Policy Brief: Aufruf zum Handeln für den Westen, um die Demokratie in Georgien zu retten

Executive summary

Georgia faces an immense political crisis, one which could soon become an economic crisis as well if the problem of the Government’s legitimacy is not swiftly resolved. Widely discredited due to fraud and intimi­dation on a massive scale, the parlia­mentary elections of October 2024 triggered waves of grass­roots protests across the nation. Public protest inten­sified after 28 November, when the Georgian Dream leaders declared that Georgia was reversing its course toward EU integration. Over a month of massive peaceful demons­tra­tions throughout the country have created a crisis of legitimacy for the Government. The Georgian Dream (GD) regime, under the control of oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, has responded with syste­matic violence, repression, and democratic backsliding. This policy brief offers actionable recom­men­da­tions for the inter­na­tional community on countering Georgia’s descent into authoritarianism.

The legitimacy crisis

Since the October 2024 elections, Georgia has witnessed unpre­ce­dented erosion of its democratic fabric and insti­tu­tions. What was once a budding democracy on the path to European integration has now all but entirely slipped into autho­ri­ta­rianism. The numerous viola­tions and irregu­la­rities described by election observers, including those from the OSCE/​ODIHR, PACE, and the European Parliament, clearly portray the elections as far from free or fair and as yielding results that do not represent the will of the people. Reports from both Georgian civil society groups and inter­na­tional organiza­tions detail widespread voter intimi­dation, ballot manipu­lation, and misuse of state resources. Furthermore, the use of systemic violence against those attending pro-European rallies by law enforcement agencies, which are under the control of the Georgian Dream, has further eroded people’s trust in the government and created the worst political crisis in Georgia’s recent history. We should not forget that this crisis was preceded by the adoption of Russian-style legis­lation in the form of a statute on “trans­pa­rency of foreign influence” (similar to Russia’s Foreign Agents Act and often referred to as the “foreign agents law”) and another on “family values” (similar to the Russian laws banning “LGBT propaganda”).

The regime’s response to public outrage over the reversal of the European path has been brutal. Peaceful protesters demanding free elections and the release of political prisoners have met with police violence, arbitrary arrests, and inhuman treatment and torture. President Salome Zoura­bichvili, Georgia’s last remaining independent consti­tu­tional figure, has vowed to stand her ground. Still, the GD-controlled parliament has “replaced” her with a pro-Russian far-right party loyalist through an illegi­timate process. At stake is not only the future of Georgia’s democracy but also its European aspirations.

Electoral fraud: subverting the will of the people

The October 2024 elections marked a turning point in Georgia’s democratic trajectory. Reports from inter­na­tional monitors, local observer groups, and independent analysts painted a bleak picture:

• Violation of the secrecy of the vote: OSCE/​ODIHR noted that the secrecy of the vote was compro­mised in at least a quarter of the precincts under its obser­vation. In reality, the marks indicating voters’ choices were visible on the reverse side of the ballot papers. The GD set up a system to intimidate voters and ascertain how they voted. The district court of Tetrit­skaro annulled the results for the entire district due to the trans­pa­rency of the ballot papers. This ruling was overturned by the appellate court, whose bench comprises prominent repre­sen­ta­tives of the judiciary clan, some of whom are subject to US sanctions.
• Voter intimi­dation: citizens were threa­tened with the loss of their jobs, financial penalties, and physical harm if they failed to support the ruling party. The intimi­dation campaign was linked with the violation of vote secrecy, as the GD was able to determine who voted for whom through the elaborate mechanism of polling station monitoring using cameras installed by fake observer groups.
• Manipu­lation of electoral processes: the Central Election Commission operated as an arm of the ruling party, frequently denying independent observers access to polling stations. Most precinct election commis­sions had been stacked with GD activists and supporters. The Georgian Dream had well-organized groups vote multiple times (carousel voting) using the names of Georgian citizens residing abroad, as reported by several journa­listic inves­ti­ga­tions. As a result of this kind of manipu­lation, a number of precincts reported ballot counts that exceeded the number of the precinct’s regis­tered voters who were physi­cally present in Georgia. The GD and CEC refused to allow access to or publish the marked registers (electoral rolls showing who cast votes) to dispel the concerns about voter data manipulation.
• Suppression of independent media: journa­lists who reported on irregu­la­rities were harassed, detained, and, in some cases, physi­cally assaulted. Opposition media came under an organized attack before and after the elections. There were no formal political debates, and critical media outlets operated in an atmosphere of fear and stress due to the threat or imposition of financial sanctions and criminal procee­dings against them.
• The attack on NGOs: following the adoption of the “foreign agents law,” which is similar to the Russian Foreign Agents Act, Georgian NGOs became almost dysfunc­tional, many wasting time, resources, and energy on regis­tering abroad (rather than be forced to register as organiza­tions “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”). Despite this, a coalition of NGOs organized several obser­vation missions, which were instru­mental in reporting on and uncovering the scale and intri­cacies of fraud. The NGOs continued to be targeted after the elections as well, including through physical assaults and verbal threats from the GD leaders.
• Capture of the courts: The Georgian Dream has installed a gover­nance structure in the court system that makes access to justice impos­sible. With one exception, the courts rejected all of the complaints concerning the election filed by NGOs or opposition parties. In the next instance, the court immediately overturned one complaint that led to a ruling annulling the voting results for an entire district

