Policy Paper: Georgia’s Fight for Democ­ratic Survival

Intro­duction

Georgia is under­going a profound political trans­for­mation that can no longer be described as mere democ­ratic backsliding. The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party is accel­er­ating a systemic consol­i­dation of power, mirroring the trajec­tories of compet­itive author­i­tarian regimes. The pace and direction of recent devel­op­ments indicate a struc­tural shift toward a one-party autocratic system with increas­ingly total­i­tarian features. Core democ­ratic pillars – civil society, political pluralism, independent insti­tu­tions, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly – are being system­at­i­cally targeted.

This internal trans­for­mation is insep­a­rable from Georgia’s foreign-policy reori­en­tation. The adoption of Russian-style legis­lation not only provides tools for internal repression but also signals a delib­erate geopo­litical shift. As the government consol­i­dates author­i­tarian power at home, it is simul­ta­ne­ously distancing itself from Georgia’s tradi­tional Euro-Atlantic allies, escalating its confronta­tional rhetoric toward the EU and the United States, challenging long-standing partner­ships, and, increas­ingly, echoing Kremlin narra­tives. These internal and external dynamics are mutually reinforcing, reflecting a strategic reposi­tioning that aligns Georgia more closely with author­i­tarian models than with European democ­ratic principles.

Yet despite sustained repression, Georgian society continues to resist in an unprece­dented manner. Peaceful demon­stra­tions have persisted without inter­ruption for almost a year, with protesters, adapting to escalating police pressure, admin­is­trative deten­tions, and restrictive legis­lation. Civic activism contin­ually finds new forms of expression, demon­strating both resilience and creativity in the face of author­i­tarian consol­i­dation. Impor­tantly, public backing for EU integration consis­tently exceeds 70 percent (Georgia annual survey 2025), and has thus been able to serve as one of the few remaining democ­ratic stabilisers amid the country’s accel­er­ating autocratisation.

Legal and coercive pressures on Georgian civil society

Over the past 2 years, the government has intro­duced and opera­tionalised a series of legal, insti­tu­tional, and coercive measures designed to suppress dissent and close down the remaining civic space. The current regression is struc­tural rather than episodic and is driven by a delib­erate and sustained effort to consol­idate power through an increas­ingly restrictive legal framework reinforced by punitive enforcement practices.

Since 2024, civil society organ­i­sa­tions (CSOs) have faced an unprece­dented escalation of repression. This process began in spring 2024 with the adoption of the “Trans­parency of Foreign Influence” law and inten­sified further with the expanded “Foreign Agents” law and amend­ments to the “Law on Grants” in April 2025. Collec­tively, these measures have created a hostile operating environment that leaves virtually no space for independent civic activity.

Non-compliance with the Foreign Agents law results in criminal liability and severe financial penalties, while the amend­ments to the Law on Grants effec­tively prevent organ­i­sa­tions from receiving foreign funding without prior government approval. Viola­tions result in fines amounting to double the value of any unautho­rised grant, under­mining both the opera­tional autonomy and the financial sustain­ability of the organ­i­sation in question. A recent PACE resolution 2624 (2025) describes the cumulative effect of these laws as devas­tating, empha­sising that they place the very survival of Georgian civil society at immediate risk.

The author­ities have accorded additional powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), granting it sweeping authority to access sensitive internal documents, commu­ni­ca­tions, financial records, and data on benefi­ciaries. Since spring 2025, the ACB has carried out multiple waves of inspec­tions of NGOs, ultimately encom­passing approx­i­mately 100 organ­i­sa­tions. These inspec­tions are widely perceived as polit­i­cally motivated and intended to induce insti­tu­tional paralysis, discourage public engagement, and compel self-censorship.

Repression inten­sified sharply in August 2025, when author­ities froze the bank accounts of seven CSOs as part of a criminal inves­ti­gation. At issue is the suspected commission of several serious criminal offences including sabotage, attempted sabotage under aggra­vated circum­stances, assisting a foreign organ­i­sation or an organ­i­sation under foreign influence in hostile activ­ities, and financing actions against Georgia’s consti­tu­tional order and national security. These charges carry penalties ranging from seven years to fifteen years of impris­onment. Author­ities claim that the organ­i­sa­tions’ funds were used to supply basic protective items to peaceful protesters during the 2024 demon­stra­tions, which were marked by widespread police violence, as well as to cover fines, provide free legal aid, and engage with inter­na­tional partners. Among others, the directors of several CSOs have been summoned for questioning, while opposition political leaders are already formally charged under similar allegations. 

