The Strategic Role of a German-Led Coalition of the Willing in Ukraine’s EU Accession Process

EU accession negoti­a­tions with Ukraine do not fit the typical pattern of EU enlargement, as seen in 2004, in the accession of states in Central and Eastern Europe. There are several reasons for this on the Ukrainian side. First, negoti­a­tions are taking place under the unprece­dented condi­tions of an ongoing war that is taking a constant toll on human and financial resources. This weakens Ukraine’s admin­is­trative capacity, which was already insuf­fi­cient prior to the full-scale invasion.

In addition, the balance of power between the president, the government and the parliament has been gradually shifting towards the concen­tration[1] of authority in the presi­dential office, and this poses challenges for imple­men­tation of reforms. These devel­op­ments result in a constant pressure on the reform process within the framework of the accession negoti­a­tions, as successful reform imple­men­tation entails more than just formal legal harmo­nization with the EU acquis. A strong system of gover­nance with suffi­cient human and financial resources is essential for the effective imple­men­tation of pro-European reforms.

In addition to the factors on the Ukrainian side mentioned above, certain trends on the EU side are also of relevance. The delib­er­ately cautious public messaging from Brussels,[2] intended to secure continued support for Ukraine during the war from EU member states, does not suffi­ciently incen­tivise Ukraine’s political elites to pursue polit­i­cally costly reforms. The EU member states should be encour­aging such reforms, in order to avoid future crises similar to the NABU and SAPO episode in July.

The challenge is that when public, constructive criticism is not considered feasible, the EU member states need alter­native instru­ments that they can use to encourage difficult political reforms in Ukraine. The recent reshuffle within the Presi­dential Office of Ukraine repre­sents a unique oppor­tunity to introduce such an instrument and to push political elites toward the imple­men­tation of challenging political reforms in the framework of the EU accession negoti­ation process.

A consis­tently positive public messaging toward Ukraine from the EU started with the imple­men­tation of the seven require­ments for maintaining candidate status in 2022. This was necessary in the early phase of Russia’s war of aggression to ensure political unity. As the war has dragged on, however, this approach has increas­ingly taken on a life of its own. The combi­nation of uncon­di­tional public solidarity and the widespread renun­ci­ation of political criticism has changed the incentive structure for far-reaching reforms. Thus far, the Ukrainian government has been able to postpone polit­i­cally sensitive but insti­tu­tionally crucial reform steps without incurring any noticeable conse­quences within the accession process. Devel­op­ments surrounding NABU and SAPO in 2025 make it clear that this approach has reached its limits.

The war has shifted the insti­tu­tional balance between the presi­dency, the cabinet, and the parliament. Meanwhile, the reform of Ukraine’s public admin­is­tration remains incom­plete, and civil service profes­sionals are leaving the service more than it was before the full-scale invasion. This under­mines the state’s ability to act, which is all the more problematic as Ukraine is simul­ta­ne­ously waging war and preparing complex accession negoti­a­tions. Bottle­necks in key ministries are less an isolated admin­is­trative problem and more a systemic risk for the entire enlargement process.

The European Commission can only address these challenges to a limited extent. Its mandate is primarily technical in nature, and the political situation makes it unwilling to engage in public confrontation which might undermine the unity of the EU. The limita­tions of technical support instru­ments become quickly apparent when informal power relations, the logics of political decision-making, or insti­tu­tional blockages determine the progress of reforms. This creates an imple­men­tation gap between formal condi­tion­ality and political reality.

Taking these tendencies into consid­er­ation, EU member states, and partic­u­larly Germany, should modify the approach they have taken for negoti­a­tions with Ukraine thus far. Germany should initiate a closed high-level political dialogue with Ukraine on political reform and should lead that dialogue within the framework of a new kind of “coalition of the willing”. This coalition should consist of EU member states that actively support Ukraine’s accession to the EU and are prepared to take on political respon­si­bility on more than a symbolic level. Rather than fuelling division on European enlargement policy, such a format would strengthen it by affording a platform for those member states that are prepared to bring political substance to the process.

The platform would be explicitly designed to complement the work of the European Commission, and its activ­ities would be carried out in close consul­tation with the EC. Its added value would consist in the creation of a confi­dential political space in which reform blockages could be openly identified, realistic reform paths developed, and political expec­ta­tions clearly communicated—without public escalation and without calling Europe’s solidarity with Ukraine into question. Meetings at realistic intervals, e.g., of about every three months, would enable continuous but not overloaded political steering.

The dialogue should bring together high-level repre­sen­ta­tives of the German cabinet and parliament, repre­sen­ta­tives of the EU states in the coalition of the willing, and repre­sen­ta­tives of the Ukrainian presi­dential admin­is­tration, cabinet, and parliament, as well as a limited number of selected civil society actors with proven expertise in European integration. The civil society role would be analytical in nature: its experts should provide evidence-based assess­ments, evaluate reform options, and provide factual support for political decision-making processes.

