Inter­na­lized FIMI – How Russian infor­mation manipu­lation became domestic political commu­ni­cation in Georgia

Executive summary

There has been a funda­mental trans­for­mation in foreign infor­mation manipu­lation and inter­fe­rence (FIMI) in Georgia. Whereas Russian influence opera­tions once relied primarily on external actors, such as Kremlin-run media, openly pro-Russian organiza­tions, and anonymous social media networks, a different pheno­menon is incre­asingly apparent in Georgia’s infor­mation environment: the inter­na­lization of Russian FIMI by influ­ential domestic political actors. This assessment is supported by the European Commission’s Georgia Report 2025, which found that the Georgian autho­rities had syste­ma­ti­cally engaged in unpre­ce­dented hostile anti-EU rhetoric that often echoed Russian-style disinformation.

This policy brief argues that the Georgian Dream government, together with its principal media platforms, TV Imedi, POSTV, and Rustavi 2, has incre­asingly adopted not only the narra­tives promoted by the Kremlin but also the opera­tional methods, commu­ni­cation strategies, and infor­mation manipu­lation techniques tradi­tio­nally associated with Russian influence opera­tions. Rather than functioning as independent domestic political commu­ni­cators, these actors incre­asingly reproduce Russian strategic messaging within Georgia’s infor­mation environment through domestic insti­tu­tions, media, and political language. The European Commission has separately concluded that the Georgian autho­rities have syste­ma­ti­cally disse­mi­nated anti-EU rhetoric and disinformation.

Evidence of the propa­ganda machinery operating in Georgia was provided by Meta’s Q2 2024 Adver­sarial Threat Report, which documented a coordi­nated inauthentic network in Georgia that used ficti­tious personas and media-style entities to criticize protesters and support the Georgian Dream. Meta linked this network, which operated across Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, to the Georgian government’s Department of Strategic Communications.

As a result, Georgia now has a hybrid infor­mation ecosystem in which foreign influence is no longer wielded exclu­sively from abroad/​by foreign actors. Instead, Russian strategic narra­tives are localized, legiti­mized, and amplified by mainstream domestic actors. The Fourth EEAS FIMI Threat Report identifies Georgia as one of the countries targeted by false allega­tions of EU- and NATO-backed desta­bi­lization plots, which is one element of the broader Russian campaign whose narra­tives are then picked up and repro­duced in Georgian domestic political discourse.

This represents an evolution from external influence to inter­na­lized FIMI, creating new challenges for the European Union, NATO, democratic insti­tu­tions, technology companies, and civil society organiza­tions seeking to strengthen democratic resilience.

From Russian propa­ganda to domestic infor­mation manipulation

Russian infor­mation opera­tions have targeted Georgia since long before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian military opera­tions during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War were accom­panied by a coordi­nated propa­ganda campaign portraying Georgia and the West as respon­sible for Russia’s aggression. In the years that followed, Moscow invested in the develo­pment of local proxies capable of disse­mi­nating anti-Western narra­tives from within Georgia. These included openly pro-Russian media outlets, organiza­tions, political groups, and coordi­nated anonymous social media networks. The develo­pment of these networks and their messaging are documented in the Media Develo­pment Foundation’s annual reports on anti-Western propa­ganda and GRASS Disinfo Briefs.

Until recently, however, these pro-Russian actors remained largely on the political margins. Their influence was limited because they were widely perceived as directly repre­senting Russian interests.

This landscape has changed signi­fi­cantly since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Anti-Western narra­tives, once confined to fringe pro-Kremlin organiza­tions, have incre­asingly migrated into mainstream political commu­ni­cation. Rather than openly advocating closer relations with Moscow, domestic political actors began framing Russia’s strategic narra­tives through the language of Georgian sovereignty, peace, Chris­tianity, tradi­tional values, and national identity. This localization made the messages substan­tially more persuasive as made it seem that they origi­nated from domestic political debate rather than foreign propa­ganda. As the European Commission concluded, Georgian autho­rities have “syste­ma­ti­cally engaged in hostile anti-EU rhetoric, manipu­lative narra­tives and conspiracy theories, often mirroring Russian-type disin­for­mation.” The European Parliament has also confirmed that the government-affiliated media regularly spread manipu­lative narra­tives and conspiracy theories that emulated Russian-inspired propaganda.

