{"id":79764,"date":"2026-08-07T11:00:35","date_gmt":"2026-08-07T09:00:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/?p=79764"},"modified":"2026-08-07T11:20:38","modified_gmt":"2026-08-07T09:20:38","slug":"russian-fimi-in-germany","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/russian-fimi-in-germany\/","title":{"rendered":"Russian FIMI in Germany"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Germany is at the center of Russian influence opera\u00adtions \u2014 not only because of its political and economic signif\u00adi\u00adcance, but also due to societal vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities that are being delib\u00ader\u00adately exploited. The analysis examines the strategies Russia is using to desta\u00adbilize German democracy and the resulting impli\u00adca\u00adtions for European security.<\/h3>\n

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[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css=\u201c\u201d]Russia\u2019s infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation and influence opera\u00adtions (FIMI) pose growing security challenges for Germany. As Europe\u2019s largest economy and a key supporter of Ukraine, Germany plays a pivotal role within the European Union and NATO \u2014 making it a partic\u00adu\u00adlarly attractive target for Russian influence opera\u00adtions. In doing so, the Kremlin does not rely solely on disin\u00adfor\u00admation on social media but also delib\u00ader\u00adately exploits existing social fault lines and political tensions: historical narra\u00adtives, migration, East-West differ\u00adences, and economic uncer\u00adtainties serve as entry points to sow distrust and weaken democ\u00adratic insti\u00adtu\u00adtions. The aim of all this is to undermine support for Ukraine, damage social cohesion, and impair the ability of Germany and its partners to act effec\u00adtively. The analysis identifies the most important instru\u00adments and objec\u00adtives of Russian FIMI in Germany and highlights the measures needed to sustainably strengthen resilience against hybrid threats.<\/p>\n

This policy paper is part of a series of five case studies from the project \u201cRussian Playbook: Foreign Infor\u00admation Manip\u00adu\u00adlation and Inter\u00adference (FIMI) in Armenia, Georgia, Germany, Moldova, and Ukraine<\/b>\u201d under the Eastern Partnership Plus program. The project is funded by the Federal Foreign Office.<\/em>[\/\u200bvc_\u200bcolumn_\u200btext]<\/p>

Download Policy Paper as PDF<\/a><\/div> [vc_\u200bcolumn_\u200btext css=\u201c\u201d]\n

Country context and strategic relevance<\/h2>\n

Germany occupies a central place in Russia\u2019s calcu\u00adla\u00adtions, because it is at once the most important European supporter of Ukraine and a country whose political weight is indis\u00adpensable to the cohesion of the European Union and to the strength of NATO. As the EU\u2019s largest economy and its most populous member state, Germany shapes the decisions that matter most to Moscow: the scale of military and financial aid to Kyiv, the mainte\u00adnance of sanctions, the pace of enlargement, and the direction of the Union\u2019s common foreign and security policy. When Berlin moves, Europe tends to follow; when Berlin hesitates, the whole edifice begins to look unstable. This is precisely why the country\u2019s domestic political direction is so conse\u00adquential for the Kremlin. Were a party committed to leaving the European Union and kneeling before Russia \u2014 the AfD \u2014to gain real power, the effects would be close to ideal for Russia: it would fracture the European Union from within, weaken the coalition supporting Ukraine, and validate the narrative about the end of the Western way of life. Germany, in other words, is not one theatre of influence opera\u00adtions among many; influence there is a lever with conti\u00adnental reach.<\/p>\n

The current state of relations reflects how far the two countries have diverged. Russia has officially placed Germany on its list of \u201cunfriendly states\u201d, and the relationship has deteri\u00ado\u00adrated into open antag\u00adonism beneath the surface of formal diplomacy.[1]<\/a>  Persistent espionage, the recruitment and deployment of so-called low-level agents, and a widening reper\u00adtoire of hybrid warfare are now increas\u00adingly recog\u00adnised as such by German decision-makers, and the frosty state of bilateral ties follows directly from this recog\u00adnition. Chancellor Merz has captured the essence of this shift, warning that Germany finds itself in a hybrid war \u2014 no longer at peace, not yet at war in the conven\u00adtional sense.[2]<\/a> This turn in perception has nonetheless been slow and is still incomplete.As a result, Georgia now has a hybrid infor\u00admation ecosystem in which foreign influence is no longer wielded exclu\u00adsively from abroad\/\u200bby foreign actors. Instead, Russian strategic narra\u00adtives are localized, legit\u00adimized, and amplified by mainstream domestic actors. The Fourth EEAS FIMI Threat Report identifies Georgia as one of the countries targeted by false allega\u00adtions of EU- and NATO-backed desta\u00adbi\u00adlization plots, which is one element of the broader Russian campaign whose narra\u00adtives are then picked up and repro\u00adduced in Georgian domestic political discourse.<\/p>\n

