Final battle to save civil space in Georgia

Executive summary

For quite some time now, the democ­ratic world has been watching, in real-time, as the Georgian Dream (GD) government chokes civil society and opposition in the country, silencing critical voices. GD accel­erated this process in 2023, attempting to pass a Russian-style foreign agents law. In parallel with that, it launched large-scale attacks (verbal as well as physical) on civil activists in Georgia. Georgian Dream failed in its first attempt to pass the legis­lation, but this did not stop them from building author­i­tar­i­anism. GD has managed to shrink the civic space in Georgia dramat­i­cally in record time. While civil society engages in its final battle against the author­i­tarian regime in Georgia, the European Union persists in its failure to realize that the GD is already passed the point of no return and has been wasting time and effort trying to change GD’s behaviour. In December 2023, the European Union spared the rod – giving candidate status to Georgia even though GD had not fulfilled crucial points of the condi­tions that were to supposed be a prereq­uisite for the award of this status. With that decision, the EU lost yet more and arguably the last of its leverage over GD. It also contra­vened its own logic – first refusing grant Georgia candidate status in 2022 due to the democ­ratic backsliding in the country, and then deciding to grant it in the autumn of 2023, when the situation was even worse. Georgian civil society realizes that their country’s future is on the line and that this is their battle to fight, but to wage this battle they need tailor made and practical support from Brussels and EU member states.

The reality on the ground

Every day, the ravaged space in which civil society organi­za­tions (CSOs) can operate grows smaller and more perilous. Starting from the time of its indepen­dence, Georgia boasted a vibrant civil society, which is one of the central guarantees when it comes to keeping author­ities accountable in countries where state insti­tu­tions are weak, and the system of checks and balances is distorted. As of 2022, there were 31,339 non-entre­pre­neurial (non-commercial) legal entities – NNLEs – regis­tered in Georgia, though only 4,051 of these were recog­nized as “active” by the National Statis­tical Office of Georgia. One of the biggest challenges CSOs faced was securing their financial viability. Inter­na­tional donors like USAID, the EU, and individual EU member states used to be the primary source of income for civil society organizations.

On 28 November 2024 Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would be dropping the EU accession process, opening the door for GD to pass legis­lation strength­ening author­i­tar­i­anism in the country. The GD took aim at its detractors, with three main objec­tives: restricting the space for street protests, damaging the reputation of civil society repre­sen­ta­tives by attributing the status of foreign agents to them, and hurting the opposition parties, notably the United National Movement, by accusing them of treason. The decisions taken by the new US admin­is­tration are grist for GD’s mill. As mentioned above, Georgia’s civil society depends largely on foreign donors, and the sudden decisions to suspend the work of USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) left Georgian CSOs in a critical situation at this crucial moment, when the country is heading at full speed into author­i­tar­i­anism. Thus far, European Union’s promise that the frozen EUR 120 million origi­nally intended for Georgian author­ities would be redirected to support civil society organi­za­tions remains just words. The time for words has passed though. Georgian civil society now needs action rather than rhetoric. Time is of the essence: CSOs must either comply with the legis­lation enacted by the GD government and label themselves foreign agents or put their very existence at risk. If Georgia’s civil society loses the battle it is waging, the EU will have yet another author­i­tarian state in its immediate neighbourhood.

Decisive battle for Georgia’s democracy

Georgian Dream has reached the final phase of its project to annihilate Georgian civil society. In a speech held in April 2024, Bidzina Ivanishvili promised the strict condem­nation of the United National Movement (UNM) (which brings together civil society, media, opposition, political parties, etc.), adding that they would be punished. He is now in the process of trans­lating those words into deeds. In the last few years, the Georgian people and civil society have been fighting to save the country’s European future. GD’s aim is to suffocate the NGO sector gradually. It is using three main methods to do so.

Firstly, the GD parliament amended the admin­is­trative code, intro­ducing harsher penalties for viola­tions of the rules on organizing or holding assem­blies or demon­stra­tions. The aim here is to put an end to the street protests. Under the amended legis­lation, anyone who blocks a roadway during a protest could be fined GEL 5,000 (approx­i­mately EUR 1650), 2.5 times the average monthly salary in Georgia. The fine for hanging the placards was increased from GEL 50 to GEL 1000 (app. EUR 330). According to the one of the most reputable civil society organi­za­tions in Georgia — the Georgian Young Lawyers Associ­ation (GYLA) — from November 28, 2024, when popular protests erupted in Georgia, to March 18, 2025, fines imposed on protesters accused by author­ities of blocking roads reached GEL 2 million (app. EUR 670,000). To effec­tively identify the “perpe­trators”, GD police use state surveil­lance cameras manufac­tured by two Chinese companies, Hikvision and Dahua Technology, both of which are subject to US sanctions. Moreover, the country’s Interior Ministry uses a facial recog­nition system from a company with ties to Russian intel­li­gence. Surveil­lance is part of the GD’s approach to rule, and the figures speak for themselves: In 2020, Georgia imported 7,178 surveil­lance cameras. In 2021, that figure increased to 9,694; 16,423 were imported in 2022; and 16,423 in 2023. In 2024, there were at least 4318 so-called “smart cameras” in Georgia. The “smart camera” has a range of advanced functions, including vehicle number recog­nition, detecting traffic rule viola­tions, and identi­fying various types of movements.