The defining charac­te­ristic of today’s Georgian infor­mation environment is therefore not the volume of Russian propa­ganda entering the country, but the extent to which influ­ential domestic actors themselves reproduce Russian narratives.

Inter­na­lization of Russian strategic narratives

The conver­gence between Kremlin messaging and Georgian Dream commu­ni­cation is visible across virtually every major strategic narrative that the Kremlin has promoted since 2022.

The first such narrative concerns the claim that the West seeks to drag Georgia into a war against Russia. Russian officials have repea­tedly argued that the United States and NATO aim to expand the conflict in Ukraine by opening additional fronts against Moscow. Georgian Dream gradually adopted the same message domesti­cally through a “second front” narrative, claiming that the European Union, the United States, opposition parties, civil society organiza­tions and independent media were attempting to force Georgia into military confron­tation with Russia.

Closely connected is the “Global War Party” conspiracy. Georgian Dream leaders claim that there is an undefined network of Western political elites that controls European and American insti­tu­tions, finances Georgian NGOs and media, organizes protests, and seeks regime change in Tbilisi. Although presented as a domestic political concept, this narrative closely mirrors long-standing Russian conspiracy theories describing a collective Western “war party” that is deter­mined to weaken Russia through proxy conflicts and externally orchestrated revolutions.

Similarly, the notion that Georgia is facing an externally organized attempt to implement a “colour revolution” follows an almost identical trajectory. Russian Foreign Intel­li­gence Service (SVR) repeated issued state­ments throughout 2024 warning that Washington was preparing a “Tbilisi Maidan” involving NGOs, election observers, youth organiza­tions and Western govern­ments. Shortly before and after these state­ments were released, Georgian Dream repre­sen­ta­tives, TV Imedi, and POSTV presented nearly identical allega­tions, claiming that demons­tra­tions, election monitoring, and civic activism formed part of a Western plan to overthrow the government. Georgian Dream leaders often claim that five colour revolu­tions have been organized in the last several years, all foiled by autho­rities’ vigilance.

The same conver­gence is visible with respect to the attitude towards NGOs, independent media, and election obser­vation. Organiza­tions tradi­tio­nally understood as insti­tu­tions of democratic accoun­ta­bility are now syste­ma­ti­cally portrayed as foreign agents, revolution organizers, and instru­ments of Western intel­li­gence services. These narra­tives provided political justi­fi­cation for the legis­lation restricting foreign funding of civil society and independent media passed by the Georgian Dream in the 2024–2026 period. In its opinions on Georgia’s Foreign Influence Trans­pa­rency Law and other restrictive laws, the Venice Commission concludes that these laws threaten freedom of association, independent media, and civil society, and recom­mends their repeal.

Another important area of conver­gence involves identity politics. Rather than criti­cizing European integration primarily on insti­tu­tional grounds or arguing over legitimate issues, such as the speed of integration and the EU’s infle­xi­bility, Georgian Dream incre­asingly frames the European Union as a civiliza­tional threat: as seeking to undermine Georgian identity, Orthodox Chris­tianity, and tradi­tional family values by promoting LGBTQ rights, under­mining the Orthodox Church, infringing on sovereignty, and inter­fering in domestic affairs. This framing directly reflects one of the Kremlin’s principal geopo­li­tical narra­tives, which portrays liberal democracy as incom­pa­tible with national identity and tradi­tional civilization.

Finally, the Georgian Dream propa­ganda machinery often uses compa­rative propa­ganda, or what could be dubbed “compa­ra­ganda”, that is, propa­ganda ampli­fying stories from the European Union and the USA that lend themselves to use domesti­cally to justify the party’s anti-democratic steps. For instance, if a Western state arrests opposition politi­cians, passes legis­lation limiting human rights, or cracks down on demons­trators, stories on the subject are widely disse­mi­nated with the aim of showing that action of that kind is perfectly normal, even in Western democracies. This compa­ra­ganda sometimes goes too far, with the Georgian Dream leaders actually attacking Western democracies for democratic backsliding, as was recently the case with Denmark.

