Success for Ukraine and the Free World: What it means and how to get there

Wars can accel­erate history. At its Vilnius Summit in July, pressed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, NATO declared its intention to welcome Ukraine into its ranks. Wrangling inside NATO about that decision – whether it went far enough and whether it was too caveated — attracted much attention and obscured its signif­i­cance. In fact, NATO’s affir­ma­tion of Ukraine’s ultimate member­ship in the Alliance (more credible than the rough compro­mise language from the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit), in parallel with the European Union’s decision to advance Ukraine’s EU accession nego­ti­a­tions, signify that the United States and Europe are coming to see Ukraine as family: part of an undivided Europe and undivided Western alliance and not a part of a Russian Empire or Moscow’s sphere of domination.

The how and when of NATO and EU acces­sions are not yet clear and chal­lenges remain enormous.  Putin has chosen aggres­sive war to show that if Russia cannot dominate Ukraine, Russia will make a wasteland of it. Ukraine’s NATO accession has advanced but is not a done deal and accession while a war is ongoing is fraught. The war is not the only challenge. Even if it ends with Ukrainian victory, Ukraine will still have to make the grade on its reforms – demo­c­ratic and systemic – and these will have to be as trans­for­ma­tional as those under­taken by Ukraine’s neighbors to its West after 1989. Ukrainian accession to the EU even after the war will be a heavy lift: quite apart from deep Ukrainian reforms, it would require deep and difficult reforms to EU mech­a­nisms and budgets.[i]

Never­the­less, both Ukraine and its transat­lantic friends have never been clearer about their respec­tive strategic objec­tives toward one another; fortu­nately, and at last, these goals are in parallel.

The long road to a common goal

It took a long time for Ukraine and the West to decide what they wanted their relations to be.

In roughly the first ten years of its inde­pen­dence from Moscow in 1991, with Russia rela­tively weaker and its lead­er­ship more benign, Ukraine stagnated at home, with few reforms, much less an internal trans­for­ma­tion, and a limited vision of its place in Europe. Ukraine’s aspi­ra­tions to join Europe grew in stages as Ukrainians appeared to grow impatient with stag­nating living standards and auto­cratic rule. The supporters of the Orange Revo­lu­tion of 2004–5 and espe­cially the Revo­lu­tion of Dignity of 2013–14, sought domestic democ­ra­ti­za­tion and the rule of law plus inte­gra­tion with the EU. The Revo­lu­tion of Dignity began as a protest over then-President Yanukovych’s sudden refusal, under Kremlin pressure, to sign an Asso­ci­a­tion Agreement with the European Union[ii]; the protesters in Maidan Square in Kyiv were carrying EU flags. As captured by these popular movements, 21^st century Ukrainian national identity, as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it[iii], started crys­tal­izing in a pro-demo­c­ratic and pro-European form. Yanukovych responded to the protests with violence, lost support of Ukrainian society and even many of Ukraine’s oligarchs and fled. Pro-European and pro-reform leaders took his place.

In response, Putin invaded Crimea and then the Donbas. Once ambiva­lent about NATO member­ship and reason­ably well disposed toward Russia, Ukrainian society became fiercely supportive of NATO accession and hostile to Russia. That shift was a product of Russia’s dirty war; it was neither inevitable nor the work (as Kremlin propa­ganda would have it) of Western machinations.

U.S. and European views of Ukraine were likewise slow to develop. Neither the U.S. nor most European govern­ments expected inde­pen­dence in 1991; most foreign policy experts saw Ukraine through the prism of relations with Russia.[iv] In the 1990s and early 2000s, when the U.S. and its European allies sought to build an undivided Europe by opening NATO and the EU to the newly self-liberated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, few had Ukraine in mind. The strategic mental map of most U.S. and European policy makers shifted, albeit after some hesi­ta­tion, to include Central Europe and the Baltic countries as part of Europe, but this shift did not extend to Ukraine.

