{"id":79639,"date":"2026-07-29T08:58:59","date_gmt":"2026-07-29T06:58:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=79639"},"modified":"2026-07-30T19:20:03","modified_gmt":"2026-07-30T17:20:03","slug":"internalized-fimi-how-russian-information-manipulation-became-domestic-political-communication-in-georgia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/internalized-fimi-how-russian-information-manipulation-became-domestic-political-communication-in-georgia\/","title":{"rendered":"Inter\u00adnalized FIMI \u2014 How Russian infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation became domestic political commu\u00adni\u00adcation in Georgia"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Georgia\u2019s infor\u00admation environment has undergone a funda\u00admental shift. Pro-Russian influence opera\u00adtions are no longer driven primarily by external actors, such as Kremlin-controlled media, but increas\u00adingly by domestic actors, including the Georgian Dream government. As a result, anti-Western disin\u00adfor\u00admation has entered Georgia\u2019s political mainstream.<\/h2>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]This country paper is part of a series of five case studies published under the title <\/i>\u201cRussian Playbook: Foreign Infor\u00admation Manip\u00adu\u00adlation and Inter\u00adference (FIMI) in Armenia, Georgia, Germany, Moldova, and Ukraine.\u201d<\/i><\/b> The publi\u00adca\u00adtions are part of LibMod\u2019s Eastern Partnership Plus Programme, funded by the German Federal Foreign Office.<\/i>[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]This paper was written by an author who wishes to remain anonymous.[\/vc_column_text]<\/p>

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Executive summary<\/h2>\n

There has been a funda\u00admental trans\u00adfor\u00admation in foreign infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation and inter\u00adference (FIMI) in Georgia. Whereas Russian influence opera\u00adtions once relied primarily on external actors, such as Kremlin-run media, openly pro-Russian organi\u00adza\u00adtions, and anonymous social media networks, a different phenomenon is increas\u00adingly apparent in Georgia\u2019s infor\u00admation environment: the inter\u00adnal\u00adization of Russian FIMI by influ\u00adential domestic political actors. This assessment is supported by the European Commission\u2019s Georgia Report 2025<\/a>, which found that the Georgian author\u00adities had system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally engaged in unprece\u00addented hostile anti-EU rhetoric that often echoed Russian-style disinformation.<\/p>\n

This policy brief argues that the Georgian Dream government, together with its principal media platforms, TV Imedi, POSTV, and Rustavi 2, has increas\u00adingly adopted not only the narra\u00adtives promoted by the Kremlin but also the opera\u00adtional methods, commu\u00adni\u00adcation strategies, and infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation techniques tradi\u00adtionally associated with Russian influence opera\u00adtions. Rather than functioning as independent domestic political commu\u00adni\u00adcators, these actors increas\u00adingly reproduce Russian strategic messaging within Georgia\u2019s infor\u00admation environment through domestic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, media, and political language. The European Commission<\/a> has separately concluded that the Georgian author\u00adities have system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally dissem\u00adi\u00adnated anti-EU rhetoric and disinformation.<\/p>\n

Evidence of the propa\u00adganda machinery operating in Georgia was provided by Meta\u2019s Q2 2024 Adver\u00adsarial Threat Report<\/a>, which documented a coordi\u00adnated inauthentic network in Georgia that used ficti\u00adtious personas and media-style entities to criticize protesters and support the Georgian Dream. Meta linked this network, which operated across Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, to the Georgian government\u2019s Department of Strategic Communications.<\/p>\n

As a result, Georgia now has a hybrid infor\u00admation ecosystem in which foreign influence is no longer wielded exclu\u00adsively from abroad\/\u200bby foreign actors. Instead, Russian strategic narra\u00adtives are localized, legit\u00adimized, and amplified by mainstream domestic actors. The Fourth EEAS FIMI Threat Report<\/a> identifies Georgia as one of the countries targeted by false allega\u00adtions of EU- and NATO-backed desta\u00adbi\u00adlization plots, which is one element of the broader Russian campaign whose narra\u00adtives are then picked up and repro\u00adduced in Georgian domestic political discourse.<\/p>\n

This repre\u00adsents an evolution from external influence to inter\u00adnalized FIMI, creating new challenges for the European Union, NATO, democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, technology companies, and civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions seeking to strengthen democ\u00adratic resilience.<\/p>\n

