{"id":79978,"date":"2026-09-03T14:56:35","date_gmt":"2026-09-03T12:56:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/russian-playbook-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-in-ukraine\/"},"modified":"2026-09-03T15:10:03","modified_gmt":"2026-09-03T13:10:03","slug":"russian-playbook-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-in-ukraine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/libmod.de\/en\/russian-playbook-foreign-information-manipulation-and-interference-fimi-in-ukraine\/","title":{"rendered":"Russian Playbook: Foreign Infor\u00admation Manip\u00adu\u00adlation and Inter\u00adference (FIMI) in Ukraine"},"content":{"rendered":"

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text css_animation=\u201cnone\u201d][\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column][\/vc_row][vc_row css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508251598805{margin-top: 30px !important;}\u201d][vc_column width=\u201c2\/3\u201d css=\u201d.vc_custom_1508252250311{padding-right: 20px !important;}\u201d][vc_column_text css_animation=\u201cnone\u201d]<\/p>\n

Ukraine has been a target of Russian infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation and inter\u00adference for more than a decade \u2013 on a scale closely inter\u00adtwined with military force, cyber opera\u00adtions and occupation gover\u00adnance. The analysis shows which narra\u00adtives, platforms and methods Russia uses to undermine trust, intensify war fatigue and weaken the resilience of Ukrainian society.<\/h3>\n

[\/vc_column_text][vc_column_text css_animation=\u201cnone\u201d]Russian infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation and inter\u00adference in Ukraine is not an isolated disin\u00adfor\u00admation phenomenon, but part of a broader war strategy. Since the annex\u00adation of Crimea in 2014, and especially since the launch of the full-scale invasion in 2022, the Kremlin has combined infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions with military attacks, cyber activ\u00adities, diplo\u00admatic pressure and occupation gover\u00adnance. Its aim is to weaken trust in political and military insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, sow doubts about mobil\u00adi\u00adsation and resis\u00adtance, portray defeat as inevitable and undermine support from Western partners.<\/p>\n

Russia employs a broad arsenal: historical myths and the denial of Ukrainian statehood, narra\u00adtives portraying the country\u2019s leadership as corrupt or \u201cNazi\u201d, attempts to cast doubt on Western assis\u00adtance and European integration, as well as coordi\u00adnated campaigns using Telegram, social media, forged documents, fake accounts and manip\u00adu\u00adlated content. Ukraine has responded by building a dense network of government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, civil society organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions, independent media and researchers. At the same time, the paper shows that resilience is not a fixed end state: for Germany and the EU, this means acting less reactively and more proac\u00adtively \u2013 through better infor\u00admation-sharing, early-warning systems, stronger cyber and media resilience, and closer integration of Ukrainian expertise into European security policy.<\/p>\n

This country paper is part of a series of five case studies published under the title <\/i>\u201cRussian Playbook: Foreign Infor\u00admation Manip\u00adu\u00adlation and Inter\u00adference (FIMI) in Armenia, Georgia, Germany, Moldova, and Ukraine.\u201d<\/i><\/b> The publi\u00adca\u00adtions are part of LibMod\u2019s Eastern Partnership Plus Programme, funded by the German Federal Foreign Office.<\/i>[\/\u200bvc_\u200bcolumn_\u200btext]<\/p>

Policy Paper (Englisch) als PDF herunterladen<\/a><\/div> [vc_\u200bcolumn_\u200btext css_animation=\u201cnone\u201d]\n

Part I. Country context and strategic relevance: Ukraine<\/h2>\n

Ukraine repre\u00adsents the most advanced contem\u00adporary case of Russian foreign infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation and inter\u00adference (FIMI) in terms of scale, duration and integration with military opera\u00adtions. Since Russia\u2019s illegal annex\u00adation of Crimea in 2014, and partic\u00adu\u00adlarly following the launch of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin has subjected Ukraine to systematic and adaptive infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions that are closely integrated with kinetic warfare, cyber activ\u00adities, occupation gover\u00adnance and coercive state\u00adcraft.[1]<\/a> Thus, Ukraine is experi\u00adencing Russian FIMI under the condi\u00adtions of an ongoing military assault, allowing the inter\u00adaction between infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions and kinetic warfare to be observed in real time. It also provides a rare example of how whole-of-society resilience develops under sustained pressure.<\/p>\n

