How German Hesitancy Prolongs the War against Ukraine

“I had to wait 28 years too!” — German Chancellor Angela Merkel is said to have exclaimed this allusion to the duration of the Berlin Wall, visibly annoyed, when then Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko presented Russian passports issued by Moscow in Crimea and the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk at a joint press conference in early 2015. After Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled the Euromaidan protests in 2014, Russia created military facts in Crimea and subse­quently inter­vened in the Donbas, while the West did nothing about it. From Merkel’s point of view, a serious confrontation or even retal­i­ation against Russia were unthinkable, especially because the US under President Barack Obama was not prepared to intervene militarily in any way, nor to use deter­rence or even a show of military force. So, the only option was to come to terms with the loss of Crimea and the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, to freeze the conflict as best as possible and to hope that, years or decades later, internal changes would occur in Russia, enabling a new approach to these issues. Until then, it would be necessary to come to terms, especially as Russia would be needed to resolve a whole range of economic and political issues. These basic attitudes still charac­terise German policy towards Ukraine today.

Of course, a lot has happened since that press conference in 2015. Germany had a “Zeiten­wende” after the major Russian attack in February 2022. And yet it remains unclear to this day what strategic consid­er­a­tions are guiding the German government in supporting Ukraine and a future security order in Europe. You often get the impression that Germany only hesitantly and reluc­tantly goes along with what others propose. Some partners and observers still harbour the suspicion that Berlin is secretly dreaming of a return to the status quo ante, despite Germany’s now very extensive military support for Ukraine.  Above all, however, there is a remarkable conso­nance: while Russian ruler Vladimir Putin is guided by a mixture of Russian neo-imperi­alism and rolling back the “greatest geopo­litical catastrophe” – the collapse of the Soviet Union – since 2014, the German government has perceived devel­op­ments in Ukraine as inevitably leading to a new form of European division. A division that could be ended in the distant future by a new fall of the Berlin Wall, just like Germany’s own experience.

There is no question that German policy towards Ukraine and Russia has changed consid­erably since the major Russian attack in February 2022. Never­theless, the strategic thinking at the top of the German government still seems to be charac­terised more by conti­nuity than by a funda­mental rethink that the response needs a real “turnaround”. Although Germany also almost overem­pha­sises its loyalty to the alliance and close coordi­nation with its partners in public, in reality the government has repeatedly taken a special path (Sonderweg) in the discussion about support for Ukraine. Does the German government even have a strategy towards Ukraine and the future security of Europe? From a German perspective, the endgame of the Russian-Ukrainian war seems to be guided solely by the vague objective that the war will “somehow get bogged down”. Instead of concrete ideas for a post-war Europe, German politi­cians still seem to expect – or hope for – a return to a modified pre-war Europe.  However, the pressure from military events, the position of the USA, of partners in both Scandi­navia and Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the German Bundestag, and the public too could change German government policy.

German policy since 2022: Growing support, too slow and too late

Germany played a decisive role in the greatest failure of Western policy from 2014 onwards. After the annex­ation of Crimea, Western states did not do nearly enough to deter Putin from preparing and carrying out the large-scale military invasion of Ukraine. Instead, they resorted to wishful thinking, driven above all by the great German desire for no change and foreign policy conti­nuity. This led to cheap energy prices for the German economy and the hope, against all evidence, that co-operative solutions could be found with Putin’s Russia on important inter­na­tional policy issues. This was made possible by an absolute denial of the realities of Putin’s inten­tions and by delib­er­ately ignoring domestic political devel­op­ments in Russia. This was the only reason why Germany was finally able to perceive a “Zeiten­wende” at all when the major invasion began in February 2022, which really was not a surprising change in the inter­na­tional situation but a harsh and unavoidable confrontation between Germany and the reality of security policy.

Until the end of 2021 and early 2022, Germany was still telling itself that the Russian troop deploy­ments were exercises and that the Americans and British were exagger­ating their warnings. Immedi­ately after the large-scale attack, Germany initially reacted helplessly. The general mood in Berlin on 24th and 25th February 2022 was that Ukraine was lost, there was nothing that could be done, and arms deliv­eries would no longer arrive. All that could be done now was to expand the eastern flank into a new iron curtain, which was a pity but could not be changed.