TV Imedi, Rustavi 2, and POSTV: domestic infra­structure of inter­na­lized FIMI

The localization of Russian strategic narra­tives became possible due to the trans­for­mation of Georgia’s mainstream media landscape into a polarized media space. On one side, there are dominant state-controlled media channels, which are over-resourced and pampered, on the other, struggling independent media channels, which are subject to legal constraints, monetary fines and regular demonization, as well as harassment in the form of physical threats, arrests and violence. The broader deterio­ration of media pluralism has been documented by the European Commission, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, Human Rights Watch, and Media Freedom Rapid Response, and is described in considerable detail in the OSCE Moscow Mechanism 2026 report on Georgia.

TV Imedi, Rustavi 2 and POSTV incre­asingly serve as central nodes in the domestic infor­mation ecosystem that supports Georgian Dream’s political commu­ni­cation. Although legally these broad­casters are privately owned, all three channels maintain close political and economic ties with influ­ential figures connected to the ruling party.

The propa­ganda is further amlified are further supported by the Georgian Public Broad­caster, which is under the Georgian Dream party’s control and is staffed by party loyalists. Despite being state-funded, the GPB does not enjoy high ratings. It often propa­gates the official party line and denies airtime to the opposition leaders and criti­cally minded experts.

That the pro-government media have been evolving into propa­ganda mouth­pieces has been parti­cu­larly noticeable since 2022. Their coverage has incre­asingly focused on portraying Western govern­ments as hostile actors, delegi­ti­mizing civil society organiza­tions, accusing opposition parties of serving foreign interests, questioning European integration, and ampli­fying conspiracy theories concerning the “second front,” the “Deep State,” and foreign attempts to organize revolution. These narra­tives have syste­ma­ti­cally repro­duced strategic messaging that has long been promoted by Russian state insti­tu­tions and Kremlin-controlled media.

The conver­gence in messaging with Russia received unpre­ce­dented inter­na­tional recognition in February 2026, when the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on TV Imedi and POSTV under its Russia sanctions regime, identi­fying both broad­casters as entities involved in spreading Russian disin­for­mation concerning Ukraine. The UK’s Sanctions Notice asserts that the broad­casters disse­mi­nated deliberately misleading infor­mation portraying the Ukrainian government as illegi­timate, Ukraine as a puppet of the West, and alleging that Ukraine and Western govern­ments were attempting to desta­bilize Georgia.

The imposition of these sanctions marked the first time a Western government had formally designated major Georgian television broad­casters as parti­ci­pants in Russian infor­mation opera­tions. The measures included asset freezes in the United Kingdom and restric­tions on economic activities involving the designated entities. It is noteworthy that Imedi TV used to be owned by a London-based company, but the owners of that company sold its shares just weeks before London announced the sanctions.

Beyond their symbolic signi­fi­cance, the sanctions brought poten­tially important practical conse­quences. Because Georgian banking regula­tions require Georgian financial insti­tu­tions to implement UK sanctions regimes related to Russia, legal experts argued that Imedi and POSTV could face restric­tions in relation to domestic banking services, adver­tising revenue, financial transac­tions, as well as to access to Western commercial partners. The sanctions also substan­tially increase reputa­tional and compliance risks for businesses, adver­tisers, and inter­na­tional companies that cooperate with the broadcasters.

In addition to activities mentioned, these two pro-Georgian Dream broad­casters are also incre­asingly providing platforms for inter­na­tional commen­tators whose views are regularly amplified by Russian state media, including Jeffrey Sachs, Larry Johnson, Thierry Mariani, Mick Wallace and Glenn Diesen. Although these indivi­duals differ in their political views, each consis­t­ently advances narra­tives blaming NATO expansion for the war in Ukraine, criti­cizing Western support for Kyiv, questioning democratic movements in Georgia, or portraying Western insti­tu­tions as desta­bi­lizing actors.

