Unequal friends: Impli­ca­tions and limita­tions of an increas­ingly asymmet­rical Sino-Russian relationship

The first part of the discussion focused on the character, trajectory and limita­tions of Sino-Russian relations. The experts agreed that the partnership between Moscow and Beijing is strong, resilient and currently inten­si­fying in many sectors. Both countries share the goal of challenging the Western-dominated liberal inter­na­tional order.

At the same time, speakers stressed that the relationship is deeply asymmet­rical with Russia in increas­ingly subor­dinate position. China and Russia, united in their ant-western position, do not share a common ideology nor a common vision of the inter­na­tional order in the 21st century. Moreover, bilateral relations have been shaped by mutual mistrust rooted in historical trauma and cultural distance. This factor, though close present alignment of the both countries remains relevant at least in medium term.

The relationship was therefore described less as a genuine alliance than as a flexible strategic partnership driven by self-interest and realpolitik. Both sides under­stand the benefits they derive and are aware that they would be signif­i­cantly worse off without each other. Yet the partnership also contains clear limita­tions and potential areas of tension.

A source of geopo­litical comfort for Moscow

For Moscow, the relationship with Beijing is a source of geopo­litical comfort and a force multi­plier for Russian influence around the world. Without China, Russia — and Putin in particular — would be consid­erably weakened. Since February 2022 and the imposition of Western economic sanctions, however, China has become indis­pensable for the Russian economy, providing markets, technology, financial channels and dual use goods that enable the current Russian war effort.

For China, Russia provides a secure strategic rear along their 4,200-kilometre border. This is important in itself, but also because it allows Beijing to focus on more pressing prior­ities, above all its relationship with the United States. In the broader strategic rivalry with Washington, Russia serves as a useful geopo­litical partner. At the same time, Russian acqui­es­cence to Beijing’s ambitions is not least as important as active cooper­ation, ensuring that Moscow does not obstruct Chinese interests in Northeast and Central Asia, in the Arctic or in global governance.

Several speakers highlighted the relationship’s increas­ingly asymmetric nature. Beijing has taken advantage of Russian weakness in recent years by purchasing oil and gas at discounted prices, expanding Chinese manufac­turing exports and strength­ening its position in key sectors of the Russian economy. Partic­i­pants also noted that many previ­ously promising and future-oriented forms of techno­logical and indus­trial cooper­ation have stagnated or disap­peared altogether since the invasion of Ukraine. China maintains a certain distance because the Russian economy has become toxic due to sanctions and Beijing does not want Moscow to compete with it in indus­trial manufac­turing. Thus, although economic relations have become more intense, they have also become simpler and less promising for Russia: They largely center on raw material exports from Russia and imports of manufac­tured goods from China.

At the same time, experts argued that there are limits to how far China can exploit Russian depen­dency. Beijing cannot push Putin too far into a corner, since excessive pressure could create insta­bility inside Russia and poten­tially threaten the survival of the Kremlin regime — a scenario China wants to avoid.

China sees its future in renew­ables, Russia remains dependent on fossils

Although the energy partnership remains a crucial pillar of bilateral relations and may deepen further in the short term – not least because of insta­bility in the Middle East – the experts argued that its long-term impor­tance is likely to decline. China sees its geo-economic future in renewable energy and techno­logical dominance. Its transition towards a technology-driven, post-carbon economy contrasts sharply with Russia’s growing depen­dence on fossil fuels, military production and raw material exports. In the long run, China’s economic trans­for­mation could therefore pose an existential challenge to Russia’s position and influence in the inter­na­tional system.

Moreover, the widening power gap between China and Russia raises an increas­ingly important question for the Kremlin: where should the geopo­litical and geo-economic bound­aries of the relationship be drawn?