The Russian FIMI playbook in Germany<\/h2>\n

Moscow\u2019s exploitation rests on a set of entrenched German vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities. There is, first, the deep-seated \u201cRussland-Romantik.\u201d This refers to a cultural sympathy for Russia that is rooted in liter\u00adature, music, history and a diffuse sense of shared destiny and that repeatedly softens German judgement and provides an emotional entry point for manip\u00adu\u00adlation. Russland-Romantik is reinforced by the long tradition of German Ostpolitik, which, for decades, assumed that the key to peace and order in Europe lay in Moscow \u2014 a habit of mind that still inclines parts of the political class to seek accom\u00admo\u00addation with the Kremlin and to read Russian conduct in the most forgiving light.[3]<\/strong><\/a> There is also the legacy of energy depen\u00addence: for years, German reliance on Russian natural gas delivered by Gazprom through the Nord Stream pipelines was itself a channel of leverage, and the abrupt rupture of that relationship created anxieties that are easily inflamed.[4]<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

In addition to those vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities, Russia works on the resentment surrounding refugees and migration. Moreover, it attacks the enduring divide between East and West Germany \u2014 a fault line bound up with the unresolved social and psycho\u00adlogical conflicts linked with reuni\u00adfi\u00adcation, an area where feelings of having been treated as second-class citizens remain polit\u00adi\u00adcally potent. Each of these vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities offers a ready-made grievance that can be amplified, obviating the need to invent new ones. Layered over all of this is the memory of the Second World War, which Russian actors instru\u00admen\u00adtalise with particular cynicism: the propa\u00adganda works to portray Germany as once again turning aggres\u00adsively against \u2018the East\u2019, and, in its attempt to recast today\u2019s Ukraine and its German backers as the heirs of fascism, inverting historical guilt by forgetting, conve\u00adniently, that Ukraine itself suffered enormously under Nazi occupation during the Second World War, bearing some of the heaviest losses of any territory \u2014 a fact that flatly contra\u00addicts the entire construction.<\/p>\n

Identity, historical memory, security fears and socio-economic grievance are thus not separate targets but a single inter\u00adlocking surface that Moscow assails from several direc\u00adtions at once. The first objective of Russian FIMI in Germany is to erode public support for Ukraine, wearing down the willingness to sustain military and financial aid. The second is to fracture the cohesion of the European Union and NATO, in part by framing Germany as a mere puppet of the United States, stripped of genuine sover\u00adeignty. The third is to delegit\u00adimise the federal government and the mainstream media, corroding the trust on which democ\u00adratic delib\u00ader\u00adation depends. A further \u2014 more subtle \u2014 objective, as we also know from the leaked internal documents of the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency, is simply to raise the general level of insecurity and anxiety about the future among the German public.[5]<\/strong><\/a>[6]<\/strong><\/a> These objec\u00adtives are mutually reinforcing and find their common denom\u00adi\u00adnator in the Kremlin\u2019s objective to strengthen the AfD and to a lesser degree the BSW, whose electoral success is read by Moscow as a direct weakening of the West.<\/p>\n

