{"id":78648,"date":"2026-05-21T10:17:02","date_gmt":"2026-05-21T08:17:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=78648"},"modified":"2026-05-21T16:51:33","modified_gmt":"2026-05-21T14:51:33","slug":"russia-china-roundtable-berlin-nest-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/russia-china-roundtable-berlin-nest-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Unequal friends: Impli\u00adca\u00adtions and limita\u00adtions of an increas\u00adingly asymmet\u00adrical Sino-Russian relationship"},"content":{"rendered":"

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An expert round\u00adtable at the Center for Liberal Modernity discussed the deepening ties between Russia and China. The event, held in cooper\u00adation with the New Eurasian Strategies Centre (NEST), conve\u00adniently coincided with Vladimir Putin\u2019s latest visit to Beijing.<\/h3>\n

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Photos: Tobias Kunz, Libmod<\/em><\/p>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_message css=\u201c\u201d]The event was prompted by the recently published NEST report Marriage Without Love: The Sino-Russian partnership and what it means for the world. <\/em><\/a>More than 30 experts from think tanks, academia, journalism and the diplo\u00admatic community discussed the deepening ties between the two author\u00adi\u00adtarian powers and the impli\u00adca\u00adtions of their partnership for European and Western policy.<\/p>\n

*Because the event was held under Chatham House Rules, quotes are not assigned*<\/strong><\/p>\n

[\/vc_message][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]The first part of the discussion focused on the character, trajectory and limita\u00adtions of Sino-Russian relations. The experts agreed that the partnership between Moscow and Beijing is strong, resilient and currently inten\u00adsi\u00adfying in many sectors. Both countries share the goal of challenging the Western-dominated liberal inter\u00adna\u00adtional order.<\/p>\n

At the same time, speakers stressed that the relationship is deeply asymmet\u00adrical with Russia in increas\u00adingly subor\u00addinate position. China and Russia, united in their ant-western position, do not share a common ideology nor a common vision of the inter\u00adna\u00adtional order in the 21st century. Moreover, bilateral relations have been shaped by mutual mistrust rooted in historical trauma and cultural distance. This factor, though close present alignment of the both countries remains relevant at least in medium term.<\/p>\n

The relationship was therefore described less as a genuine alliance than as a flexible strategic partnership driven by self-interest and realpolitik. Both sides under\u00adstand the benefits they derive and are aware that they would be signif\u00adi\u00adcantly worse off without each other. Yet the partnership also contains clear limita\u00adtions and potential areas of tension.<\/p>\n

A source of geopo\u00adlitical comfort for Moscow<\/h2>\n

For Moscow, the relationship with Beijing is a source of geopo\u00adlitical comfort and a force multi\u00adplier for Russian influence around the world. Without China, Russia \u2014 and Putin in particular \u2014 would be consid\u00aderably weakened. Since February 2022 and the imposition of Western economic sanctions, however, China has become indis\u00adpensable for the Russian economy, providing markets, technology, financial channels and dual use goods that enable the current Russian war effort.<\/p>\n

For China, Russia provides a secure strategic rear along their 4,200-kilometre border. This is important in itself, but also because it allows Beijing to focus on more pressing prior\u00adities, above all its relationship with the United States. In the broader strategic rivalry with Washington, Russia serves as a useful geopo\u00adlitical partner. At the same time, Russian acqui\u00ades\u00adcence to Beijing\u2019s ambitions is not least as important as active cooper\u00adation, ensuring that Moscow does not obstruct Chinese interests in Northeast and Central Asia, in the Arctic or in global governance.<\/p>\n

Several speakers highlighted the relationship\u2019s increas\u00adingly asymmetric nature. Beijing has taken advantage of Russian weakness in recent years by purchasing oil and gas at discounted prices, expanding Chinese manufac\u00adturing exports and strength\u00adening its position in key sectors of the Russian economy. Partic\u00adi\u00adpants also noted that many previ\u00adously promising and future-oriented forms of techno\u00adlogical and indus\u00adtrial cooper\u00adation have stagnated or disap\u00adpeared altogether since the invasion of Ukraine. China maintains a certain distance because the Russian economy has become toxic due to sanctions and Beijing does not want Moscow to compete with it in indus\u00adtrial manufac\u00adturing. Thus, although economic relations have become more intense, they have also become simpler and less promising for Russia: They largely center on raw material exports from Russia and imports of manufac\u00adtured goods from China.<\/p>\n

At the same time, experts argued that there are limits to how far China can exploit Russian depen\u00addency. Beijing cannot push Putin too far into a corner, since excessive pressure could create insta\u00adbility inside Russia and poten\u00adtially threaten the survival of the Kremlin regime \u2014 a scenario China wants to avoid.<\/p>\n

China sees its future in renew\u00adables, Russia remains dependent on fossils<\/h2>\n

Although the energy partnership remains a crucial pillar of bilateral relations and may deepen further in the short term \u2013 not least because of insta\u00adbility in the Middle East \u2013 the experts argued that its long-term impor\u00adtance is likely to decline. China sees its geo-economic future in renewable energy and techno\u00adlogical dominance. Its transition towards a technology-driven, post-carbon economy contrasts sharply with Russia\u2019s growing depen\u00addence on fossil fuels, military production and raw material exports. In the long run, China\u2019s economic trans\u00adfor\u00admation could therefore pose an existential challenge to Russia\u2019s position and influence in the inter\u00adna\u00adtional system.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the widening power gap between China and Russia raises an increas\u00adingly important question for the Kremlin: where should the geopo\u00adlitical and geo-economic bound\u00adaries of the relationship be drawn?<\/p>\n