Opera­tional conver­gence: adoption of Russian infor­mation techniques

Inter­na­lization of Russian FIMI extends beyond the disse­mi­nation of Russian narratives.

TV Imedi, Rustavi 2, and POSTV, as well as broader pro-government messaging, including through the public broad­caster, are making incre­asing use of opera­tional techniques commonly associated with Russian FIMI.

First, major infor­mation campaigns are frequently charac­te­rised by synchro­nized disse­mi­nation across television broad­casters, online media, and anonymous social media accounts. Similar stories often appear across multiple outlets within minutes of each other, creating an artificial impression of independent confirmation.

Second, evidence suggests an incre­asing use of coordi­nated inauthentic behaviour. Meta has repea­tedly dismantled networks linked to Georgian Dream actors that operated fake Facebook pages, anonymous accounts, and coordi­nated ampli­fi­cation campaigns. More recent cases involved the simul­ta­neous publi­cation of identical content by television broad­casters and anonymous accounts, suggesting the pursuit of coordi­nated disse­mi­nation strategies similar to those employed in Russian influence operations.

Third, staged and manipu­lated audio­visual content is incre­asingly appearing in domestic political commu­ni­cation. During protests against the foreign agents law, broad­casters disse­mi­nated videos that discredited protesters, individual politi­cians, and activists. These attacks often included selec­tively edited recor­dings that spread at viral rates on Facebook and TikTok.

Fourth, Georgia witnessed probable AI-assisted infor­mation manipu­lation during the 2025 local elections and the protests of 4 October 2025. Anonymous pro-government accounts distri­buted audio recor­dings allegedly including the voices of opposition figures and government critics. Independent technical analysis indicated high proba­bi­lities that the content was AI-generated in several cases, and the autho­rities never confirmed the authen­ticity of the recor­dings. The widespread disse­mi­nation of these recor­dings in the run up to politi­cally signi­ficant events demons­trates how synthetic media is being integrated into domestic political communication.

Why this matters

The Georgian case illus­trates an important evolution in modern FIMI. Tradi­tional responses to foreign infor­mation manipu­lation have sought primarily to identify external actors: foreign govern­ments, foreign state media, troll farms or coordi­nated influence networks operating across borders. Once these actors have been identified, the idea is to mobilize local government and employ a whole-of-society approach to counter the FIMI.

The FIMI model seen in Georgia is quite different. In Georgia, it is, incre­asingly, domestic political insti­tu­tions, mainstream broad­casters and local political actors who are advancing Russian strategic objec­tives. This signi­fi­cantly compli­cates attri­bution because it means that influence opera­tions become embedded within legitimate domestic political commu­ni­cation. Thus the distinction between external propa­ganda and internal political messaging is becoming incre­asingly blurred.

This develo­pment carries serious impli­ca­tions for democratic resilience.

When conspiracy theories become norma­lized through mainstream broad­casters, public trust in democratic insti­tu­tions erodes. When NGOs and journa­lists are portrayed as foreign agents, independent accoun­ta­bility mecha­nisms weaken. When election observers are depicted as instru­ments of foreign intel­li­gence, confi­dence in electoral integrity declines. When peaceful protests are framed as externally orchestrated coups, civic parti­ci­pation itself is delegi­ti­mized., More importantly, though, when the European Union is presented as an enemy and Russia is presented as a protector of Christian values, the line between enemy and friend is blurred. This blurring will inevi­tably cause severe security problems for a small country that has undergone repeated attacks by Russia on its sovereignty and terri­torial integrity and whose prosperity and safety largely depends on its prospects of integration into the Western political and security insti­tu­tions, like the EU and NATO.

Perhaps most importantly, this environment makes the attri­bution of and response to FIMI far more difficult. While it is clear that Georgian domestic actors employ the same methods, techniques, tactics, and behavioural patterns, and their messaging and strategic commu­ni­cation closely mirror Kremlin narra­tives, it is becoming incre­asingly difficult to identify those respon­sible, establish their links to Moscow, or demons­trate any formal chain of coordi­nation or subor­di­nation. This, in turn, raises questions such as whether these actions are simply a coinci­dence or are directly controlled by and subor­di­nated to Moscow.

