Policy Paper: Georgia’s Soon-To-Be Dicta­torship and What Can Still Be Done

The EU candidate country is facing one of its deepest political crises in recent years. For more than a year, people have been taking to the streets in peaceful protest. At the same time, the Russia-leaning ruling party, Georgian Dream, has been hardening its course: repression against civil society, independent media, and the opposition is visibly intensifying.

Against this backdrop, leading repre­sen­ta­tives from Georgian civil society, academia, media, and politics travelled to Berlin at the invitation of the Center for Liberal Modernity (LibMod). During their visit, they took part in a press breakfast, a hearing in the Committee on European Union Affairs of the German Bundestag, and meetings in both the Bundestag and the Federal Foreign Office, where they also presented the following policy paper.

Executive Summary

Georgia is on the verge of consol­i­dating a one-party dicta­torship after more than a decade of rule by Georgian Dream, a party that has shifted from a nominally pro-European force to an openly author­i­tarian regime aligned with Russian strategic interests. Since 2023, democ­ratic backsliding has accel­erated dramat­i­cally through the adoption of repressive legis­lation targeting civil society, independent media, political opposition, and public protest. The latest legal package from March 2026 further shrinks the space for independent actors. The consensus on the nature of the Georgian Dream’s government, however, is widening inter­na­tionally. The sanctions by the UK on propa­ganda media in February 2026 and the OSCE Moscow Mechanism report on the violation of human rights in March 2026, are the two latest devel­op­ments, which demon­strate the potential of the external pressure mechanisms.

The internal author­i­tarian consol­i­dation of Georgia is insep­a­rable from a broader geopo­litical shift. The Georgian Dream has frozen EU accession efforts, adopted anti-Western rhetoric, and increas­ingly mirrors Kremlin narra­tives, while advancing policies that objec­tively serve Russian interests. Yet, Georgia is not yet a lost cause. Despite sustained repression, opposition parties, civil society, independent media, and a strongly pro-European public continue to resist. Public support for EU integration remains above 70%, and mass protests demon­strate that the regime has not succeeded in reshaping societal preferences.

The central analytical mistake in some Western circles is to view Georgia as already irreversibly captured by Russia. This misdi­ag­nosis risks strategic disen­gagement. The primary driver of author­i­tar­i­anism in Georgia is not Russian control but the domestic logic of regime survival: a ruling elite unwilling to relin­quish power and therefore system­at­i­cally disman­tling democ­ratic pluralism. External engagement still matters because Georgia remains deeply dependent on Western economic, financial, and political ties.

A more effective Western response requires moving beyond fragmented and reactive measures toward a coordi­nated strategy of deter­rence and support. Sanctions should be embedded in a broader framework of clearly commu­ni­cated red lines and conse­quences, combined with incen­tives for de-escalation. At the same time, the West must prioritise the survival of democ­ratic infra­structure (civil society, media, and political actors), whether inside the country or in exile. The window for action is rapidly closing, but Western leverage remains signif­icant. The decisive question is whether it will be used with suffi­cient clarity, coordi­nation, and resolve.

Intro­duction

In 2026, Georgia entered its fourteenth year of rule by the Georgian Dream (GD) party, which once positioned itself as a pro-Western political force committed to EU-oriented reforms and democ­ratic trans­for­mation. Little more than a decade ago, Georgia was widely regarded as a frontrunner in post-Soviet democ­ra­ti­sation and as a committed aspirant to EU and NATO membership. Today, it can be described as a country just five minutes away from a one-party dictatorship.

In recent years, Georgia’s progress along the trajectory from being a reform-oriented young democracy towards a system charac­terised by increas­ingly formalised author­i­tarian practices has accel­erated. The rollback of reforms and the adoption of repressive legis­lation have been accom­panied by a delib­erate shift in foreign policy away from the country’s Euro-Atlantic partners. The country’s political environment increas­ingly resembles a total­i­tarian system: opposition political parties are soon to be banned; opposition leaders and activists face arrest, prose­cution, or exile; civil society and independent media are under permanent legal and financial pressure; party loyalists have captured courts and security insti­tu­tions; and nominally independent state bodies are subject to partisan and political control. The Georgian Dream also engages in internal political and admin­is­trative purges, a feature typical of author­i­tarian regimes.