Ukraine occupies a central place in the Kremlin\u2019s imperial worldview. Preventing the consol\u00adi\u00addation of a sovereign, democ\u00adratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Ukraine has become one of Russia\u2019s main strategic prior\u00adities. Following the full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, diplo\u00admatic relations between the two countries were severed, and inter\u00adaction has since been limited to commu\u00adni\u00adcation relating to wartime arrange\u00adments, including prisoner exchanges, third-party mediation and technical negoti\u00ada\u00adtions. Within this context, Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions seek to exploit several overlapping societal vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities and strategic depen\u00addencies in Ukraine. These include fragmented trust in political insti\u00adtution, war fatigue and mobil\u00adi\u00adsation-related anxiety, depen\u00addence on digital platforms (partic\u00adu\u00adlarly Telegram) as primary sources of breaking news and security updates, and Ukraine\u2019s continued reliance on sustained inter\u00adna\u00adtional political, military and financial support.[2]<\/a> Rather than creating these vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities, Russian FIMI seeks to amplify existing societal tensions, deepen uncer\u00adtainty and erode public resilience over time, as it does in other countries targeted by the Kremlin.<\/p>\n

Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions also system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally weaponise history, identity and socio-economic griev\u00adances to both legit\u00adimise the war and undermine Ukrainian sover\u00adeignty.[3]<\/a> Historical narra\u00adtives portray Kyivan Rus and figures such as Volodymyr the Great as part of an exclu\u00adsively Russian historical tradition, while cities such as Odesa are presented as inher\u00adently \u201cRussian\u201d. Russia likewise exploits the memory of the World War II by portraying the Ukrainian government as \u201cNazi\u201d and framing the invasion as a process of \u201cdenaz\u00adi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d and historical justice. In the temporarily occupied terri\u00adtories, these historical narra\u00adtives are reinforced through socio-economic messaging portraying Russia as the guarantor of security, recon\u00adstruction and public services while depicting Ukraine as incapable of governing its own territory and providing for its own people.[4]<\/a> Russian FIMI is therefore insep\u00ada\u00adrable from the broader campaign against Ukrainian statehood. At the same time, cyber opera\u00adtions reinforce these efforts by enabling espionage, infor\u00admation theft and the manip\u00adu\u00adlation of digital infor\u00admation that can subse\u00adquently be incor\u00adpo\u00adrated into broader influence campaigns across Ukraine.<\/p>\n

Part II. The Russian FIMI playbook in Ukraine<\/h2>\n

a) Strategic objectives<\/strong><\/p>\n

Within the broader military and political strategy, Russian FIMI pursues a defined set of objec\u00adtives and is designed to shape the psycho\u00adlogical, political, and strategic condi\u00adtions of the war. In Ukraine, Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions seek to undermine trust in political and military leadership, weaken confi\u00addence in public insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, reduce support for mobil\u00adi\u00adsation, increase percep\u00adtions of inevitable defeat, and erode societal resilience.[5]<\/a> These messages interact with the wider experience of war, including repeated attacks on residential areas and critical infra\u00adstructure, which intensify fear, exhaustion and percep\u00adtions of insecurity amongst the affected population.<\/p>\n

b) Target audiences<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian FIMI campaigns are highly audience-specific. Ukrainian monitoring organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions identify residents of government-controlled terri\u00adtories, residents of temporarily occupied terri\u00adtories, frontline commu\u00adnities, military personnel and their families, inter\u00adnally displaced persons, and younger social media users as distinct target audiences.[6]<\/a>,<\/sup>[7]<\/a> Messaging, emotional framing and dissem\u00adi\u00adnation channels are tailored to each group, allowing Russian actors to exploit different vulner\u00ada\u00adbil\u00adities while pursuing common strategic objec\u00adtives. This level of audience segmen\u00adtation reflects an adaptive influence strategy that responds to the realities of wartime rather than relying on uniform mass messaging.<\/p>\n

