Conference report: “Rethinking Liber­alism — Challenges to Liber­alism in Turbulent Times”

When the Center for Liberal Modernity was founded in 2017, the “illiberal counter­rev­o­lution” (Timothy Garton Ash) was already in full swing. But the force with which autocratic and illiberal currents have since picked up speed exceeds our fears. Our inter­na­tional conference “Rethinking Liber­alism — Challenges to Liber­alism in Turbulent Times” took place just days before Trump’s second inaugu­ration, in the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and overshadowed by the electoral successes of right-wing populists across of Europe.

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Contents

Rethinking Liber­alism: Challenges in Turbulent Times

Welcome and Introduction

Keynote & Discussion: On Freedom

Panel I: The state of freedom in the US and Europe

Panel II: What liber­alism has to say to us today

Panel III: How can the inter­na­tional liberal order be saved?

Panel IV: How to make liberal democracy great again?

Final panel: Defending freedom

 

Rethinking Liber­alism: Challenges in Turbulent Times

In this context, the current state of liber­alism and liberal democracy worldwide is a cause for concern. To help liber­alism out of its position of defense, it is essential not only to analyze the causes of its crisis and the rise of populism, but also to develop innov­ative ideas for its renewal.

Holding that in mind, we hosted an inter­na­tional conference at the Allianz Forum in Berlin-Mitte on January 16, 2025, entitled “Rethinking Liber­alism: Challenges to Liber­alism in Turbulent Times”. The event brought together leading liberal thinkers, policy­makers from around the world, and repre­sen­ta­tives of civil society and academia to discuss key issues for the future of liber­alism and to provide new impetus for its further development.

The following core questions were discussed:

  • What internal weaknesses of liber­alism have contributed to the current crisis?
  • How can liberal democ­racies strengthen their resilience to political, economic and ecological challenges?
  • What strategies are needed to effec­tively address populist issues such as migration?
  • How can the concept of “defending democracy” protect freedom without drifting into author­i­tarian tendencies?
  • What role should liberal democ­racies play in the emerging global (dis)order, especially in dealing with author­i­tarian powers such as China and Russia?

With around 200 guests and numerous panels, there was plenty of material for critical reflection and the discussion of liberal answers to an increas­ingly turbulent world.

Welcome and introduction

“The weakness of liberal democ­racies, and not the strength of their opponents, is the problem. Merely defending the status quo is not enough. We liberals must finally come out of our defensive stance.” Ralf Fücks

In his opening speech, Ralf Fücks identified six factors contributing to the rapid rise of illiberalism:

  • The triumph of liber­alism has triggered the anti-liberal backlash. What for some are political and cultural achieve­ments mean the loss of tradi­tional values and security for others.
  • The inherent belief in progress in liber­alism has been replaced by scenarios of decline.
  • A fear of losing control, which goes hand in hand with global­ization, mass immigration and the digital revolution, dominates the discourse
  • The growing mental and social gap between the winners and losers of economic and cultural modernization
  • The arrogance and self-centeredness of liberal elites, and
  • Growing doubts about the ability of democ­ratic parties and insti­tu­tions to act.

Liber­alism will only regain its appeal if it provides liberal answers to the great challenges of our time and radiates a new idea of progress, according to Fücks.

In her welcoming speech, Karolina Wigura described liber­alism as a promise of freedom and the oppor­tunity to shape one’s own life individ­ually. This promise is of particular impor­tance for the post-Soviet democracy movements, the “Solidarnosc Gener­ation”. At the same time, liber­alism comes with an oblig­ation: A temporary modus vivendi must be found time and again, by means of which different individuals can jointly find a peaceful and free form of society. She found a metaphor to describe the special character of liber­alism: A garden whose plants are as precious as they are fragile. It is up to us whether we want to be gardeners or barbarians in this garden od Liberalism.