The tactics, techniques and proce\u00addures used to spread these narra\u00adtives are evolving constantly. Crucially, none of this lands in a vacuum: it is directed at political actors who are already receptive to it. In Germany this is the AfD above all, the far left-wing BSW in part, and some useful idiots in other parties. In hack-and-leak opera\u00adtions \u2014 most strik\u00adingly the inter\u00adception and publi\u00adcation of a confi\u00addential Bundeswehr discussion about Taurus cruise missiles in 2024 \u2014 cyber intrusion was fused with the targeted exploitation of the stolen material to maximise political damage.[7]<\/strong><\/a>  Not to be forgotten are the acts of physical inter\u00adference denoted by the second \u201ci\u201d in FIMI: sabotage, arson, drone overflights of sensitive sites, and the recruitment of low-level agents through Telegram.[8]<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

In the realm of social media, infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation first began with relatively crude troll farms. These days, opera\u00adtions in this area are more targeted and more automated. Bot networks generate and amplify content around the clock. The main distri\u00adb\u00adution channels are Telegram, TikTok, X, Facebook and YouTube. Another frontier is the delib\u00aderate \u201cpoisoning\u201d of Large Language Models, seeding the web with manip\u00adu\u00adlated material in the expec\u00adtation that LLM systems will absorb and reproduce it.[9]<\/strong><\/a> Paid influ\u00adencers carry Kremlin-aligned messaging to different German audiences, and increas\u00adingly convincing deepfakes depict events that never happened. Alongside these, \u201coverload opera\u00adtions\u201d flood fact-checkers with a deluge of fabri\u00adcated claims. A newly uncovered campaign dubbed \u201cRoska Bridge\u201d now targets decen\u00adtralised platforms, using the open-source software Brid.gy to seed pro-Russian content on Mastodon and then mass-replicate it onto Bluesky.[10]<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

Moreover, although social media networks are the principal distri\u00adb\u00adution channels for disin\u00adfor\u00admation, breaking through into the respected German mainstream media remains an ambition  \u2014 one that is easier to achieve when the \u2018respected\u2019 media outlets welcome Russian propa\u00adganda with open arms. The daily Berliner Zeitung is a case in point.[11]<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

One conclusion must be stated with complete clarity. Every one of the vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities that Moscow exploits, the AfD exploits too; every narrative that Moscow propa\u00adgates, the AfD plays as well. The algorithmic dynamics the Kremlin utilizes are also utilized by the AfD. The party mirrors the Kremlin\u2019s propa\u00adganda, echoes its talking points and lends them domestic legit\u00adimacy. For that reason the single greatest entry point, the most effective vector of ampli\u00adfi\u00adcation and, ultimately, the gravest danger posed by Russian FIMI in Germany is the AfD itself.<\/p>\n

Resilience and countermeasures<\/h2>\n

Thus far, the German response has been shame\u00adfully insuf\u00adfi\u00adcient. Few attempts at monitoring or counter\u00admea\u00adsures can be counted as successes. In January 2024, the German Foreign Ministry discovered the vast Doppel\u00adganger network operating on X.[12]<\/a> However, this success was due to the work of only a very small number of government experts. In March 2024, the Bundestag\u2019s Parlia\u00admentary Oversight Panel, in a rare inter\u00advention, warned publicly that the existing tools and proce\u00addures for intel\u00adli\u00adgence handling were no longer suffi\u00adcient to meet the challenge.[13]<\/a> The freshly published annual report of the Bundesamt f\u00fcr Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutz (Germany\u2019s federal domestic intel\u00adli\u00adgence service) reinforces this assessment, documenting the growing intensity of Russian espionage, sabotage and disin\u00adfor\u00admation against Germany.[14]<\/a> That mounting evidence has yet to be matched by a commen\u00adsurate build-up of capability. To this end, new depart\u00adments and workstreams are being set up within the ministries, including the newly opened Joint Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats (GAZ Hybrid), which will need to make disin\u00adfor\u00admation a core part of its remit. One of its most important tasks must be to establish a functioning, methodical system for monitoring the infor\u00admation space, so that Germany actually knows what is happening in real time rather than learning of Russian opera\u00adtions only once they have produced their effects.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n

The lesson Germany offers to other countries is, uncom\u00adfortably, a cautionary one. Germany should serve as a warning of what happens when a serious and sustained threat is under\u00ades\u00adti\u00admated for too long. It is a negative example from which its partners can learn, so that they do not proceed with the same compla\u00adcency. The imper\u00adative now is to convert this awareness, which came at such a high cost for Germany, into action.<\/p>\n