This Western view of Ukraine changed because Ukraine changed, devel­oping and acting upon a self-concep­tion as a European country with aspi­ra­tions to join European and transat­lantic insti­tu­tions. Ukrainian leaders, both President Zelenskyy and his team and many in Ukraine’s political oppo­si­tion and inde­pen­dent civil society, have made the powerful case that Ukraine is fighting for the same values that underpin the transat­lantic alliance, the European Union, and the Free World. They want Ukraine to have the same oppor­tu­ni­ties as other nations in Central and Eastern Europe to join that community. U.S. and European leaders now say they agree.

 What does the Kremlin want?

Putin intended his “Special Military Operation” against Ukraine to be a swift, surgical effort to remove its lead­er­ship and restore Moscow’s domi­na­tion over the country. That failed in spec­tac­ular fashion due to Ukraine’s resis­tance, Russia’s initial military over­con­fi­dence and incom­pe­tence (espe­cially in the campaign against Kyiv), and rapid U.S. and European provision of weapons and economic support for Ukraine plus economic pressure on Russia through inten­si­fied sanctions.

Putin seems to be bent less on conquest of Ukraine and more on destruc­tion and terror.

Despite its failures on the battle­field, Russia’s war aims in Ukraine remain maximal. It is difficult to discern whether the Kremlin has any thoughts of lesser aims amid its torrent of threats, lies, bluster, and complaints, A former (and uniden­ti­fied) U.S. official eager to explore a diplo­matic solution to the Russo-Ukraine War, complained a few weeks ago that the senior Russian officials with whom he was in contact were unable to artic­u­late what they wanted.[v] It does seem clear, however, what the Kremlin doesn’t want: Ukraine with a European and transat­lantic future. Putin seems to be bent less on conquest of Ukraine and more on destruc­tion and terror, seeking to grind down Ukraine’s economy and will to continue resisting, to outlast Ukraine’s Western supporters, and thus to reduce Ukraine to a vassal state.

How could the war end?

Ukraine can win the war by forcing the Russians out of Ukraine entirely, an outcome that appears unlikely but cannot be dismissed. Russia’s military position may be brittle and could unravel if the Ukrainians achieve a break­through in the South. Ukraine could also win by breaking the land bridge to Crimea, a possible best-case outcome of the ongoing Ukrainian offensive, or, with even greater like­li­hood, by advancing enough in the south to bring Crimea within the range of Ukrainian long-range artillery and missiles.

Seizing and holding Crimea appears to be one of Putin’s principal objec­tives, a goal he appears to have long cherished; as early as April 2008, in his speech at the NATO-Russia Summit in Bucharest, he claimed Crimea for Russia[vi]. Crimea has resonance for Russian nation­al­ists: it was an early Russian Imperial conquest, a sign of Russia’s ascen­dency over the Ottomans who had previ­ously held Crimea. Posses­sion of Crimea gives Russia signif­i­cant military leverage over Ukraine: through Crimea, Russia can more easily strike at the Ukrainian heartland and ports and exert greater control over the Black Sea. If Ukraine were to compro­mise Moscow’s hold over Crimea, forcing Russia to abandon it or even making its hold unsus­tain­able, it would gain the upper hand in the war.

Putin could respond to the loss or potential loss of Crimea by esca­lating, including by threat­ening to use nuclear weapons. But his options for conven­tional esca­la­tion may be few: if he had them, he probably would be employing them. Nuclear threats are easier made than used success­fully. The Kremlin had earlier threat­ened the use of nuclear weapons and some Russian officials e.g., former President Medvedev, and pro-regime commen­ta­tors like Dmitry Trenin and Sergey Karaganov, regularly do so now. Russia’s use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine cannot be ruled out but seems unlikely given the probable conse­quences: alien­ation of China, Russia’s strongest quasi-ally, and most of the Global South; even deeper alien­ation of Europe; and the possi­bility of a strong U.S. response. The Kremlin made threats of nuclear use last fall but retreated in the face of what appear to have been serious and credible warnings from the Biden Admin­is­tra­tion[vii], both public and, according to some Admin­is­tra­tion officials, addi­tional ones in private.

