is already so extensive that external Western engagement can no longer make a difference. This view is both mistaken and strate\u00adgi\u00adcally dangerous. It is mistaken because, while the Georgian Dream government has aligned itself with Russian strategic interests, Russia is not the primary driver of Georgia\u2019s author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation. The logic of repression is domestic: even if Moscow\u2019s influence were to weaken dramat\u00adi\u00adcally tomorrow, those in power in Tbilisi would not step aside. On the contrary, they would likely intensify their grip, doubling down against real and imagined enemies to preserve oligarchic rule.<\/p>\n

    It is strate\u00adgi\u00adcally dangerous because it invites paralysis and compla\u00adcency. By overstating Russia\u2019s deter\u00adminism, it erases the agency of domestic actors and encourages the West to disengage precisely when engagement still matters.<\/p>\n

    Nor is Georgia\u2019s trajectory the result of \u201cexcessive balancing\u201d, the notion that author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism is a defensive response to geopo\u00adlitical pressure from Russia and the West. Georgia is not being pushed into a dicta\u00adtorship by external constraints. It is being driven there by a ruling elite that has concluded that losing power is unacceptable, and that democ\u00adratic pluralism is therefore an existential threat<\/p>\n

    Three circum\u00adstances in particular make clear that Georgia is not yet a lost cause.<\/p>\n

    First, political parties and leaders continue to resist, even under severe pressure and from behind bars.<\/strong> They are still organ\u00adising, repre\u00adsenting citizens in the street protests, commu\u00adni\u00adcating with partners, and refusing to accept author\u00adi\u00adtar\u00adi\u00adanism as normal and irreversible. Even if some parties are banned or prevented from partic\u00adi\u00adpating in elections, the political opposition will not simply disappear, provided that it is not physi\u00adcally destroyed or forced into exile. Certainly, the proposed legislative amend\u00adments increase the chance of its demise by those very means, however the political opposition will not surrender so easily.<\/p>\n

    Second, independent media and civil society continue to function despite demon\u00adi\u00adsation, legal harassment, and financial pressure.<\/strong> Inves\u00adtigative reporting continues; corruption is exposed; disin\u00adfor\u00admation is analysed; politi\u00adcians\u2019 state\u00adments are fact-checked; and the idea of a European Georgia remains alive in the public sphere. Many organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions are operating under a constant risk of fines, raids, and prose\u00adcution, yet they are operating, nonetheless. Though the new legis\u00adlation might severely impact the work of civil society, the media, and activists, many will continue their work, either from abroad or simply in defiance of the law \u2013 thus increasing the human cost of resis\u00adtance even further.<\/p>\n

    Third, and most impor\u00adtantly, the Georgian public remains overwhelm\u00adingly firm in its European choice.<\/strong> The widely published images of the Tbilisi streets filled with EU flags amidst clouds of tear gas reflect a resilient social consensus on the direction the country should take. The fact that the protests have been going on for over a year and the consis\u00adtently high support for EU membership demon\u00adstrate that the regime has not succeeded in severing Georgia from Europe at the level of public identity and aspiration.<\/p>\n

    These factors explain why the government is still investing so much of its resources in coming up with new repressive laws and promoting anti-Western propa\u00adganda, while simul\u00adta\u00adne\u00adously devel\u00adoping narra\u00adtives that imitate Western conser\u00adv\u00adative language in which it claims to be \u201cdefending\u201d \u201creal\u201d Georgian and Western values. If society had already turned away from Europe, such efforts would be unnec\u00adessary. Georgia is not yet irreversibly lost.<\/p>\n

    Western Response to Georgia\u2019s Crisis<\/span><\/h2>\n

    For the European Union and for the West in general, the central question is whether it can afford to lose Georgia or tolerate a one-party dicta\u00adtorship in a candidate state. The stakes extend beyond Georgia\u2019s future to the credi\u00adbility of the EU\u2019s enlargement policy and its trans\u00adfor\u00admative power.<\/p>\n

    The strategic objective of the West should therefore be to undermine entrenched author\u00adi\u00adtarian rule and curb Kremlin influence by signif\u00adi\u00adcantly increasing the political costs that Georgian Dream must pay for accel\u00ader\u00adating the disman\u00adtling of democracy. More robust, principled, and assertive European engagement is essential \u2013 not only to counter external influence opera\u00adtions and author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation, but also to strengthen the societal forces still committed to democ\u00adratic gover\u00adnance and European integration. As long as resilient democ\u00adratic spaces continue to exist in Georgia, there is still a chance to preserve Georgia\u2019s democracy.<\/p>\n

    The worst thing the Western powers could do now would be to disengage and let Georgian Dream\u2019s rhetoric about Georgians no longer being inter\u00adested in Western integration win the day.<\/p>\n

    What the West Can Still Do?<\/span><\/h2>\n

    A realistic starting point is the recog\u00adnition that regime change and democ\u00adra\u00adti\u00adsation are always internal tasks. No external pressure could, on its own, result in the overthrow of the ruling party. Pretending otherwise fuels the propa\u00adganda narrative that the \u201cdeep state\u201d and the \u201cglobal war party\u201d are using local proxies in a coup attempt. What external actors can<\/strong> do, however, is enable the survival of enough democ\u00adratic space \u2013 political, civic, and media space \u2013 to ensure that resis\u00adtance remains possible until such time as change becomes achievable.<\/p>\n