In Georgia, as in many other states of the region, democ­ratic decline has led to a shift in foreign policy. Foreign policy goals have shaped the state’s internal political trajectory since Georgia regained its indepen­dence in 1991, with European integration serving as the main struc­tural anchor for democ­ratic reforms, at least since 2003. Thus the current retreat from democ­ratic trans­for­mation and the shift in foreign policy orien­tation are two inter­re­lated dimen­sions of the same political process.

Consol­i­dation of One-Party Dictatorship

Author­i­tarian consol­i­dation in Georgia has become more visible since 2023, due to legis­lation targeting “foreign influence”, which restricts civic space and foreign funding. By central­ising control over civil society, the media, and inter­na­tional assis­tance, Georgian Dream has sought to neutralise independent actors and limit foreign partners’ engagement, a pattern observed in other autocracies.

A series of legislative measures adopted since 2024 has system­at­i­cally targeted freedom of assembly and expression, political parties, media, and, most recently, univer­sities. Large parts of this framework are modelled directly on legal mecha­nisms used in the Russian gover­nance model.

While democ­ratic setbacks are not uncommon in young democ­racies, Georgia’s case reflects a sustained, accel­er­ating shift toward a one-party rule closely aligned with Russian strategic interests. Impor­tantly, dicta­torship is not yet a fait accompli, but the coming months will be used to complete the process through a variety of means: the inten­si­fi­cation of prose­cu­tions, exerting financial pressure on independent media through selective funding, adver­tising restric­tions, and regulatory fines, the widening of inves­ti­ga­tions against civil society, the arrest of civil society leaders, pressure on activists to leave the country, the arrest of the political opponents, and the final­i­sation of measures to ban major opposition parties.

Key Features of Georgia’s Autocratic System

There are clear similar­ities between Georgia’s regime and other author­i­tarian systems, but several features make the Georgian case distinctive:

• Informal rule: Bidzina Ivanishvili exercises de facto control over the state, despite holding no formal government office. This creates great challenges in terms of account­ability and limits external leverage on him due to the lack of access and his informal capacity.
• Rapid author­i­tarian consol­i­dation: Georgia has nearly completed its transition from a functioning, EU-oriented democracy to a formalised autocratic system in an unusually short period. What took other states a decade has been achieved by the Georgian Dream in less than two years.
• Russian alignment: The Georgian Dream government is functionally in unison with Russian strategic interests.
• Persistent societal resis­tance: Almost 500 days of street protests are evidence of a strong pushback from the public.
• Resilient democ­ratic actors: Civil society, independent media, academia, and opposition parties continue to defend democ­ratic space despite severe pressure.
• Enduring pro-European support: Public backing for European integration remains overwhelm­ingly high, consis­tently exceeding 70%, highlighting the tension between author­i­tarian consol­i­dation and the population’s European orientation.

Latest Major Blow to Civil Society and Political Activism

On 4 March 2026, Georgian Dream adopted a new legislative framework, in addition to the existing Trans­parency of Foreign Influence Law, the Foreign Agents Regis­tration Act (FARA), and the Law on Grants. The new legislative package is poised to deal a poten­tially fatal blow to civil society, independent media, and political activism.

Broad defin­ition of grants: The legis­lation dramat­i­cally broadens the defin­ition of a grant. The term grant now encom­passes any transfer of foreign funds, monetary or in-kind, that may be used (read: inter­preted) in the belief or with the intent of influ­encing government insti­tu­tions, public policy, or any part of society. This includes activ­ities related to shaping or changing domestic or foreign policy, as well as initia­tives connected to the public or political interests of foreign govern­ments or political actors. This effec­tively means that no media products, public policy analyses, public posts, or other output from think tanks or civil society can be produced by anyone who receives any foreign funding for any (even unrelated) purpose.