Policy recom­men­da­tions

The European Union and its Member States should recognize inter­na­lized FIMI as a distinct category of hybrid threat, especially in countries in which pro-Russian anti-democratic govern­ments are in power. This is currently the case in Georgia; had the Moldovan and Armenian elections been won by pro-Russian forces, it would have happened there as well.

Second, the assess­ments of foreign infor­mation manipu­lation should not focus exclu­sively on Russian state actors but should also examine domestic political and media actors that syste­ma­ti­cally reproduce and amplify the Kremlin’s strategic narra­tives. In many countries, these actors are more dangerous for national security – in terms of making the local societies vulnerable to Russian pressure – than the Moscow-orchestrated trolls and state propa­ganda attacks.

Support for independent media and inves­ti­gative journalism should remain a strategic priority for the West if it wishes to seriously counter homegrown pro-Russian propa­ganda and Russia’s influence opera­tions. Streng­thening resilient domestic infor­mation ecosystems represents one of the most effective long-term responses to inter­na­lized FIMI.  The adoption of a whole-of-society approach is impos­sible in Georgia, since the Government is the agent of the FIMI. Therefore, other actors at the forefront in protecting European values and countering FIMI should be empowered more.

Technology companies should adopt frame­works for the detection of coordi­nated inauthentic behaviour to improve the identi­fi­cation of synchro­nized campaigns involving tradi­tional broad­casters alongside anonymous online networks. Existing moderation systems often treat television broad­casters and coordi­nated social media activity separately, despite the incre­asing opera­tional conver­gence among them. Greater empowerment of the fact-checking community by tech giants and greater EU oversight of these social media corpo­ra­tions should be made an integral part of the EU-wide response framework towards the Russian FIMI.

Future sanctions frame­works against Russia should consider not only indivi­duals who directly coordinate with Moscow-based propa­ganda machinery, but also those who syste­ma­ti­cally facilitate and amplify foreign infor­mation-manipu­lation campaigns within domestic political systems. As it can sometimes be impos­sible to establish links between the latter and Moscow, especially if the government is in charge of covering up, any evidence to that effect, the use of the same standard for sanctions that is used vis-à-vis Russia Today or other propa­ganda outlets that are clearly run by the Russian government is neither effective nor practical.

Finally, democratic resilience initia­tives related to Georgia should incre­asingly focus on identi­fying the localization of anti-European and pro-Russian narra­tives rather than solely on monitoring propa­ganda coming directly from foreign countries. As the Georgian experience demons­trates, modern FIMI often succeeds not because foreign actors speak louder, but because domestic actors have begun speaking with their voices.

Conclusion

Georgia represents one of the clearest contem­porary examples of the way in which foreign infor­mation manipu­lation can evolve into a domesti­cally sustained political commu­ni­cation system. Russian strategic narra­tives, opera­tional techniques, and influence metho­do­logies have not only entered the Georgian infor­mation space but also incre­asingly been inter­na­lized by influ­ential domestic political actors and mainstream media institutions.

This trans­for­mation funda­men­tally changes the way that democratic societies should under­stand and respond to FIMI. The principal challenge is no longer exclu­sively external propa­ganda origi­nating from Moscow. It is also the norma­lization of Russian influence metho­do­logies within domestic political discourse itself.

Recognizing this evolution is essential for the develo­pment of effective democratic resilience policies. To be successful, efforts to counter Russian FIMI in Georgia will therefore have to address not only foreign influence opera­tions but also the domestic political and media infra­struc­tures that have adopted, localized, and legiti­mized them. However, even if this infra­structure is targeted via various restrictive measures, it will not be possible to counter the success of Russian FIMI in Georgia without regular steps to empower the major domestic actors   resisting it – independent TV media, news and online media, fact-checking community, civil society organiza­tions and univer­sities –, even if the local legal environment does not permit such empowerment.