    Western engagement has been weakened by fragmen\u00adtation and hesitation. Washington is detached from Georgia; Europe is divided. Increas\u00adingly, EU member states are taking conflicting approaches: some normalise engagement with Georgian Dream without condi\u00adtioning contact with it on democ\u00adratic standards, while others refuse to engage in high-level political meetings, lest by doing so, they appear to condone the author\u00adi\u00adtarian consol\u00adi\u00addation and thus lend it legitimacy.<\/p>\n

    In recent years, the EU member states, the United States, and the United Kingdom have intro\u00adduced several targeted sanctions against Georgian officials in response to human rights viola\u00adtions. Primarily focused on individuals, these measures have had limited systemic impact on the Georgian Dream (GD) government. The latest UK sanctions, intro\u00adduced on 24 February 2026 and imple\u00admented as part of the set of wider measures relating to Russia, target Georgia\u2019s two major pro-government TV channels, Imedi TV and POSTV, for spreading \u201cdelib\u00ader\u00adately misleading infor\u00admation\u201d about Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In targeting GD\u2019s key propa\u00adganda outlets, these sanctions are proving to be an extremely effective tool for disrupting the main instrument that the party uses for autocratic consol\u00adi\u00addation, demon\u00adstrating that carefully calibrated measures can directly undermine the mecha\u00adnisms that sustain author\u00adi\u00adtarian practices.<\/p>\n

    Because the EU is unlikely to reach unanimity on a course of meaningful action, waiting for a consensus to emerge is no longer a viable option. The response must take the form of coordi\u00adnated pressure exerted by a coalition of willing states \u2013 specif\u00adi\u00adcally, states prepared to act jointly through bilateral tools: synchro\u00adnised diplomacy, coordi\u00adnated messaging, condi\u00adtional financial engagement, and close coordi\u00adnation with the United States and the United Kingdom.<\/p>\n

    This kind of engagement from the West does matter because Western leverage over Georgia remains substantial. Georgia is not yet dependent on Russia; it is still deeply dependent on the West, through investment, markets, loans, credits, grants, remit\u00adtances, and inter\u00adna\u00adtional financial archi\u00adtecture. This depen\u00addence is the West\u2019s strongest tool when it comes to protecting a society that has not abandoned its democ\u00adratic aspirations.<\/p>\n

    Thus far, the use of sanctions has not fully exploited the potential of this instrument. Not because the sanctions intro\u00adduced have been unnec\u00adessary, but because they have often been used post hoc, in small doses, rather than being integrated into a broader strategy aimed at deterring further deteri\u00ado\u00adration of democracy, or undoing already adopted draconian laws. A broader strategy for deter\u00adrence and effective engagement is, thus, necessary. An effective engagement with Georgia requires that sanctions and similar measures be preceded, wherever possible, by clearly commu\u00adni\u00adcated warnings that specific non-democ\u00adratic steps will trigger concrete conse\u00adquences. At the same time, such a strategy should include carefully calibrated incen\u00adtives that encourage de-escalation and a return to democ\u00adratic commitments.<\/p>\n

    The OSCE Moscow Mechanism report provides credible data on human rights viola\u00adtions on the ground and offers concrete recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions for OSCE partic\u00adi\u00adpating states, integrating well-documented facts with concrete policy sugges\u00adtions. The report can serve as a solid basis for evidence-based, targeted inter\u00adna\u00adtional measures, enabling the inter\u00adna\u00adtional community to respond strate\u00adgi\u00adcally rather than reactively to author\u00adi\u00adtarian practices in Georgia.<\/p>\n

    A serious Western response should therefore focus on:<\/p>\n

      \n
    • Deter\u00adrence:<\/strong> Commu\u00adni\u00adcating clear red lines and conse\u00adquences before taking new restrictive steps; conse\u00adquences should follow if commit\u00adments are broken, but commu\u00adni\u00adcation and condition-setting ahead of time are essential.<\/li>\n
    • High-level condi\u00adtional engagement:<\/strong> Engagement that is not subject to condi\u00adtions, such as that by some EU member states, has served only to embolden Georgian Dream; therefore, diplo\u00admatic activity must be backed by sticks and carrots and an enforcement plan.<\/li>\n
    • Targeting the regime\u2019s stability calculus:<\/strong> The West should consider expanding its use of tools that affect financial and reputa\u00adtional stability (travel, assets, networks, and trans\u00adac\u00adtional access), in addition to individual targeted sanctions.<\/li>\n
    • Protecting democ\u00adratic infra\u00adstructure:<\/strong> Ensuring that civil society and independent media can survive finan\u00adcially and legally, if necessary, in exile; helping them maintain minimum opera\u00adtional capacity, including through flexible and secure funding instruments.<\/li>\n
    • Maintaining Georgia\u2019s political visibility:<\/strong> Keeping Georgia on the agenda through coordi\u00adnated minis\u00adterial and parlia\u00admentary attention; the regime benefits from the absence of attention and fatigue.<\/li>\n
    • Strength\u00adening societal resilience:<\/strong> Supporting youth movements, watchdog activity, fact-checking, election monitoring capacity, and legal defence \u2013 precisely the things the regime is trying to choke off.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      The \u201cfive minutes\u201d are not a metaphor for despair, but for urgency.  Western states continue to have enormous leverage over Georgia. The key question is whether they are willing to use it with clarity, coordi\u00adnation, and resolve.<\/p>\n

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