Amidst increasing pressure on civil society, the government has announced a contro­versial reform of higher education, involving changes to the funding of univer­sities, the redis­tri­b­ution of faculties, and anopti­mi­sation of resources. Concerns have emerged that, given the non-trans­parent and extremely expedited process and the climate of growing hostility toward dissent in academia, the reform may be aimed at estab­lishing political control over univer­sities and further eroding any remaining independent spaces within the academic sector.

Despite mounting pressures, including the risk of criminal prose­cution, intrusive inspec­tions, asset freezes, and persistent state-orches­trated defamation, Georgian CSOs continue to operate. Many have adapted by adjusting their strategies, decen­tral­ising their opera­tions, and devel­oping alter­native methods and means to continue their work. However, these measures reflect estab­lished author­i­tarian techniques for constricting civic space, weakening democ­ratic account­ability, and eroding the insti­tu­tional founda­tions essential for plural­istic gover­nance. The trajectory indicates not merely backsliding but the systematic disman­tling of the civic sector as an independent actor within Georgia’s state system.

Erosion of Political Pluralism in Georgia: Legal and Insti­tu­tional Mechanisms

By 2025, the political environment in Georgia has deteri­o­rated dramat­i­cally. State actions against opposition leaders reached levels incom­patible with democ­ratic gover­nance and the rule of law. Seven leaders, repre­senting all the major opposition parties, are in detention or have been convicted, with some serving several months in jail for non-compliance with summonses issued by a one-party parlia­mentary inves­tigative commission, which is widely regarded as a partisan tool and lacking proce­dural legitimacy.

In November 2025, the Prosecutor’s Office brought new criminal charges against eight opposition leaders, including sabotage, collab­o­ration with foreign powers, and attempting to overthrow the consti­tu­tional order. Opposition leaders now face the prospect of long-term impris­onment on charges for activ­ities that clearly fall within the bound­aries of legit­imate political participation.

At the same time, the ruling party has been advancing legislative measures that directly threaten political pluralism. On 16 October 2025, the one-party parliament adopted, through an expedited procedure, a package of amend­ments enabling the prohi­bition of political parties and the indef­inite depri­vation of political rights for individuals associated with them. The intent and effect of these measures was to preemp­tively exclude the ruling party’s political competitors from partic­i­pation in public life. The legislative changes were immedi­ately followed by a consti­tu­tional appeal requesting the banning of three major opposition parties.

The legal justi­fi­ca­tions presented are broad and polit­i­cally charged, including claims that opposition parties have questioned the legit­imacy of the government, actions related to the 2008 August war, decisions to boycott elections.

On 17 November, the ruling party intro­duced further amend­ments to the Election Code, effec­tively depriving Georgian citizens residing abroad of their right to vote in parlia­mentary elections, claiming that these citizens are “subject to pressure from foreign govern­ments”. This step consti­tutes yet another measure contributing to the consol­i­dation of increas­ingly author­i­tarian gover­nance, further weakening societal and political pluralism.

The combined use of criminal prose­cu­tions, restrictive legis­lation, and consti­tu­tional litigation demon­strates a coordi­nated strategy to consol­idate one-party dominance through judicial and admin­is­trative means. These devel­op­ments consol­idate author­i­tarian control, effec­tively elimi­nating the condi­tions for genuine political compe­tition and plural­istic governance.

Targeting of freedom of assembly in Georgia

Since spring 2024, and especially during the November–December protests, Georgians have come under an escalating attack on freedom of assembly, with increas­ingly aggressive policing. Widespread abuse has been documented, including the unlawful and dispro­por­tionate use of special means resulting in serious injuries, arbitrary arrests conducted by uniden­ti­fiable police and special forces, physical violence during arrests, transport, and detention, denial of medical care and obstruction of emergency services, systemic impunity due to the failure of the Special Inves­tigative Service and the judiciary to fulfill their mandates (Human Rights Crisis in Georgia [November 2024 – February 2025]: A Joint Report by Eleven Georgian Civil Society Organi­za­tions, Tbilisi, 14 May 2025)

On 1 December 2025, the BBC reported finding evidence suggesting that Georgian author­ities may have used prohibited chemical substances against protesters during the demon­stra­tions that started on 28 November 2024. If this did indeed occur, it would constitute a severe violation of inter­na­tional norms, human rights oblig­a­tions, and Georgia’s commit­ments under inter­na­tional conventions.