“We need gardeners to take care of the garden of liber­alism and its delicate plants, which are worthy of protection, to tend to them and let them flourish.” Karolina Wigura

The conference in detail:

Keynote: On Freedom

The keynote of the conference was delivered by Alan S. Kahan, Professor of British Civilization at the Université de Versailles/​St. Quetin-en-Yvelines and member of the Sciences Po St. Germain-en-Laye. Based on his book “Freedom from Fear”, in which Kahan examines the history of liber­alism in terms of its sustain­ability, he empha­sized that liber­alism means the search for a society that is free from fear. Fears — of the force and pace of change, which are always accom­panied by losses — are the breeding ground for anti-liberal populism.

Freedom from fear is never complete, and liber­alism is always incom­plete; it contains a utopian – unful­filled – element. Throughout its history, liber­alism has constantly been threatened – by feudal absolutism, by modern total­i­tar­i­anism, but also by the poverty of large sections of the population, which can lead to radicalism and extremism. The current threat is populism, said Kahan.

“We can debate whether populism is democ­ratic. But populism certainly cannot be liberal. There can be an illiberal democracy. But there is no such thing as liberal populism.” Alan S. Kahan

Populists thrive on fear and stoke fear, Kahan continued. He asked how we have reached a point where populism has gained such strength. His answer: After the end of the Second World War, liberals had increas­ingly discussed less and less about values and morals, thereby leaving a void for populists to fill. Liberals had increas­ingly no longer discussed moral progress and ideas of a “good life”, but limited themselves to defending political and economic freedom. As an example, he cited the liber­alism of economist and Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman

In addition, during the 1960s, parts of the political right had allied with the liberals in the fight against communism. With the end of communism, liber­alism had found itself on its tradi­tional battle­ground, fighting against both the political right and the left.

The reason for the current weakness of liber­alism is not the economy: we are not in a global economic crisis, there is no hyper­in­flation that could explain the rise of illib­er­alism, said Kahan. In fact, according to Kahan, we live in a world in which individuals are exposed to very little pressure. And yet millions of people have turned away from liber­alism and towards populism.

“We need a liber­alism 4.0. We need a rebranding. I am no longer talking about liberal democracy, I am talking about democ­ratic liber­alism. Because freedom comes first.” Alan S. Kahan

To become able to speak again, we would have to return to the three basic pillars of liber­alism: freedom, the market and morality. Democ­ratic liber­alism must mean hope for all parts of society and exclude resentment; it needs a society based on solidarity, not one based on egalitarianism.

Why, Kahan went on to ask, should anyone be enthu­si­astic about liber­alism if it does not include progress? For that, he said, we need a liberal market economy and democ­ratic insti­tu­tions that work better in the face of populism than our current ones do.

“Liber­alism has to be a party of hope, not a party of fear. We need democ­ratic liber­alism because freedom of course is the only good choice.” Alan S. Kahan

Comment and discussion

Alan S. Kahan’s keynote speech was the starting point for a lively discussion.

Jan Zielonka, Emeritus Profes­sorial Fellow at St Antony’s University of Oxford and Professor of Inter­na­tional Relations at the University of Venice, defined populism as the result of a pathology of democracy. The dissat­is­faction with democracy felt by large sections of the population was respon­sible for its rise.

“Populism is an illiberal democ­ratic response to undemo­c­ratic liber­alism.” Jan Zielonka

The journalist Kerstin Kohlenberg, most recently head of the Washington office of DIE ZEIT, pointed out that “liber­alism” in the USA is currently framed as an ideology of the political left. It is seen by parts of society as an attack on their values and a disregard for their lifestyles.

Karolina Wigura took up Jan Zielonka’s diagnosis. Populism is easy to diagnose, but difficult to overcome. Not only does liber­alism form the framework of our Western civilization, but it also contains values. However, she warned, there is also a tendency to lecture, which should never be the task of liberalism.

Ralf Fücks inter­jected that while the majority of liberal thinkers had formu­lated values and principles, they had never formu­lated a utopian vision of a good society – for good reasons, liber­alism leaves the future open. He added that Alan Kahan, too, had defined liber­alism primarily in negative terms, as freedom from fear.