Thus, the law now equates funds associated with service contracts, donations, and technical assis­tance with grants. Transfers involving knowledge, expertise, technology, or profes­sional services are automat­i­cally categorised as grants if they fall within the expansive political defin­ition. This elimi­nates the previ­ously existing distinction between project-based grants and contractual service arrange­ments, thereby including an entire range of legit­imate profes­sional and academic cooper­ation in its scope. In short, the GD is casting an all-encom­passing net over any activ­ities that they may decide to consider “political”, threat­ening to crimi­nalise them if they are in any way linked to a foreign financial source.

Mandatory prior government approval: All such “grants” (read: trans­ferred sums) require the prior approval of the Government of Georgia – effec­tively that of the State Audit Office, which is staffed by prose­cutors and headed by the prede­cessor of the current prose­cutor general. This requirement applies not only to domestic organ­i­sa­tions but also to branches or repre­sen­tative offices of foreign legal entities (such as German founda­tions) operating in Georgia. Even funding trans­ferred inter­nally within an inter­na­tional organisation’s structure triggers the oblig­ation to obtain approval. This law prohibits all cross-country cooper­ation on matters of policy and political activ­ities concerning Georgia. Organ­i­sa­tions must either submit their activ­ities for political vetting or risk severe sanctions. The absence of clear proce­dural guarantees and objective criteria for approval further exacer­bates the risk of arbitrary or polit­i­cally motivated decisions.

Criminal liability: The most conse­quential aspect of the amend­ments is the replacement of admin­is­trative liability with criminal liability – impris­onment of up to 6 years. Engaging in grant-related activ­ities without prior autho­ri­sation may result in fines, community service, or up to 6 years’ impris­onment. This reclas­si­fi­cation elevates viola­tions to the category of serious crimes, enabling the use of intrusive inves­tigative techniques such as searches, seizures, and covert surveil­lance.  By crimi­nal­ising what was previ­ously a regulatory offense, the legis­lation intro­duces a powerful chilling effect. Civil society actors, donors, and individual experts face the prospect of prose­cution, asset freezes, and long-term impris­onment for engaging in activ­ities that are recog­nised inter­na­tionally as legit­imate forms of civic participation.

Retroactive impli­ca­tions: The amend­ments include a clause requiring entities that previ­ously received grants which were not subject to approval at the time to apply for retroactive approval within 1 month of the law’s entry into force. During this period, the use of received funds of this kind is prohibited. This retroactive appli­cation under­mines legal certainty and places organ­i­sa­tions in an impos­sible position: previ­ously lawful agree­ments may suddenly expose them to criminal liability.

Impact on donors and inter­na­tional organ­i­sa­tions: These amend­ments impose liability not only on recip­ients but also on donors and other funding providers. Employees of foreign organ­i­sa­tions may face criminal conse­quences if they engage in funding activity that has not been approved. This creates signif­icant opera­tional uncer­tainty for inter­na­tional donors, including multi­lateral insti­tu­tions and devel­opment agencies. To mitigate risks, donors may be forced to withdraw, reduce their level of engagement, or resort to opaque inter­me­diary mecha­nisms. Such outcomes would undermine long-standing partner­ships supporting legal aid, inves­tigative journalism, election monitoring, and social services. The new restric­tions are also in clear violation of Georgia’s oblig­a­tions under the EU-Georgia Associ­ation Agreement.

Restric­tions on political partic­i­pation: The legislative package contains provi­sions whose scope extends beyond civil society to include political actors. Senior officials of political parties may face criminal liability for accepting foreign funding. Individuals employed by organ­i­sa­tions that receive more than 20 percent of their annual income from foreign sources are prohibited from party membership for the next eight years. These provi­sions erect the wall between civic engagement and partisan activity, effec­tively disqual­i­fying a signif­icant segment of active citizens from partic­i­pating in politics.