c) Dominant narratives<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian narra\u00adtives reinforce one another and support broader strategic objec\u00adtives. Central messages portray Ukraine as an artificial state lacking genuine sover\u00adeignty and histor\u00adi\u00adcally belonging within Russia\u2019s sphere of influence.[8]<\/a> Here, the Ukrainian government is depicted as corrupt, extremist and \u201cNazi\u201d, while the invasion is framed as a legit\u00adimate process of \u201cdenaz\u00adi\u00adfi\u00adcation\u201d and historical justice. Additional narra\u00adtives target both Ukrainian and inter\u00adna\u00adtional audiences with claims that Ukraine is losing the war, mobil\u00adi\u00adsation is unjust or pointless, Western assis\u00adtance is ineffective or misap\u00adpro\u00adpriated, and Kyiv is obstructing peace. The Kremlin\u2019s campaigns have also increas\u00adingly targeted Ukraine\u2019s European integration by portraying EU and NATO membership as unattainable or respon\u00adsible for prolonging the war, while simul\u00adta\u00adne\u00adously exploiting bilateral tensions between Ukraine and individual European partners.[9]<\/a> Currently, this includes disputes with Poland over historical memory, agricul\u00adtural trade and political support.<\/p>\n

d) Tactics, techniques and proce\u00addures (TTPs)<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian FIMI campaigns rely on a broad spectrum of opera\u00adtional techniques designed to give false or misleading content the appearance of authen\u00adticity, indepen\u00addence and widespread public support.[10]<\/a> These include coordi\u00adnated ampli\u00adfi\u00adcation through bot networks and fake accounts; imper\u00adson\u00adation of Ukrainian insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, public officials and media outlets; the dissem\u00adi\u00adnation of forged documents and fabri\u00adcated screen\u00adshots; and the manip\u00adu\u00adlation of authentic material through selective editing or removal from its original context. Kremlin-aligned narra\u00adtives are frequently laundered through anonymous Telegram channels, pseudo-local news outlets and osten\u00adsibly independent commen\u00adtators before being amplified across multiple platforms. Campaigns are also synchro\u00adnised with military devel\u00adop\u00adments, mobil\u00adi\u00adsation decisions, diplo\u00admatic disputes and attacks on civilian infra\u00adstructure, allowing Russian actors to exploit moments of heightened uncer\u00adtainty and emotional vulner\u00ada\u00adbility. Cyber-enabled activ\u00adities, including hacking, data theft and infor\u00admation leaks, can provide additional material for subse\u00adquent influence opera\u00adtions. In the temporarily occupied terri\u00adtories, these techniques are reinforced through systematic censorship of Ukrainian infor\u00admation sources and the monop\u00ado\u00adli\u00adsation of local media, creating a controlled infor\u00admation environment in which independent reporting and alter\u00adnative inter\u00adpre\u00adta\u00adtions of events are increas\u00adingly difficult to access.<\/p>\n

e) Actors<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian FIMI campaigns are imple\u00admented through a layered ecosystem that combines state insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, state-controlled media, occupation author\u00adities and proxy actors.[11]<\/a> At the strategic level, the Presi\u00addential Admin\u00adis\u00adtration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Russian intel\u00adli\u00adgence services play central roles in setting, producing and dissem\u00adi\u00adnating strategic messaging. Russian state-controlled media remain central dissem\u00adi\u00adnators of narra\u00adtives despite the reduction of the extent of their direct reach within Ukraine due to restric\u00adtions intro\u00adduced in the years following 2014. Dissem\u00adi\u00adnation is further enabled through local collab\u00ado\u00adrators, occupation media, anonymous Telegram admin\u00adis\u00adtrators, pseudo-local news outlets and coordi\u00adnated inauthentic social media networks that adapt and amplify pro-Kremlin messaging while obscuring direct state involvement.[12]<\/a> This decen\u00adtralized, multi-channel dissem\u00adi\u00adnation model increases the perceived credi\u00adbility of Russian influence campaigns and compli\u00adcates attribution.<\/p>\n