Kahan replied that it was important to have ideals and values and to know them as a point of reference, but that liber­alism was always incom­plete – he pointed to the provi­sional character of the liberal project:

“Clearly one of liberalism’s great strength is to be open ended, that it does not have a strict target point for the future. That’s why we can update the operating system.” Alan S. Kahan 

The relationship between liber­alism and democracy was discussed in the further course of the discussion:

Kahan empha­sized that democracy primarily means the sover­eignty of the majority, and therefore populism is thoroughly democ­ratic, even if it is not liberal. Jan Zielonka strongly disagreed, saying that ultimately democracy means much more than the rule of the majority, as populists falsely claim. He criti­cized the fact that liberals do not deal with the causes of the crisis of liber­alism, but often take paths that are not conducive to the fight against populism. They often try to fight populism with populism or – by means of technocracy, which causes even more resentment towards the political system. Instead, one must address the short­comings of democracy, said Zielonka.

Karolina Wigura disagreed with Zielonka’s analysis on one point: with regard to Denmark, where a centrist government has taken up the populists’ issues, an electoral victory for the populists has been prevented.

Journalist Kerstin Kohlenberg pointed to the central role of social media, which reduce complex issues to simple messages. Democrats would have to find a language to counter the populists.

A positive vision of values and morals is needed, supported by a language of respect, said Kahan.

However, this respect cannot be shown to homophobia, anti-Semitism, racism or misogyny, added Jan Zielonka. A liberal culture can never be imposed on people per se. Zielonka also pointed to the self-righteous, even arrogant attitude of liberals, which has contributed to the weakness of liberalism.

During the financial crisis and the Covid pandemic, a new accel­er­ation of events has become visible. But democracy is about slowing things down. Furthermore, liber­alism does not construct utopias, but lives from exper­iment and is the result of constant trial and error.

Alan S. Kahan concluded by pointing out the necessity of values that affect not only the individual but also society as a whole. These should be negotiated in dialogue. Kahan quoted Karl Popper’s tolerance parodoxon, according to which unlimited tolerance also leads to the end of tolerance and the abolition of an open, tolerant society.

Panel I: The state of freedom in the US and Europe

The next panel discussion looked at the specific political situation in Europe and the United States.

Constanze Stelzen­müller, director of the Center on the United States and Europe, a division of the Brookings Insti­tution, kicked off the discussion by saying that the new, illiberal Trump admin­is­tration in the United States wields enormous power. On the other hand, however, there are different camps among Trump supporters: the author­i­tarian liber­tarians, whose ideas of state, borders and religion differ signif­i­cantly from those of the national conser­v­a­tives, despite some similar­ities. She did not want to venture any concrete predic­tions about the next four years in the US. Stelzen­müller empha­sized that an author­i­tarian system change, as has already taken place in Hungary, should be assessed differ­ently from the attempt to weaken democracy and its institutions.

“It is one thing to exhaust the democ­ratic insti­tu­tions, the markets and society and another to start changing the rules and start fiddling with the machinery of the liberal order.” Constanze Stelzen­müller

The French journalist Christine Ockrent called for a new liberal narrative:Lliberal society is a successful project and we can and should look back on the achieve­ments of liber­alism with pride.

The philosopher and chairman of the Ukrainian PEN Center Volodymyr Yermolenko empha­sized that in Ukraine, freedom also means the will to be free. He referred to Sartre and his idea that man is damned to freedom. In fact, a lack of freedom can be the easier, more comfortable choice.

Ukraine shows what it means to practice one’s freedom and maintain a democ­ratic society under the adverse condi­tions of war.

“Liber­alism is not a warm bath. Ukraine shows us the close connection between the fight for freedom and being free.” Volodymyr Yermolenko

There are other cultures that are not based on the idea of freedom, which are based on the idea of collec­tivism instead of the liberal idea of individual freedom. The 21st century is one of intense struggle over these diverging values, Yermolenko pointed out.

