Input Paper „Should the EU can­di­date status for Moldova become a rea­listic goal?“

Im Rahmen unseres Pro­jek­tes „Öst­li­che Part­ner­schaft Plus“ ver­öf­fent­li­chen wir eine Reihe von Input Papers zum Thema: Per­spek­ti­ven und Wege zum EU-Kan­­di­­da­­ten­sta­­tus für die Ukraine, Geor­gien und die Repu­blik Moldau.

Für die Repu­blik Moldau ana­ly­siert Okta­wian Milew­ski die po­li­ti­sche Lage und for­mu­liert seine Hand­lungs­emp­feh­lun­gen an die Ent­schei­dungs­trä­gerInnen in Berlin und Brüssel, warum die EU ein geo­po­li­ti­scher Akteur werden sollte und dem Trio im Juni einen EU-Kan­­di­­da­­ten­sta­­tus ver­lei­hen sollte.

Current poli­ti­cal and social situation

Moldova has been heavily affec­ted by the war in Ukraine in eco­no­mic and human-social terms. The country had to sud­denly cope with an unpre­ce­den­ted influx of people from Ukraine, around 450.000, of which around 95.000 are cur­r­ently resi­ding in Moldova. For a country with limited eco­no­mic and admi­nis­tra­tive resour­ces, Moldova has so far coped fairly well with this task. However, this task has added to the com­ple­xity of the back­ground in which Moldova has been struggling with before Febru­ary 24. It has sub­se­quently com­pli­ca­ted the country’s arith­me­tic regar­ding its rela­tion with the Euro­pean Union.

The added com­ple­xity of the war in Ukraine created the per­cep­tion of even more incre­a­sed state fra­gi­lity stem­ming from the capa­city to manage admi­nis­tra­tively and finan­cially all the issues on the agenda plus the sup­ple­men­tary refu­gees crisis. The social-eco­no­mic spillover effect of the Russian inva­sion in Ukraine added a sup­ple­men­tary layover on already exis­ting crises in the energy, health­care and ulti­mately eco­no­mic-finan­cial, labor and ulti­mately mili­tary spheres. Moldova has, however, felt the power of its inhan­ced depen­dency on the rela­tion with the EU which has been tan­ta­mount to making the dif­fe­rence between failure and sur­vi­val. EU’s fast bud­ge­t­ary aid and direct funding for resis­ting the refugee chal­lenge allowed the aut­ho­ri­ties in Chi­si­nau to suc­cess­fully weather this huma­ni­ta­rian crisis as well.

Once the atten­tion of the aut­ho­ri­ties shifted toward secu­rity issues related to the war in Ukraine the reforms of the judi­ciary system and the iden­ti­fi­ca­tion of finan­cial and human resour­ces for reforms in the energy sphere has been delayed even more stron­gly. Basi­cally the months of March and April have pro­du­ced a lull in Chisinau’s race to tackle cor­rup­tion as ener­ge­ti­cally as pos­si­ble. To all the above the public agenda has been derai­led by a plethora of false secu­rity crises related to the situa­tion in Trans­nis­tria and the auto­no­mous region of Gagau­zia. These issues added steam to the already exis­ting anxiety in the Mol­d­o­van society related to the war in Ukraine.

In the first nine months of gover­nance, the Gav­ri­litsa – Sandu tandem and the new genera­tion that came to power in Moldova did achieve some success in de-iso­la­ting Moldova and genui­nely putting the country on the path of sys­temic reform. Accord­ing to Repor­ters Without Borders the freedom of press index, Moldova has ranked 40 in 2022 (down from 89 in 2021) and scored visibly better than such coun­tries as Romania (56), Poland (66) or Hungary (85). Moldova has dis­played pro­mi­sing inten­ti­ons on fight against cor­rup­tion as well, alt­hough for the period of writing (May 2022) it is still pre­ma­ture to expect that the country will regis­ter a truly visible impro­ve­ment earlier than in autumn 2022. Moldova still scores 105^th on the Cor­rup­tion Per­cep­tion Index (down from 107) accord­ing to Trans­pa­rency International.

Overall it would be too early to affirm that Moldova reached the point of no return in terms of sys­temic reforms, but it is an obvious fact that at present the country is ruled by the most pro­gres­sive and genui­nely pro-Euro­pean genera­tion since independence.