Political leaders must commu\u00adnicate the threat honestly, ending the highly dangerous ignorance with which evidence of Russian sabotage has too often been met, and equipping the security services with the powers the situation demands. At the European level, all of this should be embedded in a coherent common strategy against hybrid threats \u2014 one basing its approach on those in Scandi\u00adnavia, where both insti\u00adtu\u00adtional defence and societal resilience are markedly more advanced.<\/p>\n

Moreover, we should not look only to Sweden and its neigh\u00adbours: Ukraine and Moldova, both countries which have withstood Russian infor\u00admation warfare at its most intense and sustained, have a great deal to teach us. Germany would do well to listen to these friends and partners and to heed their recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions, which are based on hard experience.[16]<\/a> The common thread running through these recom\u00admen\u00adda\u00adtions is: infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation must at last be treated not as a peripheral nuisance but as a first-order question of security.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Russia added Germany, all EU member states and numerous other countries to its official register of \u201cunfriendly states\u201d by Government Decree (Raspor\u00adjaschenije) No. 430\u2011r of 5 March 2022, adopted alongside Presi\u00addential Decree No. 95 of the same date. See Deutscher Bundestag, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, \u201cRussische Gegen\u00adsank\u00adtionen als Reaktion auf westliche Sanktionen\u201d, WD 5 \u2013 3000 \u2013 020\/\u200b22 (Berlin, 2022); an official German trans\u00adlation of Decree No. 430\u2011r appears in Osteuropa-Recht<\/em> 68, no. 2 (2022): 15, https:\/\/doi.org\/10.5771\/0030\u20136444-2022-x-15<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Friedrich Merz, remarks at the \u201cSt\u00e4ndehaus-Treff\u201d of the Rheinische Post<\/em>, D\u00fcsseldorf, September 2025: \u201cWir sind nicht im Krieg, aber wir sind auch nicht mehr im Frieden.\u201d See \u201cBundeskanzler Merz: \u2018Wir sind nicht mehr im Frieden,\u2019 \u201d ZDFheute, 24 September 2025, https:\/\/www.zdfheute.de\/politik\/ausland\/merz-frieden-bedrohung-russland-100.html<\/a>. On the \u201chybrid war\u201d formu\u00adlation, see \u201cMerz warnt vor Putin: \u2018Er f\u00fchrt einen hybriden Krieg gegen uns,\u2019 \u201d n\u2011tv, September 2025, https:\/\/www.n\u2011tv.de\/politik\/Merz-Wir-sind-nicht-im-Krieg-aber-auch-nicht-mehr-im-Frieden-article26064729.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> On the tradition of Ostpolitik and \u201cWandel durch Ann\u00e4herung\u201d and its strategic reassessment after 2022, see Susan Stewart, \u201cConsol\u00adi\u00addating Germany\u2019s Russia Policy: Refine Existing Approaches and Clarify Trade-offs\u201d, SWP Comment 2023\/\u200bC 30 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2023), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.18449\/2023C30. On the origins of the concept, see the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung\u2019s account of Egon Bahr\u2019s 1963 Tutzing speech and the distinction between Cold-War d\u00e9tente and post-1991 Russland\u00adpolitik, https:\/\/www.fes.de\/themen\/zeitenwende-frieden-und-sicherheit\/die-historische-entspannungspolitik-und-der-russische-angriff-auf-die-ukraine<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> On German energy depen\u00addence on Russia via Nord Stream and Gazprom as a source of political leverage: around 55 per cent of German gas imports came from Russia in 2021 (up from roughly 32 per cent in 2010, following the commis\u00adsioning of Nord Stream 1). See Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, Die Bedeutung russischer Gasliefer\u00adungen f\u00fcr die deutsche Wirtschaft (Gutachten f\u00fcr die Atlantik-Br\u00fccke, 2022), https:\/\/www.atlantik-bruecke.