Polish historian and LibMod fellow Jarosław Kuisz empha­sized that national experi­ences and shared memories signif­i­cantly shaped the under­standing of populism and liber­alism. But political sover­eignty is always a prereq­uisite for democracy.

Constanze Stelzen­müller pointed out the gener­a­tional differ­ences in attitudes towards democracy and liber­alism. If young people today flirt with author­i­tar­i­anism, she said, we have to ask where the anger of those who identify with it comes from.

Volodymyr Yermolenko asked why the far right in Europe sees Russia as its ally. After all, Putin is not concerned with values or conser­vatism. He stated that the West is losing faith in itself, indulging in self-doubt and self-flagellation.

“If Ukraine loses the war, this will be the end of Europe. Because every­thing that we think of as the European idea and its values will be destroyed. The idea of borders will be destroyed, the idea of solving problems peace­fully will be destroyed.” Volodymyr Yermolenko

Regarding Kahane’s postulate of a society without fear, Yermolenko remarked that fear is part of human nature. In view of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Europe is not suffi­ciently afraid of defeat. Fear should mobilize Europeans to fight for their values, which would otherwise be lost.

Jaroslaw Kuisz concluded by appealing not to forget Ukraine and Georgia. He asked: “Where is the solidarity among democrats?” He said that it is lacking, and instead the public sphere has been hijacked by populists.

Panel II: What liber­alism has to say to us today

Moderator Alexander Schwitteck, project coordi­nator at the Center for Liberal Modernity, began by asking what signif­i­cance liber­alism, its thinkers and ideas could convey to us today. Stefan Kolev, economist and director of the Ludwig Erhard Forum, responded with a digression on the concept of neolib­er­alism, which for him encom­passes all innova­tions within liberalism.

Karen Horn, professor of economics at the University of Erfurt, on the other hand, empha­sized the diversity of liberal schools of thought. She said that there were many points of criticism of the liberal thought leaders, but that it was still possible to build on them.

Michael Zürn, professor of inter­na­tional relations at the Free University of Berlin, empha­sized that liber­alism encom­passes much more than populism claims: pluralism, but also univer­salism, are crucial compo­nents of liber­alism, as is the commitment to a free market. However, the affinity between liber­alism and capitalism also means that liber­alism must define a limit to economic inequality. This is partic­u­larly important in times when access to education, health, and fair oppor­tu­nities in life are being questioned.

Ewa Atanassow, professor of politics at Bard College Berlin, argued that liber­alism has become the dominant ideology of Western democ­racies. However, it is wrong to think that we are all liberal today. We need to rethink seemingly opposing values such as nation­alism. These are being used today by opponents of liber­alism, but could be redefined by liberals to unite democracy and patriotism.

Stefan Kolev empha­sized the value of compromise and moder­ation. Finding agree­ments without negating differ­ences is something that German post-war society success­fully demon­strated, he said: a society that was completely polarized and developed in a very short time into a society based on compromise, agree­ments and consensus.

Karen Horn added that the ability to moderate and negotiate is part of the Western tradition of thought and thus also differs from the populist environment.

Alexander Schwitteck noted that many Western liberals have become mea culpa liberals. Ewa Atanassow agreed, saying

“The West has gone far too far in taking the blame. Not noticing that a lot of the origin of this blaming comes from hostile places. Liberal democ­racies should be aware that they are in a fight. You need to be strategic, not only confes­sional.” Ewa Atanassow

She questioned whether moder­ation is therefore a good modus operandi. Instead, she said, we should return to the idea of compe­tition. A compe­tition of ideas at the political and economic level. To do this, liber­alism should return to one of its funda­mental dilemmas: the state, the leviathan, which both grants and restricts funda­mental rights. In history, nation­alism has meant overcoming inequality.

In contrast, Atanassow put forward the concept of an inclusive and integrating nation state. Liber­alism has much more to offer than has been previ­ously thought.

Karen Horn empha­sized that one should not talk about liber­alism in the abstract. It is about finding answers to the specific problems of specific people. The idea of moder­ation in the sense of temperance and a willingness to compromise is central to liberal thinking. But for that, a moral framework must be found.