As a result, Germany came under unprece­dented pressure from European and inter­na­tional partners, to the point of being threatened with isolation. By abandoning Nord Stream 2, by beginning arms supplies to Ukraine and with the Chancellor’s powerful and historic “Zeiten­wende” speech on 27th February 2022, Germany reestab­lished itself as a loyal alliance member and restored its agency. Since then, however, although Germany provides Ukraine with ever growing military support, there is a growing impression that it is always reluctant, too slow, and too late to make decisions. Germany’s military support for Ukraine has the same gestation like the Zeiten­wende speech: Germany is not imple­menting its own strategy or taking a strate­gical approach but is just trodding along with the US-led coalition of Ukraine supporters. Germany’s sheer size and consid­erable economic and financial might mean that the effects for Ukraine are very significant.

The Government is unable to break with the assumption of an overwhelming Russian superiority 

On the battle­field, it became clear early on that Russia could be defeated militarily in Ukraine. Central hypotheses about possible escalation risks have also been disproven in more than two years of war. The Marder infantry fighting vehicle did not trigger World War Three, nor did Russia respond to attacks against Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet with nuclear weapons. However, despite these findings, the German government is still unable to break with the basic assumption of an overwhelming Russian military superi­ority and from presumed serious escalation risks.

Conti­nuity despite Zeitenwende

Since Chancellor Scholz’ ground-breaking speech on 27th February 2022, “Zeiten­wende” has been the central leitmotif for all debates on German foreign and security policy. “Zeiten­wende” or, as Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock called it, “waking up in a different world”, means that nothing will ever be the same again. However, the German reaction to “Zeiten­wende” has so far not been a rapid, far-reaching, and irreversible change, but remains charac­terised by slowness and a great deal of continuity.

The German response to “Zeiten­wende” has been much more transat­lantic than European 

Germany’s enormous assis­tance with weapons, ammunition and military equipment for Ukraine repre­sents the central and paradigm change in German policy. German weapons give Ukraine’s armed forces an advantage on the battle­field. They also help Ukraine to survive and prevent Putin from achieving his military goals. Never­theless, the German government as a whole seems to continue to assume that Germany itself cannot be a decisive factor in deciding the war and restoring peace. The government in Berlin adamantly looks to the White House for leadership. So far, the German response to Zeiten­wende has been much more transat­lantic than European.

The German government’s policy still seemingly rests on the assumption that Russia cannot be militarily defeated. In its contin­u­ation of US strategy, Berlin relies on a slow degra­dation of Russian military capabil­ities in Ukraine. The strategic assumption seems to be that measured assis­tance to Ukraine would cause frustration for Russia and a relatively weak position for Ukraine at the same time, so that both sides would seek a military pause, a stalemate in the war and ultimately a ceasefire along a new “line of contact” further west than that of 2014. From this perspective, real strategic change can only be achieved if the US changes its strategy or if signif­icant changes occur within Russia. The latter could still be decades away.

Tradi­tionally, German foreign policy does not want to do too little, but certainly not too much 

Despite “Zeiten­wende”, Germany thus continues its tradi­tional foreign and security policy, except for supplying arms to Ukraine. The German government does not see itself as having a leading role in defending Ukraine against Russian aggression and restoring Ukraine to its inter­na­tionally recog­nised borders of 1991. Instead, it remains reactive and plays small. Germany sees itself as one partner among many, ideally in a balancing middle position. In accor­dance with tradition, German foreign policy does not want to do too little, but certainly not too much. And the German government would rather take a position on the proposals of others than make proposals itself that might be open to criticism.

Recog­nising the looming threat to Germany and Europe, becoming aware of its own strength and duty, adapting German policy to the possi­bil­ities of its own size and capabil­ities and moving from being a hesitant and restraining player to a driver and shaper – this is still difficult for Germany. Germany could and should be a source of ideas and a driving force for joint European action in support of Ukraine. The intuition of German foreign policy regarding Ukraine seems to remain the same even after “Zeiten­wende”: “We are watching this closely, we are examining it carefully, we will have to wait and see.”