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/IW-Gutachten_Die-Bedeutung-russischer-Gaslieferungen.pdf; and Manuel Frondel and Christoph M. Schmidt, \u201cDeutsch\u00adlands Energiev\u00ader\u00adsorgungsrisiko\u201d, Perspek\u00adtiven der Wirtschaft\u00adspolitik 23, no. 3 (2022), https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1515\/pwp-2022\u20130030. The German government halted Nord Stream 2 certi\u00adfi\u00adcation in February 2022, and Russian pipeline gas supplies ceased in the course of 2022.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> On the leaked internal documents of the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency (SDA), which reveal, among other goals, the aim of height\u00adening Germans\u2019 \u201cfear of the future\u201d (Zukun\u00adft\u00adsangst), see the joint inves\u00adti\u00adgation by WDR, NDR and S\u00fcddeutsche Zeitung, \u201cLeak enth\u00fcllt russische Desin\u00adfor\u00admation\u201d, tagesschau.de, 2024, https:\/\/www.tagesschau.de\/investigativ\/ndr-wdr\/desinformation-russland-social-design-agency-100.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Bundesamt f\u00fcr Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutz, Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutzbericht 2024<\/em>, presented 10 June 2025, chapter on \u201cSpionage, Cyberan\u00adgriffe und sonstige nachrich\u00adt\u00aden\u00addi\u00aden\u00adstliche Aktiv\u00adit\u00e4ten\u201d, subsection on Russian \u201cEinflussnahme und Desin\u00adfor\u00admation\u201d, page 300ff https:\/\/www.verfassungsschutz.de\/SharedDocs\/publikationen\/DE\/verfassungsschutzberichte\/2025\u201306-10-verfassungsschutzbericht-2024.html<\/a>.  An English-language summary is available at https:\/\/www.verfassungsschutz.de\/SharedDocs\/publikationen\/EN\/reports-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution\/2025\u201306-brief-summary-2024-report-on-the-protection-of-the-constitution.pdf (see p. 61).<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> On the \u201cTaurus\u201d inter\u00adception, Margarita Simonyan (editor-in-chief of RT) published a recording on 1 March 2024 of a c. 30-minute Webex conver\u00adsation that took place on 19 February 2024 among senior Luftwaffe officers, including Inspector Ingo Gerhartz, who were discussing possible Taurus deliv\u00aderies to Ukraine. The German Ministry of Defence confirmed the record\u00ading\u2019s authen\u00adticity, and Defence Minister Boris Pistorius attributed the breach to an individual appli\u00adcation error on an unsecured connection. See \u201cAbh\u00f6raff\u00e4re um Taurus-Gespr\u00e4ch\u201d, Tagesschau, March 2024, https:\/\/www.tagesschau.de\/<\/a><\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> On sabotage, drone overflights and Telegram-recruited \u201clow-level agents\u201d, see Bundesamt f\u00fcr Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutz, Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutzbericht 2024<\/em> (Cologne\/\u200bBerlin, June 2025), section on espionage, sabotage and influence activities.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> On the delib\u00aderate \u201cpoisoning\u201d\/\u201cgrooming\u201d of Large Language Models via the Pravda\/\u201cPortal Kombat\u201d network, see McKenzie Sadeghi and Isis Blachez, \u201cA Well-Funded Moscow-Based Global \u2018News\u2019 Network Has Infected Western Artificial Intel\u00adli\u00adgence Tools Worldwide with Russian Propa\u00adganda,\u201d NewsGuard, 6 March 2025, https:\/\/www.newsguardtech.com\/special-reports\/moscow-based-global-news-network-infected-western-artificial-intelligence-russian-propaganda\/<\/a>; VIGINUM, Portal Kombat: A Struc\u00adtured and Coordi\u00adnated Pro-Russian Propa\u00adganda Network<\/em> (Paris: SGDSN, 12 February 2024); and DFRLab, \u201cPravda Network,\u201d 12 March 2025, https:\/\/dfrlab.org\/2025\/03\/12\/pravda-network-wikipedia-llm\u2011x\/<\/a>. See also Agora Digitale Trans\u00adfor\u00admation, Meinungs\u00adbildung im Wandel<\/em> (July 2026), https:\/\/agoradigital.de\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/07\/ADT_Studie_Meinungsbildung-im-Wandel.