“Russia is putting enormous pressure on the Baltic Sea region”

According to Oliver Moody, people in the Baltic states have been aware of the threat posed by Russia for much longer. The Berlin corre­spondent for The Times and Sunday Times has just written a book about “The Baltic Sea Conflict Zone” (“Konflik­tzone Ostsee”) In an interview with Till Schmidt, he explains what we can learn from the Baltic states.

Mr. Moody, your new book deals with the Baltic Sea as a geopo­litical and geo-economic region. What do these many different countries—the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, Poland, and Germany—have in common?

Even though the military power and sover­eignty constel­lation has changed repeatedly, dense trade networks have always existed in the region. This dates back to the Bronze and Iron Ages. Today, the region has developed into one of the most culturally and econom­i­cally inter­con­nected regions in the world. All countries now share the threat posed by Russia. Security issues have become enormously important again since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Since then, the Baltic Sea region has been on high alert. This is also because the threat posed by a series of power cable, telecom­mu­ni­ca­tions, and gas pipeline failures as well as by the Russian shadow fleet has become more concrete. What exactly has changed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022?

Even immedi­ately after the end of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states continued to perceive Russia as a clear threat. In the Nordic countries and also in Germany, the situation was different for a long time. In the meantime, all countries in the Baltic Sea region have become much more aligned in their perception of the Russian threat. This process began even before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion: with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2000, the unrest in Estonia in 2007, which was stirred up by Russia, and Russia’s annex­ation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has heightened the perception of threat, partic­u­larly in Finland, but also in Sweden.

Both countries are now part of NATO. Does that alone justify the more frequent triumphant talk of the Baltic Sea as a “NATO sea” that we can hear now?

I don’t want to take away from anyone the pleasure of patting themselves on the back for the geopo­litical changes in north­eastern Europe. And given the current severe lack of good news, a little triumphalism should be okay. However, I do have a problem with the “NATO sea” rhetoric when it becomes complacent and ignores the military-strategic realities: namely, that Russia continues to exert enormous pressure on the entire Baltic Sea region, and on the Baltic states in particular. Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO has not changed this situation significantly.

Does this mean that all Western countries in the Baltic Sea region are now “frontline states” in the fight against Russia?

We have become very accus­tomed to the idea that the perception of threat and the willingness to spend more than five percent of gross domestic product on defense, to take up arms and die for one’s country, are stronger the closer we get to the Russian border.

Due to Russia’s continuous aggression below the military threshold, I would extend the term “frontline states” to include countries that do not directly border Russia. In any case, we should take a greater interest in percep­tions of the conflict, partic­u­larly in the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland.

In “Konflik­tzone Ostsee” (Conflict Zone Baltic Sea), you repeatedly work with future scenarios – similar to Carlo Masala in his book “Wenn Russland gewinnt” (When Russia Wins). Neither of you do this to scare your readers, but to show what is at stake if European countries fail to make their policies more forward-looking and their societies more resilient. What is the worst-case scenario for the Baltic Sea region?

There are two types of possible scenarios: First, a scenario as outlined by Carlo Masala. In this scenario, the Putin regime sends a message in the form of an attack on the Baltic states. In this scenario, the US is funda­men­tally unwilling to respond compre­hen­sively in the sense of a NATO alliance case. This forces European NATO members into a situation where they have to decide: Are they willing to send their soldiers into battle and to their deaths, risking escalation to a poten­tially nuclear conflict, in order to save a small area in the Baltic? Masala delib­er­ately leaves the outcome of this scenario open. The second scenario involves the possi­bility of a full-scale Russian attack on the Baltic states, in which the situation escalates very quickly and very badly.

How far are we currently from these scenarios?

Bringing concrete data into the debate conveys a sense of urgency. But ultimately, these are arbitrary assessments—whether they come from the Danish intel­li­gence service or the German Bundeswehr. The parameters that go into these assess­ments are therefore crucial. First, there is the assessment of the Putin regime’s inten­tions. I am no expert on Russia. But I was shocked by the excessive confi­dence of many Russia analysts who, before February 2022 thought they could predict events well – and were completely surprised by the full-scale invasion. I am convinced that Putin does not yet know exactly what he will do in the future.

Secondly, Russia’s military capability is very dependent on the course of the war in Ukraine. It is also obvious that Russia has signif­i­cantly restruc­tured its military struc­tures and infra­structure on NATO’s borders, especially those with Finland and Estonia, and that Belarus is increas­ingly being integrated into Russia for military purposes. Based on current production rates in the arms industry and the conscription of soldiers, some medium-term devel­op­ments should be easy to predict. Thirdly, however, we should pay particular attention to what we can best control and manage: namely, our deter­rence, consisting of conven­tional military capabil­ities, their mainte­nance, and the logistics for their deployment, but also political signals.

Over time, many states and societies in the Baltic Sea region had no choice but to develop a forward-looking and resilient approach to strategic threats and war. In your book, you portray the countries primarily from this perspective. Who or what impressed you the most?

The extra­or­dinary trans­for­mation of the Baltic states over the past forty years. The political and social debate in Estonia in the 1990s went something like this: We have just regained our indepen­dence, and now we are so vulnerable that everyone expects us to be drawn back into Russia’s sphere of influence immedi­ately. In order to ensure their own survival, prior­ities were set. As a result, Estonians have built a state that is not only far more resilient in times of crisis and war than many Western European countries. Estonia has been able to draw additional advan­tages from this situation. These include, above all, an incredibly good education system, a renowned technology sector, and successes in digital gover­nance. In Estonia, resilience does not just mean ensuring that citizens know what to do in the event of a missile attack on their hometown.

What does that mean in concrete?

I am impressed by Estonia’s attempt to develop cognitive defenses against disin­for­mation. In Estonia, emphasis is placed on teaching media literacy from the earliest school years. This includes checking news sources for credi­bility, the ability to identify where things circu­lating on social media come from and devel­oping a sense of questioning things before sharing them. All of this may sound trivial. But in many countries, it is always aston­ishing to see how credu­lously many people treat infor­mation from social media and tradi­tional media. We can learn from Estonia in this respect.

How do you describe the sentiment in the region against the backdrop of uncer­tainty about future dynamics?

In the Baltic states, people are very aware of the fact that their country’s existence could be wiped out very quickly. But they have been living with this awareness for 30 years, if you estimate conservatively—or for 700 years, if you want to delve very deeply into history. Over such a long period of time, it is impos­sible to remain afraid. You develop a certain serenity and are therefore able to assess and evaluate threats more clearly. This has also been evident in Finland, where it is not only possible to mobilize public consensus on security issues, but also to change it very suddenly when necessary—as was the case with the decision to join NATO following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.