Secondly, the Georgian Dream justice system keeps on chasing the individuals who were active during the protests. This includes either subjecting them to severe beats or putting them in prison on sentences of up to several years. From November 2024 to January 2025, the GD justice system imprisoned 54 persons linked to the protests. With this tactic, GD is aiming at a chilling effect to discourage others from protesting.

Thirdly, GD uses legis­lation modeled on statutes from Western countries to attack civil society and independent media. GD parliament recently created its own cut and paste version of the US Foreign Agents Regis­tration Act (FARA), and it copied copiously from a UK law on media and disin­for­mation. In copying FARA, GD aims to silence critics with the argument that it is following the Western path and best practice. This is far from the case, though: the Georgian legis­lation is being used to drive CSOs into a corner and is being wielded in a reality very different from that of its model. The objective of FARA, enacted in the US 80 years ago, was to counter Soviet and Nazi influence in the United States. The GD is using its cloned version to counter the influence of the USA and EU, which are the most prominent donors of civil society organizations.

Through the enactment of UK-style media law provi­sions, the GD first gave a quasi-independent state agency – the Commu­ni­cation Commission, which, like many other state agencies, serves the interest of the Georgia Dream – the right to impose fines and, later, to silence the critical media in Georgia. Unlike the case in the UK, it makes no sense for media outlets to take the Commu­ni­cation Commission to court, since the courts in Georgia have already been captured by Georgian Dream.

GD is also laying the groundwork for the promotion of the work of government-supported non-govern­mental organi­za­tions, a.k.a. GONGOs. The GD parliament passed a law creating the State Grants Management Agency for this purpose. With an annual budget of GEL 20 million (app. EUR 7 million), SGMA will provide funding to NGOs that work on less polit­i­cally sensitive issues, not those that seek to document GD short­comings and are regis­tered in the foreign agents’ registry.

GD has signif­i­cantly benefited from the US Presi­dent’s decision to suspend the work of USAID and NED. Both used to be prominent donors to Georgian civil society organi­za­tions. The decision started a clock ticking for most of the CSOS operating in Georgia. Since EU support is also on hold, CSOs are facing existential threats.

GD is not about to ease up; it will ensure the passing of further legis­lation strength­ening author­i­tar­i­anism in the country. Civil society organi­za­tions and activists are in dire straits. There are four ways civils society organ­i­sa­tions /​activists could react in this new environment: they could keep on fighting despite the risks, either be severely fined or imprisoned, abandon their civil activism and switch to other jobs, leave Georgia and work from abroad or register as foreign agents thus bringing reputation damage. Georgia may be facing another wave of brain drain. This may mean that there will soon no longer be agents of change on the ground in Georgia, that the only voices heard in the public arena are of those who benefit from the GD rule. If this occurs, the upcoming local elections scheduled in October 2025 will be a mere formality.

One ought not assume that GD has reached the limits of oppression. It is quite possible that it will follow the lead of the author­ities in Tajik­istan, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan and impose severe internet censorship and restric­tions on freedom. This would enable GD to block websites more swiftly, centralize control and curb civil liberties. It might also tackle the univer­sities, which remain islands of freedom of expression and critical thinking.

Conclusion

It turns out that Bidzina Ivanishvili meant what he said in April 2024. He is now trans­lating those words into deeds and entirely elimi­nating anything that might oppose his rule. The clock is ticking for Georgian civil society, which was long at the forefront of the country’s Europeanization process. One thing the European Union can do is continue their efforts to isolate Georgia Dream officials (e.g. not inviting them to the upcoming European Political Community summit in Tirana, Albania, on May 16, or the next one in Denmark on October 2). EU and EU member states should also help those who want to leave the country by offering various schol­ar­ships, intern­ships and temporary relocation programs. It is crucial to support those who want to keep working from abroad and ensure that they can easily enter and/​or acquire a residence permit in the EU Member states. EU has also sped up shifting EUR 120 million in support from the state to the CSOs and reviewing its operation guide­lines for recip­ients of EU grants.