Ukraine might not win. The current Ukrainian offensive could stall and bring stalemate on the ground. Continued Russian missile and other air attacks on Ukrainian infra­struc­ture and civilians could grind down the Ukrainian economy. Fatigue in Ukraine, and in Europe and the U.S. could mount. Pressure could build for forcing Ukraine into nego­ti­a­tions on the basis, as the Kremlin says, of Ukrainian accep­tance of “existing terri­to­rial realities,” meaning Russian conquests. Putin may be counting on that and on the U.S. election season strength­ening Trumpian neo-isola­tionism, meaning U.S. aban­don­ment of Ukraine and accep­tance of a tacit (or overt) recog­ni­tion of Russian domi­na­tion over Ukraine.

What must the U.S. and Europe do?

First, help Ukraine win the war. That means providing the weapons needed to make Ukraine’s current offensive a success. Much has been written about the potential for ATACMS (a ground-based tactical missile system) or other systems to help. The prolonged discus­sion within the US Admin­is­tra­tion about ATACMS and other systems has become a metaphor for the U.S. commit­ment (or lack thereof) to help Ukraine. There is even a cynical view that the U.S. wants to supply Ukraine with suffi­cient munitions and weapons to fight but not to win. That seems off. The Admin­is­tra­tion has worked dili­gently and steadily to provide Ukraine enormous quan­ti­ties of weapons systems and ammu­ni­tion. It faced criticism, both inter­na­tion­ally and from its own political supporters, for deciding to provide cluster munitions to Ukraine, but did so anyway out of an assess­ment of their military utility. Arguments that one or another weapons system would be a game changer or war winner are unconvincing.

(ATACMS) could help at the margin, and it is sometimes at the margin that military campaigns are decided. 

That said, however, the U.S. and some European allies, including Germany, do seem to have a convo­luted and time-consuming decision-making process on providing some weapons systems. Repeated examples of initial refusal to provide one or another weapons system followed by prolonged debate, followed by an eventual decision to send them has fed skeptical narra­tives. Arguments from the Biden Admin­is­tra­tion that a system like ATACMS would not be decisive may be accurate but seem defensive and not the point. ATACMS or other weapons systems may indeed not be decisive. But they could help at the margin, and it is sometimes at the margin that military campaigns are decided. If some in the Admin­is­tra­tion are frus­trated by the focus on ATACMS, it could both provide them in the qualities possible, determine what other weapons systems would do the most good and provide those as well and promptly.

A Russian defeat in Ukraine would bring compli­ca­tions of its own, but these are in the category of good problems to have, certainly better than the problems a Russian victory would bring. Russian history suggests that defeat in an aggres­sive war, one that does not involve defense of the Russian heartland, can trigger domestic unrest and a change of course. Russia’s political stability is ques­tion­able after the Prigozhin Mutiny in June and the Kremlin’s wavering response both at the time and after. While regime change in the Kremlin is not and should not be a U.S. or European objective, Russia’s defeat in Ukraine could lead to political change, even to Putin’s ouster. A post-Putin lead­er­ship need not be reformist or liberal to want to stabilize Russia’s inter­na­tional position by ending Russia’s war against Ukraine. Stalin’s illiberal succes­sors, acting out of their percep­tion of Soviet interest, helped end the Korean War and lowered tensions in Europe.

If there is no Ukrainian near- or mid-term victory, that is, if Ukraine cannot through its current offensive liberate much more of its territory or undermine Russia’s hold on Crimea, the U.S. and Europe still have options to help Ukraine and achieve strategic success, meaning a free, secure Ukraine on the road to inte­gra­tion with the EU and NATO.

A longer-term strategy for success, regard­less of the outcome on the battle­field, includes longer-term military assis­tance such as G7 countries offered at the time of the Vilnius NATO Summit.[viii] This process should move fast. The U.S. has held a first round of talks with Ukraine and other friends of Ukraine need to start. Because of its impor­tance to the defense of Ukraine and its major contri­bu­tions so far, Poland should have been brought into the G7 group from the outset; it should be part of the process now.