From Russian propa\u00adganda to domestic infor\u00admation manipulation<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions have targeted Georgia since long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian military opera\u00adtions during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War were accom\u00adpanied by a coordi\u00adnated propa\u00adganda campaign portraying Georgia and the West as respon\u00adsible for Russia\u2019s aggression. In the years that followed, Moscow invested in the devel\u00adopment of local proxies capable of dissem\u00adi\u00adnating anti-Western narra\u00adtives from within Georgia. These included openly pro-Russian media outlets, organi\u00adza\u00adtions, political groups, and coordi\u00adnated anonymous social media networks. The devel\u00adopment of these networks and their messaging are documented in the Media Devel\u00adopment Foundation\u2019s annual reports<\/a> on anti-Western propa\u00adganda and GRASS Disinfo Briefs<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Until recently, however, these pro-Russian actors remained largely on the political margins. Their influence was limited because they were widely perceived as directly repre\u00adsenting Russian interests.<\/p>\n

This landscape has changed signif\u00adi\u00adcantly since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.<\/p>\n

Anti-Western narra\u00adtives, once confined to fringe pro-Kremlin organi\u00adza\u00adtions, have increas\u00adingly migrated into mainstream political commu\u00adni\u00adcation. Rather than openly advocating closer relations with Moscow, domestic political actors began framing Russia\u2019s strategic narra\u00adtives through the language of Georgian sover\u00adeignty, peace, Chris\u00adtianity, tradi\u00adtional values, and national identity. This local\u00adization made the messages substan\u00adtially more persuasive as made it seem that they origi\u00adnated from domestic political debate rather than foreign propa\u00adganda. As the European Commission concluded<\/a>, Georgian author\u00adities have \u201csystem\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally engaged in hostile anti-EU rhetoric, manip\u00adu\u00adlative narra\u00adtives and conspiracy theories, often mirroring Russian-type disin\u00adfor\u00admation.\u201d The European Parliament has also confirmed<\/a> that the government-affil\u00adiated media regularly spread manip\u00adu\u00adlative narra\u00adtives and conspiracy theories that emulated Russian-inspired propaganda.<\/p>\n

The defining charac\u00adter\u00adistic of today\u2019s Georgian infor\u00admation environment is therefore not the volume of Russian propa\u00adganda entering the country, but the extent to which influ\u00adential domestic actors themselves reproduce Russian narratives.<\/p>\n

Inter\u00adnal\u00adization of Russian strategic narratives<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The conver\u00adgence between Kremlin messaging and Georgian Dream commu\u00adni\u00adcation is visible across virtually every major strategic narrative that the Kremlin has promoted since 2022.<\/p>\n

The first such narrative concerns the claim that the West seeks to drag Georgia into a war against Russia. Russian officials have repeatedly argued that the United States and NATO aim to expand the conflict in Ukraine by opening additional fronts against Moscow. Georgian Dream gradually adopted the same message domes\u00adti\u00adcally through a \u201csecond front\u201d narrative<\/a>, claiming that the European Union, the United States, opposition parties, civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions and independent media were attempting to force Georgia into military confrontation with Russia.<\/p>\n

Closely connected is the \u201cGlobal War Party\u201d conspiracy. Georgian Dream leaders<\/a> claim that there is an undefined network of Western political elites that controls European and American insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, finances Georgian NGOs and media, organizes protests, and seeks regime change in Tbilisi. Although presented as a domestic political concept, this narrative closely mirrors long-standing Russian conspiracy theories describing a collective Western \u201cwar party\u201d that is deter\u00admined to weaken Russia through proxy conflicts and exter\u00adnally orches\u00adtrated revolutions.<\/p>\n

Similarly, the notion that Georgia is facing an exter\u00adnally organized attempt to implement a \u201ccolour revolution\u201d follows an almost identical trajectory. Russian Foreign Intel\u00adli\u00adgence Service (SVR) repeated issued state\u00adments<\/a> throughout 2024 warning that Washington was preparing a \u201cTbilisi Maidan\u201d involving NGOs, election observers, youth organi\u00adza\u00adtions and Western govern\u00adments. Shortly before and after these state\u00adments were released, Georgian Dream repre\u00adsen\u00adta\u00adtives, TV Imedi, and POSTV presented nearly identical allega\u00adtions<\/a>, claiming that demon\u00adstra\u00adtions, election monitoring, and civic activism formed part of a Western plan to overthrow the government. Georgian Dream leaders often claim<\/a> that five colour revolu\u00adtions have been organized in the last several years, all foiled by author\u00adities\u2019 vigilance.<\/p>\n