Another major factor shaping the relationship is the difference between Chinese and Russian visions of global order. Although both countries seek to challenge US primacy and advocate a “multi­polar world order,” the concept of multi­po­larity means very different things in Moscow and Beijing. The Russian under­standing resembles a kind of “Yalta 2.0” based on spheres of influence and bargaining between US, China and Russia. Some experts argued that, while previous Chinese leaders were uneasy about the idea of a G2 (made up of China and the US), Xi Jinping appears more receptive to it because that places China on the same level as the United States. Generally, China favours a rule-based inter­na­tional order, what it sees as a prereq­uisite for achieving the “Chinese dream” of national rejuve­nation. One speaker described China as a “revisionist but not revolu­tionary power”: Beijing seeks to reshape the inter­na­tional system on the expense of the US and Europe, working within it. It promotes itself as a defender of global­ization and multi­lat­er­alism, playing out  its economic power  and global influence for conse­quently under­mining liberal values and seeking to filling vacuum in global gover­nance. Russia, by contrast, was portrayed as a power that seek to tear down the system, as it benefits from geopo­litical insta­bility and thrives in situa­tions of crisis and disruption.

Although these differ­ences could, in the long run, pose a challenge to the partnership, partic­i­pants argued that the China-Russia relationship is likely to remain stable in the medium term. That is why experts have dismissed as delusional the idea of a ‘reverse Kissinger’ or ‘reverse Nixon’ whereby Washington attempts to improve relations with Russia in order to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Neither Russia nor China can afford to allow their partnership to unravel, essen­tially, when the alter­na­tives currently offer them so little.

“China is under­cutting the very essence of European power”

The second part of the discussion focused on the challenges posed by China to Europe, first and foremost to Germany.

The main assessment of the threat emanating from Beijing’s economic policies was drastic: China is under­cutting the very essence of European power, which mainly rests in its huge economic potential. The bloc’s GDP in nominal terms is still bigger than China’s (23 v 20.8 trillion dollars expected for 2026, according to the IMF). But Beijing has more confi­dence, ambition and willingness to take risk. A stark example of this are the restric­tions Beijing imposed on rare earth exports in 2025, which hit the EU hard. Europe is already suffering deindus­tri­al­ization, with Germany alone losing an estimated 10,000 industry jobs monthly.

Add to this China’s role as the major enabler for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The brutal war was described by a partic­ipant as “incredibly conve­nient” for Beijing, because China “spends nothing, gains a lot and is happy that its biggest adver­saries are burning money every day on military support for Ukraine”, something that does not generate revenue nor wealth.

Europe’s answer has so far been twofold – diplo­matic hard talk and economic sanctions. The first measure rests on the assumption that reputa­tional risks matter to Chinese officials, who like to portrait their country as neutral and as a power inter­ested in reaching a productive solution. The second was imple­mented with the 20th EU sanctions package against Russia in April, which for the first time targets ⁠third-country suppliers of dual-use goods or weapons systems to Russia, including banks and companies from China. “Our thinking is that China’s support for Russia’s war is immensely detri­mental to our interests,” a policy­maker said.

But this might be far from enough. Some argue that Chinese officials really have no problem with reputa­tional risks, when it comes to their relationship with Russia “because they don’t think (the Europeans) matter”. In fact, China has not really paid a price for its support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Others, however, challenged the notion that Beijing does not care about its reputation. As one partic­ipant put it “they are not nice and sweet, but they are less aggressive than few years ago”.

The ensuing debate on sanctions centered on possible costs on the Chinese aviation industry to be imposed via software restric­tions for Airbus planes – however the issue is compli­cated by compe­tition from US giant Boeing and mounting uncer­tainty about Washington’s stance on the issue.

Criticism was also heaped at the EU trade policy versus China, which turned the bloc into a supplier of “highly replaceable” agricul­tural and commodity goods like barley, potatoes and even chicken feet, while the Chinese “take on all the indus­trial sides”.

Europe must challenge China as a bloc

The discussion ended with the firm conclusion that Europe can only challenge China as a bloc and not on national levels. It should aim for a mitigation scenario, in which the EU acts fast (within 6 to 12 months) to protect its indus­tries from the Chinese onslaught, while it keeps supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia.

If this fails, think tankers warn of a scenario (called “adaptation”), in which a Chinese-led global order leads to the EU’s fragmen­tation and to a greater role for Russia.

Nikolaus von Twickel contributed to this report