These and other examples of the deliberate subversion of democratic norms have drawn compa­risons to autocratic practices in Russia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, raising concerns about Georgia’s drift toward authoritarianism.

Repression of protest: a syste­matic campaign of violence

The protests following the elections have revealed the GD regime’s willingness to use extreme measures to suppress dissent. Trans­pa­rency International’s December 2024 report documents a syste­matic campaign of violence:

• Excessive use of force: riot police have used tear gas and water cannons loaded with water and unknown chemicals against protesters; many have received brutal beatings from riot police, who do not wear any insignia, ensuring their impunity.
• Torture during detention: vast numbers of detainees have reported physical abuse, threats of rape, and degrading treatment in the temporary detainment facilities, police premises, and specially designated vehicles, which were used by masked law-enforcement personnel for the beatings of detainees. Arrested persons were held in overc­rowded cars for hours and denied access to medical care and legal representation.
• State-sanctioned vigilantism: videos circu­lating on social media depict masked thugs, allegedly backed by the state, attacking opposition figures and journa­lists. Although prominent journa­lists were subjected to severe beatings, none of the incidents have been investigated.
• Oppressive measures targeting the civil service: several hundred civil servants have been fired since 28 November, when numerous state employees issued letters of protest, and many even resigned. The diplo­matic corps was at the forefront of the internal resis­tance: five ambassadors resigned, and over 240 diplomats signed a letter of protest. Private businesses have set up several funds to help the illegally fired civil servants re-establish themselves and continue their legal battle against the state.
• Oppressive laws to silence demons­trators: the Georgian Dream government has enacted sweeping legis­lative changes aimed at suppressing dissent and tightening control over civic life, in a stark departure from democratic norms. The Law on Assem­blies and Demons­tra­tions was amended to ban items like pyrotechnics, lasers, and face coverings at protests. At the same time, amend­ments to the Adminis­trative Offenses Code sharply increased fines for protest activities and expanded police powers to detain persons and conduct searches without a court order. Police law now provides for non-compe­titive recruitment, raising concerns about politi­cally motivated hires, and changes in the Law on Civil Service have politi­cized public adminis­tration, allowing arbitrary dismissals and making civil servants more vulnerable to political pressure. These measures have under­mined freedoms, weakened civil society, and signalled Georgia’s continued departure from its European aspirations.

Grass­roots resis­tance: the last bastion of hope

In the face of this repression, Georgia’s citizens have demons­trated remar­kable resilience. Tens of thousands have taken to the streets in grass­roots protests, mainly self-organized with support from civil society groups and opposition alliances. These protests are not just about the contested elections—they represent a broader fight for Georgia’s democratic European future. Despite the cold weather and Christmas/​New Year holidays, the protesters have now kept Rustaveli Avenue closed down for 40 days and counting. Over this period, including on New Year’s Eve, hundreds of thousands of Georgians have turned out to rallies on several occasions.