The same conver\u00adgence is visible with respect to the attitude towards NGOs, independent media, and election obser\u00advation. Organi\u00adza\u00adtions tradi\u00adtionally under\u00adstood as insti\u00adtu\u00adtions of democ\u00adratic account\u00adability are now system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally portrayed as foreign agents, revolution organizers, and instru\u00adments of Western intel\u00adli\u00adgence services. These narra\u00adtives provided political justi\u00adfi\u00adcation for the legis\u00adlation restricting foreign funding of civil society and independent media passed by the Georgian Dream in the 2024\u20132026 period. In its opinions<\/a> on Georgia\u2019s Foreign Influence Trans\u00adparency Law and other restrictive laws, the Venice Commission concludes that these laws threaten freedom of associ\u00adation, independent media, and civil society, and recom\u00admends their repeal.<\/p>\n

Another important area of conver\u00adgence involves identity politics. Rather than criti\u00adcizing European integration primarily on insti\u00adtu\u00adtional grounds or arguing over legit\u00adimate issues, such as the speed of integration and the EU\u2019s inflex\u00adi\u00adbility, Georgian Dream increas\u00adingly frames<\/a> the European Union as a civiliza\u00adtional threat: as seeking to undermine Georgian identity, Orthodox Chris\u00adtianity, and tradi\u00adtional family values by promoting LGBTQ rights<\/a>, under\u00admining the Orthodox Church<\/a>, infringing<\/a> on sover\u00adeignty, and inter\u00adfering<\/a> in domestic affairs. This framing directly reflects one of the Kremlin\u2019s principal geopo\u00adlitical narra\u00adtives, which portrays liberal democracy as incom\u00adpatible with national identity and tradi\u00adtional civilization.<\/p>\n

Finally, the Georgian Dream propa\u00adganda machinery often uses compar\u00adative propa\u00adganda, or what could be dubbed \u201ccompara\u00adganda\u201d, that is, propa\u00adganda ampli\u00adfying stories from the European Union and the USA that lend themselves to use domes\u00adti\u00adcally to justify<\/a> the party\u2019s anti-democ\u00adratic steps. For instance, if a Western state arrests opposition politi\u00adcians, passes legis\u00adlation limiting human rights, or cracks down on demon\u00adstrators, stories on the subject are widely dissem\u00adi\u00adnated with the aim of showing that action of that kind is perfectly normal, even in Western democ\u00adracies. This compara\u00adganda sometimes goes too far, with the Georgian Dream leaders actually attacking Western democ\u00adracies for democ\u00adratic backsliding, as was recently the case with Denmark<\/a>.<\/p>\n

TV Imedi, Rustavi 2, and POSTV: domestic infra\u00adstructure of inter\u00adnalized FIMI<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The local\u00adization of Russian strategic narra\u00adtives became possible due to the trans\u00adfor\u00admation of Georgia\u2019s mainstream media landscape into a polarized media space. On one side, there are dominant state-controlled media channels, which are over-resourced and pampered, on the other, strug\u00adgling independent media channels, which are subject to legal constraints, monetary fines and regular demonization, as well as harassment in the form of physical threats, arrests and violence. The broader deteri\u00ado\u00adration of media pluralism has been documented by the European Commission<\/a>, Freedom House<\/a>, Reporters Without Borders<\/a>, Human Rights Watch<\/a>, and Media Freedom Rapid Response<\/a>, and is described<\/a> in consid\u00aderable detail in the OSCE Moscow Mechanism 2026 report on Georgia.<\/p>\n

TV Imedi, Rustavi 2 and POSTV increas\u00adingly serve as central nodes in the domestic infor\u00admation ecosystem that supports Georgian Dream\u2019s political commu\u00adni\u00adcation. Although legally these broad\u00adcasters are privately owned, all three channels maintain<\/a> close political and economic ties with influ\u00adential figures connected to the ruling party.<\/p>\n

The propa\u00adganda is further amlified are further supported by the Georgian Public Broad\u00adcaster, which is under the Georgian Dream party\u2019s control and is staffed by party loyalists. Despite being state-funded, the GPB does not enjoy high ratings. It often propa\u00adgates<\/a> the official party line and denies airtime to the opposition leaders and criti\u00adcally minded experts.<\/p>\n