Impact on business and entre­pre­neurs: A new admin­is­trative offense intro­duced into the Code of Admin­is­trative Offenses applies to business enter­prises that engage in public political activ­ities unrelated to their core business activity. The sanction in this case is an admin­is­trative fine of 20,000 GEL (around 7,000 EUR), and repeated viola­tions result in criminal liability, effec­tively barring a business from supporting civil movements and initiatives.

Crimi­nal­i­sation of “non-recog­nition” of consti­tu­tional bodies: amend­ments to the Criminal Code intro­duced penalties for “systematic and public” calls to defy government bodies, create alter­native author­ities, or question the legit­imacy of the consti­tu­tional order. Sanctions include fines, community service, or up to three years’ impris­onment. Moreover, “non-recog­nition” of this kind as a motivating factor will also serve as an aggra­vating circum­stance for other offenses that can result in a longer sentence. The vague and expansive wording grants the author­ities broad discretion, raising concerns that ordinary political speech – including refer­ences to the ruling party as a “regime” or refusal to acknowledge officials as legit­imate – could be treated as criminal conduct.

New Restric­tions on Assem­blies: Crimi­nal­ising Pavement Protests

In late December 2025, the Georgian Parliament passed another set of amend­ments to the Law on Assem­blies and Manifes­ta­tions and to the Admin­is­trative Offences Code, which further tightened restric­tions on public protests. The amend­ments expand the scope of prohibited conduct to include “obstructing people’s movement” in pedes­trian areas, including pavements (sidewalks), whereas previ­ously only the blocking of roads was punishable. This change trans­formed even non-disruptive protest tactics, such as standing or chanting on a pavement, into an offence carrying up to 15 days’ admin­is­trative detention and harsher penalties for repeat offences. More than 20 persons have appeared in court on this charge, and more than 16 have been sentenced to 4–5 days in jail. This is the first time in Georgia’s history that people have been arrested for simply standing on a pavement during an anti-government demonstration.

Viewed against the background of other repressive measures adopted throughout 2025, these recent measures testify to broader strategy aimed at narrowing the scope for civic engagement: curtail­ments that may appear minor on paper have severe conse­quences in practice, turning active partic­i­pation in public life into grounds for arrest and sentencing.

The 2026 OSCE Moscow Mechanism

On 12 March 2026, the OSCE Office for Democ­ratic Insti­tu­tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) published a report under the Moscow Mechanism, highlighting a sharp deteri­o­ration of human rights and funda­mental freedoms in Georgia. Invoked in January 2026 by 24 partic­i­pating states, the mechanism-one of the OSCE’s strongest and oldest tools found author­i­tarian practices in Georgia that include restric­tions on assembly, harassment of opposition figures and journalists, polit­i­cally motivated prose­cu­tions, laws limiting civil society and media freedoms, and arbitrary detention and ill-treatment.

Under­scoring the serious erosion of democ­ratic insti­tu­tions in the country, the report urges Georgian author­ities to take urgent corrective measures and calls on OSCE member states to monitor imple­men­tation and consider targeted sanctions or the involvement of inter­na­tional legal mecha­nisms, such as the ICC, the ECHR, the UN Committee against Torture, and the ICJ.

Geopo­litical Repositioning

The author­i­tarian turn in Georgia’s domestic policy has been accom­panied by a broader geopo­litical recal­i­bration. Georgian Dream is not only adopting Russian-style methods at home but also, increas­ingly, repro­ducing the Kremlin’s anti-Western propa­ganda narra­tives and mirroring its stance toward Western actors. In addition to concrete steps like suspending the EU accession process and scaling down its engagement with NATO, the Georgian government has been portraying the EU and other inter­na­tional allies as “deep state” (whatever that might mean) and as hostile powers intent on inter­fering in Georgia’s internal affairs and under­mining its sover­eignty. The government-controlled propa­ganda media amplify anti-Western narra­tives designed to discredit the liberal democ­ratic community and to reframe European integration as a threat rather than a national objective.