Implicitly, Germany’s Ukraine policy after “Zeiten­wende” draws parallels with the division of Germany, as it did in 2014, even after the major Russian invasion of 2022. From this perspective, all that needs to be achieved is a stalemate and a temporary ceasefire, which can then be trans­formed into an eternal provi­sional arrangement so that the funda­mental conflict can possibly be resolved decades later.

Between loyalty and Sonderweg

After the “Zeiten­wende” speech finally brought the positions of German Ukraine and Russia policy back into line with the then consensus of the Americans, British, Central Eastern Europeans and Scandi­na­vians, the consistent avoidance of an explicit agreement on strategic objec­tives for support of Ukraine in recent years has once again led to a distancing of positions. While it is clear to the Scandi­na­vians, Central Eastern Europeans, and the British that support for Ukraine must serve to restore the country’s full sover­eignty within the 1991 borders and that this requires Russia to be defeated militarily on Ukrainian soil, the strategic approach for the US and Germany appears to be to manage the war and hope that both sides get bogged down. Once again, Germany seemingly gives more wheight to Russian views, Putin’s state­ments and feared Russian reactions to German behaviour than to the positions of Ukraine, the Central Eastern Europeans and the Scandi­navian partners. Germany’s complex and long-disproved fear of escalation with Russia is leading the country into self-deter­rence instead of making it a key player for the European order. Ultimately, there is still a danger that Germany will at least implicitly accept Russian offers of a great power policy in Europe, which will translate into the policy of a German “special path” (Sonderweg).

Since the major Russian invasion and Germany’s change of course following the “Zeiten­wende” speech, the German government has domes­ti­cally placed utmost impor­tance on the impression that its action is always closely coordi­nated with all partners. In principle, this corre­sponds to the classic and histor­i­cally correct German foreign policy approach. In decisive strategic issues, however, German coordi­nation seems to apply only to the US and even includes the principle that Germany only ever does something if the Americans have already done something similar. The decision to deliver Leopard 2 battle tanks dependent on the delivery of M1 Abrams battle tanks by the US was the most notable example.

Germany must get back on track in order to act together with its European partners 

The German government rightly feels that public and inter­na­tional criticism of Germany’ aid volume for Ukraine is unfair. Why is Germany repeatedly criti­cised while other large countries such as France, Spain, and Italy, which provide much less aid, remain largely unchal­lenged? Germany is obviously still suspected by many of wanting to return to the status quo with Russia due to its special relationship with Moscow, which lasted until 2022. For this reason, every step is perceived with particular scrutiny and every statement is judged with particular criticism. Above all, however, the fact that Germany is not taking the lead in any of the steps for Ukraine is viewed criti­cally abroad. Berlin is also opposed to Ukraine’s NATO membership and seems not yet entirely convinced about Ukraine’s integration into the EU. Germany therefore now needs strategic agreement with the Scandi­na­vians and Central Eastern Europeans on its Ukraine policy. French President Emmanuel Macron recently took a turn in this direction compared with 2023. Germany, too, must reconnect in order to act together with its European partners.

Does Germany have a strategy?

Germany has never formu­lated a strategy for Ukraine. Since the Orange Revolution of 2004, the German approach can be summarised as follows: A European Ukraine governed by the rule of law is in our interest and we hope that this devel­opment will occur on its own. After the NATO Bucharest summit in 2008 the German position was: EU rapprochement with Ukraine is possible, but NATO rapprochement is not, due to Russian opposition, even if it were agreed by NATO as a funda­mental perspective. A slow EU integration of Ukraine, possibly without conflict with Russia, seemed to be Germany’s strategic hope. After Putin inter­vened against the EU Associ­ation Agreement and Ukrainian President Yanukovych then made a U‑turn, Germany presented itself as a fervent supporter of Ukraine’s European perspective during the Euromaidan protests. As soon as Putin lost his political influence in Kyiv as a result of Yanukovych’s flight and immedi­ately resorted to military force in Crimea, Germany categor­i­cally ruled out military force and military demon­stra­tions of power, thereby leaving Ukraine in the lurch. From 2014 onward, it tried a three-pronged approach of freezing the war, investing in and engaging Ukraine, while simul­ta­ne­ously continuing close energy and economic relations with Russia. The result is well known: Squaring the circle could not succeed.

