Hungary’s Veto and the Future of Ukraine’s EU Accession

Ukraine on its path toward EU membership

The European Union is entering a new and serious stage in its enlargement crisis. Ukraine has breathed new life into the EU, motivating it to overcome the enlargement fatigue that followed earlier accession rounds. Yet the actions of a single member state seem to have rendered the Union unable to seize this oppor­tunity, thus jeopar­dising the EU’s broader strategic objectives.

Since submitting its appli­cation for membership in February 2022, Ukraine has demon­strated an unprece­dented level of deter­mi­nation in advancing towards EU accession. Despite the full-scale war, the country has been imple­menting reforms, meeting oblig­a­tions, and conducting accession negoti­a­tions at a pace that outstrips that of any previous candidate country.

One of Ukraine’s key integration goals for 2025 is to enter into parallel negoti­a­tions in all clusters. At present, Ukraine is urging its European partners to take the proce­dural steps necessary to open Cluster 1 (i.e. Funda­mentals) in the near term. The European Commission has acknowl­edged both Ukraine’s substantial progress and the legit­imacy of its expectations.

Hungary blocks EU accession talks

Paradox­i­cally, the main obstacle facing Ukraine is no longer a lack of readiness on its part but rather political inertia on the EU side. This is engen­dered by Hungary’s unilateral blockade of key steps in the negoti­ation process. Thus, in addition to grappling with Russian aggression and internal anti-reform forces, Ukraine must now also deal with the injustice of EU proce­dures that allow a single member state to stall the entire process.

Ukrainian civil society, working closely with national insti­tu­tions and EU partners, has played a pivotal role in ensuring reform trans­parency and account­ability thus far. However, unjus­tified delays in negoti­a­tions threaten to erode trust in the EU within Ukrainian society, fuel pro-Russian narra­tives and undermine the credi­bility of the enlargement agenda as a whole.

This moment calls for a reassessment of EU proce­dures, partic­u­larly with regard to the need to minimize oppor­tu­nities for individual member states to abuse their veto powers during technical phases in the accession process. The merit-based approach must remain the corner­stone of enlargement policy. Moreover, it may also be time for the EU to seriously consider invoking Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union.

Can the EU keep up with Ukraine’s exemplary speed?

When Ukraine submitted its appli­cation for EU membership in late February 2022, few took this truly historic step seriously. A country under­going a massive attack from an aggressive Russia was not expected to have any realistic prospect of joining the European Union. However, subse­quent events have shown that Ukraine is capable of changing the course of history and overturning old assump­tions. It has withstood Russia’s military onslaught and success­fully challenged the stubborn enlargement fatigue that had set in in the EU.

In June 2022, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status, and in December 2023, EU leaders agreed to open accession negoti­a­tions. One year ago, the EU officially launched accession talks with Ukraine, and Ukrainians quickly got to work meeting oblig­a­tions and completing the proce­dures associated with the next stage of the accession process, in hopes of bringing membership closer.

Ukraine continues to demon­strate a high level of commitment to its European goal. The Ukrainian government, parliament, and civil society have been rapidly building up their expertise, preparing extensive documen­tation, and have pledged to implement all oblig­a­tions with the same levels of deter­mi­nation and quality. Ukrainian policy­makers under­stand the signif­i­cance of the moment and have declared their readiness to meet all require­ments not just on time but at an even faster pace than other candidate states did during previous rounds of EU enlargement. The key question remaining is whether the EU is prepared to respond appro­pri­ately: not only by matching the swift pace of Ukraine’s decision-making but also by demon­strating the strategic resolve to welcome the country as a member in the near future. Ukrainian officials have publicly voiced the expec­tation that Ukraine will achieve full EU membership by 2030.

Talks on four negoti­ating packages concluded

To this end, the Ukrainian Government is inten­sively studying and adopting best practices for negoti­a­tions and for the effective, swift imple­men­tation of EU require­ments. The Government reports that bilateral screening meetings have already been completed in four of the six negoti­ation clusters:[1]

• Cluster 1 – Fundamentals
• Cluster 2 – Internal market
• Cluster 3 – Compet­i­tiveness & inclusive growth[2]
• Cluster 6 – External relations

Currently, Ukraine is awaiting decisions from its European partners on the proce­dural steps required to open negoti­a­tions on Cluster 1. “Ukraine has fulfilled all the necessary prereq­ui­sites for opening the first negoti­ation cluster,” empha­sizes Olha Stefan­ishyna, Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Minister of Justice.[3] This readiness is supported by finalized roadmaps on the rule of law and on public admin­is­tration reform, which are key condi­tions for opening the cluster. The roadmap on the functioning of democ­ratic insti­tu­tions and the Action Plan on safeguarding the rights of persons belonging to national minorities have also been finalized.

