Keeping Yerevan in Moscow’s Orbit: Russia’s FIMI Playbook in Armenia

I. Country context and strategic relevance

Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus that is a formal member of Russia-led proxy organi­za­tions both in the military-political sphere (the Collective Security Treaty Organi­zation, CSTO) and in the economic sphere (the Eurasian Economic Union, EAEU), organ­i­sa­tions which serve as instru­ments for preserving Russia’s geopo­litical dominance across the post-Soviet space. Armenia suspended its partic­i­pation in the CSTO following Azerbai­jan’s attacks on Armenia’s sovereign territory in September 2022. Armenia is also the only country in the region in which Russia continues to maintain a legal military presence. This presence includes the 102nd Military Base, consisting of the main garrison in Gyumri, the Kanaker garrison (Yerevan), and the 3624th Air Base at Erebuni Airport (Yerevan). In addition, under a 1992 agreement, Russian border guards are respon­sible for protecting Armenia’s borders with Iran (45 km) and Turkey (327 km). The withdrawal of these forces would mean the end of Russia’s physical military presence throughout the South Caucasus, excluding the occupied terri­tories of Georgia.

Current Armenian–Russian relations are charac­terized by the weakening of what have tradi­tionally been close ties and growing diplo­matic and economic tensions. Russia is no longer Armenia’s primary supplier of military equipment (it accounted for 94% of Armenia’s arms imports in 2020 but less than 7% by 2026)․^[1]

Russia began imposing bans on imports of various Armenian agricul­tural products, as well as certain alcoholic beverages, mineral water, and other goods ahead of Armenia’s June 2026 parlia­mentary elections and has continued to introduce new restric­tions since the election. Simul­ta­ne­ously, Moscow increased its diplo­matic pressure on Yerevan, demanding that it “choose between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union”.

Exploited vulner­a­bil­ities:

1. The unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan and the closed border with Turkey, including issues relating to:

• the occupation of Armenian territory
• refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh
• the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Azerbaijan
• the trauma of the Armenian Genocide
• aggressive rhetoric from Baku, including the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative

2. Armenian seasonal migrant workers in Russia, whose vulner­a­bility stems from the possi­bility of depor­tation, work restric­tions, and limita­tions on the transfer of remit­tances to Armenia.
3. Socio-economic problems within Armenia.
4. The conflict between Armenia’s secular author­ities and the leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church.
5. Armenia’s economic and energy depen­dence on Russia.

II. The Russian FIMI playbook

The peace process with Azerbaijan and normal­ization of relations with Turkey are portrayed as a betrayal of national memory.

Russian influence opera­tions are synchro­nized with political messaging and increas­ingly confronta­tional diplo­matic rhetoric. This has included demands that Armenia consider the interests of Russian citizens in its domestic political processes, notably during the Pashinyan-Putin meeting of 1 April 2026.

Russia regularly reminds Armenia of the discount rates Armenia pays for gas and of Armenia’s depen­dence on the Russian market. Since late May 2026, these narra­tives have been accom­panied by bans on imports of Armenian products, turning what had previ­ously been threats into concrete economic pressure.

As Russia has lost many of its tradi­tional leverage mecha­nisms in the security domain, its infor­mation opera­tions increas­ingly focus on portraying the Armenian–Azerbaijani and Armenian–Turkish peace processes as doomed to failure and empha­sizing the alleged existential threat that Turkey and Azerbaijan both pose to Armenia.

Diplo­mat­i­cally, Russia‘s rhetoric toward Armenia has grown harsher; Moscow increas­ingly puts Armenia in the same group as Ukraine and warns against the “Ukrainization of Armenia”.^[2]

Russia’s strategic objec­tives in the infor­mation domain

Russia’s objec­tives in the infor­mation domain are to promote pro-Kremlin narra­tives that reinforce Moscow’s preferred inter­pre­tation of regional devel­op­ments and to undermine alter­native perspec­tives. At the same time, Russia seeks to desta­bilize Armenia’s domestic political environment by eroding public confi­dence in state insti­tu­tions, ampli­fying social tensions, and weakening the govern­ment’s ability to govern effec­tively. A further objective is to increase political polar­ization by deepening divisions between different political and social groups, making it more difficult to achieve consensus on key national issues and creating condi­tions that enhance Russia’s leverage over Armenia’s internal decision-making.

The ultimate objective is regime change through the replacement of the current government with one more obedient to Russia.

