{"id":78349,"date":"2026-04-07T08:57:23","date_gmt":"2026-04-07T06:57:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=78349"},"modified":"2026-04-07T10:27:36","modified_gmt":"2026-04-07T08:27:36","slug":"elections-in-hungary-the-increasingly-radical-campaign-signals-what-is-at-stake","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/elections-in-hungary-the-increasingly-radical-campaign-signals-what-is-at-stake\/","title":{"rendered":"Elections in Hungary \u2013 the increas\u00adingly radical campaign signals what is at stake"},"content":{"rendered":"

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After more than a decade of not facing a credible challenger, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n is contending with an extremely tight electoral contest that could see him being forced out of power, writes Zsuzsanna Szel\u00e9nyi in her analysis in the run-up of the elections. She is a former Hungarian MP, director of the Central European University\u2019s Democracy Institute, and the author of \u2018Tainted Democracy: Viktor Orban and the Subversion of Hungary\u2019.<\/h3>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Hungary\u2019s March 15th<\/sup> national holiday, commem\u00ado\u00adrating the revolution of 1848, symbolised<\/a> how close of a race Orb\u00e1n is facing. A few miles from Orb\u00e1n\u2019s own mass gathering in Budapest, another rally, led by opposition insurgent, P\u00e9ter Magyar, drew hundreds of thousands of people, four weeks before Hungarians are going to the polls on April 12 to elect their next parliament.<\/p>\n

Orb\u00e1ns \u201cilliberal democracy\u201d as a model and global example<\/h2>\n

Prime Minister Orb\u00e1n has in recent years become a figure of outsized global signif\u00adi\u00adcance, given Hungary\u2019s small population of less than 10 million people. Within the space of a week, he can meet<\/a> Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump. Having hosted Orb\u00e1n multiple times at his Mar-a-Lago resort and the White House, Trump reiterated his \u201ctotal endorsement\u201d of the Hungarian leader in March. Orb\u00e1n has also become a model for right-wing populists abroad, having hosted a wide range of far-right leaders in Budapest over the years. His inter\u00adna\u00adtional stature rests on two things: repeated electoral victories at home, and the ideological confi\u00addence with which he has waged war on Europe\u2019s liberal mainstream.<\/p>\n

For 16 years Orb\u00e1n and his party, Fidesz, have dominated Hungarian politics without a credible challenger. This has profoundly reshaped Hungarian politics and civil society. Fidesz has bent insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and public resources to partisan ends, reshaping the state itself. Orb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal system has concen\u00adtrated power to an excep\u00adtional degree, constructed a loyalist state, and deployed public money and public insti\u00adtu\u00adtions to promote the values of a closed society through schools, cultural bodies and the media. Over the past decade tens of millions of euros of public funds were spent building an inter\u00adna\u00adtional illiberal network: this includes hosting conser\u00adv\u00adative forums such as CPAC<\/a>; using vehicles such as the far-right \u2018Patriots for Europe\u2019<\/a> group to undermine EU action; and funding billions to think-tanks like MCC<\/a>, designed to export his ideas across Europe and the US.<\/p>\n

The opposing candidate and challenger<\/h2>\n

P\u00e9ter Magyar, a new political star, is threat\u00adening Orb\u00e1n\u2019s regime in this election cycle. Once a little-known insider within Fidesz, Magyar launched<\/a> an anti-estab\u00adlishment movement in the spring of 2024. Having long been part of the Fidesz system, Magyar\u2019s explosive revela\u00adtions about the inner workings of the Orb\u00e1n regime galvanised many people. A decade and a half of frustration with systemic corruption, economic malaise, contro\u00adversial foreign policy and repeated scandals exposing the regime\u2019s hypocrisy created an opening for a new political entre\u00adpreneur: ambitious, combative and promising to dismantle Orb\u00e1n\u2019s system. Within months Magyar\u2019s party, Tisza, was running neck-and-neck with Fidesz in opinion polls; it has since opened a lead of 10 percentage points, according<\/a> to independent pollsters.<\/p>\n

Magyar\u2019s rise repre\u00adsents an existential challenge for the ruling Fidesz party. An electoral defeat would cost Orb\u00e1n not only his excep\u00adtional power at home, but much of his influence abroad. It is no surprise, then, that from the outset Magyar became the target of ferocious smear campaigns, including a threat to release a sex tape of the opposition leader. Yet over the past two years, as he travels the country, his support has continued to grow. The belief that he might genuinely unseat Orb\u00e1n has forged a strong bond of trust between him and his supporters, and, so far, accusa\u00adtions have struggled to stick<\/a>. However, a clear poll lead is not the same as certain victory.<\/p>\n

16 years in power: The trans\u00adfor\u00admation of Hungary<\/h2>\n

Hungary is not a liberal democracy, and its elections are not fair. In its latest Report of V\u2011Dem,<\/a> Hungary is catego\u00adrized as electoral autocracy further deteri\u00ado\u00adrating in 2025, the only EU country in this group. Fidesz, which enjoys a two-thirds consti\u00adtu\u00adtional majority in parliament, has repeatedly rewritten the electoral rules to suit its own interests: over 16 years, the system has been amended<\/a> more than 30 times. At a recent closed-door campaign meeting, Orb\u00e1n reportedly acknowl\u00adedged that the electoral system heavily favours the winner, warning activists not to confuse past mandate totals with genuine levels of support. Prelim\u00adinary modelling suggests a stark asymmetry: Tisza may need around 54% of the popular vote to secure a simple parlia\u00admentary majority, while Fidesz could poten\u00adtially win a consti\u00adtu\u00adtional super\u00adma\u00adjority with as little as 45%.<\/p>\n