Design of EU can­di­date status process

Until Febru­ary 24, Chi­si­nau was regar­ding the per­spec­tive of can­di­date status as a mid- to long-term goal, that is 3 to 5 years. It was hoped that by the end of the current term of office of the pre­si­dent and/​or exe­cu­tive (2024–2025) Moldova would seek to apply for the status of can­di­date country, a process that could take at least one more longer after this step taking into account the pre­vious expe­ri­ence of the Western Balkan coun­tries which had been per­cei­ved in Chi­si­nau as a refe­rence guide until then (24 Febru­ary that is). Thus it would be fair to believe that mentally the year of can­di­date status achie­ve­ment should have been 2026. Stem­ming from this cal­cu­la­tion Chi­si­nau was weig­hing and pro­jec­ting its reform related stra­te­gies that should have opened the EU can­di­date status.

The Ukrai­nian-Russian war com­ple­tely obli­te­ra­ted these mental bench­marks and shifted the odds. The moment Ukraine applied for can­di­date status on Febru­ary 28 caused a mental “burning of stages” on both the Asso­cia­ted Trio and Euro­pean sides. Moldova started per­cei­ving the process of EU inte­gra­tion within a dif­fe­rent mode due to Ukraine’s land­mark decision at the end of April and only three days later (March 3) fol­lo­wed Ukraine in for­mally app­ly­ing for EU can­di­date status. Basi­cally Chi­si­nau reacted on the spot and climbed on the band­wa­gon using the oppor­tu­nity opened by Ukraine’s sur­pri­sing bid.

The recei­val of the can­di­date status double ques­ti­onn­aire gave some idea about the country’s capa­city to meet formal steps into this process. Chi­si­nau mobi­li­zed not only the avail­able central govern­men­tal bureau­cracy com­pe­tent to fill the two ques­ti­onn­aires, but also recei­ved signi­fi­cant support from civil society actors from Moldova and Romania. A number of CSOs from Romania and Roma­nian MEPs offices in Brussels also con­tri­bu­ted with the filling in, espe­cially to the second ques­ti­onn­aire, which is indi­ca­tive of how crucial exter­nal support for Moldova is, yet also how scarce human resour­ces in Chi­si­nau are as well.

At present Moldova is in awai­t­ing for the EU Council summit in June where the collec­tive unani­mous decision on Moldova’s can­di­dacy will be taken. The country’s lea­ders­hip, espe­cially the pre­si­dent and the prime-minis­ter are leading a poli­ti­cal charm offen­sive among inte­res­ted Euro­pean chan­cel­le­ries to improve Moldova’s chances for obtai­ning a can­di­date status. It is enough to check the agenda of working visits of Moldova’s lea­ders­hip to under­stand this effort.

Chal­len­ges and role of civil society

The grea­test chal­lenge for Chi­si­nau at present is achie­ving a social-poli­ti­cal envi­ron­ment of suf­fi­ci­ent calm and pre­dic­ta­bi­lity in order to imple­ment reforms per­tai­ning to rule of law and fight against cor­rup­tion. These essen­tial reforms have been pro­tra­c­ted because of the crisis overlay that the Gav­ri­litsa government had to struggle with from the very first months of its invest­ment in August 2021.

There have been no serious gover­nance mista­kes by the Sandu – Gav­ri­litsa tandem or crises pro­vo­ked by poor manage­ment of state affairs, or cor­rup­tion or anything of the kind, but the Mol­d­o­van exe­cu­tive had to struggle with a cascade of crises star­ting with the energy crisis caused by Russia, the COVID pan­de­mics and the sub­se­quent eco­no­mic tur­bu­lence caused by it. Even if in 2021 the Mol­d­o­van economy grew by almost 13%, for 2022 the growth might be a mere 0.3%. The high costs of the energy resour­ces have trig­ge­red a chain reac­tion of very high living costs and the highest infla­tion rate in Europe at present (27% infla­tion in May), causing loss of popu­la­rity and enthu­si­asm for reforms. This also caused the loss of social-eco­no­mic gains obtai­ned by the government in the first months of its rule when it deli­ve­red a pension reform. Its effect was brought to nil by the chain reac­tion which resul­ted from the high energy costs. On this back­ground, the crisis overlay caused by the Ukrai­nian-Russian war deepe­ned the sense of anxiety within the Mol­d­o­van society.