Observers in both Ukraine and the EU have noted that these strategic documents were developed in record time, consid­ering their scope and the large number of stake­holders involved—which include government agencies, civil society, and inter­na­tional experts.[4]

Cluster 1, Funda­mentals, is the always the first cluster to be opened in accession talks. Negoti­a­tions in this cluster will focus on the alignment of core areas of Ukraine’s legis­lation with EU law. One of the most complex and most important clusters, Cluster 1 is typically the last cluster to be closed in the negoti­ation process. It encom­passes a wide range of topics that are of critical impor­tance for Ukraine’s Europeanization—including the sustain­ability of democ­ratic insti­tu­tions, rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and more.[5]

Ukraine’s formula: inspi­ration & Europeanization

Support for a future EU membership remains very high in Ukraine: 90 percent of Ukrainians want to see their country join the European Union according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv Inter­na­tional Institute of Sociology (KIIS).[6] Ukrainians also generally have a positive attitude toward EU pressure to move forward with reforms: in a November 2024 survey conducted by Info Sapiens on behalf of the New Europe Center, over 60 percent of respon­dents considered it appro­priate for the EU and the US to press for action to combat corruption in Ukraine.[7]

However, the same New Europe Center survey also revealed some trend towards increasing scepticism. The percentage of respon­dents who believed that “the EU and the US are looking for excuses to deny Ukraine greater support” had increased slightly compared to a similar survey conducted in 2023.[8]

Public demand for Europeanization in Ukraine is strong, creating additional leverage for those promoting a reformist agenda in the country. This leverage has enabled an active civil society, reformers within government insti­tu­tions, and the EU to work together to push through many crucial changes. Thus, the current situation affords a unique oppor­tunity to implement vital trans­for­mation in Ukraine. At the same time, it creates a window of oppor­tunity that other candidate countries can turn to their own benefit.

However, it is crucial that the process of accession be trans­parent and fair, and it must be one that rewards the candidate country for progress made on reform. Recently, tones of frustration have become increas­ingly audible in Kyiv, as certain EU member countries appear to be blocking Ukraine’s accession process for no justi­fiable reason.

Hungary’s campaign against Ukraine’s accession to EU

Hungary has repeatedly raised objec­tions aimed at delaying or even blocking Ukraine’s EU accession process. Initially, Budapest cited concerns about the rights of national minorities in Ukraine as justi­fi­cation for such action. However, after Ukraine demon­strated its commitment to addressing these issues, Hungary’s lines of argument changed, and it became possible to discern other motiva­tions that may lie behind a possible veto on its part.

Hungarian officials, including Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, have launched an active campaign to discredit Ukraine. Notably, Orbán has claimed that Ukraine’s accession would mean that “all Hungary’s money” would have to be spent on Ukraine.[9] Hungary’s Minister for EU Affairs János Bóka has stated that “Ukraine can only function as a buffer zone”.[10]

Budapest has repeatedly blocked EU sanctions against Russia and has put up obstacles to EU-level military assis­tance to Ukraine. It appears increas­ingly likely that Hungary intends to block Ukraine’s EU path without putting forth any plausible justi­fi­cation for doing so.

The resulting reality is one in which Ukrainians are fighting on three fronts: against Russian imperial ambitions, against anti-reform forces within their own country, and against unjust practices within the EU itself. In recent years, most EU countries have demon­strated their ability to support Ukraine on those first two fronts, i.e., in resisting Russia’s aggression and promoting Europeanization. Now, Ukrainians expect their European partners to support them on this third front as well, demon­strating solidarity and under­standing by helping them counter anti-Ukrainian manip­u­lation from within the Union.

In April 2025, Ukrainian civil society organi­za­tions appealed to the foreign ministers of EU countries to increase their efforts to build a consensus on opening negoti­a­tions on Cluster 1, warning that bilateral issues threatened to obstruct the overall accession negoti­ation process, while also empha­sizing their full support for what they described as “the idea that the accession process should follow a merit-based methodology.”

Orbán’s blocking tactics…

Thus far, EU has managed to achieve a consensus on many proposed actions despite efforts by Hungary to block them, a case in point being the packages of sanctions against Russia (although, Hungary’s objec­tions have at times resulted in the adoption of weaker measures than those origi­nally proposed). Similarly, despite Budapest’s resis­tance, Ukraine has been enabled to make progress on the path toward European integration.

One widely cited example (now considered a case study in creative EU diplomacy) occurred in December 2023, when the EU voted to open accession negoti­a­tions with Ukraine. On that occasion, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán left the room in which the Council was sitting, enabling the remaining 26 member states to proceed without his veto. Reportedly, then-German Chancellor Olaf Scholz suggested that Orbán go out for a coffee break to facil­itate the move.