f) Infor\u00admation channels<\/strong><\/p>\n

Russian influence opera\u00adtions rely on a diverse media ecosystem tailored to the Ukrainian infor\u00admation environment. Telegram has become the principal platform for influence opera\u00adtions due to its widespread use in Ukraine, the promi\u00adnence of anonymous channels and compar\u00ada\u00adtively limited content moder\u00adation.[13]<\/a> Moreover, Telegram often functions as the entry point for narra\u00adtives that are subse\u00adquently amplified through short-form videos, pseudo-news content and coordi\u00adnated social media accounts on other platforms. Telegram\u2019s role is especially important during periods of acute uncer\u00adtainty, when users seek immediate infor\u00admation about attacks, mobil\u00adi\u00adsation or frontline devel\u00adop\u00adments. Russian actors also exploit TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram to reach different demographic groups. In addition, television, radio, and pseudo-local news outlets in the temporarily occupied terri\u00adtories have been brought under Russian control and integrated into occupation gover\u00adnance.[14]<\/a><\/p>\n

Part III. Ukrainian resilience and remaining challenges<\/h2>\n

Ukraine\u2019s response to Russian FIMI has evolved into a compre\u00adhensive whole-of-society effort involving government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, civil society organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions, independent media, researchers and inter\u00adna\u00adtional partners.[15]<\/a> Respon\u00adsi\u00adbility for monitoring, analysing and responding to infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation is distributed across a broad ecosystem of actors with comple\u00admentary roles. Government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, including the Centre for Countering Disin\u00adfor\u00admation, work alongside specialised civil society organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions such as CAT-UA, Internews Ukraine and the Institute of Mass Infor\u00admation (IMI). Independent analytical and media organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions, including Detector Media, Vox Ukraine, Texty.org.ua and StopFake, complement these efforts by monitoring emerging narra\u00adtives, exposing influence opera\u00adtions, fact checking and seeking to strengthen public resilience. Together, these actors have created a distributed resilience ecosystem that combines insti\u00adtu\u00adtional capacity with independent expertise and continuous societal engagement.<\/p>\n

This insti\u00adtu\u00adtional ecosystem has also been evolving in response to the changing character of the war. During Mykhailo Fedorov\u2019s tenure as Minister of Defence (January-July 2026), the ministry signif\u00adi\u00adcantly increased the emphasis on military innovation and cognitive warfare, reflecting an even greater effort to integrate infor\u00admation effects more system\u00adat\u00adi\u00adcally into defence planning. Although some of the reforms are insti\u00adtu\u00adtionally fragile due to Fedorov\u2019s dismissal in July 2026, they illus\u00adtrate how rapidly Ukraine\u2019s under\u00adstanding of the infor\u00admation domain is devel\u00adoping under wartime conditions.<\/p>\n

At the same time, resilience remains uneven and should not be under\u00adstood as immunity. Russia continues to adapt its tactics, narra\u00adtives and dissem\u00adi\u00adnation methods in response to Ukrainian counter\u00admea\u00adsures. Long-term war fatigue, mobil\u00adi\u00adsation-related anxiety, longstanding distrust in insti\u00adtu\u00adtions and the continued dominance of Telegram as one of the key digital sources of infor\u00admation create oppor\u00adtu\u00adnities for influence opera\u00adtions that exploit existing societal tensions.[16]<\/a> Residents of temporarily occupied terri\u00adtories remain partic\u00adu\u00adlarly vulnerable because their access to independent Ukrainian infor\u00admation is severely restricted and Russian-controlled media environ\u00adments dominate everyday infor\u00admation consumption.[17]<\/a><\/p>\n