The civil society has been already a crucial sta­bi­li­zing actor in as much as it kept feeding the state with exper­tise and the cri­ti­cal input necessary to keep the refor­mist climate going. Civil society has also been a source of recruit­ment for a number of key posi­ti­ons within the new exe­cu­tive. However its capa­city is limited. There is a strin­gent need to attract new human resour­ces from the Mol­d­o­van Dia­spora, but this is a long term process and it requi­res highly moti­va­tio­nal rewar­ding system. Without suf­fi­ci­ent finan­cial resour­ces and an exter­nal incen­tive from inter­na­tio­nal part­ners such a bre­akthrough would be impossible.

Signi­fi­cance of can­di­date status

Gran­ting the can­di­date status for Moldova is per­cei­ved in Chi­si­nau as akin to the light at the end of the tunnel. It could be a truly stra­te­gic game changer with signi­fi­cant mobi­li­zing impact on the elites, public admi­nis­tra­tion, popu­la­tion at large and Mol­d­o­van dia­spora, of which around 700.000 may be resi­ding in the EU already (out of a popu­la­tion of 2.7 mln.). Aside from crea­ting a new genuine stra­te­gic purpose for the country – unpre­ce­den­ted by any measure, it would also signi­fi­cantly raise the attrac­ti­ve­ness of the country in deve­lo­p­men­tal terms. EU can­di­date status would render the country more attrac­tive for the dia­spora which is the crucial resource that the country lost in the last two to three decades and which could signi­fi­cantly con­tri­bute to the recon­struc­tion of a truly Euro­pea­ni­zed state.

EU is already the refe­rence point for Moldova’s stra­te­gic course, but it is not yet clear if the refe­rence itself is taking its role as expec­ted in Chi­si­nau. In other words, EU’s trans­for­ma­tive power would get much more gravity and velo­city should can­di­date status be granted to Moldova.

Role of reforms and the Asso­cia­tion Agreement

We have to start from the premise that the can­di­date status bid came abso­lutely unplan­ned and unawai­ted alt­hough inten­si­vely dreamt of, as a direct con­se­quence of the whole secu­rity land­s­cape shock among the Eastern Euro­pean partner coun­tries. It was caused by Russia’s inva­sion of Ukraine and the radical change of the secu­rity optics in Europe. Before this moment, the EU Parliament’s report on the imple­men­ta­tion of the AA and DCFTA from Novem­ber 2021 dubbed Moldova as being on an encou­ra­ging path to reform once the Sandu-Gav­ri­litsa tandem took hold of power in Chi­si­nau. These incumbents fol­lo­wed as close as pos­si­ble the nor­ma­tive gui­d­ance of the EU and have been intent on keeping this course come what may.

The main course of reforms initia­ted by the Gav­ri­litsa cabinet have aimed at buil­ding admi­nis­tra­tive func­tio­n­a­lity, insti­tu­tio­nal capa­city, social-eco­no­mic resi­li­ence and overall enhan­cing the Mol­d­o­van state after decades of brain drain and state capture by semi-cri­mi­na­li­zed net­works. The central ongoing reform at present is the judi­cial reform. It is still in its initial stages, after it has been delayed by the fight for the genuine inde­pen­dence of the General Prosecutor’s office and the triple crisis descri­bed above (pan­de­mics, energy and high infla­tion and living costs). At stake is the func­tio­n­a­lity of a core pillar of the judi­cial system com­po­sed of around 450 pro­se­cu­tors who in past over­whel­min­gly co-par­ti­ci­pa­ted in the state-capture and insti­tu­tio­nal under­mi­ning of the Mol­d­o­van society. Star­ting with March and until the end of 2022 the main bodies of Mol­d­o­van pro­se­cu­tors and judges will pass through a legal pre-vetting process which is the direct result of a special law adopted in this sense. Essen­ti­ally, the pre-vetting law adopted in Febru­ary should yield momen­tum for a strong sanitiz­a­tion of the judi­cial system. As a con­se­quence, once the Prosecutor’s Office will start deli­vering on its due inves­ti­ga­tive and objec­tive indict­ment func­tions (sup­po­sedly in a more evident form in the autumn of 2022) it is expec­ted that a refor­mist moment of the rest of the justice system will invi­go­rate the insti­tu­tio­nal capa­city of the state to support other crucial reforms. An impro­ved rule of law envi­ron­ment would de-cri­mi­na­lize the Mol­d­o­van insti­tu­ti­ons and further incre­ase the chances for eco­no­mic deve­lo­p­ment by raising Moldova’s attrac­ti­ve­ness for foreign investment.