Ukraine continues to emphasize the impor­tance of dialogue and partnership with all EU member states. This was reflected in Ukraine’s efforts to engage in intensive dialogue with Budapest on national minority issues. However, Hungary has grown increas­ingly hostile in its rhetoric towards Ukraine, focussing less on bilateral concerns and taking on a more obstructive stance toward Ukraine’s EU aspirations.

… and the search for creative answers

After allowing the Council to approve the opening of accession talks in 2023, Orbán pointed out that the Hungarian government would still have “about 75 occasions … to stop this process” (referring to the votes on opening and closing the more than 30 negoti­ation chapters). It appears that Budapest is now acting on this threat by blocking the opening of Cluster 1 negotiations.

The EU faces a serious dilemma: It must either devise 75 separate “creative” solutions to persuade Hungary not to block Ukraine’s accession, or it must find one sustainable mechanism that will accom­plish the same thing. The former path would demand a signif­icant investment in insti­tu­tional resources, time, and sometimes financial incentives.

This may be the moment for the EU to review certain technical proce­dures involved in the accession process. It should not be necessary for all EU member states to approve the opening of each and every negoti­ation cluster or chapter. These are largely technical steps, guided by specific indicators and measurable progress.The requirement of unanimous approval enables the “bilat­er­al­ization” of the accession process, i.e. it allows a single member state to insert polit­i­cally motivated roadblocks into the process, with the result that that state’s domestic interests are allowed to distort the collective agenda. This under­mines the EU’s credi­bility and efficiency.

 In view of all this, calls for the activation of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union have been increas­ingly in frequency. (This mechanism allows certain rights of a member state to be suspended). However, it may be impos­sible to attain the unanimity necessary for this step, as Hungary could well find allies to prevent this scenario.

No ad-hoc-solutions, please!

Thus, the EU continues to expend time and resources managing internal obstruction in an attempt to keep its enlargement agenda alive. One recent ad hoc idea was to “decouple” the accession processes of Ukraine and Moldova and open negoti­a­tions with Chișinău only. This suggestion was strongly criti­cized by Ukraine. From Kyiv’s perspective, such a move would be profoundly unfair—and would amount to punishing a candidate country for the misconduct of an existing member state. It is the latter that should be subjected to condi­tion­ality in such a case, not the candidate country. Pursuing Moldova’s accession process separately would increase Ukraine’s isolation, which is exactly what Hungary is aiming for when it promotes the idea of enlargement without Ukraine. The interests of Hungary and Russia coincide strangely on this point.

The blockage of Ukraine’s EU accession could reduce Ukrainians’ motivation to pursue internal reforms and its efforts to cooperate with other candidate countries to achieve joint progress. Thus, its impact would extend well beyond Ukraine and its relations with the EU: Ukraine has been the main driver of the enlargement process. Its isolation could jeopardize security interests of the EU as a whole and would ultimately play into the hands of the EU’s adversaries.

Accession to the European Union repre­sents a corner­stone of Ukraine’s plans for post-war recovery and is a key guarantee of long-term stability. Hungary’s actions undermine these vital objectives.

Civil society: ready to help – and in need of support

Contrived delays in the enlargement process risk discred­iting the EU in the eyes of citizens in candidate countries. The window of oppor­tunity for reforms will gradually close, while voices ampli­fying Russian propa­ganda narra­tives (e.g., “Europe doesn’t want Ukraine”) will grow louder. Corrupt elites in candidate countries, along with the Kremlin, would welcome such an outcome.

What Ukraine is seeking is the chance to prove that it can become a success story of democ­ratic trans­for­mation. Thus, the reper­cus­sions of failing to give it this chance at the very start of its journey would be especially harmful and dangerous. Blocking or unnec­es­sarily delaying Ukraine’s EU accession process could have wide-ranging negative conse­quences. Under­mining enlargement would weaken Europe and hand a victory to those invested in the EU’s decline.

Despite suffering greatly from Russian aggression, Ukraine continues to implement the necessary reforms on its path toward EU membership. Ukrainian civil society, which has been playing a key role in holding its government accountable, remains open to close cooper­ation with EU stake­holders to ensure Ukraine’s success.

Non-govern­mental experts are actively involved at every stage of the accession process: from preparing documents and partic­i­pating in decision-making discus­sions to providing independent assess­ments of reform progress. Many of these experts are formally included in negoti­ation working groups respon­sible for each chapter of the EU accession process.