The Kremlin may seek to use a military stalemate on the ground to shift to a prolonged degra­da­tion of Ukraine’s economy, to win through grinding down Ukraine and outlasting its supporters. Appar­ently to this end, Russia has inten­si­fied its attacks on Ukrainian civilian infra­struc­ture and popu­la­tion. One option to counter that strategy is to help Ukraine increase its ability to strike at Russian military targets, including in Russia. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock is correct in pointing out that Ukrainian attacks on Russian military targets inside Russia are lawful. [ix] The U.S. position on such oper­a­tions has been under­stand­ably cautious: the govern­ment does not encourage such attacks nor provide the means to carry them out. If providing direct assis­tance to Ukraine to enable it to strike military targets inside Russia is too much, there may be other ways to assist Ukraine, possibly working through third countries, to develop a capacity to sustain its own strategic campaign against Russian military targets. The objective would be to deprive Russia of the option to pounding Ukraine indef­i­nitely at little cost to itself.

A second area of longer-term effort should include economic support for Ukraine, including use of the $300+ billion of immo­bi­lized Russian foreign exchange reserves that the G7 locked down in the days following the February 24, 2022 invasion. The legal and prece­den­tial objec­tions to such a course are many. But given the scale of the war, including the many Russian war crimes, and under­stand­able pressure from U.S. and European publics not to use taxpayer resources when Russian resources are available, this should be pursued. Legal options appear available.[x] One challenge might be to gain the support or tacit accep­tance of such a course from key stake­holders outside Europe and the G7, including Saudi Arabia, other Arab countries, and African countries affected (and angered) by Russia’s blockade on Ukraine’s Black Sea grain exports. To make the case, the U.S. and Europe could use the format estab­lished through the Copen­hagen and Jeddah meetings this June and August, respec­tively, that included senior officials from European, BRICS, and other Middle Eastern, Asian, and African govern­ments, but not Russia.[xi]

Sanctions .. can work if applied over time and with suffi­cient diligence.

That format may provide a means to put addi­tional pressure on Russia, including through directing its foreign exchange assets for Ukraine.

Economic pressure on Russia – including sanctions and export controls — takes time to work. But it can work if applied over time and with suffi­cient diligence. Increasing the effec­tive­ness of such measures, espe­cially export controls, will take effort. Sanctions, export controls and the price cap on Russian oil sales must be enforced; violators, both middlemen and Western companies, warned and punished; and laws tightened to help uncover hidden nests of and channels for Kremlin and other Russian funds. The bad news is that sanctions and export controls will never be airtight. There will be a constant race between evasion and enforce­ment. The good news is that such measures need not work 100 percent to have a strategic impact. The cumu­la­tive impact of such measures means that the Russian klep­to­cratic system, like the sclerotic Soviet system before it, will be increas­ingly hard pressed to fund its aggres­sion and maintain living standards.

Diplo­matic options may be part of the mix. To borrow from Barack Obama, I’m not against all diplomacy, I’m just against dumb diplomacy.

Many advocates of diplo­matic approaches with Moscow seem eager, even breath­less, and convey the impres­sion that Ukraine should negotiate from a position of weakness or that the mere fact of diplomacy will bring about a reason­able settle­ment. There is little point in diplomacy for its own sake. But diplomacy should not neces­sarily be regarded as a trap or sign of weakness.

Talks with Moscow may not be possible at all and should not start by running toward the Kremlin nor by accepting Putin’s current terms, i.e., Ukrainian recog­ni­tions of the “terri­to­rial realities.” One of the Trump Administration’s better moves in its Ukraine policy was the 2018 “Pompeo Doctrine” pledging no U.S. recog­ni­tion of Russia’s purported annex­a­tion of Crimea and consciously modeled on the 1940 Wells Doctrine that pledged no U.S. recog­ni­tion of Soviet annex­a­tion of the Baltic States.[xii] That should remain a bottom line for the U.S. and Europe: no recog­ni­tion of annexations.

Korea and Germany as examples for Prolonged Stalemate

It is possible that a prolonged battle­field stalemate could result in a ceasefire that does not end the conflict but stabi­lizes it. The Korean War ceasefire in 1953 brought neither a solution nor complete peace to the Korean Peninsula. But it brought relative stability and created the condi­tions for South Korea’s demo­c­ratic and free market trans­for­ma­tion. The arrange­ments that allowed for a temporarily divided Germany and stabi­lized the Cold War conflict in Europe are another example of imperfect settle­ments that worked. Neither example is an exact model for Ukraine. Neither is to be wished for or imposed on Ukraine. But Ukraine may itself decide to consider similar approaches based on its own assess­ment of the battle­field outcome. A ceasefire along a line of contact, perhaps supported by inter­na­tional observers, is one option. The danger of any such solution is that it might be nothing more than an oppor­tu­nity for Russia to rebuild its forces and restart the war. The Korean Peninsula and German examples worked only because they were accom­pa­nied by real, not paper, provi­sions to maintain the security of South Korea and West Germany.