Michael Zürn concluded by saying that liber­alism is linked to a particular social episte­mology. In contrast to this, there are “alter­native facts” and the idea of flooding the public space with untruths. Such ideas and strategies undermine liberal episte­mology. This must be defended.

Panel III: How can the inter­na­tional liberal order be saved?

Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the question of its signif­i­cance for the liberal world order were the subject of the first panel, moderated by Christoph Becker.

Marija Gobuleva, Chair of the Baltic Initiative on European Reform and former Minister of the Interior of Latvia, called the war in Ukraine the greatest challenge for the liberal world order. The question, she said, was whether the West still existed as a political force. The war of disin­for­mation and author­i­tarian oligarchs within and outside the West were the two most aggressive threats to liberalism.

“Europe is the biggest hope for democ­ratic liber­alism to reestablish itself. The question is: Will we as Europe get our act together to enable the strength­ening of democ­ratic liber­alism?” Marija Gobuleva

Jessica Berlin, Senior Fellow at the Center for European Analysis, empha­sized that the outcome of the war in Ukraine would determine the rest of the century. However, the liberal world order we are talking about is seen quite differ­ently in different regions of the world:

“For billions of people around the world, the second half of the 20th century was not partic­u­larly liberal, the rules that we came up with did not apply to the entire world, and it was not partic­u­larly orderly.” Jessica Berlin

For large parts of the world’s population, our Western values only existed on paper, Berlin said. There is a huge gap between the West’s procla­ma­tions and actions. She saw a direct connection between this delusion and the lack of action on Ukraine. This is partic­u­larly evident in Germany: The government’s rhetoric is taking a different direction than its actions. What does that tell us about the liberal order?

“Hypocrisy and denial killed the liberal order.” Jessica Berlin

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, looked back at the recent past: He could not say at which point the inter­na­tional world order currently finds itself. There was a post-1990 hybris when it was assumed that the whole world would become democ­ratic. The question is whether the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or rather the Tiananmen massacre in the same year was the defining event. There is a distinction between the post-World War II order and the post-1990 order he said. It  is truly liberal only after 1990, he continued.. The liberal overreach and the hybris that is connected to the post-1990 order should be corrected with more moder­ation. Maybe going back to the more moderate type of 1945 rather than the 1990 model would serve us well, he concluded.

Charles Clarke, former British Home Secretary under Tony Blair, argued that liberal politics had failed to address the negative effects of globalization.

“We as politi­cians failed to deal with the downsides of global­ization. It destroyed whole economies and commu­nities. There were great losses. And this was the momentum of Donald Trump, of Nigel Farrage and of Brexit, of Marine Le Pen and of the AfD.” Charles Clarke

We have moved from a world with two super­powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to a world with only one super­power and are now on the way to a world with several major powers, Clarke said. The question now is whether we can form coali­tions with each other. The nation­alists claim that any form of inter­na­tional coalition is terrible, whether it is the EU or the UN or whatever. But it is precisely such inter­na­tional insti­tu­tions that are needed.

Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff disagreed with Clarke: It is not global­ization that is to blame for what we see today. Rather, we have to under­stand the cultural homelessness that unreg­u­lated migration drives people into the hands of right-wing populists. Global­ization is only a small part of the cause.

Marija Golubeva pointed out the urgency with which the West must now act together. She asked: Is there something we in the West are fighting for together in Ukraine? The question is how to address the failures of Western policy without completely questioning the liberal order and the inter­na­tional system.