Without a strategy, Germany’s Ukraine policy is unlikely to succeed 

Since the large-scale invasion and the Zeiten­wende speech, Germany has despite initial hesitancy become one of the biggest military supporters of Ukraine and a provider of consid­erable financial and human­i­tarian aid. However, the impetus for this has almost always come from others: Anti-tank weapons, “heavy weapons”, the Ramstein format, battle tanks, air defence, ammunition initiative – Germany ultimately supplies a lot – but in response to public sugges­tions of others and after initial hesitation and foot dragging. The purpose of Germany’s military aid to Ukraine remains unclear and is dressed up with the formulas “Ukraine must not lose” and “we will provide support for as long as necessary”. After two years of war, it is long overdue that Germany develops its own organ­i­sa­tional ideas and sets itself strategic goals. This may be lacking because there is no unity within the governing coalition. However, without a strategy, Germany’s Ukraine policy is unlikely to be successful.

The endgame from the German perspective

In the third year of the war, the German government’s actions still seem to be guided by a vague idea that the fighting will stop without outside inter­ference. Since the start of the large-scale invasion, Germany has been unable to free itself from this mindset. In February 2022 it was assumed that the war would end with a Russian victory in a few weeks; after Russia’s retreat from Kyiv, a stalemate was expected in the summer of 2022. After the Ukrainian counter-offensive in late summer 2022 it was believed that a stalemate would come with winter. Later it was assumed that stalemate would come after the large-scale Ukrainian counter-offensive of 2023 fizzled. All of these expec­ta­tions never materialised.

Presently, the US and, conse­quently, Germany appear to be focussing on a stalemate by the end of 2024, although, as in all previous cases, it remains unclear on what analytical basis this thinking is based. The aim is gradual support of Ukraine in small steps, with as little effort and as little cost as possible, with the under­lying hope that the Ukrainians will at some point make “difficult” decisions, while also hoping that Putin “realises” that he is getting nowhere.

Even if such hopes are realistic, it will probably take a very long time for these ideas of an endgame to materi­alise. Providing Ukraine with measured military support while at the same time refraining from rapidly building up higher indus­trial capac­ities in Germany and Europe for weapons and ammunition also repeatedly opens up new oppor­tu­nities for Putin to win.

Post-war Europe or pre-war Europe?

According to Putin himself, he decided to invade Ukraine to funda­men­tally change the European order. In contrast, Germany is supporting defensive war in Ukraine without having developed a strategic vision of a post-war Europe. The German approach so far seems to be driven more by the desire to return to pre-war Europe: ceasefire in Ukraine, even if the line of contact is further west, no NATO membership for Ukraine, EU membership preferably in the distant future.

According to this idea, the current European members of the EU and/​or NATO are sealing themselves off in order to secure their prosperity and security, while Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are left in a grey zone. Perhaps even relations with Russia could be gradually normalised over time in this constel­lation. Only on NATO’s eastern flank, and thus also on the EU’s eastern border, Germany would strengthen its commitment by perma­nently stationing a brigade and setting up a “European Sky Shield”. According to this concept, we are returning to a slightly altered pre-war Europe. However, it does not answer how exactly the end of the Russia-Ukraine war will be brought about and how a war that lasts years can be avoided. And the question of how Russia will be deterred from further military adven­tures and aggression in the future also remains unanswered according to current German thinking. Stability and security in the grey zone are also left unconsidered.