Ukrainian NGOs continue to actively support the European integration agenda although they have been signif­i­cantly affected by the U.S. decision to halt all assis­tance to Ukraine. In this regard, additional support from the EU may be needed to strengthen Ukraine’s independent expertise.

The best guarantee that Ukraine will not backslide on its reformist agenda is the rule that the EU will hold all actors – not just candidate countries – to high standards. The EU must seriously consider the long-term risks that result from allowing individual member states to misuse proce­dural rules and their privi­leged status in the Union of developed democracies.

Recom­men­da­tions to the EU and Germany:

1. The EU should establish sustainable and clear proce­dures that prevent manip­u­lation of the accession process. Germany and other member states should consider possible changes to the decision-making method­ology for the accession process to prevent a single state (or a visible minority of states) from blocking progress from one technical proce­dural stages to the next.
2. Consider the activation of Article 7 as a last resort. Although the EU is unlikely to achieve unanimity on this issue, this mechanism should not go entirely unmen­tioned in EU discus­sions. Germany can explore ways of influ­encing member states that abuse EU proce­dures and disregard funda­mental EU values. By ignoring Hungary’s current approach, the EU may risk encour­aging other member states to abuse EU proce­dures in the same way.
3. Maintain solidarity against polit­i­cally motivated obstruction. Germany should lead efforts to challenge attempts by member states to block Ukraine’s EU path with no valid justification.
4. Reject the proposal to decouple Ukraine’s accession process from those of other candidate countries. Decou­pling Ukraine’s process from that of Moldova or other candi­dates would unfairly penalize Ukraine for internal EU disputes over which it has no influence. Enlargement policy must be based on fair and consistent principles.
5. Technical proce­dures should not be politi­cized. Germany and other EU member states should actively support Ukraine’s efforts towards an accel­erated accession process, also by opening all six negoti­ation clusters by the end of this year. It is crucial that the opening of Cluster 1 (Funda­mentals) take place without delay, Ukraine having already fulfilled all the necessary prereq­ui­sites. The opening of clusters should be a swift and technical process, while greater political attention from the EU would be more logical at the stage of cluster closure.
6. Ensure a merit-based accession process. Rather than seeking special treatment, Ukraine is advocating for a fair and trans­parent evalu­ation of its reform efforts. Polit­i­cally motivated obstacles will undermine trust in the EU.
7. Support Ukrainian civil society. EU assis­tance for and engagement with Ukrainian civil society and non-govern­mental experts plays a vital role in enabling them to hold their government accountable and drive reform forward. Member states should advocate for and provide additional support to strengthen Ukraine’s independent expertise, ensuring trans­parent monitoring and sustained reform momentum.
8. Take steps to counter disin­for­mation and support Ukraine’s Europeanization narrative. Germany and its partners should actively counter Russian propa­ganda and disin­for­mation that undermine support for Ukraine’s accession and reform efforts, by reinforcing the message that Europe stands firmly with Ukraine.

[1] Ukrainska Pravda, “Half of Ukraine’s EU accession clusters already screened, says bloc”, 23 April 2025. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/23/7508856/

[2] The European Integration, “Ukraine has success­fully completed the EU screening under Cluster 3”, 6 June 2025. https://eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/news/ukrayina-uspishno-zavershyla-skryning-z-yes-za-klasterom-3-konkurentospromozhnist-ta-inklyuzyvnyj-rozvytok/

[3] Interfax-Ukraine, “Ukraine has fulfilled all the necessary prereq­ui­sites to open the first negoti­ation cluster for EU accession – Stefan­ishyna”, 15 May 2025. https://ua.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1071921.html

[4] European Pravda, “EU on the accession talks with Ukraine: half of Ukraine’s EU accession clusters already screened”, 23 April 2025. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/04/23/7210106/

[5] European Pravda, “Key negoti­ation chapter with the EU: Which reforms must Ukraine implement”, Ivan Nahorniak, Maria Shalam­beridze, 18 March 2025. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2025/03/18/7207364/

[6] KIIS, “Dimen­sions of Attitudes Towards the EU and NATO and Attitudes Towards the USA”, 14 January 2025. https://kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1468

[7] New Europe Center, “Foreign policy and security. Opinions of Ukrainian society” 10 December 2024. https://neweurope.org.ua/en/analytics/zovnishnya-polityka-i-bezpeka-nastroyi-ukrayinskogo-suspilstva/

[8] Ibid.

[9] The Guardian, “Orbán’s stance on Ukraine pushes Hungary to brink in EU relations”, 19 April 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/19/orban-ukraine-hungary-eu-relations-kyiv

[10] European Pravda, “Hungary wants Ukraine to be buffer zone between Russia and EU”. 20 March 2025. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/news/2025/03/20/7207654/