The protest movement has coalesced around clear demands:

1. New, free, and fair elections under inter­na­tional super­vision with changed rules
2. Immediate release of all political prisoners

One thing is incre­asingly clear: With the Georgian Dream in power, business as usual cannot continue. Civil society groups and opposition parties have diverging views on how best to lawfully end the crisis and on the new election rules. However, there is a solid consensus that new elections are the only way forward. While the opposition groups and civil society actors have not issued any roadmaps or action plans, they have worked closely together to establish joint positions vis-à-vis inter­na­tional partners.

Inter­na­tional response: a mixed picture

While some inter­na­tional actors, such as the European Parliament, have taken strong stances, others have been conspi­cuously silent. Notable develo­p­ments include:

• A European Parliament resolution: the European Parliament has called for new elections and condemned the autho­ri­tarian turn of the GD regime.
• The reaction in the US Congress: with the aim of creating a framework that will deny the Georgian Dream the legitimacy it so urgently requires, repre­sen­ta­tives have reintro­duced the “MEGOBARI Act” in the US Congress and submitted a new resolution – “Georgian Nightmare Non-Recognition Act.”
• Bilateral sanctions and diplo­matic isolation: Ukraine and several European countries (Baltic and Nordic States, as well as Eastern European partners) have adopted bilateral, targeted sanctions against GD officials and law enforcers. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania jointly agreed to impose national sanctions against those who suppressed legitimate protests in Georgia. Nordic states have also expressed concern with the develo­p­ments in Georgia.
• US sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili: on December 27, 2024 the US Department of the Treasury sanctioned Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder and honorary chairman of Georgian Dream, under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulation (E.O. 14024). The sanctions freeze all property and assets owned by Ivanishvili in the United States or controlled by US persons and require the latter to report them to the Treasury. All transac­tions involving companies owned by Ivanishvili or his associates are prohi­bited except those falling under specific exemp­tions. Notably, the sanctions extend to assets linked to Credit Suisse Trust Ltd v. Ivanishvili, Bidzina and others, which the Singapore Court of Appeal ruled on in 2024. The US accused Ivanishvili of enabling human rights abuses, eroding Georgia’s democratic insti­tu­tions, and under­mining its European and Euro-Atlantic future in favor of Russian interests. Secretary of State Antony Blinken condemned Ivanishvili’s role in derailing Georgia’s progress while fostering repression against protestors, media, and opposition figures. The US empha­sized its commitment to holding accoun­table those who undermine democracy and align Georgia with Russian influence.
• Previous US sanctions: The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned two Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs officials, Vakhtang Gomelauri and Mirza Kezevadze, under the Global Magnitsky Act (E.O. 13818) for overseeing violent crack­downs on protesters, journa­lists, and opposition figures during demons­tra­tions in 2024. The sanctions freeze all US-linked property and interests of the designated indivi­duals and block any entities that is owned 50% or more by them. U.S. persons are prohi­bited from engaging in transac­tions with the sanctioned indivi­duals, and viola­tions may result in civil or criminal penalties. These measures are aimed at holding accoun­table those who are respon­sible for human rights abuses and at safeguarding democratic values. Earlier, on 16 September, the US treasury department sanctioned the head of the Georgian interior ministry’s Special Task Department, Zviad Khara­zishvili (Khareba), and his deputy Mileri Lagazauri as well as two other officials from that department – Konstantine Morgoshia and Zurab Makha­radze, both radical right-wing figures associated with the violent Alt-info movement – for “serious human rights abuses” due to their role in brutal crack­downs on protesters demons­t­rating against the “foreign agent law” and for “violent attacks on Georgians exercising their freedom of peaceful assembly.” The US State Department also imposed visa restric­tions on more than 60 Georgian indivi­duals “respon­sible for, or complicit in, under­mining democracy in Georgia” and their family members.
• UK sanctions: the UK has sanctioned five senior Georgian officials, including Interior Minister Vakhtang Gomelauri and Tbilisi Police Chief Sulkhan Tamaza­shvili, for violent crack­downs on protesters, journa­lists, and opposition figures. The sanctions impose travel bans and asset freezes. These measures, coordi­nated with US sanctions, follow the UK’s suspension of programme support to and defence coope­ration with the Georgian government. The sanctions were in response to the Georgian Dream’s repression of civil society and media after the regime suspended the country’s EU integration process, a move seen as bringing Georgia closer in line with Kremlin interests. The UK reite­rated its commitment to holding those respon­sible for human rights abuses accoun­table and supporting the Georgian people’s democratic aspirations.
• German sanctions: on December 31, Germany announced entry bans for nine indivi­duals deemed primarily respon­sible for violence against protesters and opposition members in Georgia, empha­sizing the importance of protecting the universal right to peaceful protest.
• EU sanctions: The European Commission has proposed suspending parts of the EU-Georgia Visa Facili­tation Agreement, requiring Georgian diplomats, officials, and their families to obtain visas for short stays in the EU. The move, set for a Council vote in January, is also intended as a response to violent crack­downs on peaceful protesters and independent media, as well as anti-democratic legis­lation such as the foreign agents law and the anti-LGBT laws passed in 2024. Noting that Georgian citizens with ordinary passports would retain visa-free travel privi­leges, the proposal highlights Georgia’s “serious democratic backsliding,” which has stalled its EU accession process and drawn warnings from the European Council. Hungary and Slovakia have threa­tened to block any further joint sanctions.