An inter­me­diate objective is to escalate diplo­matic pressure, economic coercion, internal desta­bi­lization, driven by pro-Russian parlia­mentary parties and social discontent, to the point where govern­mental decision-making becomes paralyzed. This would compel Armenia’s author­ities to make conces­sions on issues important to Russia, such as the following: the preser­vation of Russian logis­tical assets; maintaining the Russian military base; retaining the Russian railway concession; and ensuring Russian involvement in regional connec­tivity projects, including the “Trump Road”.

Dominant narra­tives promoted by Russian and pro-Russian actors

The principal narra­tives promoted by Russian and pro-Russian actors portray Armenia as facing an existential threat of “Turki­fi­cation”, claiming that the govern­ment’s foreign and security policies will ultimately place the country under Turkish political, economic, and cultural influence. At the same time, Russia is presented as Armenia’s only reliable security guarantor and an indis­pensable economic partner, with narra­tives empha­sizing that no viable alter­native exists. These messages are reinforced by efforts to foster distrust toward the West, portraying European and Euro-Atlantic engagement as either ineffective or ultimately serving Turkish and Azerbaijani interests rather than Armenia’s security.

The West is portrayed as synonymous with Turkey in the regional context, accom­panied by narra­tives concerning the possible return of 300,000 Azerbai­janis and related security threats.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures

Russian influence opera­tions rely on a combi­nation of infor­mation, political, and societal instru­ments. These include coordi­nated disin­for­mation campaigns and the systematic dissem­i­nation of strategic narra­tives through state, proxy, and online media. Infor­mation activ­ities are often synchro­nized with official diplo­matic state­ments and political messaging to amplify their impact. Russian actors also seek to influence Armenia’s domestic politics by mobilizing Armenians who live in Russia during elections, supporting or culti­vating pro-Russian political forces, and maintaining a network of pro-Russian media outlets. At the same time, soft power insti­tu­tions, such as the Russian Book House, are used to promote Russian cultural influence and reinforce pro-Kremlin narratives.

Russian influence opera­tions involve a broad network of state and non-state actors. These include a signif­icant portion of Armenia’s pro-Russian opposition, Russian citizens engaged in business activ­ities in Armenia, and segments of the Armenian diaspora residing in Russia. Infor­mation opera­tions are amplified through Russian state media, including Sputnik Armenia, as well as Russian television channels available in Armenia’s public broad­casting network. Additional influence is exercised through Russia-based commen­tators and experts who present themselves as sympa­thetic to Armenian interests, such as Konstantin Zatulin, alongside ethnic Armenian media person­al­ities including Margarita Simonyan, Semyon Bagdasarov, and Karen Shakhnazarov.^[3] Russian actors also seek to mobilize vulnerable social groups, partic­u­larly refugees from Artsakh, individuals maintaining close personal or economic ties with Russia, and sympa­thetic activists, bloggers, and civil society repre­sen­ta­tives, who knowingly or unknow­ingly contribute to the dissem­i­nation of pro-Kremlin narratives.

Primary target audiences

Russian influence opera­tions target audiences that are considered to be partic­u­larly suscep­tible to security, economic, and identity-based narra­tives. These include people directly affected by the conflict with Azerbaijan, farmers and businesses impacted by Russian trade restric­tions, relatives of Armenians living and working in Russia, socially vulnerable groups, and citizens dissat­isfied with the policies of Prime Minister Pashinyan. Particular attention is devoted to the population of Armenia’s Syunik Province, where Russian and pro-Russian actors actively promote narra­tives claiming that the region is under threat of occupation, “Turki­fi­cation”, or eventual transfer to Azerbaijan in order to heighten insecurity, fuel public anxiety, and undermine confi­dence in the govern­ment’s policies.

The most signif­icant Russian FIMI opera­tions during the past three to five years

1. Promotion of narra­tives regarding the return of 300,000 Azerbai­janis, “Western Azerbaijan”, and related themes. Although these narra­tives origi­nated in Baku, their active promotion became a main commu­ni­cation tactic of pro-Russian political forces during Armenia’s election campaign.
2. Distri­b­ution of coordi­nated messaging (“talking points”) to Russian media outlets and bloggers following Azerbai­jan’s military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, aimed at assigning full respon­si­bility to the Armenian government, including the narrative that “Pashinyan recog­nized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in Prague”.[4]
3. The disin­for­mation campaign alleging that Turkish mosques were being built in Armenia.
4. Exploitation of the conflict between Prime Minister Pashinyan and the Catholicos (the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church) as part of the broader “Turki­fi­cation of Armenia” narrative.
5. The deployment of Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan to Armenia during this political confrontation.