Kleine-Brockhoff empha­sized that the post-1990 order was the best since indus­tri­al­ization. Germans in particular have benefited from it and are attached to this order – even beyond its sell-by date. Now, however, dissat­is­faction has grown to such an extent that there is hope for change. Reforms are needed in the economy, in technology policy, and in foreign policy. With regard to Trump, he is somewhat perplexed:

“If anyone had told me that hemispheric imperi­alism would be the concept that the new Trump admin­is­tration would start its reign with, I would have called him crazy. And we have to under­stand, this is a coherent concept, this is not just crazy. This is a coherent concept of preparing for a hegemonic conflict through national power. That’s why he attacks even the terri­torial integrity of allies. That’s a concept I still can’t wrap my head around. I still don’t under­stand what that will mean.” Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff

Trump could get what he needs from Canada or Denmark in other ways. But he is not concerned with alliances, Kleine-Brockhoff said. His concept is one of spheres of interest, a concept of national power. This explains why Trump does not consider it outlandish that Putin wants to take over parts of Eastern Europe.

Jessica Berlin added that it was Trump’s tactic to start by saying something completely insane and bombastic, which everyone was outraged by. The next step was then to demand something less drastic, which everyone was then relieved about and agreed to. You had to recognize this as a tactic and develop your own tactic for dealing with it.

Panel IV: How to make liberal democracy great again?

How can practical politics respond to the problems that populists use to attack liberal democracy? This was the key question of the panel moderated by Irene Hahn-Fuhr.

Otto Fricke, FDP member of the German Bundestag, empha­sized that the FDP had much more to offer than market liber­alism. He criti­cized the fact that both the media and other parties were constantly trying to pin this label on the FDP and thus discredit liber­alism. His party stood just as much for civil rights as it did for a market economy.

Sergey Lagodinsky, a member of the European Parliament for the German Green Party, also empha­sized that his party stands for much more than climate trans­for­mation and identity politics – both trigger points for populist rhetoric. Democ­ratic parties should not allow the AfD to narrow and determine political discourse.

In the necessary endeavor to bind conser­v­ative voters or win them back, the CDU will not tear down the firewall to the AfD under any circum­stances, empha­sized Karin Prien, deputy chair­woman of the CDU. As a liberal-conser­v­ative party, the Christian Democrats are a bulwark against right-wing populism and extremism. That is why the AfD’s goal is to destroy the CDU.

In response to the question of how the SPD intends to hold its own against the populists, who are posing as the protectors of the little people, Dietmar Nietan, Member of the Bundestag, empha­sized that freedom, justice and solidarity are the three corner­stones of the SPD. The aim is not to pursue a crude distri­b­ution policy, but to create smart framework condi­tions for future invest­ments and new value chains in order to deprive the populists of their social support.

Final panel: Defending freedom

Ralf Fücks opened the final panel of the conference by calling for the famous question “What is to be done” to be the central issue after a day full of clever diagnoses of the crisis of liberal democracies.

The Russian opposition member, activist and former world chess champion Garry Kasparov pointed out that the West’s inertia and passivity stemmed from the fact that it had lived in relative security after 1990 and ignored the warnings about Putin and the rise of author­i­tar­i­anism. He said that the West did not lack resources, but political courage and determination.

Jan-Werner Müller, the Roger Williams Straus Professor of Social Science at Princeton University, argued that the West has gradually adapted to funda­mental changes without realizing their dimension. There has been no sudden loss of freedom; loss of freedom comes in many small, imper­cep­tible steps, he said.

And he continued: The political agenda is set by autocrats, and supporters of liberal democracy react by complaining and expressing outrage, but they are not proactive. Müller empha­sized that liber­alism is not exhausted by the fight against author­i­tar­i­anism, and that it has more to offer than its opponents. It is up to us to get out of the defensive and develop ideas for the future that appeal to people.

Natalia Gavrilita, former Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova, pointed out the contri­bution that Eastern Europe has to make to the West’s fight to preserve freedom.

“There is more energy and more deter­mi­nation in central and eastern Europe now. And I think we can contribute a lot in reviving this in western liberal democ­racies.” Natalia Gavrilita

Liber­alism has been put on the defensive, she said, and is having to justify itself. It must be made clear again that only liber­alism guarantees individual freedom, human rights, compe­tition and a legal system. Liberal societies should look with pride at the achieve­ments of a free society.