Instead of providing trans­parency about the chemical agents used against peaceful protesters, the State Security Service of Georgia has begun summoning individuals featured in a BBC documentary, including doctors and human rights defenders, for questioning as part of an inves­ti­gation into alleged “assis­tance to foreign entities” and “abuse of official powers.”

Although hundreds of cases of ill-treatment of demon­strators in November and December 2024 have been reported, none of the incidents has been inves­ti­gated. Following the violent crack­downs, the inter­na­tional community responded by imposing targeted sanctions and travel bans on high-ranking police officials and judges, several of whom were dismissed later. After mid-December, large-scale physical violence declined, and the author­ities appeared to shift their tactics from the widespread use of force to legal, admin­is­trative, and financial forms of pressure, a shift that may have been influ­enced, among other factors, by the sanctions and the prospect of further inter­na­tional action

Over the past year, legal framework and policing practicesfor peaceful assembly in Georgia has undergone successive waves of restrictive amend­ments, trans­forming partic­i­pation in protests into a high-risk and heavily penalised activity. The process began in December 2024, with the most recent amend­ments adopted in October 2025. Each legislative package has responded directly to emerging protest tactics: fines for protest-related acts were raised 20 to 30 times, reaching 5,000 GEL — which is approx­i­mately 2.5 to 3 times the average monthly income, and thus effec­tively unaffordable for ordinary citizens. Funds which previ­ously provided financial assis­tance to people fined during the ongoing anti-regime protests or dismissed from their jobs due to their civic activism have also been frozen. The widespread imposition of these heavy fines has placed a dispro­por­tionate financial burden on partic­i­pants, producing a chilling effect on the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly.

The maximum period of admin­is­trative detention has been extended from 15 to 60 days, thus surpassing compa­rable limits in Russia and Belarus (15 days). The October 2025, new amend­ments intro­duced admin­is­trative detention for first-time viola­tions of assembly rules and criminal liability for repeat offences. The first case under the new rules has already been initiated. Under this new framework, even failure to comply with a lawful order from law enforcement can result in criminal charges and impris­onment. Fines have largely been replaced by detention, meaning that partic­i­pants may now face up to 15 days of impris­onment for actions such as covering their faces during a protest, partially or fully blocking roads, or creating obstacles to pedes­trian or vehicle movement.

Following the intro­duction of the new amend­ments, 5 to 10 people were detained daily for acts such as obstructing traffic. Police began physi­cally preventing road-blocking, prompting protesters to shift from static rallies to mobile marches. Despite these adapta­tions, systematic arbitrary arrests continued, often targeting individuals simply for walking in groups or standing on sidewalks, and frequently based on absurd or fabri­cated accusa­tions, including alleged disobe­dience to police orders. In October 2025, Trans­parency Inter­na­tional Georgia documented the detention of eleven media repre­sen­ta­tives under admin­is­trative charges.

On December 10, new restrictive measures emerged, further tight­ening control over freedom of assembly. The amend­ments signif­i­cantly expand state oversight by requiring organizers to notify the Ministry of Internal Affairs five days in advance of any gathering or demon­stration and by extending assembly restric­tions from roadways to pedes­trian zones, effec­tively leaving practi­cally no space for protest. Non-compliance can result in admin­is­trative detention of up to 15 days, while repeat offences carry criminal liability, including impris­onment for up to one year.

As regards criminal charges related to protest partic­i­pation, Trans­parency Inter­na­tional Georgia reports that 148 individuals have faced criminal proceedings since late 2024; 66 remain in pre-trial detention, and 54 have been convicted. In per capita terms, the number of crimi­nalised protesters in Georgia now exceeds compa­rable figures for Russia, reflecting an extremely high level of repression in a country that nominally remains an EU candidate state.

The cumulative effect of excessive fines, routine admin­is­trative detention, and criminal liability for repeated offences has created a legal and policing system explicitly designed to eliminate civic mobil­i­sation. By contin­u­ously tight­ening rules and adapting enforcement to protest tactics, the author­ities are not merely responding to dissent, they are actively suppressing peaceful assembly and disman­tling one of the final avenues for democ­ratic expression.