Just recently, Georgian Dream-controlled media announced a televised debate challenging the rationale for EU integration. This is an unprece­dented move, one that targets Georgia’s central foreign policy goal, despite overwhelming public support for and the country’s consti­tu­tional commitment to a European trajectory. At least two artifi­cially created political parties affil­iated with Georgian Dream have been actively calling for the revision of the Consti­tution and for a refer­endum on whether Georgia should still aspire to join the EU. These devel­op­ments fit perfectly with Russia’s long-term strategic interests in relation to Georgia and the wider region.

Russia has been pursuing its strategic goals in Georgia, which are to strengthen and expand its influence over both domestic and foreign policy there. It has a sophis­ti­cated set of hybrid tools that it uses to deepen political polar­i­sation, spread disin­for­mation, promote democ­ratic erosion, and further isolate Georgia from its Western partners.

Georgia’s political debate often centres around the same tired question: is Georgian Dream “pro-Russian”? Are its leaders controlled by Moscow? Are they Russian agents or cynical pragma­tists? This kind of language has lost its value. It invites denial, hair-splitting, and propa­ganda games. The reality is simpler and more dangerous: Georgia’s internal political model, foreign policy posture, and infor­mation environment have become functionally aligned with Russia’s interests.

Over the past several years, virtually every signif­icant political, legal, and foreign policy move taken by the Georgian Dream government has either advanced or protected Moscow’s interests: from the disman­tling of NATO inter­op­er­ability struc­tures and the halting of EU-integration reforms to the crimi­nal­i­sation of civil society, the adoption of Kremlin-style legis­lation, the weapon­ising of propa­ganda, and the work preparing the ground for historical revisionism.

This alignment with Moscow’s interests is visible both in the government’s foreign policy behaviour and in its strategic decision-making. Substantive work on EU accession has been frozen and EU-requested reforms have been reframed and decried as “exter­nally imposed inter­ference”. A parlia­mentary commission has revised the narrative of the 2008 war in a way that shifts respon­si­bility away from Russia and toward internal “provo­ca­teurs.” Fulfilling a long-standing Russian demand, the government also abolished the temporary admin­is­tration for South Ossetia – a structure in place for 18 years that was designed to portray the conflict as an inter­state one between Georgia and Russia.

The reori­en­tation is also apparent in the way that Georgia’s ruling party speaks about the West. Pro-government outlets increas­ingly portray the EU and the United States as seeking to drag Georgia into war, undermine its tradi­tions, and control its politics through NGOs and media, which are also core elements of Russian disinformation.

The change of foreign policy vector is also reflected in some of Georgia’s strategic economic and security choices. Georgian Dream halted the Anaklia deep-sea port project, rejecting Western (including American) investment and influence over the Black Sea. As one former Anaklia investor recalls, Ivanishvili argued that there was “no place for Americans in the Black Sea” – precisely echoing a strategic objective that Moscow has pursued for decades.

Most impor­tantly, this change of trajectory has helped achieve another of Moscow’s long-term objec­tives: Georgia’s gradual disap­pearance from the Western diplo­matic agenda. “Georgia fatigue” and “Georgia is a lost cause” have become a kind of shorthand for inaction. For Russia, erasing Georgia from Western political discourse has always been a strategic goal: Georgian Dream has become an instrument for achieving that goal.

Why Georgia Is Not Yet a Lost Cause

One argument gaining traction in some Western circles holds that Russia’s control over Georgia is already so extensive that external Western engagement can no longer make a difference. This view is both mistaken and strate­gi­cally dangerous. It is mistaken because, while the Georgian Dream government has aligned itself with Russian strategic interests, Russia is not the primary driver of Georgia’s author­i­tarian consol­i­dation. The logic of repression is domestic: even if Moscow’s influence were to weaken dramat­i­cally tomorrow, those in power in Tbilisi would not step aside. On the contrary, they would likely intensify their grip, doubling down against real and imagined enemies to preserve oligarchic rule.

It is strate­gi­cally dangerous because it invites paralysis and compla­cency. By overstating Russia’s deter­minism, it erases the agency of domestic actors and encourages the West to disengage precisely when engagement still matters.