Objec­tives of the platform:

• The promotion of polit­i­cally sensitive reforms that are central to the accession process but are not adequately addressed by existing European instruments—in particular, the reform of public admin­is­tration, the stabi­lization of minis­terial struc­tures, the protection of a profes­sional civil service, and the insti­tu­tional balance between the president, the government, and parliament.
• Increased effec­tiveness of European and bilateral technical assis­tance through the incor­po­ration of political realities into the design of reform projects at an early stage.
• The facil­i­tation of prompt political feedback enabling reform setbacks or blockages to be identified and addressed polit­i­cally within the coalition of the willing in a timely manner before they burden the formal accession process.

Priority topics for the platform:[3]

1. Public admin­is­tration reform (PAR) should play a key role in the accession negoti­ation process. The following aspects should be prioritised:

A) Strategic planning of PAR. Devel­opment and adoption of an effective strategy for public admin­is­tration reform.

B) Government formation. Adoption of a revised version of the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers and Ministries with the aim of preventing the Ukrainian practice of frequent changes of the Government’s structure through merging and splitting ministries by defining the ministries respon­sible for specific policy sectors, as such rearrangement has negative impact for the whole accession negoti­ation process. Intro­duction of the practice under which the office of prime minister is appointed solely by Parliament and can then form the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine himself. This would give the prime minister greater indepen­dence and respon­si­bility for the ministers appointed.

C) Policy­making: intro­duction of the entire policy-making cycle, from problem-identi­fi­cation in specific policy direc­torates and consul­ta­tions with stake­holders to the adoption of legis­lation and monitoring of its implementation.

D) Action to ensure that access to the civil service is open to profes­sional and experi­enced personnel. Reintro­duction of the compe­ti­tions for civil servants.

2. Prior­ities for rule of law reform:

A) Reform of the Prosecutor’s Office: intro­duction of a merito­cratic approach (open compe­tition) to the process for the selection of prosecutors.

B) Anti-corruption reform: increasing the analytical and expert capacity of the NABU and the SAPO, enabling them to fulfil their functions properly. The aim should be to solve the challenges associated with the selection of judges serving on the High Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine.

C) Judicial reform: adoption of the Strategy for Reforming the Justice System, which is not adopted officially in Ukraine at a strategic level. Steps to ensure that candi­dates selected by the advisory expert group for the Consti­tu­tional Court of Ukraine are appointed in a timely fashion, so that the Court can function as it should. The involvement of inter­na­tional experts in judicial selection proce­dures in conjunction with the devel­opment of selection formats to be imple­mented once the inter­na­tional experts’ mandate expires and Ukraine becomes an EU Member State.

In lieu of a conclusion

On 12 December, EU Commis­sioner Marta Kos and Deputy Prime Minister of Ukraine Taras Kachka issued a joint statement[4] outlining ten reform prior­ities that Ukraine is expected to implement in 2026. Most of these prior­ities correlate with those identified for our platform in rule of law. This alignment demon­strates that the identified reforms are not only relevant and necessary for Ukraine, but also polit­i­cally sensitive and challenging. Given existing political and security risks, the reforms will require enhanced oversight by EU member states, even within the framework of the accession negoti­ation process. Another reason that this additional oversight is necessary is that the negoti­ation process is still unfolding largely along a techno­cratic track, with limited political involvement, a situation which is likely to persist until the EU finds a solution to the Hungarian veto. Even once accession negoti­a­tions are officially unblocked, political-level monitoring of sensitive and challenging reforms in Ukraine will continue to be necessary to ensure that the negoti­ation process remains manageable and effective.

Author: Liubov Akulenko, Executive Director of Ukrainian Center for European Politics (UCEEP)

[1] Ukraine during the Russian War of Aggression. The Nexus between Internal Devel­op­ments and EU Accession, SWP, Susan Stewart, 06.09.2024: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/ukraine-during-the-russian-war-of-aggression

[2] EU agrees on positive enlargement report for Ukraine, avoids “reversal of reforms” narrative, Ukrainska Pravda, November 4, 2025: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/11/04/8005739/

[3] These prior­ities were developed on the basis of an expert interview with Viktoria Melnyk, Head of Inter­na­tional Relations and EuropeanI­in­te­gration at the Centre of Policy and Legal Reform.

[4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/joint-statement-between-commissioner-marta-kos-and-deputy-prime-minister-ukraine-taras-kachka_en?fbclid=IwY2xjawPW9_VleHRuA2FlbQIxMABicmlkETE5MW4zWUlWbW0xc2Y3cnJCc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHsj7S1X2S4oyJsQl-Qal6ZX6QPbUZ_xbdvJm_Tx_PTgZTJSRo5_iDq2sOFPK_aem_zOitYSLQcNIuzsdZe6k3PQ