On this back­ground the can­di­date status offers a clear promise of stra­te­gic purpose and sets the stan­dards for the whole Mol­d­o­van state and society. These stan­dards have already been on a track of adop­tion through the Asso­cia­tion Agree­ment status, the DCFTA and the nor­ma­tive stan­dar­di­z­a­tion gra­du­ally adopted by Moldova in the last decade. At this stage Moldova has been at a point where these stan­dards are insti­tu­tio­na­li­zed and inter­na­li­zed in practice.

Public opinion in Moldova

Accord­ing to the last opinion poll con­duc­ted by Watch­Dog Moldova and CBS Axa (May 10) the Mol­d­o­van society is divided rela­tively by half as regards to the origins of the war in Ukraine. Almost half of the Mol­d­o­van public agrees with strands of nar­ra­ti­ves from Russia on the war in Ukraine. Such results are the direct con­se­quence of a strong impact of Russian media on the Mol­d­o­van infor­ma­tion market. For instance, around 40% of Mol­d­o­vans con­si­der Russia to blame for the inva­sion in Ukraine, while approx. 37% con­si­der Ukraine to be the sole respon­si­ble for the war. Equally con­cer­ning is the fact that around 20% of Mol­d­o­vans would not be able not give an answer to who is on the good or evil side of the war. However, the war in Ukraine did produce some changes con­cer­ning the per­cep­tion of the EU and the stra­te­gic choice of Mol­d­o­vans. 55% of Mol­d­o­vans would choose EU as their stra­te­gic inte­gra­tive option, while only 22% would opt for the Eura­sian Union. This dis­crepancy has never been so big since such pre­fe­ren­ces started being mea­su­red. It also should be borne in mind that opinion polls do not take into account the per­cep­ti­ons of the dia­spora Mol­d­o­vans or citi­zens who live in the bre­aka­way Trans­nis­trian region. Should dia­spora Mol­d­o­vans’ opinion be sur­veyed there is a high pro­ba­bi­lity that over 70% of Mol­d­o­vans would indi­cate the EU as their stra­te­gic pre­fe­rence. At the same time, accord­ing to the same survey 54% of Mol­d­o­vans are against joining NATO which also cor­re­la­tes with the Russian media nar­ra­ti­ves still domi­na­ting in Moldova.¹

Star­ting with the begin­ning of 2022 the public opinion has gra­du­ally become much more cri­ti­cal of the incum­bent elites in Chi­si­nau. Even if the Mol­d­o­van exe­cu­tive has not com­mit­ted serious mista­kes in the gover­nance process, the mul­ti­ple crises it had to con­front with has eroded its popu­la­rity. However this should not be con­si­de­red as a con­cer­ning process from the view­point of overall sta­bi­lity of the poli­ti­cal situa­tion in Moldova. The pro-Euro­pean PAS domi­na­ted par­lia­ment tog­e­ther with the Sandu-Gav­ri­litsa tandem are only in their first stage of rule and such ero­si­ons should be regar­ded as an obvious result of both reforms to fight cor­rup­tion and insti­tute the rule of law, as well as the effect of still pre­ca­rious infor­ma­tio­nal envi­ron­ment domi­na­ted by Kremlin funded nar­ra­ti­ves.  The gover­ning party is still in the lead. PAS (Party of Action and Soli­da­rity) would receive 29% of the popular vote should elec­tions have taken place in early May. The pro-Russian Socia­list Party of Moldova would receive 22,5%. Maia Sandu remains the most popular Mol­d­o­van leader with 40% pre­fe­rence, while her othe­ring fol­lower is the former pro-Russian pre­si­dent Igor Dodon with 39% and on the third is the mayor of Chi­si­nau Ion Ceban with 37%. However the dis­crepancy becomes much more pro­mi­nent if Mol­d­o­vans are asked about who they trust most of all in a hier­ar­chi­cal order. In this case Maia Sandu leads with 24%, Igor Dodon follows with 16% and the fugi­tive Ilan Shor would get 4%.