III. Resilience and countermeasures

What has worked

The most effective counter­mea­sures have combined government action, civil society initia­tives, and public awareness efforts. These have included identi­fying and exposing mecha­nisms used to transport Armenian citizens from Russia to partic­ipate in elections, as well as uncov­ering coordi­nated disin­for­mation networks, partic­u­larly through the work of the Union of Informed Citizens. Legislative reforms crimi­nal­izing both vote-buying and vote-selling, accom­panied by extensive public awareness campaigns, including at airports, have also strengthened electoral resilience. In addition, Russia’s own economic restric­tions on Armenian exports generated an unintended backlash, contributing to growing public scepticism toward Moscow’s policies and reducing the effec­tiveness of some pro-Russian narratives.

Remaining vulner­a­bil­ities and gaps

Armenia continues to face several struc­tural vulner­a­bil­ities that can be exploited by Russian influence opera­tions. These include its signif­icant economic and energy depen­dence on Russia, as well as the continued presence of Russian military forces on Armenian territory. Existing capability gaps include the lack of adequate mecha­nisms for detecting and prose­cuting covert foreign financing of election campaigns and other forms of political inter­ference. Russia also benefits from narra­tives that originate in Azerbaijan, which Russia then amplifies to reinforce its own strategic messaging. Additional vulner­a­bil­ities stem from the presence of pro-Russian political forces that are capable of contributing to domestic desta­bi­lization and political paralysis, the continued broad­casting of Russian television channels through Armenia’s national multiplex, the operation of Russian media outlets such as Sputnik Armenia and proxy platforms including Euromedia24 and Channel 5, and the activ­ities of Russian soft power insti­tu­tions such as the Russian Book House.

How effective is cooper­ation with the EU, NATO, and other inter­na­tional partners?

The major inter­na­tional political devel­op­ments including the European Political Community Summit, President Emmanuel Macron’s state visit, and enhanced cooper­ation with the United States have created a favourable infor­mation environment. This is reflected in consis­tently high approval ratings for the European Union and France, alongside rising negative percep­tions of Russia (currently approx­i­mately 43%).^[5]

General lessons include under­standing mecha­nisms being exploited in multiple countries in relation to cyber opera­tions, societal polar­ization, and the exploitation of sensitive political and historical issues. At the same time, Armenia’s case remains unique due to several distinctive factors, including its conflicts with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as Russia’s extensive influence and physical presence inside the country.

Policy recom­men­da­tions at the national and European levels:

• Adapt legis­lation to address the specific charac­ter­istics of Russian inter­ference, including covert financing mecha­nisms and voter bribery.
• Provide expert and technical assis­tance to identify hidden mecha­nisms of Russian influence.
• Strengthen intel­li­gence cooper­ation, opera­tional infor­mation-sharing, and exchange of data, including infor­mation on Russian citizens involved in FIMI activ­ities within the EU and targeted countries.
• Train specialists to identify and counter the principal narra­tives and messaging techniques used by Russian propaganda.
• Expand cyber­se­curity assis­tance (partially underway through the new European Mission in Armenia).
• Provide technical and insti­tu­tional support for devel­oping Armenia’s border management capacity, enabling the eventual replacement of Russian border guards.
• Develop contin­gency plans, including economic and energy crisis scenarios, with rapid assis­tance mecha­nisms for Armenia, similar to the support provided to Moldova since 2022 (energy assis­tance, food supply, opening European markets to Armenian exports, etc.).

[1] Stockholm Inter­na­tional Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (accessed July 2026).

[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Feder­ation, Press conference by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova, June 2026, available at: https://mid.ru/en/press_service/spokesperson/briefings/ (state­ments referring to the alleged “Ukrainization of Armenia”).

[3] European External Action Service (EEAS), 2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Infor­mation Manip­u­lation and Inter­ference (FIMI) Threats, 2024, and EUvsDisinfo database, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/, documenting the role of state-affil­iated media person­al­ities and proxy actors in Russian infor­mation manip­u­lation campaigns.

[4] DFRLab (Atlantic Council), Breakout from the Black Box: Russian Infor­mation Opera­tions after the Fall of Nagorno-Karabakh, 2023; European External Action Service (EEAS), 2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Infor­mation Manip­u­lation and Inter­ference (FIMI) Threats, 2024.

[5] Inter­na­tional Repub­lican Institute (IRI), Armenia Poll, 2025–2026; Inter­na­tional Repub­lican Institute, Center for Insights in Survey Research, public opinion surveys measuring attitudes toward the European Union, France, the United States, and Russia in Armenia.