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Check\u00adFirst, \u201cRoska Bridge: How a Pro-Russian IMS Exploits Vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities of Decen\u00adtralised Platforms to Spread Propa\u00adganda,\u201d 2025, https:\/\/checkfirst.network\/roska-bridge-how-a-pro-russian-ims-exploits-vulnerabilities-of-decentralised-platforms-to-spread-propaganda\/<\/a>. Active since at least September 2025, the campaign recycles content from EU-sanctioned outlets such as the Pravda network and shows struc\u00adtural overlaps with Portal Kombat.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> On criticism of the Berliner Zeitung as a dissem\u00adi\u00adnator of Kremlin-aligned narra\u00adtives, see \u201cPutins Propa\u00adganda in Europa: Die Klone des Kreml,\u201d taz, 2024; and \u201cSprechen wie der Kreml? Die spezielle Berichter\u00adstattung der Berliner Zeitung,\u201d \u00dcbermedien. The Bavarian State Office for the Protection of the Consti\u00adtution had listed berliner-zeitung.de among websites whose content the Doppel\u00adg\u00e4nger actor redis\u00adtributed in its \u201cDoppel\u00adg\u00e4nger\u201d analysis of August 2024, but revised that categori\u00adsation in September 2024 after protests from the outlets concerned, clari\u00adfying that it did not thereby allege that these media dissem\u00adi\u00adnated Russian propa\u00adganda; the listing is therefore not cited here as evidence.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> The German Foreign Office first went public with its findings on the large-scale Doppel\u00adganger network on X in January 2024, based on a six-week obser\u00advation window from mid-December 2023 to the end of January 2024, in which it identified more than 50,000 inauthentic accounts; it published the full technical analysis on 5 June 2024. Ausw\u00e4r\u00adtiges Amt, Technical Report<\/em> (5 June 2024).<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Parla\u00admen\u00adtarisches Kontroll\u00adgremium, \u201cBewertung des Parla\u00admen\u00adtarischen Kontroll\u00adgremiums gem\u00e4\u00df \u00a7 10 Absatz 2 Satz 1 des Kontroll\u00adgremi\u00adumge\u00adsetzes: Russische Einflussnahme in Deutschland,\u201d Bundestags\u00addruck\u00adsache 20\/\u200b10655, 13 March 2024, https:\/\/dserver.bundestag.de\/btd\/20\/106\/2010655.pdf<\/a>. The panel warned that Germany stands \u201cat the centre of Russian influence opera\u00adtions\u201d and that the existing means were no longer adequate.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Bundesamt f\u00fcr Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutz, Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutzbericht 2024<\/em> (June 2025), chapters on Russian espionage, sabotage and disin\u00adfor\u00admation, https:\/\/www.verfassungsschutz.de\/SharedDocs\/publikationen\/DE\/verfassungsschutzberichte\/2025\u201306-10-verfassungsschutzbericht-2024.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> On the \u201cGemein\u00adsames Zentrum zur Abwehr hybrider Bedro\u00adhungen\u201d (GAZ Hybrid), opened by Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt on 16 June 2026 and hosted by the Bundesamt f\u00fcr Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutz as a coordi\u00adnation platform of some 40 federal and state agencies with a dedicated working group on disin\u00adfor\u00admation and influence (\u201cAG Desin\u00adfor\u00admation und Einflussnahme\u201d), see Bundesamt f\u00fcr Verfas\u00adsungss\u00adchutz, \u201cGAZ Hybrid,\u201d 16 June 2026, https:\/\/www.verfassungsschutz.de\/SharedDocs\/kurzmeldungen\/DE\/2026\/2026\u201306-16-gaz-hybrid.html<\/a>; and \u201cWas soll das gemeinsame Abwehrzentrum bringen?,\u201d Tagesschau, 16 June 2026, https:\/\/www.tagesschau.de\/inland\/gesellschaft\/abwehrzentrum-hybride-bedrohungen-100.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> On the Baltic states and Nordic countries as models of insti\u00adtu\u00adtional defence and societal resilience against disin\u00adfor\u00admation, see the work of the European Centre of Excel\u00adlence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Helsinki) and the NATO Strategic Commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions Centre of Excel\u00adlence (Riga); e.g. Hybrid CoE, https:\/\/www.hybridcoe.fi\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n

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