Another major factor shaping the relationship is the difference between Chinese and Russian visions of global order. Although both countries seek to challenge US primacy and advocate a \u201cmulti\u00adpolar world order,\u201d the concept of multi\u00adpo\u00adlarity means very different things in Moscow and Beijing. The Russian under\u00adstanding resembles a kind of \u201cYalta 2.0\u201d based on spheres of influence and bargaining between US, China and Russia. Some experts argued that, while previous Chinese leaders were uneasy about the idea of a G2 (made up of China and the US), Xi Jinping appears more receptive to it because that places China on the same level as the United States. Generally, China favours a rule-based inter\u00adna\u00adtional order, what it sees as a prereq\u00aduisite for achieving the \u201cChinese dream\u201d of national rejuve\u00adnation. One speaker described China as a \u201crevisionist but not revolu\u00adtionary power\u201d: Beijing seeks to reshape the inter\u00adna\u00adtional system on the expense of the US and Europe, working within it. It promotes itself as a defender of global\u00adization and multi\u00adlat\u00ader\u00adalism, playing out  its economic power  and global influence for conse\u00adquently under\u00admining liberal values and seeking to filling vacuum in global gover\u00adnance. Russia, by contrast, was portrayed as a power that seek to tear down the system, as it benefits from geopo\u00adlitical insta\u00adbility and thrives in situa\u00adtions of crisis and disruption.<\/p>\n

Although these differ\u00adences could, in the long run, pose a challenge to the partnership, partic\u00adi\u00adpants argued that the China-Russia relationship is likely to remain stable in the medium term. That is why experts have dismissed as delusional the idea of a \u2018reverse Kissinger\u2019 or \u2018reverse Nixon\u2019 whereby Washington attempts to improve relations with Russia in order to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Neither Russia nor China can afford to allow their partnership to unravel, essen\u00adtially, when the alter\u00adna\u00adtives currently offer them so little.<\/p>\n

\u201cChina is under\u00adcutting the very essence of European power\u201d<\/h2>\n

The second part of the discussion focused on the challenges posed by China to Europe, first and foremost to Germany.<\/p>\n

The main assessment of the threat emanating from Beijing\u2019s economic policies was drastic: China is under\u00adcutting the very essence of European power, which mainly rests in its huge economic potential. The bloc\u2019s GDP in nominal terms is still bigger than China\u2019s (23 v 20.8 trillion dollars expected for 2026, according to the IMF). But Beijing has more confi\u00addence, ambition and willingness to take risk. A stark example of this are the restric\u00adtions Beijing imposed on rare earth exports in 2025, which hit the EU hard. Europe is already suffering deindus\u00adtri\u00adal\u00adization, with Germany alone losing an estimated 10,000 industry jobs monthly.<\/p>\n

Add to this China\u2019s role as the major enabler for Russia\u2019s war of aggression against Ukraine. The brutal war was described by a partic\u00adipant as \u201cincredibly conve\u00adnient\u201d for Beijing, because China \u201cspends nothing, gains a lot and is happy that its biggest adver\u00adsaries are burning money every day on military support for Ukraine\u201d, something that does not generate revenue nor wealth.<\/p>\n

Europe\u2019s answer has so far been twofold \u2013 diplo\u00admatic hard talk and economic sanctions. The first measure rests on the assumption that reputa\u00adtional risks matter to Chinese officials, who like to portrait their country as neutral and as a power inter\u00adested in reaching a productive solution. The second was imple\u00admented with the 20th EU sanctions package against Russia in April, which for the first time targets \u2060third-country suppliers of dual-use goods or weapons systems to Russia, including banks and companies from China. \u201cOur thinking is that China\u2019s support for Russia\u2019s war is immensely detri\u00admental to our interests,\u201d a policy\u00admaker said.<\/p>\n

But this might be far from enough. Some argue that Chinese officials really have no problem with reputa\u00adtional risks, when it comes to their relationship with Russia \u201cbecause they don\u2019t think (the Europeans) matter\u201d. In fact, China has not really paid a price for its support for Russia\u2019s war against Ukraine. Others, however, challenged the notion that Beijing does not care about its reputation. As one partic\u00adipant put it \u201cthey are not nice and sweet, but they are less aggressive than few years ago\u201d.<\/p>\n

The ensuing debate on sanctions centered on possible costs on the Chinese aviation industry to be imposed via software restric\u00adtions for Airbus planes \u2013 however the issue is compli\u00adcated by compe\u00adtition from US giant Boeing and mounting uncer\u00adtainty about Washington\u2019s stance on the issue.<\/p>\n

Criticism was also heaped at the EU trade policy versus China, which turned the bloc into a supplier of \u201chighly replaceable\u201d agricul\u00adtural and commodity goods like barley, potatoes and even chicken feet, while the Chinese \u201ctake on all the indus\u00adtrial sides\u201d.<\/p>\n

Europe must challenge China as a bloc<\/h2>\n

The discussion ended with the firm conclusion that Europe can only challenge China as a bloc and not on national levels. It should aim for a mitigation scenario, in which the EU acts fast (within 6 to 12 months) to protect its indus\u00adtries from the Chinese onslaught, while it keeps supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia.<\/p>\n

If this fails, think tankers warn of a scenario (called \u201cadaptation\u201d), in which a Chinese-led global order leads to the EU\u2019s fragmen\u00adtation and to a greater role for Russia.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Nikolaus von Twickel contributed to this report<\/em><\/p>\n

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