That the pro-government media have been evolving into propa\u00adganda mouth\u00adpieces has been partic\u00adu\u00adlarly noticeable since 2022. Their coverage has increas\u00adingly focused on portraying Western govern\u00adments as hostile actors, delegit\u00adimizing civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions, accusing opposition parties of serving foreign interests, questioning European integration, and ampli\u00adfying conspiracy theories concerning the \u201csecond front,\u201d the \u201cDeep State,\u201d and foreign attempts to organize revolution. These narra\u00adtives have system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally repro\u00adduced strategic messaging that has long been promoted by Russian state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and Kremlin-controlled media.<\/p>\n

The conver\u00adgence in messaging with Russia received unprece\u00addented inter\u00adna\u00adtional recog\u00adnition in February 2026, when the United Kingdom imposed sanctions<\/a> on TV Imedi and POSTV under its Russia sanctions regime, identi\u00adfying both broad\u00adcasters as entities involved in spreading Russian disin\u00adfor\u00admation concerning Ukraine. The UK\u2019s Sanctions Notice asserts that the broad\u00adcasters dissem\u00adi\u00adnated delib\u00ader\u00adately misleading infor\u00admation portraying the Ukrainian government as illegit\u00adimate, Ukraine as a puppet of the West, and alleging that Ukraine and Western govern\u00adments were attempting to desta\u00adbilize Georgia.<\/p>\n

The imposition of these sanctions marked<\/a> the first time a Western government had formally desig\u00adnated major Georgian television broad\u00adcasters as partic\u00adi\u00adpants in Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions. The measures included asset freezes in the United Kingdom and restric\u00adtions on economic activ\u00adities involving the desig\u00adnated entities. It is noteworthy that Imedi TV used to be owned<\/a> by a London-based company, but the owners of that company sold<\/a> its shares just weeks before London announced the sanctions.<\/p>\n

Beyond their symbolic signif\u00adi\u00adcance, the sanctions brought poten\u00adtially important practical conse\u00adquences. Because Georgian banking regula\u00adtions require Georgian financial insti\u00adtu\u00adtions to implement UK sanctions regimes related to Russia, legal experts argued that Imedi and POSTV could face restric\u00adtions in relation to domestic banking services, adver\u00adtising revenue, financial trans\u00adac\u00adtions, as well as to access to Western commercial partners. The sanctions also substan\u00adtially increase<\/a> reputa\u00adtional and compliance risks for businesses, adver\u00adtisers, and inter\u00adna\u00adtional companies that cooperate with the broadcasters.<\/p>\n

In addition to activ\u00adities mentioned, these two pro-Georgian Dream broad\u00adcasters are also increas\u00adingly providing platforms for inter\u00adna\u00adtional commen\u00adtators whose views are regularly amplified by Russian state media, including Jeffrey Sachs<\/a>, Larry Johnson<\/a>, Thierry Mariani<\/a>, Mick Wallace<\/a> and Glenn Diesen<\/a>. Although these individuals differ in their political views, each consis\u00adtently advances narra\u00adtives blaming NATO expansion for the war in Ukraine, criti\u00adcizing Western support for Kyiv, questioning democ\u00adratic movements in Georgia, or portraying Western insti\u00adtu\u00adtions as desta\u00adbi\u00adlizing actors.<\/p>\n

Opera\u00adtional conver\u00adgence: adoption of Russian infor\u00admation techniques<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Inter\u00adnal\u00adization of Russian FIMI extends beyond the dissem\u00adi\u00adnation of Russian narratives.<\/p>\n

TV Imedi, Rustavi 2, and POSTV, as well as broader pro-government messaging, including through the public broad\u00adcaster, are making increasing use of opera\u00adtional techniques commonly associated with Russian FIMI.<\/p>\n

First, major infor\u00admation campaigns are frequently charac\u00adterised by synchro\u00adnized dissem\u00adi\u00adnation across television broad\u00adcasters, online media, and anonymous social media accounts. Similar stories often appear across multiple outlets within minutes of each other, creating an artificial impression of independent confirmation.<\/p>\n