As is evident, there has been no unified inter­na­tional response in the form of sanctions on Georgian Dream officials and law enforcers, as well as propa­gan­dists and enablers. Many sanctions have been imposed bilate­rally by various states. This lack of a unified approach risks embol­dening the GD regime and signalling a lack of Western commitment to democracy in the region.

Geopo­li­tical stakes: the risk of a new iron curtain

Georgia’s descent into autho­ri­ta­rianism has impli­ca­tions far beyond its borders. A failure of domestic and inter­na­tional efforts to prevent a further conso­li­dation of power by the GD regime could result in the following:

• Russian influence: Georgia risks becoming a satellite state of Moscow, which would reduce the impact of sanctions and give Russia greater control over the Black Sea region.
• European security: a desta­bi­lized Georgia would jeopardize the EU’s influence in the Southern Caucasus, weakening its geopo­li­tical position and creating further risks for Armenia.
• Democratic values: a failure to support Georgian Democrats would set a dangerous precedent, encou­raging autho­ri­tarian regimes worldwide. The defenders of democracy in Georgia, such as civil society groups, media repre­sen­ta­tives, and opposition politi­cians, would be forced to live with the risk of detention or flee the country.

Recom­men­da­tions: a call to action

1. Recognize the crisis and de-legitimize the GD regime

The inter­na­tional community must acknow­ledge the severity of Georgia’s democratic backsliding. This includes unequi­vo­cally rejecting the legitimacy of the October 2024 elections and the GD-controlled parliament and government. It would also entail refraining from any bilateral meetings with GD officials and the withdra­wal/non-issuance of invita­tions to high-level events. The action of this kind has been taken in two cases: Poland rescinded an invitation to the COSAC confe­rence, a signi­ficant European parlia­mentary event, that it had extended to Georgia on 6 December 2024, and the President of the OSCE’s Parlia­mentary Assembly postponed her visit to Georgia on 6 January 2024.

Further steps in this direction would include not accepting the creden­tials of Georgian MPs at the Parlia­mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in January 2025, not inviting Georgian Dream leadership to the Davos Forum and Munich Security Confe­rence and refusing agréments to the appointment of Georgian ambassadors to NATO and the UN and to the following states – Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Nether­lands, Slovakia, Spain, Switz­erland, United Kingdom and USA. (The fact that there are ambassa­dorial vacancies in so many EU countries testifies, among other things, to the Georgian Dream’s attitude towards its relations with the EU.)