Ukraine\u2019s experience never\u00adtheless demon\u00adstrates that effective responses to FIMI must extend well beyond debunking false infor\u00admation or removing online content. They require sustained and persistent investment in trusted public insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, independent journalism, strategic commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions, media literacy campaigns, civil society partner\u00adships and continuous adaptation to an evolving threat environment. The Ukrainian example  also illus\u00adtrates that resilience is not a fixed outcome but an ongoing process that must evolve quickly and efficiently.<\/p>\n

Part IV. Impli\u00adca\u00adtions for Germany and the European Union<\/h2>\n

As discussed throughout this paper, the Ukrainian case demon\u00adstrates that Russian foreign infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation and inter\u00adference (FIMI) cannot be under\u00adstood as an isolated disin\u00adfor\u00admation problem. During the full-scale invasion, infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions have functioned alongside military action, cyber opera\u00adtions, diplo\u00admatic pressure and occupation gover\u00adnance as part of a broader strategy to weaken Ukraine\u2019s capacity and willingness to resist. This has important impli\u00adca\u00adtions for Germany and the European Union. It means that countering FIMI is not solely a question of content moder\u00adation or strategic commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions, but of strength\u00adening democ\u00adratic resilience as an integral component of European security policy through whole-of-society approaches.<\/p>\n

The European Union has made signif\u00adicant progress in devel\u00adoping a more coordi\u00adnated response to FIMI. The European External Action Service (EEAS) FIMI framework, sanctions against Russian state-controlled media, the Digital Services Act, support for independent journalism, and increased cooper\u00adation with Ukrainian insti\u00adtu\u00adtions have all strengthened Europe\u2019s capacity to identify, expose and respond to foreign infor\u00admation manipulation.<\/p>\n

The Ukrainian experience never\u00adtheless highlights several limita\u00adtions of current European approaches. Much of the existing policy framework remains reactive, focusing on identi\u00adfying and responding to individual campaigns after they emerge. Ukraine demon\u00adstrates that Russian influence opera\u00adtions are adaptive, long-term and integrated with broader military, political and diplo\u00admatic objec\u00adtives. Addressing such campaigns therefore requires responses that  include stronger insti\u00adtu\u00adtional resilience, sustained public trust, independent media and platform ecosystems, and closer integration between strategic commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions, cyber security, intel\u00adli\u00adgence and civil society.<\/p>\n

A second lesson concerns the value of Ukrainian expertise. Over more than a decade of confronting Russian infor\u00admation opera\u00adtions, and more than four years of full-scale war, Ukraine has developed practical knowledge that extends far beyond individual tools or technologies. Expertise has accumu\u00adlated across government insti\u00adtu\u00adtions, civil society organ\u00adi\u00adsa\u00adtions, independent media, researchers and technology specialists, creating a uniquely mature under\u00adstanding of how Russian influence opera\u00adtions evolve over time and in parallel with military action. European cooper\u00adation should therefore increas\u00adingly move beyond tradi\u00adtional donor-recipient relation\u00adships towards even more systematic knowledge exchange and insti\u00adtu\u00adtional partner\u00adships, in which Ukrainian practi\u00adtioners contribute directly to policy devel\u00adopment, profes\u00adsional training, capability devel\u00adopment and early-warning mecha\u00adnisms. Moreover, partners still need faster infor\u00admation-sharing, stronger joint early-warning systems and more systematic cross-countries coordi\u00adnation.[18]<\/a><\/p>\n