Propa­ganda as a pillar of emerging autocracy in Georgia

A central pillar of the author­i­tarian consol­i­dation is the ruling party’s expanding disin­for­mation and propa­ganda system, which has become one of the most powerful tools for manip­u­lating public opinion. GD-affil­iated media outlets operate in close alignment with Kremlin narra­tives, system­at­i­cally demon­ising and delegit­imising inter­na­tional partners, EU insti­tu­tions, and democ­ratic allies. Critical state­ments from the EU, US, OSCE, and other organ­i­sa­tions are portrayed as “foreign inter­ference”, while domestic critics are framed as “enemies”, “traitors”, or agents acting against Georgian statehood. This narrative archi­tecture not only seeks to isolate Georgia from its democ­ratic partners but also creates a hostile environment in which violence and intol­erance toward dissent are implicitly encouraged. By engineering an “infor­mation siege,” the ruling party reinforces public mistrust in independent voices and strengthens the ideological founda­tions of its emerging autocratic system.

Policy recom­men­da­tions: coordi­nated inter­na­tional response to the consol­i­dation of autocracy in Georgia

Georgia’s democ­ratic future is still visible, provided those defending it receive the support and protection they need. A coordi­nated inter­na­tional strategy is required to uphold human rights, support civic space, and prevent further author­i­tarian consol­i­dation in Georgia. Active engagement from the EU and other partner states could make a tangible difference. Specif­i­cally, the EU and other partner states could:

• Actively support an independent inter­na­tional inquiry

The recent BBC inves­ti­gation into the alleged use of chemical irritants and uniden­tified substances against protesters has heightened concerns about systematic and escalating state violence in Georgia. Opposition parties and civil society organ­i­sa­tions have already called for an independent inter­na­tional inquiry, led by credible organ­i­sa­tions, to establish the facts, determine respon­si­bility, and prevent further use of such substances. Supporting such an inquiry should be the initial step, providing a solid eviden­tiary foundation for any subse­quent policy actions.

• Activate inter­na­tional human rights mechanisms

The activation of existing inter­na­tional human-rights account­ability mecha­nisms is essential. The OSCE Moscow Mechanism, which has been used effec­tively in contexts such as Belarus, is a credible and rapid tool for use in cases where national insti­tu­tions fail to ensure account­ability. A fact-finding mission under this mechanism would be able to gather credible documen­tation of human rights viola­tions on the ground. A report to that effect would create a solid ground for evidence-based, targeted inter­na­tional measures.

• Implement coordi­nated restrictive measures

Although it may be difficult to arrive at EU-wide unanimity, individual member states can still act in concert with one another to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities respon­sible for repression. Bilateral or coalition-based measures, such as through a Weimar+ format (Germany, France, Poland and like-minded partners), can reinforce the legit­imacy of evidence, ensure account­ability despite EU-level gridlock, and impose tangible conse­quences on actors driving democ­ratic backsliding. Credible documen­tation from inter­na­tional inves­ti­ga­tions or OSCE fact-finding missions would form the basis for such targeted measures, aligned with the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (Council Regulation 2020/​1998).

• Apply financial pressure on author­i­tarian networks

Targeted financial measures would be a highly effective tool with which to influence the autocratic leadership. Measures restricting access to assets, financial networks, and opera­tions controlled by oligarchic struc­tures, as well as by pro-government businesses and media outlets, would be partic­u­larly effective. Such steps would weaken the regime’s resource base, disrupt its propa­ganda networks, limit its capacity for repression, and strengthen independent actors and civil society. Imple­men­tation can be bilateral or coordi­nated, depending on legislative possibilities.

• Ensure civil society’s survival and resilience

External pressure should be accom­panied by robust support for civil society actors, including flexible, rapid-response funding, emergency assis­tance for activists and independent media, continued legal aid for detainees and victims of repression, and measures aimed at protecting journalists, human-rights defenders, and civic activists. Strength­ening civil society in this way is essential to maintaining channels for peaceful mobil­i­sation and protecting funda­mental rights under increasing state pressure.

• Rethink EU democ­ratic leverage in emerging autocracies

As Georgia’s leadership has effec­tively suspended the country’s EU accession, the scope for the Union to apply its core pre-accession tool of condi­tion­ality is signif­i­cantly reduced. This under­scores the inade­quacy of existing EU instru­ments to address autocratic regimes that renounce EU integration in order to diminish the Union’s democ­ra­tising leverage. The situation in Georgia, therefore, neces­si­tates more serious reflection, a thorough assessment of the realities, and the devel­opment of a more strategic and adaptable approach capable of responding to contexts where an author­i­tarian turn makes current EU democracy-promotion policies ineffective.

Authors:

Nino Chachava (EU- Project­co­or­di­nator, Civil Society Foundation, Georgia) and Saba Bachveli (Human Rights Program Manager, Civil Society Foundation, Georgia)