{"id":78559,"date":"2026-05-05T12:06:07","date_gmt":"2026-05-05T10:06:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/ungarn-wendet-sich-wieder-europa-zu-und-was-das-fuer-seine-partner-bedeutet\/"},"modified":"2026-05-05T16:00:12","modified_gmt":"2026-05-05T14:00:12","slug":"hungary-swings-back-to-europe-and-what-this-means-for-its-partners","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/hungary-swings-back-to-europe-and-what-this-means-for-its-partners\/","title":{"rendered":"Hungary swings back to Europe \u2013 and what this means for its partners"},"content":{"rendered":"

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[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]<\/p>\n

Hungary\u2019s parlia\u00admentary elections of 12 April marked a clear end to the 16-year rule of Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n and his Fidesz party, a period that will be recorded as the first attempt to establish an illiberal, semi-author\u00adi\u00adtarian regime within the European Union. Daniel Heged\u00fcs, Deputy Director at the Institute for European Politics (IEP), analyzes what P\u00e9ter Magyar\u2019s victory means for Europe.<\/h3>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Orb\u00e1n\u2019s time in office was charac\u00adterized by the systematic disman\u00adtling of democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and checks and balances, the entrenchment of polit\u00adi\u00adcally organized and strategic corruption, and a reori\u00aden\u00adtation of Hungary\u2019s geopo\u00adlitical alignment away from its European partners toward Europe\u2019s strategic challengers, including the author\u00adi\u00adtarian great powers Russia and China, and \u2013 since January 2025 \u2013 increas\u00adingly the Trump administration.<\/p>\n

Together with the erosion of output legit\u00adimacy and the regime\u2019s persis\u00adtently weakening economic perfor\u00admance, these three factors played a decisive role on the demand side of politics in driving the robust mobilization of Hungarian society in support of govern\u00admental and regime change. On the supply side, the notable political achieve\u00adments of the \u201cRespect and Freedom\u201d (Tisza) party \u2013 estab\u00adlished in early 2024 \u2013 and its leader, P\u00e9ter Magyar, increas\u00adingly convinced Hungarian voters of the plausi\u00adbility of opposition victory and political trans\u00adfor\u00admation. This encom\u00adpassed not only the successful devel\u00adopment of party struc\u00adtures and a resilient political movement in rural areas beyond the tradi\u00adtional urban strong\u00adholds of the opposition, but also the artic\u00adu\u00adlation of compelling narra\u00adtives that effec\u00adtively linked the regime\u2019s corrupt practices to the everyday \u201cbread-and-butter\u201d concerns of ordinary citizens.<\/p>\n

This political config\u00adu\u00adration resulted, on 12 April, in a historic record turnout of 79.56 percent and a consti\u00adtu\u00adtional super\u00adma\u00adjority of 141 mandates (out of 199) for Tisza<\/a>. While approx\u00adi\u00admately 70 percent of parlia\u00admentary seats was secured with only 53.18 percent of the party-list vote, it is important to emphasize that Tisza achieved this landslide victory within the same electoral system designed by Fidesz \u2013 one that had previ\u00adously enabled Fidesz to obtain consti\u00adtu\u00adtional super\u00adma\u00adjorities with similar or smaller shares of the popular vote. Moreover, the opposition\u2019s victory was delivered in a \u201cfree but not fair\u201d election<\/a>, conducted on an uneven playing field that conferred struc\u00adtural advan\u00adtages on the incumbent Fidesz party.<\/p>\n

Restoring democracy, combating corruption, and re-estab\u00adlishing Hungary as a constructive partner within the European Union constitute the most important tasks facing the new government. However, while the regime of Prime Minister Orb\u00e1n repre\u00adsented a well-known quantity in Europe, the incoming prime minister, P\u00e9ter Magyar, and his government are under\u00adstandably less familiar, creating space for a wide range of projec\u00adtions among investors and inter\u00adna\u00adtional partners. Against this backdrop, it is worth examining the key reform challenges in both the domestic and European political arenas, as well as the expec\u00adta\u00adtions surrounding Hungary\u2019s newly elected democ\u00adratic government.<\/p>\n

The Way out of State Capture<\/h2>\n

Over its 16 years in power, the Orb\u00e1n regime estab\u00adlished political control over all key consti\u00adtu\u00adtional insti\u00adtu\u00adtions as well as Hungary\u2019s media system. This control \u2013 partic\u00adu\u00adlarly over the Prosecutor\u2019s Office and the judiciary \u2013 enabled regime actors to become deeply entangled in political corruption without facing prose\u00adcution or conse\u00adquences under criminal law. As a result, the restoration of the rule of law and the fight against corruption are likely to be closely inter\u00adtwined in the months and years ahead in Hungary.<\/p>\n

Even though the new parlia\u00admentary majority holds a consti\u00adtu\u00adtional super\u00adma\u00adjority, the process of restoring the indepen\u00addence of state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions will most likely take years and may closely resemble the post-2010 period of consti\u00adtu\u00adtional engineering carried out by Fidesz \u2013 albeit directed toward the re-estab\u00adlishment of democ\u00adratic checks and balances.<\/p>\n

In his victory speech on the evening of 12 April, P\u00e9ter Magyar called for the resig\u00adnation of Hungary\u2019s president, as well as the heads of several key insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, including the Consti\u00adtu\u00adtional Court, the Supreme Court (K\u00faria), the Prose\u00adcutor General\u2019s Office, and the State Audit Office, among others. This reflected not only the recog\u00adnition that these political appointees have come to symbolize state capture in Hungary, but also the under\u00adstanding that the independent functioning of these insti\u00adtu\u00adtions is scarcely conceivable with their current leadership in place. Since then, Magyar has used several public appear\u00adances to sustain pressure on these officials, tacitly acknowl\u00adedging that their removal from office is difficult \u2013 if not impos\u00adsible \u2013 under the existing consti\u00adtu\u00adtional framework.<\/p>\n