Second, evidence suggests an increasing use of coordi\u00adnated inauthentic behaviour. Meta has repeatedly dismantled<\/a> networks linked to Georgian Dream actors that operated fake Facebook pages, anonymous accounts, and coordi\u00adnated ampli\u00adfi\u00adcation campaigns. More recent cases involved<\/a> the simul\u00adta\u00adneous publi\u00adcation of identical content by television broad\u00adcasters and anonymous accounts, suggesting the pursuit of coordi\u00adnated dissem\u00adi\u00adnation strategies similar to those employed in Russian influence operations.<\/p>\n

Third, staged and manip\u00adu\u00adlated audio\u00advisual content is increas\u00adingly appearing in domestic political commu\u00adni\u00adcation. During protests against the foreign agents law, broad\u00adcasters dissem\u00adi\u00adnated videos that discredited protesters, individual politi\u00adcians, and activists. These attacks often included selec\u00adtively edited recordings that spread at viral rates on Facebook and TikTok.<\/p>\n

Fourth, Georgia witnessed probable AI-assisted infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation during the 2025 local elections and the protests of 4 October 2025. Anonymous pro-government accounts distributed<\/a> audio recordings allegedly including the voices of opposition figures and government critics. Independent technical analysis indicated high proba\u00adbil\u00adities that the content was AI-generated in several cases, and the author\u00adities never confirmed the authen\u00adticity of the recordings. The widespread dissem\u00adi\u00adnation of these recordings in the run up to polit\u00adi\u00adcally signif\u00adicant events demon\u00adstrates how synthetic media is being integrated into domestic political communication.<\/p>\n

Why this matters<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The Georgian case illus\u00adtrates an important evolution in modern FIMI. Tradi\u00adtional responses to foreign infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation have sought primarily to identify external actors: foreign govern\u00adments, foreign state media, troll farms or coordi\u00adnated influence networks operating across borders. Once these actors have been identified, the idea is to mobilize local government and employ a whole-of-society approach to counter the FIMI.<\/p>\n

The FIMI model seen in Georgia is quite different. In Georgia, it is, increas\u00adingly, domestic political insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, mainstream broad\u00adcasters and local political actors who are advancing Russian strategic objec\u00adtives. This signif\u00adi\u00adcantly compli\u00adcates attri\u00adbution because it means that influence opera\u00adtions become embedded within legit\u00adimate domestic political commu\u00adni\u00adcation. Thus the distinction between external propa\u00adganda and internal political messaging is becoming increas\u00adingly blurred.<\/p>\n

This devel\u00adopment carries serious impli\u00adca\u00adtions for democ\u00adratic resilience.<\/p>\n

When conspiracy theories become normalized through mainstream broad\u00adcasters, public trust in democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions erodes. When NGOs and journalists are portrayed as foreign agents, independent account\u00adability mecha\u00adnisms weaken. When election observers are depicted as instru\u00adments of foreign intel\u00adli\u00adgence, confi\u00addence in electoral integrity declines. When peaceful protests are framed as exter\u00adnally orches\u00adtrated coups, civic partic\u00adi\u00adpation itself is delegit\u00adimized., More impor\u00adtantly, though, when the European Union is presented as an enemy and Russia is presented as a protector of Christian values, the line between enemy and friend is blurred. This blurring will inevitably cause severe security problems for a small country that has undergone repeated attacks by Russia on its sover\u00adeignty and terri\u00adtorial integrity and whose prosperity and safety largely depends on its prospects of integration into the Western political and security insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, like the EU and NATO.<\/p>\n

Perhaps most impor\u00adtantly, this environment makes the attri\u00adbution of and response to FIMI far more difficult. While it is clear that Georgian domestic actors employ the same methods, techniques, tactics, and behav\u00adioural patterns, and their messaging and strategic commu\u00adni\u00adcation closely mirror Kremlin narra\u00adtives, it is becoming increas\u00adingly difficult to identify those respon\u00adsible, establish their links to Moscow, or demon\u00adstrate any formal chain of coordi\u00adnation or subor\u00addi\u00adnation. This, in turn, raises questions such as whether these actions are simply a coinci\u00addence or are directly controlled by and subor\u00addi\u00adnated to Moscow.<\/p>\n

Policy recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The European Union and its Member States should recognize inter\u00adnalized FIMI as a distinct category of hybrid threat, especially in countries in which pro-Russian anti-democ\u00adratic govern\u00adments are in power. This is currently the case in Georgia; had the Moldovan and Armenian elections been won by pro-Russian forces, it would have happened there as well.<\/p>\n