It should be also added that at the moment of writing, Igor Dodon is in judi­cial custody on four cri­mi­nal counts (passive cor­rup­tion, invol­ve­ment in frau­du­lent funding for his party, illicit enri­che­ment and high treason) and risks up till 20 years in jail. At the same time, Ilan Shor is also on the wanted list of the Mol­d­o­van aut­ho­ri­ties for mul­ti­ple cri­mi­nal charges and is awaited in Moldova to serve the due sen­ten­ces. Overall, the Mol­d­o­van poli­ti­cal scene is still aut­ho­ri­ta­tively domi­na­ted by one single poli­ti­cal heavy weight: Maia Sandu.

Sce­n­a­rios

There can be pro­jec­ted four poten­tial sce­n­a­rios infor­med by the evo­lu­tion of the Ukrai­nian-Russian war and EU’s response to the new secu­rity archi­tec­ture on the con­ti­nent. Depen­ding on how suc­cess­ful the Russian inva­sion will be and how resi­li­ent Ukraine will remain we can outline four basic scenarios.

The first would result from Moldova’s gradual pro­gress whereby the can­di­date status, granted by the EU tog­e­ther with the resour­ces it would entail, would con­so­li­date the path taken by the new Mol­d­o­van genera­tion led by the Sandu – Gav­ri­litsa tandem. In this sce­n­a­rio the success of the reforms would con­so­li­date not only the state but also the incum­bent genera­tion of poli­ti­cal elites with the pos­si­bi­lity to prolong their rule for the whole decade. This would have a tre­men­dous trans­for­ma­tive impact on Moldova.

The second would be a status quo cha­rac­te­ri­zed by muddling through, slow motion attempts to reform the state with limited success because of lack of suf­fi­ci­ent mate­rial and human resour­ces. This sce­n­a­rio would include a rejec­tion or post­po­ne­ment of EU can­di­date status and a palea­tive approach to Moldova’s pre­ca­rious state­hood. The incumbents popu­la­rity and capa­city to impact the Mol­d­o­van society would gra­du­ally erode favo­ring the poten­tial return to power of a com­bi­na­tion of pro-Russian and clep­to­cracy favo­ring parties. Moldova would be at best thrown back into repea­ting the tur­bu­lent times of Vla­di­mir Pla­hot­niuc oli­gahic rule.

These first two sce­n­a­rios pre­sup­pose that Russia is not advan­cing on its re-impe­ria­li­sa­tion agenda and Ukraine one way or another wins the war and ree­sta­b­lis­hes its full sov­er­eig­nty at least within the borders of Febru­ary 23rd 2022 inclu­ding a reco­very of the occu­p­ied Donbas since 2014.

The next two sce­n­a­rios pre­sup­pose that Russia manages to defeat the Ukrai­nian army and main­tain its control on the already invaded ter­ri­tory by the end of May 2022. At the same time, the EU rejects the can­di­date status of the Asso­cia­ted Trio group and con­se­quently allows Russia to spe­cu­late on the stra­te­gic ambi­guity of the eastern neigh­bour­hood space, at a pace and aggres­si­ve­ness unseen before.

The third sce­n­a­rio would be cha­rac­te­ri­zed by wor­se­ning of Moldova’s already dire finan­cial and eco­no­mic situa­tion, weak energy diver­si­fi­ca­tion, poor demo­gra­phic poten­tial and sim­me­ring insta­bi­lity related to Trans­nis­tria. Such a course would be asso­cia­ted with social uphea­val, high poli­ti­cal insta­bi­lity and return of a com­bi­na­tion of “old” olig­ar­chy and pro-Russian parties to the helm of the stat. This sce­n­a­rio would unfurl earlier than the end of the current cycle of gover­nance (2025) with the help of Russias spon­so­red and staged coups. Moldova would be thrown back into semi-iso­la­tion and indi­rect depen­dence on a Russia dic­ta­ted stra­te­gic agenda.

The fourth would pre­sup­pose a de facto or de jure loss of sov­er­eig­nty resul­ting from nega­tive spillover of Russia’s inva­sion in Ukraine or an out­right victory of Russia over Ukraine and sub­se­quent inva­sion of Moldova. Russia would re-create its empire and dictate to the Euro­pean con­ti­nent an order seen only before WWII.

The most rea­listic sce­n­a­rios at present seem to be the first and the second one. A lot will depend on the decision taken at the Euro­pean Council of June 23–24.