2. Push for new elections and release of political prisoners

The Western powers must make a concerted effort to pressure Bidzina Ivanishvili into dispelling the ongoing political crisis by releasing all political prisoners and calling new elections, by means of a series of diplo­matic visits, phone calls, or public state­ments. It must be made clear that there will be no business as usual unless the Georgian Dream regime complies with these requests. Futile calls for dialogue or the standard diplo­matic language of “calling on all sides” is useless and is used by the Georgian Dream propa­ganda machinery to strengthen its positions, showing that the West is weak and that the democratic forces in Georgia are losing the stand-off.

3. Support democratic forces in Georgia

The EU Member States must continue providing political, financial, and logistical support to Georgian civil society organiza­tions, independent media, and opposition groups. While many EU states and the EU have made official state­ments about withdrawing government support and redirecting the funds to other actors, no concrete steps have been taken so far.

Furthermore, action to facilitate inter­na­tional platforms that enable Georgian democratic forces to voice their concerns and engage with global policy­makers is essential. This could include inviting Georgian opposition leaders, including President Salome Zoura­bichvili, to high-level inter­na­tional events and supporting them diplo­ma­ti­cally and politi­cally through bilateral visits, calls and courtesy events.

4. Impose targeted sanctions

The current crisis can only be dispelled if the calculus for Bidzina Ivanishvili changes and he realizes that increased isolation is going to hit him finan­cially and cause his support to crumble. Sanctions are the only viable instrument through which to achieve this. Therefore, the Western states must expand sanctions against the GD officials and those of their associates who have been involved in electoral fraud and human rights abuses.

The EU member states, bilate­rally or at the EU level, should target Bidzina Ivanishvili and his assets, as the United States has already done. However, additional indivi­duals and groups in the proximity of Mr. Ivanishvili can be targeted as well. These groups include:

• Police officers who bear false witness: This will undermine the current vicious cycle on which the arrest and mistre­atment of the protesters is based. Police officers routinely give false testimony in the courts, claiming that they were respon­sible for arresting protesters when, in reality, the protesters were arrested and beaten by personnel from the special tasks department. The courts never pay attention to the fact that the body cameras worn by the police officers were offline, despite the requi­rement that they be on during the arrests. This system of false witnesses is coordi­nated by the legal unit of the Patrol Police Department of the Interior Ministry.
• Heads of units of the Special Tasks Department: The Western partners should impose travel bans on the mid-level leadership of the Special Tasks Department, which is notorious for the use of excessive force, illegally detaining the protesters, and treating them inhumanly. At least one high-level Department head has resigned and fled the country; therefore, his testimony could be instru­mental in the creation of such lists.
• Georgian Dream propa­gan­dists: Target the indivi­duals who disse­minate state propa­ganda that under­mines democracy. The state propa­ganda is channeled primarily through the broad­casters Imedi TV and PosTV, as well as the Georgian Public Broad­caster and Rustavi 2. These TV stations have been instru­mental in spreading anti-Western propa­ganda, promoting hatred towards the West, justi­fying violence by the GD, and demonizing democracy defenders, as well as spreading anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian messages. Imposing travel bans and financial sanctions on them would seriously undermine their credi­bility in Georgia and would serve as a cold shower for many propa­gan­dists, such as Irakli Rukhadze, who is a British citizen and runs several companies in the UK.
• Political council: Sanctions similar to those under the Magnitsky Act or the measures against Bidzina Ivanishvili could also be extended to the members of Georgian Dream’s political council. As well as being of symbolic importance, this would create a serious wedge within the GD leadership, which is respon­sible for the country’s democratic backsliding and crackdown on the peaceful protesters.
• GD-affiliated businesses: Bidzina Ivanishvili and his family’s business empire have not yet been targeted in the West. The Kartu Group (including the Kartu Bank), its leadership, and the construction businesses owned by Ivanishvili’s family members have avoided sanctions so far. The imposition of targeted financial sanctions on these indivi­duals would seriously undermine the financial support for the Georgian Dream and would serve as a serious warning for the Georgian business community.

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