Nor is Georgia’s trajectory the result of “excessive balancing”, the notion that author­i­tar­i­anism is a defensive response to geopo­litical pressure from Russia and the West. Georgia is not being pushed into a dicta­torship by external constraints. It is being driven there by a ruling elite that has concluded that losing power is unacceptable, and that democ­ratic pluralism is therefore an existential threat

Three circum­stances in particular make clear that Georgia is not yet a lost cause.

First, political parties and leaders continue to resist, even under severe pressure and from behind bars. They are still organ­ising, repre­senting citizens in the street protests, commu­ni­cating with partners, and refusing to accept author­i­tar­i­anism as normal and irreversible. Even if some parties are banned or prevented from partic­i­pating in elections, the political opposition will not simply disappear, provided that it is not physi­cally destroyed or forced into exile. Certainly, the proposed legislative amend­ments increase the chance of its demise by those very means, however the political opposition will not surrender so easily.

Second, independent media and civil society continue to function despite demon­i­sation, legal harassment, and financial pressure. Inves­tigative reporting continues; corruption is exposed; disin­for­mation is analysed; politi­cians’ state­ments are fact-checked; and the idea of a European Georgia remains alive in the public sphere. Many organ­i­sa­tions are operating under a constant risk of fines, raids, and prose­cution, yet they are operating, nonetheless. Though the new legis­lation might severely impact the work of civil society, the media, and activists, many will continue their work, either from abroad or simply in defiance of the law – thus increasing the human cost of resis­tance even further.

Third, and most impor­tantly, the Georgian public remains overwhelm­ingly firm in its European choice. The widely published images of the Tbilisi streets filled with EU flags amidst clouds of tear gas reflect a resilient social consensus on the direction the country should take. The fact that the protests have been going on for over a year and the consis­tently high support for EU membership demon­strate that the regime has not succeeded in severing Georgia from Europe at the level of public identity and aspiration.

These factors explain why the government is still investing so much of its resources in coming up with new repressive laws and promoting anti-Western propa­ganda, while simul­ta­ne­ously devel­oping narra­tives that imitate Western conser­v­ative language in which it claims to be “defending” “real” Georgian and Western values. If society had already turned away from Europe, such efforts would be unnec­essary. Georgia is not yet irreversibly lost.

Western Response to Georgia’s Crisis

For the European Union and for the West in general, the central question is whether it can afford to lose Georgia or tolerate a one-party dicta­torship in a candidate state. The stakes extend beyond Georgia’s future to the credi­bility of the EU’s enlargement policy and its trans­for­mative power.

The strategic objective of the West should therefore be to undermine entrenched author­i­tarian rule and curb Kremlin influence by signif­i­cantly increasing the political costs that Georgian Dream must pay for accel­er­ating the disman­tling of democracy. More robust, principled, and assertive European engagement is essential – not only to counter external influence opera­tions and author­i­tarian consol­i­dation, but also to strengthen the societal forces still committed to democ­ratic gover­nance and European integration. As long as resilient democ­ratic spaces continue to exist in Georgia, there is still a chance to preserve Georgia’s democracy.

The worst thing the Western powers could do now would be to disengage and let Georgian Dream’s rhetoric about Georgians no longer being inter­ested in Western integration win the day.

What the West Can Still Do?

A realistic starting point is the recog­nition that regime change and democ­ra­ti­sation are always internal tasks. No external pressure could, on its own, result in the overthrow of the ruling party. Pretending otherwise fuels the propa­ganda narrative that the “deep state” and the “global war party” are using local proxies in a coup attempt. What external actors can do, however, is enable the survival of enough democ­ratic space – political, civic, and media space – to ensure that resis­tance remains possible until such time as change becomes achievable.

Western engagement has been weakened by fragmen­tation and hesitation. Washington is detached from Georgia; Europe is divided. Increas­ingly, EU member states are taking conflicting approaches: some normalise engagement with Georgian Dream without condi­tioning contact with it on democ­ratic standards, while others refuse to engage in high-level political meetings, lest by doing so, they appear to condone the author­i­tarian consol­i­dation and thus lend it legitimacy.