Recom­men­da­ti­ons to German and EU decision-makers

Moldova needs first and fore­most to weather the Ukrai­nian-Russian war that has so far only mar­gi­nally struck the country in com­pa­ri­son to Ukraine. Even so, the fra­gi­lity of the Mol­d­o­van state was felt throughout mul­ti­ple waves of crises related to refu­gees from Ukraine, asym­metric threats from Trans­nis­tria, con­stant energy black­mail from Russia and very high infla­tion gene­ra­ted or sus­tai­ned by the latter and the ongoing eco­no­mic crisis.

On this back­ground, Moldova needs cheap finan­cial resour­ces from the EU and Germany. For instance the German-French-Roma­nian donor con­fe­rence in Berlin on April 5 has been one such example of pled­ging finan­cial support. Back then the par­ti­ci­pants at the con­fe­rence pledged to support Moldova with a sum total of 659.5 mln euro. However, only about 10% of this sum pro­vi­des for either grants or very cheap long term loans. The rest, alt­hough extre­mely handy for Moldova’s needs, still throw a long term burden on the country’s sov­er­eign debt. Given the current chal­len­ges, Moldova would need at least 50% of this sum to be made of grants on yearly basis until the country reaches a rela­tively solid macroeco­no­mic sta­bi­lity. (sup­po­sedly 3–5 years)

Moldova’s reforming and resi­li­ence course can be impro­ved on four other main lines of action. The first one is macro-finan­cial bud­ge­t­ary support for impro­ving diver­si­fi­ca­tion of energy imports of gas and electri­city. Once Moldova will achieve its goal of non-depen­ding on very expen­sive Russian energy resour­ces, it will have a much freer hand at deli­vering reforms, away from con­stant geo-eco­no­mic black­mail from Moscow.

The second is faci­li­ta­ted access to the gover­nance process and even­tual return in the country of com­pe­tent human resour­ces which would be asso­cia­ted with tech­ni­cal and/​or tech­no­cra­tic assi­s­tance within the state admi­nis­tra­tion. We are talking not only about mana­gers, but also about pro­fes­sio­nals from edu­ca­tion and health­care. Such a common effort should be ori­en­ted not only through the central government but also at the muni­ci­pal level. Past prac­tice shows that the crea­tion of such insti­tu­tio­nal instru­ments for recruit­ment cannot be made effi­ci­ent without the invol­ve­ment of western support, inclu­ding the EU. We are talking about hund­reds of indi­vi­du­als for the begin­ning (6–12 months), needed within the central government just as within the local muni­ci­pa­lity level. After such a momen­tum is created, it would be expec­ted that a cen­tri­pe­tal effect could be shaped up.

The third one is vision and exper­tise for reforming the insti­tu­tio­nal and nor­ma­tive fabric of the state. At this point the Mol­d­o­van exe­cu­tive (central govern­men­tal chan­cel­lery and pre­si­dency), that is inclu­ding the minis­tries, benefit from the exper­tise of 11 EU funded advi­sors. However such an input is only the tip of the iceberg for Moldova’s needs and chal­len­ges. A mecha­nism for attrac­ting and recrui­t­ing dia­spora Mol­d­o­vans should also be con­cei­ved in order to improve Moldova’s capa­city to reform and produce a new insti­tu­tio­nal culture.

The last, but not least, con­struc­tion and recon­struc­tion of the cri­ti­cal infra­st­ruc­ture is a must do now! Moldova is logisti­cally relying on an infra­st­ruc­ture build and desi­gned by Russian/​Soviet stan­dards. The last three decades, Moldova did no break from this struc­tu­ral depen­dence because it lacked vision, moti­va­tion, resour­ces and a sense of stra­te­gic purpose. At present such a purpose seems to be in the process of for­ma­tion, pro­vi­ded the country bene­fits from a massive invest­ment. There is no other source for this than the Euro­pean Union. The EU can­di­date status could be and should be the source of con­ver­gence and trans­for­ma­tion to Euro­pean stan­dards through the resour­ces, exper­tise and sta­bi­lity it would provide.

¹ For more details please see Sondaj socio-politic, Mai 2022, Watch­Dog Moldova and CBS-AXA.

Okta­wian Miliew­ski, Cor­re­spon­dent for Radio France Inter­na­tio­nale, Moldova

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