Russia and China are also “deliv­ering”, albeit in very different ways, she pointed out. They are systems that profess illiberal values and are willing to endure diffi­culties for their own values.

In the West, we have experi­enced a long period of constant growth. Now this is slowing down. But instead of thinking about what we still have to offer the younger gener­a­tions to justify the continued existence of democracy, we should change the discourse:

“I think we should change this discourse and say: What are we willing to sacrifice? In order to benefit from liberal democracy. To benefit from individual freedoms.” Natalia Gravilita

Gavrilita empha­sized that the parties of the democ­ratic center were making unreal­istic promises: “We will produce rapid growth and at the same time stop migration.” In view of the demographics, this is not realistic. We should start by telling people the truth and explaining what is at stake. People can handle the truth, she emphasized.

Katarzyna Kasia, a Polish philosopher and journalist, noted that democracy is not valued equally across the world. Rather than exporting democracy, we should support those – such as Ukraine and Georgia – who are fighting for it themselves.

Populism, she continued, is a very old idea. That it is so successful today is because it is delib­er­ately supported and promoted by those who want war and disruption in Europe.

Like Gary Kasparov, she empha­sized that courage is an important part of liber­alism, along with hope and confi­dence. It takes more courage to defend freedom and democracy.

“If we want to defend our freedom and democracy we need a lot more courage. Because what we want to defend is beautiful, it is magnif­icent, it is important. But it is super fragile. And also the earth is at stake, because our values are in a peculiar way entangled with ecology. If we don’t protect this very fragile world we live in, we will be doomed.” Katarzyna Kasia

Christoph Möllers, professor of public law and philosophy of law at Humboldt University Berlin, empha­sized the need for a forward-looking political project. He pointed to the threat of a new media oligarchy that has emerged in the name of liber­alism and free speech.

Garry Kasparov called Ukraine a litmus test for Europe and asked why liberals lack energy. A culture war, cancel culture, support for Hamas at elite univer­sities – all this has driven the American middle class into the arms of Trump. Excesses on one side will always help those on the other, Kasparov said.

“We are at war. Technology has made this world much smaller. It is no longer possible to live on one side of the iron curtain without cross-inter­ference. And the other side, call them the bad actors, they know that. That’s not why they are staying within their sphere of influence, they are attacking. Whether it is Russia, China, or Iran.” Garry Kasparov

Ukraine is the most important battle­ground today, where the fight for freedom is being waged. This must be recog­nized and Ukraine must be supported in order to win this fight, said Kasparov.

Jan-Werner Müller disagreed with Kasparov’s analysis of the culture war in the U.S. If voters had been concerned only with the fight against ‘wokeness,’ they could have voted not for Trump, but for Nikki Haley or Ron de Santis.

He pointed to the new power of a new techno-oligarchy that is converting monetary power into political power:

“Today one of the biggest threats is a new oligarchy. The issue is the concen­tration of power and the conversion of power. We are facing an unprece­dented accumu­lation of financial, political and media power.” Jan-Werner Müller

Natalia Gavrilita replied that liberals had focused too much on debates that were less about the common good and more about questions of cultural identity. These identity debates are also fraught with strong emotions.

Katarzyna Kasia empha­sized the impor­tance of new media in the fight for public opinion:

“We will never be able to transmit the values of liber­alism if we are losing the channels of infor­mation to transmit those values.” Katarzyna Kasia

Christoph Möllers argued that moral values and cultural norms cannot be produced or decreed by politics if they are to be liberal values. Liberal values must be produced and defended by civil society.

He was sceptical about the possi­bil­ities of a militant democracy when 30 percent or more of the electorate is made up of anti-democ­ratic forces.

Garry Kasparov then summa­rized the hopes and prospects associated with the conference:

“We are at a critical junction. Because we are at war. We cannot win the war by simply being defensive. We have to come up with a plan. And hopefully this conference will be a contri­bution in designing the plan to fight back. And to prove the fact: liberal democracy and a market economy are pillars of a successful society.” Garry Kasparov

 

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