Whether Ukraine wins the war or there is a stalemate along with a possible ceasefire, security for Ukraine and Europe will require arrange­ments stronger than a verbal pledge (a la the ill-fated Budapest Memo­randum of 1994) or even the recent U.S./G7 pledges to support Ukraine’s military capacity. The stability of West Germany and South Korea was main­tained less by the terms of the ceasefire and more by the presence of U.S. and other troops. West Germany entered NATO in 1955 as a divided country. Whatever the outcome on the battle­field, NATO should advance Ukraine’s member­ship in the alliance and the next step should take place at the NATO Summit in Wash­ington, D.C. in July 2024. Whatever the precise formula, NATO needs to give Ukraine a clear and credible road to NATO accession and perhaps an invi­ta­tion to begin accession talks. As was the case a gener­a­tion ago with Poland and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, EU member­ship proceeded along with NATO accession and the EU should advance this as well for Ukraine.

No course is easy. As a condition for a ceasefire, Russia will try to insist on forced neutrality for Ukraine, e.g., a la the 1955 Austrian State Treaty or Cold War Finland. The West shouldn’t buy it. A ceasefire on those terms would indeed mean a breathing space for Russia to regroup and try yet another invasion. Putting Ukraine into a gray zone of strategic ambiguity is no road to peace but an invi­ta­tion to another war. For Putin, gray zones equal green lights.

Putin will not willingly accept Ukraine in NATO. He may try to keep the war going by holding if he can maintain his earlier conquests in southern Ukraine, espe­cially the land bridge to Crimea, and keep throwing missiles at Ukraine to keep the war going, degrade Ukraine’s economy, and compli­cate its NATO member­ship hopes. The U.S., Europe, and Ukraine need to forestall this by putting Russia under increasing pressure, so that the Kremlin, not Ukraine and its friends, becomes the demandeur in any nego­ti­ating process.

Ukraine’s judgments about the shape and timing of any diplomacy will be key. The Biden Admin­is­tra­tion has done well to apply to Ukraine the old Polish saying, “Nothing about us without us.” All the options – military support, economic and diplo­matic pressure on Moscow, and possible diplo­matic discus­sions – need to be discussed and deter­mined with Ukraine, prefer­ably in confi­dence. U.S., European, and Ukrainian judgement and deter­mi­na­tion will be tested in the months ahead.

Victory for Ukraine could be a win for Biden

The U.S. political dynamic could compli­cate this strategy. While most Repub­li­cans in Congress, including in key committee positions, support Ukraine, Donald Trump, the presump­tive Repub­lican nominee, and some other Repub­lican candi­dates, do not. Trump and others have revived the U.S. foreign policy tradition of “America First,” which in its current version, like its pre-Pearl Harbor version, in fact means indif­fer­ence to European security and tolerance or even support for aggres­sive dictators, Hitler then and Putin now. In addition, some from a so-called “Realist” school of foreign policy argue that Ukraine cannot possibly win the war and that the U.S. should put pressure on Ukraine to negotiate, essen­tially on Russia’s terms. This school recalls the Cold War realists who accepted the Soviet Empire in Europe as an unfor­tu­nate but necessary price of general peace and dismissed the possi­bility of demo­c­ratic dissi­dents in Central and Eastern Europe having an impact on the course of their nations. Both schools of thought essen­tially embrace spheres of influence as an orga­nizing principle of inter­na­tional relations and consign smaller powers, and even some larger ones like Ukraine, to their suppos­edly inevitable great power overseers.