Although Germany has already agreed a multi-year bilateral security agreement with Ukraine, it did not specify any strategic objec­tives. The fact that Germany has agreed to Ukraine’s EU candidate status, but at the same time opposes Kyiv’s NATO membership, is like a mental regression to the time after 2008, when it was thought that an EU rapprochement of states in the grey zone was possible without NATO security guarantees. This hypothesis has been empir­i­cally refuted.

“A lack of concrete conceptual ideas for a post-war European order”

Even in the third year of the war, the German strategy for military support for Ukraine remains implicit at best. There is a lack of concrete conceptual ideas for a European post-war order. However, peace for Ukraine can only be achieved if Germany breaks out of its incre­mental approach intel­lec­tually, develops a theory of victory for Ukraine in its defensive war against Russia, aligns its military support with this theory and at the same time develops a concept for a European post-war order. So far, Germany seems to lack the conceptual strength and political will to do this.

How can Germany’s position be changed?

However, more than two years of war have shown many times that the position of the German government change. Military devel­op­ments on the battle­field constantly reshape political thinking and government actions. After all, the battle­field deter­mines politics, not politics the battle­field. Ukraine’s successful defence against the Russian armed forces outside Kyiv opened the door for the delivery of anti-aircraft tanks and artillery, while the Ukrainian offensive in late summer 2022 laid the foundation for the decision to deliver infantry fighting vehicles and battle tanks. The Russian attacks on Kharkiv created the pressure to lift the restric­tions on the use of German weapons and ammunition on Ukrainian territory.

At the same time, the most important key to changing Germany’s Ukraine policy still seems to lie in Washington. Germany is copying changes in the American approach and always moves forward when the Americans move forward. It is possible that German decision­makers derive this approach from the fact that Germany is not a nuclear power and remains dependent on US protection. In the light of domestic political devel­op­ments in the US, this close link will soon raise questions. A change in strategy from incre­mental military aid to faster decisions is conceivable in the US either in Biden’s or Trump’s second term.

France can also influence the German debate, but only if Paris takes concrete action instead of just far-reaching rhetorical commit­ments. Together with France, allies in Central Eastern Europe and Scandi­navia are among the most important supporters of faster Ukrainian NATO membership. Their strong engagement and close dialogue with Germany, their prodding of the German government, their constant public and non-public engagement with German positions can get things moving in Berlin and help the German government to catch up strate­gi­cally. As with the united response to the start of the major Russian invasion, successful European action will only be possible if the strategic positions of the Scandi­na­vians, Central Eastern Europeans, French, British, and Germans converge again.

Germany’s moves towards stronger support for Ukraine is also a story of parlia­men­tar­i­anism and public opinion. Pressure from parliament, public debates and public opinion have played a decisive role in repeatedly bringing the government to move forward. Many of the important support measures for Ukraine, for which the government is now rightly praising itself, would not have been possible without parlia­mentary and public pressure. It will be necessary to keep these debates going and at the same time keep intro­ducing new ideas, in order to widen the German government bureaucracy’s struc­tural narrowness in foreign and security policy.

Does it really have to take 28 years for the Ukrainians to get a chance to live in freedom and unity? Will Germany help to ensure that things happen differ­ently and faster? Do we really have to wait for a new fall of the Berlin Wall, or can we do more ourselves to force an end to the war through Ukraine’s military assertiveness? Will Germany find the strength to break out of the status quo and create an image of a post-war Europe that elimi­nates grey areas and expands the zone of peace, security, and prosperity? These questions can only be answered step by step. It would be helpful if, as a first step, Germany finally clarified the objective of its military support for Ukraine and what resources are needed to achieve this and in what timeframe.

Nico Lange is Senior Fellow at the Munich Security Conference and Senior Fellow for Transat­lantic Security and Defence at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He was a senior civilian official in the German Defence Ministry from 2019–2022. Lange has lived and worked in the USA, Ukraine and Russia. He is fluent in Ukrainian and Russian.

This paper is published in the framework of the project „Russia and the West: Europe’s Post War Order and the Future of Relations with Russia“, which is supported by the German Foreign Ministry.  Any opinions in this paper are the author’s own.