Finally, the Ukrainian experience suggests that democ\u00adratic states should move beyond a predom\u00adi\u00adnantly reactive approach to countering FIMI. This does not imply mirroring author\u00adi\u00adtarian infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation or engaging in disin\u00adfor\u00admation. Instead, it includes timely strategic commu\u00adni\u00adcation, coordi\u00adnated public attri\u00adbution of hostile activ\u00adities, the release of credible intel\u00adli\u00adgence where appro\u00adpriate, pre-bunking and inocu\u00adlation efforts, and the integration of infor\u00admation activ\u00adities into broader political and security strategies. This evolution mirrors broader devel\u00adop\u00adments in Ukrainian cyber strategy, where resilience has increas\u00adingly been comple\u00admented by deter\u00adrence and carefully governed offensive capabil\u00adities.[19]<\/a> Similar lessons can be drawn for the infor\u00admation domain.<\/p>\n

Democ\u00adratic approaches to FIMI should therefore evolve from those aimed solely at protecting the infor\u00admation environment towards approaches that proac\u00adtively shape condi\u00adtions such that hostile influence opera\u00adtions become less effective and adver\u00adsarial narra\u00adtives gain traction. In doing so, democ\u00adratic states should seek not only to strengthen resilience against hostile influence, but also to shape the infor\u00admation environment in ways that reinforce democ\u00adratic security and increase the costs of author\u00adi\u00adtarian infor\u00admation operations.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> FIMI as part of Russian war machine: Ukraine\u2019s fight \u2013 Ukrainian Prism<\/a><\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Ukrainian Resis\u00adtance to Russian Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Lessons for Future Conflict | RAND<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Analytical Report: Historical Context of Russian Propa\u00adganda \u2014 PR Army<\/a><\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Examining Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Perspec\u00adtives on Residents from Occupied and Freed Terri\u00adtories on Social Media: Detector Media<\/a><\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> FIMI as part of Russian war machine: Ukraine\u2019s fight \u2013 Ukrainian Prism<\/a><\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Media Audience Segments in Ukraine: Research Results \/\u200b LMF<\/a><\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Examining Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Perspec\u00adtives on Residents from Occupied and Freed Terri\u00adtories on Social Media: Detector Media<\/a><\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> \u00ab\u042f\u043a \u0440\u043e\u0441\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044c\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0456\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u043e\u0440\u0430\u0431\u0435\u043b\u044c \u043f\u0456\u0448\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0430\u2026 \u041d\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0433\u0430\u043d\u0434\u0438 \u043f\u0456\u0434 \u0447\u0430\u0441 \u043f\u043e\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043c\u0430\u0441\u0448\u0442\u0430\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0457 \u0432\u0456\u0439\u043d\u0438\u00bb<\/a><\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Results of pro-Russian infor\u00admation manip\u00adu\u00adlation and disin\u00adfor\u00admation monitoring targeting Ukraine-EU relations during June \u2013 August, 2025 | EEAS<\/a><\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Strategic Narra\u00adtives and Infor\u00admation Warfare: Russian FIMI Campaigns against Ukraine\u2019s Armed Forces in the Context of War and Societal Impact \u2014 dif.org.ua<\/a><\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> The Archi\u00adtecture of Russia\u2019s FIMI Opera\u00adtions \u2014 EUvsDisinfo<\/a><\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> StratCom | NATO Strategic Commu\u00adni\u00adca\u00adtions Centre of Excel\u00adlence Riga, Latvia<\/a><\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Over One-Third of Ukrainians Turn to News Exclu\u00adsively from Social Media | Internews Ukraine<\/a><\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Examining Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Perspec\u00adtives on Residents from Occupied and Freed Terri\u00adtories on Social Media: Detector Media<\/a><\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Ukrainian Resis\u00adtance to Russian Disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Lessons for Future Conflict | RAND<\/a><\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> FIMI as Part of Russian War Machine: Ukraine\u2019s fight \u2013 Ukrainian Prism<\/a><\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Hybrid CoE Research Report 11. How Ukraine fights Russian disin\u00adfor\u00admation: Beehive vs mammoth<\/a><\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Time to Take a Step Forward from Analysis to a Collective Response \u2014 EUvsDisinfo<\/a><\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> Offense Is the Best Defense | Orange Cyberde\u00adfense CERT Threat Research<\/a><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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