Second, the assess\u00adments of foreign infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation should not focus exclu\u00adsively on Russian state actors but should also examine domestic political and media actors that system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally reproduce and amplify the Kremlin\u2019s strategic narra\u00adtives. In many countries, these actors are more dangerous for national security \u2013 in terms of making the local societies vulnerable to Russian pressure \u2013 than the Moscow-orches\u00adtrated trolls and state propa\u00adganda attacks.<\/p>\n

Support for independent media and inves\u00adtigative journalism should remain a strategic priority for the West if it wishes to seriously counter homegrown pro-Russian propa\u00adganda and Russia\u2019s influence opera\u00adtions. Strength\u00adening resilient domestic infor\u00admation ecosystems repre\u00adsents one of the most effective long-term responses to inter\u00adnalized FIMI.  The adoption of a whole-of-society approach is impos\u00adsible in Georgia, since the Government is the agent of the FIMI. Therefore, other actors at the forefront in protecting European values and countering FIMI should be empowered more.<\/p>\n

Technology companies should adopt frame\u00adworks for the detection of coordi\u00adnated inauthentic behaviour to improve the identi\u00adfi\u00adcation of synchro\u00adnized campaigns involving tradi\u00adtional broad\u00adcasters alongside anonymous online networks. Existing moder\u00adation systems often treat television broad\u00adcasters and coordi\u00adnated social media activity separately, despite the increasing opera\u00adtional conver\u00adgence among them. Greater empow\u00aderment of the fact-checking community by tech giants and greater EU oversight of these social media corpo\u00adra\u00adtions should be made an integral part of the EU-wide response framework towards the Russian FIMI.<\/p>\n

Future sanctions frame\u00adworks against Russia should consider not only individuals who directly coordinate with Moscow-based propa\u00adganda machinery, but also those who system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally facil\u00aditate and amplify foreign infor\u00admation-manip\u00adu\u00adlation campaigns within domestic political systems. As it can sometimes be impos\u00adsible to establish links between the latter and Moscow, especially if the government is in charge of covering up, any evidence to that effect, the use of the same standard for sanctions that is used vis-\u00e0-vis Russia Today or other propa\u00adganda outlets that are clearly run by the Russian government is neither effective nor practical.<\/p>\n

Finally, democ\u00adratic resilience initia\u00adtives related to Georgia should increas\u00adingly focus on identi\u00adfying the local\u00adization of anti-European and pro-Russian narra\u00adtives rather than solely on monitoring propa\u00adganda coming directly from foreign countries. As the Georgian experience demon\u00adstrates, modern FIMI often succeeds not because foreign actors speak louder, but because domestic actors have begun speaking with their voices.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Georgia repre\u00adsents one of the clearest contem\u00adporary examples of the way in which foreign infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation can evolve into a domes\u00adti\u00adcally sustained political commu\u00adni\u00adcation system. Russian strategic narra\u00adtives, opera\u00adtional techniques, and influence method\u00adologies have not only entered the Georgian infor\u00admation space but also increas\u00adingly been inter\u00adnalized by influ\u00adential domestic political actors and mainstream media institutions.<\/p>\n

This trans\u00adfor\u00admation funda\u00admen\u00adtally changes the way that democ\u00adratic societies should under\u00adstand and respond to FIMI. The principal challenge is no longer exclu\u00adsively external propa\u00adganda origi\u00adnating from Moscow. It is also the normal\u00adization of Russian influence method\u00adologies within domestic political discourse itself.<\/p>\n

Recog\u00adnizing this evolution is essential for the devel\u00adopment of effective democ\u00adratic resilience policies. To be successful, efforts to counter Russian FIMI in Georgia will therefore have to address not only foreign influence opera\u00adtions but also the domestic political and media infra\u00adstruc\u00adtures that have adopted, localized, and legit\u00adimized them. However, even if this infra\u00adstructure is targeted via various restrictive measures, it will not be possible to counter the success of Russian FIMI in Georgia without regular steps to empower the major domestic actors   resisting it \u2013 independent TV media, news and online media, fact-checking community, civil society organi\u00adza\u00adtions and univer\u00adsities \u2013, even if the local legal environment does not permit such empowerment.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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