To ensure its survival in power, Fidesz has once again deployed state resources to buy electoral goodwill. The government has directed a flood of handouts toward critical voter blocs, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly the middle class, ranging from subsidised housing loans and teacher pay raises to tax exemp\u00adtions for large families and bonuses for law enforcement. The fiscal cost is immense: by the end of February 2026, a staggering 42 percent<\/a> of the annual budget deficit had already been exhausted.<\/p>\n

Campaigning: politics as war<\/h2>\n

It is also relying on its formi\u00addable political commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions machine, which dwarfs the reach and spend of its rivals. Successful election campaigns in the past have featured the purported threats of \u2018returning commu\u00adnists\u2019, \u2018global financiers\u2019, \u2018hordes of Muslim migrants\u2019, and \u2018Brussels bureau\u00adcrats\u2019, to which the domestic opposition is, invariably, allied. Orb\u00e1n sees politics as war, and every election is a chance to prove he is prevailing against an ever-shifting enemy.<\/p>\n

Fidesz\u2019s 2026 campaign is no different, but with a newfound, techno\u00adlog\u00adi\u00adcally-driven intensity. This time, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is portrayed as the embod\u00adiment of agent of foreign pressure, while P\u00e9ter Magyar and his Tisza movement are branded as the \u201cdomestic agents\u201d of war and chaos, linked with Kyiv and Brussels. Government-aligned outlets and billboards<\/a> \u2014 echoing Orb\u00e1n\u2019s own rhetoric \u2014 have saturated the public square with anti-Ukrainian material, including AI-generated videos depicting apoca\u00adlyptic scenes of conflict, economic collapse, and Hungarian soldiers returning in coffins. Beyond the rhetoric, Orb\u00e1n has blocked a vital \u20ac90 billion EU loan to Ukraine and the government carried out a special forces raid on vehicles trans\u00adferring cash between Austrian and Ukrainian banks via Hungary. A day later the Hungarian parliament passed a bill allowing the government to seize the assets<\/a> of Ukrainian state asset, inves\u00adti\u00adgating if it was aimed to support the Hungarian opposition. Conflict between the Hungarian and Ukrainian government is escalating in the last weeks of the campaign, serving Orb\u00e1n\u2019s interest to heighten war hysteria among Hungarian citizens before the elections on April 12. Beyond the conspiracy-based campaigns these bizarre episodes demon\u00adstrate the high stakes of the election and allegedly foreign influence.<\/p>\n

The Moscow-Budapest-axis<\/h2>\n

According to inves\u00adtigative reports, Orb\u00e1n is also counting on help from Moscow, which sees him as a reliable ally in the EU. The Kremlin has reportedly dispatched<\/a> a team of political technol\u00ado\u00adgists to Budapest to aid Orb\u00e1n in his election campaign. Highlighting how close ties between Hungary and Russia have remained since the invasion of Ukraine, the Washington Post recently reported<\/a> that Hungarian Foreign Minister P\u00e9ter Szijj\u00e1rt\u00f3 for years made regular phone calls during breaks at EU meetings to give his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, \u201clive reports on what\u2019s been discussed\u201d.<\/p>\n

Smear campaigns targeting Magyar have also undergone a dangerous evolution in both focus and intensity. The state\u2019s rhetoric, blurring the line between political opposition and national betrayal, has moved beyond character assas\u00adsi\u00adnation \u2013 sparking fears about the prospect of state-incited violence or serious physical incidents in the coming days.<\/p>\n

What happens on April 12 will matter enormously, both for Hungary and for Europe.<\/p>\n

Possible scenarios<\/h2>\n

A narrow Fidesz win would probably trigger protests from opposition voters, partic\u00adu\u00adlarly if the party secured more seats despite losing the popular vote. In this scenario, Hungary would likely slide into a more overtly repressive form of minority rule, further embold\u00adening Europe\u2019s radical right.<\/p>\n

If Tisza were to win the elections but fail to secure a consti\u00adtu\u00adtional majority in parliament, it would face immense diffi\u00adculties. A Tisza government would inherit not only a country in economic and social distress, but also a deeply divided and morally exhausted society. Even if it lost the elections, Fidesz would remain a powerful force in parliament and would do all it could to undermine Magyar\u2019s admin\u00adis\u00adtration. Over 16 years the ruling party has embedded loyalists across state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions who could obstruct the new rulers, especially if Orb\u00e1n remained leader of the party. Hungary\u2019s foreign policy, however, would likely change to a more concil\u00adiatory mood and collab\u00ado\u00adrative mode from the first day. However, changing policy to Russia and Ukraine may require more time. Under Orb\u00e1n\u2019s rule Hungary\u2019s relations were profoundly changed with both countries, public sentiment was manip\u00adu\u00adlated analysing oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities in the new context will require time.<\/p>\n

No one should expect the swift restoration of pluralist democracy in Hungary, even in the case of a decisive opposition victory. However, election day could mark the beginning of a democ\u00adratic renewal.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]\"Textende\"[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Hat Ihnen dieser Artikel gefallen? Wenn ja, k\u00f6nnen Sie die unabh\u00e4ngige redak\u00adtionelle Arbeit und den Journal\u00adismus von LibMod \u00fcber ein einfaches Spendentool unterst\u00fctzen.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]