In recent years, the EU member states, the United States, and the United Kingdom have intro­duced several targeted sanctions against Georgian officials in response to human rights viola­tions. Primarily focused on individuals, these measures have had limited systemic impact on the Georgian Dream (GD) government. The latest UK sanctions, intro­duced on 24 February 2026 and imple­mented as part of the set of wider measures relating to Russia, target Georgia’s two major pro-government TV channels, Imedi TV and POSTV, for spreading “delib­er­ately misleading infor­mation” about Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In targeting GD’s key propa­ganda outlets, these sanctions are proving to be an extremely effective tool for disrupting the main instrument that the party uses for autocratic consol­i­dation, demon­strating that carefully calibrated measures can directly undermine the mecha­nisms that sustain author­i­tarian practices.

Because the EU is unlikely to reach unanimity on a course of meaningful action, waiting for a consensus to emerge is no longer a viable option. The response must take the form of coordi­nated pressure exerted by a coalition of willing states – specif­i­cally, states prepared to act jointly through bilateral tools: synchro­nised diplomacy, coordi­nated messaging, condi­tional financial engagement, and close coordi­nation with the United States and the United Kingdom.

This kind of engagement from the West does matter because Western leverage over Georgia remains substantial. Georgia is not yet dependent on Russia; it is still deeply dependent on the West, through investment, markets, loans, credits, grants, remit­tances, and inter­na­tional financial archi­tecture. This depen­dence is the West’s strongest tool when it comes to protecting a society that has not abandoned its democ­ratic aspirations.

Thus far, the use of sanctions has not fully exploited the potential of this instrument. Not because the sanctions intro­duced have been unnec­essary, but because they have often been used post hoc, in small doses, rather than being integrated into a broader strategy aimed at deterring further deteri­o­ration of democracy, or undoing already adopted draconian laws. A broader strategy for deter­rence and effective engagement is, thus, necessary. An effective engagement with Georgia requires that sanctions and similar measures be preceded, wherever possible, by clearly commu­ni­cated warnings that specific non-democ­ratic steps will trigger concrete conse­quences. At the same time, such a strategy should include carefully calibrated incen­tives that encourage de-escalation and a return to democ­ratic commitments.

The OSCE Moscow Mechanism report provides credible data on human rights viola­tions on the ground and offers concrete recom­men­da­tions for OSCE partic­i­pating states, integrating well-documented facts with concrete policy sugges­tions. The report can serve as a solid basis for evidence-based, targeted inter­na­tional measures, enabling the inter­na­tional community to respond strate­gi­cally rather than reactively to author­i­tarian practices in Georgia.

A serious Western response should therefore focus on:

• Deter­rence: Commu­ni­cating clear red lines and conse­quences before taking new restrictive steps; conse­quences should follow if commit­ments are broken, but commu­ni­cation and condition-setting ahead of time are essential.
• High-level condi­tional engagement: Engagement that is not subject to condi­tions, such as that by some EU member states, has served only to embolden Georgian Dream; therefore, diplo­matic activity must be backed by sticks and carrots and an enforcement plan.
• Targeting the regime’s stability calculus: The West should consider expanding its use of tools that affect financial and reputa­tional stability (travel, assets, networks, and trans­ac­tional access), in addition to individual targeted sanctions.
• Protecting democ­ratic infra­structure: Ensuring that civil society and independent media can survive finan­cially and legally, if necessary, in exile; helping them maintain minimum opera­tional capacity, including through flexible and secure funding instruments.
• Maintaining Georgia’s political visibility: Keeping Georgia on the agenda through coordi­nated minis­terial and parlia­mentary attention; the regime benefits from the absence of attention and fatigue.
• Strength­ening societal resilience: Supporting youth movements, watchdog activity, fact-checking, election monitoring capacity, and legal defence – precisely the things the regime is trying to choke off.

The “five minutes” are not a metaphor for despair, but for urgency.  Western states continue to have enormous leverage over Georgia. The key question is whether they are willing to use it with clarity, coordi­nation, and resolve.