President Biden and his Admin­is­tra­tion will face mounting pressure from both schools as the U.S. general elections in November 2024 approach, espe­cially if Ukraine has been unable to make signif­i­cant advances on the battle­field. There may be some within White House who want to avoid addressing Ukraine’s NATO member­ship as long as the Russo-Ukraine War continues because doing so could spur criticism that the U.S. was taking on too much respon­si­bility, risking war with Russia, and putting its soldiers at risk. On the other hand, support for Ukraine now could increase the chances of Ukraine achieving a successful battle­field outcome and defeating Putin’s Russia. That would be a strategic success for the U.S. and, probably, a political success for the Biden Presidency.

U.S. resolve and public support for Ukraine has held so far and at higher levels than many in the U.S. (and probably the Kremlin) antic­i­pated. That deter­mi­na­tion on the part of the U.S. govern­ment and society will be tested.

Ukraine’s deter­mi­na­tion will likewise be tested, both on the battle­field and in its ability to continue its systemic trans­for­ma­tion. Fighting in the name of democracy doesn’t mean the work is done (as Americans know from sad recent expe­ri­ence.) Talk of corrup­tion in Ukraine has become politi­cized and abused in the U.S. domestic debate about support for Ukraine. But the chal­lenges are real. U.S. officials known for their support for Ukraine have made known their continued concern over corrup­tion.[xiii] So has President Zelenskyy, who recently dismissed all the leaders of Ukraine’s regional military draft offices.[xiv] Under the pressure of war, political power in Ukraine has been central­ized in Bankova, the Pres­i­den­tial Admin­is­tra­tion, and Ukraine’s democracy will need to be strength­ened. Elections will need to be held. NATO and the EU have made this clear in even their most forth­coming state­ments about Ukraine’s accession.

Uncer­tain­ties and diffi­cul­ties abound. But the oppor­tu­nity for success for Ukraine and the Free World in resisting Russia’s aggres­sion exists. Ukraine, Europe, and the U.S. need to remember in the weeks and months ahead what it is they seek: a united Europe that extends to and includes a free, demo­c­ratic Ukraine. We all need to mean it.

[i] See, for example, “The ‘monu­mental’ conse­quences of Ukraine joining the EU,” Sam Fleming and Henry Foy, “Financial Times,” August 6, 2023

[ii] The EU-Ukraine asso­ci­a­tion agreement: a potted history – POLITICO

[iii] See The Orange Revo­lu­tion: A Revo­lu­tion of Hope | Center for US Ukrainian Relations.

[iv] One brief and largely forgotten U.S. exception was the support in late-1918 and early 1919 from President Woodrow Wilson’s national security advisor Edward House for Baltic, Finnish, and Ukrainian inde­pen­dence as the Russian Empire broke up after Russia’s defeat in World War I and the Bolshevik seizure of power  “Inter­pre­ta­tion of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points,” Inter­pre­ta­tion of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points — Wikisource, the free online library

[v] Former U.S. Official Shares Details of Secret ‘Track 1.5’ Diplomacy With Moscow — The Moscow Times

[vi] Link to the Putin April 2008 speech in Bucharest: Text of Putin’s speech at NATO Summit (Bucharest, April 2, 2008) | UNIAN.

[vii] Biden sends a careful but chilling new nuclear message to Putin in CNN interview | CNN Politics

[viii] Link to G7 statement on long-term military support for Ukraine: G7: Joint decla­ra­tion of support for Ukraine — Consilium (europa.eu)

[ix] Ukraine has legal right to attack Moscow, says Germany (msn.com)

[x] Links to pieces by Phil Zelikow, Larry Summers, and Robert Zoellick; and by Frank Kramer: Lawrence Summers, Philip Zelikow and Robert Zoellick on why Russian reserves should be used to help Ukraine (economist.com); Time for the West to seize Russian state assets | The Hill

[xi] Ukraine’s diplo­matic offensive made important advances in Saudi Arabia — Atlantic Council

[xii] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/07/welles-act-pompeo/566060/

[xiii] Bridget Brink’s X (formally Twitter) post https://x.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1689581973545660416?s=20

[xiv] WP article on Zelenskyy move: Zelensky fires military recruit­ment center chiefs after corrup­tion probe — The Wash­ington Post

This paper is published in the framework of the project „Russia and the West: Europe’s Post War Order and the Future of Relations with Russia“, which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry.  All views in this paper are the author’s own.