Tisza holds the political capacity to compre\u00adhen\u00adsively overhaul the Hungarian state system \u2013 including its office\u00adholders \u2013 through the adoption of a new consti\u00adtution. However, such a course of action could be perceived as contro\u00adversial, both domes\u00adti\u00adcally and at the level of the European Union. P\u00e9ter Magyar has stated that he will not pursue a new consti\u00adtution without the consent of other political parties. Should he adhere to this commitment, his government will be limited to consti\u00adtu\u00adtional amend\u00adments and a gradual disman\u00adtling of state capture \u2013 an approach that will require the careful identi\u00adfi\u00adcation of entry points, a methodical strategy, and time.<\/p>\n

In certain areas, however, results may be delivered rapidly. Tisza is likely to defund and restructure Hungary\u2019s Fidesz-controlled public broad\u00adcasters, accede to the European Public Prosecutor\u2019s Office, and, lever\u00adaging its consti\u00adtu\u00adtional majority, swiftly establish an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor\u2019s Office similar to those operating in Romania and Ukraine. By contrast, the imple\u00admen\u00adtation of other reforms may proceed more slowly; greater clarity in this regard is expected to emerge from the new government\u2019s program.<\/p>\n

EU and Foreign Policy Impact<\/h2>\n

While Hungary\u2019s domestic autoc\u00adra\u00adti\u00adzation has posed a signif\u00adicant challenge to the democ\u00adratic integrity of the European Union \u2013 as has its record of strategic corruption affecting the EU\u2019s financial interests \u2013 since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Budapest has been primarily perceived as a spoiler due to its obstruction of key EU decisions. Since 2022, the Orb\u00e1n regime has blocked all major financial assis\u00adtance packages and instru\u00adments designed to support Ukraine at the EU level, and has diluted or delayed most of the EU\u2019s 20 sanctions packages against Russia.<\/p>\n

In this regard, the new government may deliver an almost immediate break\u00adthrough. On Monday, 13 April, P\u00e9ter Magyar announced that his government considers the current \u20ac90 billion financial package for Ukraine a settled matter; given Hungary\u2019s opt-out from the joint borrowing component, he sees no reason why its imple\u00admen\u00adtation should not proceed. In a similar vein, he at first indicated that Hungary will not raise objec\u00adtions to the launch of EU-Ukraine accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions under the \u201cFunda\u00admentals\u201d cluster.<\/p>\n

In early May, Magyar\u2019s position shifted: he linked lifting Hungary\u2019s blockade on the launch of accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions to a far-reaching expansion of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. At the same time, he offered President Zelensky a bilateral meeting and signaled his willingness to reset relations between Kyiv and Budapest. Whether this renewed blocking stance on Magyar\u2019s part is a negoti\u00adating strategy aimed at securing maximum conces\u00adsions on minority rights, or a revival of Fidesz-style coercive diplomacy, remains to be seen. However, the rapid shift in tone and course regarding the start of accession negoti\u00ada\u00adtions can be seen as an initial warning sign.<\/p>\n

Another key EU-related issue for the new government will be the release of frozen EU funding. While successful anti-corruption reforms may unlock access to a signif\u00adicant share of the approx\u00adi\u00admately \u20ac9 billion in suspended cohesion funds, the more critical question concerns the fate of the \u20ac4.9 billion allocated under the European Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which is set to be entirely lost by August 2026 due to the expiry of the program. While some of these resources could be utilized through techno\u00adcratic workarounds \u2013 such as channeling funds into financial instru\u00adments or investment vehicles \u2013 the prospects of preserving even part of this allocation to support Hungary\u2019s post-illiberal recon\u00adstruction appear very limited in the absence of a political solution, notably in the form of a deadline extension.<\/p>\n

Securing access to frozen EU funding will be critical both for the new government\u2019s output legit\u00adimacy and for ensuring fiscal stability and sustainable economic growth in the years ahead.<\/p>\n

The Investor Perspective<\/h2>\n

Hungary\u2019s polit\u00adi\u00adcally influ\u00adenced and corruption-prone public procurement practices, discrim\u00adi\u00adnatory tax legis\u00adlation, and the aggressive conduct of author\u00adities toward polit\u00adi\u00adcally disfa\u00advored companies have generated signif\u00adicant distor\u00adtions in the domestic market.<\/p>\n

A return to market-based principles, the rollback of prefer\u00adential treatment, the intro\u00adduction of robust anti-corruption measures, and the restoration of the rule of law could reposition Hungary as a more attractive investment desti\u00adnation within the European Union \u2013 not only for top-tier multi\u00adna\u00adtionals with estab\u00adlished political connec\u00adtions, but also for mid-sized, inter\u00adna\u00adtionally active companies. This shift may be further supported by increased domestic consumption and investment, driven by a renewed inflow of EU funds, as well as by the new government\u2019s long-term commitment to adopting the euro.<\/p>\n

While key elements of the new government\u2019s tax, economic, and fiscal policies will only become clear with the publi\u00adcation of its program, investors can reasonably antic\u00adipate a more neutral, market-oriented, and business-friendly environment in Hungary \u2013 one in which the rule of law, rather than political connec\u00adtions and corruption, shapes economic outcomes.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]\"Textende\"[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Hat Ihnen dieser Artikel gefallen? Wenn ja, k\u00f6nnen Sie die unabh\u00e4ngige redak\u00adtionelle Arbeit und den Journal\u00adismus von LibMod \u00fcber ein einfaches Spendentool unterst\u00fctzen.[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text]